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The making of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) occupied 
the energy and attention of world powers, great and small, from the Irish Resolution’s 
proposal at the United Nations General Assembly in 1958 to the treaty’s entry into force 
in 1970. Accounts of why the international community fashioned a treaty whose articles 
and principles embody a tangle of self-contradictory rights, privileges, and obligations 
point to United States and Soviet hegemony, the rise of Soviet-American détente, or the 
intrinsic dangers of nuclear weapons. In contrast to these interpretations, this dissertation 
claims that the negotiation and achievement of the NPT was a contingent event whose 
course and content were shaped by a jumble of entangled causes: Cold War alliances, 
domestic politics, decolonization, the Vietnam War, and a schism in internationalist 
thought.  
 
The common impulse, however, was the perceived need to bring order to the Nuclear 
Age amid recurrent crises whose outbreak threatened global conflict if the spread of 
nuclear weapons continued unabated. In the contexts of the Cold War and 
decolonization, the establishment of a global nuclear order required Soviet-American 
 xiv 
cooperation in concert with the involvement of an international community then 
emerging from decolonization. Both were embodied in the cadre of arms control 
diplomats then working in Geneva and New York City. 
 
In the final analysis, the Cold War obstructed more than it abetted the treaty’s brokering 
and Soviet-American détente was more the result of international nuclear diplomacy than 
its cause. The Vietnam War both limited U.S. willingness to contemplate nuclear 
assurances requested by nuclear have-nots and the underlying reason that U.S. President 
Lyndon Johnson sacrificed a NATO multilateral nuclear force for the sake of an NPT in 
an effort to quiet antiwar dissent at home. Soviet-American cooperation was necessary 
but not sufficient to achieve the treaty. The failure of initial efforts, the international 
consensus required to legitimate the treaty, and concurrent talks for a Latin American 
nuclear-free zone allowed nuclear have-nots to inscribe their preferences on the NPT, 
whose fusion of a nuclear hierarchy and a grand bargain remains an open chapter in the 
history of nuclear internationalism.  
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 1 
Introduction | Crisis, Contingency, and Consensus 
On July 4, 1967, William C. Foster, the Director of the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), spoke before a crowd of American and Swiss 
partygoers, who had gathered to celebrate the United States’ national holiday on the 
Champel stadium grounds in Geneva, Switzerland. The afternoon was full of pieces of 
Americana—gallivanting children, softball games, popcorn, pony rides, even a carousel. 
The local newspaper reported that the scene seemed more like one out of “Ohio or New 
Jersey than the city of Calvin.”1 Foster spent much of his year in Geneva serving a co-
chairman of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament alongside his Soviet 
counterpart at the Palais des Nations, the former home of the League of Nations. He 
joked that his family were akin to the proverbial “man who came to dinner–here we are 
nine years later,” still working at “the slowest-moving enterprise on Earth”—
disarmament. The toil of disarmament talks went on in Geneva, he observed, “in spite of 
Vietnam and the Middle East Crisis.” As a result another advance was in the works—
“the tabling of a draft treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.” Though 
an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, the world’s two rival 
superpowers and nuclear colossi, would take another six months to coalesce, Foster’s 
hopeful statement that “it may well make life on Earth less dangerous and open new 
opportunities for further arms control and disarmament” would not abate. He likened the 
slow process of building consensus to the fate of his country’s founding document: 
I read the other day that after Thomas Jefferson had completed his original draft 
for the American Declaration of Independence, 86 changes had to be made 
before it could be adopted. My American colleagues and I can personally testify 
                                                
1 “Commémoration de l’Independence Day à Genève, Champel, USA,” 5 July 1967, Journal de Genève, 
Archives Historiques, Le Temps, http://www.letempsarchives.ch. 
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that that number of changes seems small compared to those on our non-
proliferation treaty so far. 
The lived experience of multilateral diplomacy was doubtlessly tedious, but the onus was 
equally weighty. With the children laughing and the adults on their second or third 
cocktail, the fearsome peril of thermonuclear war seemed far off over some unearthly 
horizon. Foster wished the crowd a “happy anniversary” and left them to enjoy “the 
peaceful explosions of a fireworks display.”2 
 
Description of the Subject of Inquiry  
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) would not open 
for signature for another year, on July 1, 1968, following “one of the most complex 
negotiations in the history of diplomacy extending over a period a four-and-a-half years 
and involving most of the major countries in the world”3 In truth, the origins of the treaty 
went even further back to the first proposal in September 1958 by Irish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Frank Aiken of a global arrangement to shutter the doors of the nuclear 
club. The thirteen paragraphs of its preamble and the eleven articles comprising its 
operative body inscribed the governing principles of an international body of laws, norms, 
and institutions that still governs efforts at controlling the military uses of nuclear science 
and technology around the world. Today, the NPT remains arguably the most 
consequential, and controversial, agreement of the postwar era in the field of nuclear 
conflict, security, and peace. 
                                                
2 William C. Foster, Address, “July 4, 1967,” Geneva, Folder 1, Box 18, William C. Foster Papers, George 
C. Marshall Library, Lexington Virginia, 1-5. Hereinafter, Foster Papers, GCML.  
3 U.S. National Security Council, “History of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Box 55, National 
Security Council Histories—Non-Proliferation Treaty, National Security Files, Lyndon Baines Johnson 
Library and Archives. Hereinafter, NSF, LBJL.  
 3 
Present-day discourse on the topic of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the 
global regime that it inaugurated centering on the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) are rent by clashing theses in regards to the original understandings ascribed to 
the treaty. This argument seemingly without end pits the regime’s champions against 
those who criticize it as inherently unfair and hence in need of revision, or, more fatally, 
at risk of unraveling.4  
Treaty champions laud its function as a crucial dampener by which to retard and 
potentially halt, if not reverse, the trend for nuclear weapons to “proliferate” to new 
nation-states. Since the “ultimate weapon’s” invention in 1945, more and more states 
have indeed acquired the science, technology, and organization necessary to develop a 
military nuclear capability.5 The Soviet Union followed the United States in 1949. Great 
Britain and France tested their first atomic devices in 1952 and 1960, respectively. The 
detonation of a nuclear explosive by the People’s Republic of China seemed to jolt 
international nuclear diplomacy out of a state of lethargy in 1964. And since the date 
chosen to divide legitimate nuclear powers from their illegitimate brethren, January 1, 
1967, five more countries have joined the nuclear club: Israel around 1968, India in 
1974, South Africa around 1977, Pakistan in 1998, and North Korea in 2009. Ukraine, 
Belorussia, and Kazakhstan became arguably the ninth, tenth, and eleventh nuclear 
powers when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, leaving numerous Soviet nuclear-
armed missiles on their territory. The NPT has therefore not completely stopped the 
arrival of new nuclear powers. Treaty champions nevertheless point to, as proof of the 
regime’s efficacy and legitimacy, the decreasing frequency of proliferation, sizable 
                                                
4 Steven E. Miller, Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (Cambridge, Mass.: 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2012). 
5 Thomas C. Reed, The Nuclear Express: a Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation (Minneapolis: Zenith 
Press, 2009). 
 4 
reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, the negotiation of a comprehensive 
nuclear-test ban treaty (CTBT) in 1996, the decisions of Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, 
and South Africa to relinquish their arsenals, and the treaty’s near universality.  
Treaty critics denounce its discriminatory character, charging that it represents a 
tool of superpower and, since 1991, United States hegemony. They claim that the 
nonproliferation regime empowers and even rewards certain states, the “nuclear haves,” 
that possess these weapons of mass destruction, while punishing other states, the “nuclear 
have-nots,” for availing themselves of nuclear activities whose dual-use functions make 
distinguishing their military potentialities from their peaceful applications at best a 
dubious and fraught proposition. Moreover, the co-evolution of proliferation strategies 
and nonproliferation tactics since the regime’s establishment have led to additional, non-
consensus measures to supplement the regime including supply-side controls such as the 
Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group as well as expansions of the 
IAEA’s inspection powers through the voluntary 1997 Additional Protocol.6 These 
initiatives, which were not envisaged by the NPT nor all subject to the treaty’s 
amendment process, have prompted disgruntled states in the Global South to accuse 
nuclear suppliers, mostly advanced industrial states, of forming a “nuclear cartel.”7 The 
debate is further freighted with postcolonial grievances owing to a general 
superimposition of the world geography of nuclear haves and have-nots with the old 
imperial map of former empires and their erstwhile colonies. In this vein, treaty critics 
                                                
6 For a description and analysis of the international mechanisms designed to fortify the nonproliferation 
regime in the aftermath of India’s peaceful nuclear test in 1974, read: Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The 
History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
7 See Jayantha Dhanapala, “The Management of NPT Diplomacy,” in American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, “The Global Nuclear Future. Volume 2. Volume 2.” (2010). 
 5 
often characterize the discriminatory treaty and regime as antithetical to disarmament 
(whether nuclear, or general and complete) and tantamount to “nuclear apartheid.”8 
In their ongoing debates over its present legitimacy and future trajectory, 
champions and critics invoke the history of the nonproliferation treaty to substantiate 
their claims. The original intents of the treaty’s many authors and, correspondingly, the 
original meanings imprinted in its articles and preamble, as well as the grander original 
understanding embodied by the treaty itself, are central though somewhat hidden subjects 
in these debates. Though new histories of nuclear programs in various national contexts 
have arisen as previously unavailable primary sources came on-line, our comprehension 
of the NPT’s origins are still largely the province of eyewitness accounts, legal exegeses, 
national and international mythology, and analyses in which the treaty is a corollary 
rather than a focus of U.S. foreign policy and international efforts.  
This dissertation constitutes an early effort at untangling the knot of the treaty’s 
legal and historical characters. Its methods and purpose accordingly draw inspiration 
from another study of a foundational constitutional moment, albeit it in a context more 
familiar to Thomas Jefferson than to William Foster, Jack Rakove’s Original Meanings: 
Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution.9 In light of the fundamental and abiding 
dissimilarities between national and international politics, however, the intellectual debt is 
chiefly one of inspiration rather than argumentation.  
 
                                                
8 Shane J. Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010). 
9 Jack N Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (New York: Vintage Books, 
1997). 
 6 
Review of the Existing Literature 
The historiography of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and its surrounding 
international political context began almost as soon as the ink on the first signatures were 
dry. The U.S. debate over ratification as a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in August 1968, the Indian refusal to sign, and the treaty’s undeniable importance led a 
number of international relations experts and diplomatic participants to weigh in on the 
treaty’s merits and possible effects.10 The likelihood that Brazil or India would sign was a 
major subject of inquiry.11 The attitude of Japan and the related commercial impact of 
international nuclear safeguards also received sustained attention.12 Articles in law review 
journals and by diplomats who helped write the treaty, such as George Bunn and E. L. 
M. Burns, signified early salvoes in the battle to define the NPT’s original meanings and 
understandings. Two books by international relations scholar George Quester were 
representative of another branch of this initial wave of scholarship, which by contrast 
focused on explaining the treaty’s immediate aftermath and future prospects and whose 
claims regarding its causes and motives largely extrapolated from the contemporaneous 
                                                
10 Michael E. Sherman, Nuclear Proliferation: The Treaty and After, Contemporary Affairs 40 (Toronto: 
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Treaty,” Quadrant 12 (June 1968): 25–29; Mason Willrich, “The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons: Nuclear Technology Confronts World Politics,” Yale Law Journal (July 1968): 1447–1519; Atoms in 
Japan (Tokyo: Japan Industrial Forum, Inc., 1969); E. L. M. Burns, “The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its 
Negotiation and Prospects,” International Organization 23, no. 04 (October 1969): 788–807; R. Ramo Rao, 
“The Non-Proliferation Treaty,” The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal I (July 1968): 12–29; 
Alexander Alexeev, “Non-Proliferation Treaty and Security,” International Affairs (Moscow) (January 1969): 
10–14; Alexander Alexeev, “Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Non-Nuclear States,” International Affairs 
(Moscow) (March 1969): 9–13; Edwin Brown Firmage, “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons,” The American Journal of International Law 63, no. 4 (October 1969): 711. 
11 G. G. Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968); Shelton L. 
Williams, The U.S., India, and the Bomb (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969); R. Narayanan, “Brazil’s 
Policy Toward Nuclear Disarmament,” The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal 3 (October 1970): 
178–91; H. Jon Rosenbaum and Glenn Cooper, “Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” 
International Affairs 46 (January 1970): 74–90. 
12 Atoms in Japan; Lawrence Scheinman, “Nuclear Safeguards, the Peaceful Atom, and the IAEA,” 
Interational Conciliation 572 (March 1969); Imai Ryukichi, “The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Japan,” Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists (May 1969). 
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state of play.13 Nonetheless, Quester’s work, in particular The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation, 
had a global compass of evaluation from which later studies have largely shied away. 
Robert Chalmer’s The Nuclear Years also warrants inclusion as a useful primer.14  
 The second wave of interpretations about the treaty focused more narrowly on the 
development of U.S. nonproliferation policy under the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations and was written primarily by its authors. This group of works is thus 
doubly significant because it contains the opinions and recollections of those present at 
the creation and because it establishes the orthodox interpretation of the NPT. 
Collectively, these works associate the treaty with the series of U.S. proposals in the field 
of nuclear diplomacy beginning with the 1946 Baruch Plan and portray the effort as 
singularly motivated by “the overhanging threat of nuclear holocaust.”15 In the host of 
the principal architects of U.S. nuclear policy under Kennedy and Johnson who penned 
works in which the NPT was a central topic stood National Security Adviser McGeorge 
Bundy, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg, and General Counsel 
to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency George Bunn.16 Bunn’s Managing 
Negotiations with the Russians is an indispensable reference for the activities of the 
Disarmament Agency whose interactions with Soviet officials constituted the most active 
channel of Soviet-American contact during the Johnson years. Seaborg’s Stemming the Tide: 
Arms Control in the Johnson Years makes effective use of the voluminous diary kept religiously 
                                                
13 George H. Quester and the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Nuclear Diplomacy; the 
First Twenty-five Years, University Press of Cambridge Series in the Social Sciences (New York: Dunellen Co, 
1970); George H. Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1973). 
14 Robert Chalmers, The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-1970 (New York: Praeger, 1970). 
15 Glenn T. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 
1987), 5. 
16 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, 1st ed (New York: 
Random House, 1988); Seaborg, Stemming the Tide; George Bunn, Arms Control by Committee: Managing 
Negotiations with the Russians, Studies in International Security and Arms Control (Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press, 1992). 
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by the AEC chairman. Though light on interpretation, the window it affords on the 
multiagency and multi-branch policymaking process in Washington is priceless.  
 Two members of non-aligned delegations to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 
Disarmament also published book-length assessments of its workings and achievements. 
Seaborg dedicates Stemming the Tide to the memory of Alva Myrdal, which testifies to 
Seaborg’s conviction that the NPT was “by its own terms, a treaty on trial,” as well as the 
long shadow cast by her figure. Myrdal was one of the nonproliferation treaty’s most 
formidable critics and a foremost champion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Her The 
Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race appeared in 1982, 
before the outpouring of U.S. quasi-official volumes; however, its arguments belong in a 
revisionist school of thinking about the treaty and postwar American nuclear policy more 
broadly.17 Myrdal’s call to disarm was not direct kin to an emerging body of revisionist 
works critical of the motivations at play in the atom bomb’s use against Japan by the 
United States and in the 1946 Baruch Plan to enact international control of nuclear 
power.18 Her judgment that the NPT fell “short of all reasonable expectations as a 
disarmament measure” and formed a “grossly discriminatory treaty” nonetheless 
harmonized with revisionism’s skeptical tone.19 Mohamed Shaker’s multi-volume The 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation, 1959-1979 cataloged the 
international proceedings from which the NPT arose. Shaker, a junior member of the 
                                                
17 Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States & Russia Run the Arms Race, Rev. and updated 
ed. – 2nd pbk. ed (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982). 
18 Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam; the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American 
Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); Barton Bernstein, “The Quest for 
Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946,” The Journal of 
American History 60, no. 4 (March 1974): 1003–1044; Barton Bernstein, “Roosevelt, Truman, and the 
Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation,” Political Science Quarterly 90, no. 1 (Spring 1975): 23–69; 
Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance, 1st ed (New York: Knopf : 
distributed by Random House, 1975); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 
1945-1950 (New York: Vintage Books, 1982). 
19 Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament, 159–207. 
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United Arab Republic delegation in Geneva, had to rely on published sources; even so, 
his work has stood the test of time as a foundational text on the treaty’s legal history, 
though Daniel Joyner’s Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an important recent 
supplement.20 
 Mrydal, Shaker, and Joyner do not concern themselves overmuch with the 
determinants of various states’ nuclear policymaking in relation to the treaty negotiations. 
The attitudes and policies of key nuclear and near-nuclear states, and international 
agencies, toward a nonproliferation treaty with reference to latent or active military 
nuclear programs was the primary focus of scholarly attention in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The arms control policies of Canada, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and IAEA 
received sustained treatment.21 A cottage industry of new national nuclear histories 
meanwhile shed critical light on the bureaucratic, techno-political, ideological, and 
geopolitical determinants of nuclear-weapon programs, including India and Pakistan after 
their back-to-back military tests in 1998.22 Though only secondarily interested in 
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(Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2012); Mark Cioc, 
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international nuclear diplomacy, these works immeasurably expanded our knowledge of 
the nuclear decision-making process in important states. George Perkovich’s India’s 
Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation and Feroz Khan’s recent Eating Grass: The 
Making of the Pakistani Bomb offer especially fruitful insights into how both South Asian 
states perceived efforts to negotiate a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and 
then responded to its implementation. In fact, the NPT’s negotiation and enforcement 
seems a constant actor always just off stage in both works.  
 The appearance of such compelling and exhaustive histories of the British, Soviet, 
French, Chinese, Indian, and, more recently, Pakistani nuclear programs paralleled the 
track of a new interpretive school in Cold War and nuclear history. The post-revisionist 
synthesis posited that the Soviet-American conflict’s ebbs and flows stemmed from the 
international balance of power and, more specifically, the German question: the East-
West confrontation over the status of the two Germanys and whether and how to 
normalize their status in the international system. In these reading, nuclear deterrence 
exerted a moderating influence on superpower relations. The outcome, according to John 
Lewis Gaddis, Marc Trachtenberg, and others, was a “long peace” based on the balance 
of terror, an extraterrestrial network of surveillance satellites, and a tacit resolution of the 
German question with the erection of the Berlin Wall and the fossilization of West 
Germany’s non-nuclear status by virtue of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.23 The NPT 
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was accordingly a continuation of the effort to bind Bonn’s hands in the nuclear realm 
and further Soviet-American détente so as to avert thermonuclear conflict. Susanna 
Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge’s Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the 
Struggle for Nuclear Proliferation, 1945-1970 exemplifies the usefulness of this analytical lens 
for discerning the hidden political assumptions at work in trans-Atlantic nuclear 
diplomacy in the early Cold War.24 
 The investigation of Cold War nuclear diplomacy has increasingly shifted toward 
the Global South in response to new sources and contemporary interest in how countries 
in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America have historically viewed and 
interacted with the process. The new international history has enriched rather than 
devalued the post-revisionist consensus. On the one hand, documents from archives in 
the former Eastern bloc have fortified claims related to Soviet expansionism.25 On the 
other hand, new sources have disputed the centrality of the Soviet-American relationship 
by exploring its connections to other tectonic shifts that took place in world affairs 
concurrently such as decolonization, international finance, regional rivalries, global 
governance, and human rights.26 Efforts to de-center the Cold War have benefited from 
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the efforts of scholars and researchers working under the auspices of the Cold War 
International History Project and the National Security Archive, who have unearthed 
enlightening documents from U.S. archives, those of former Warsaw Pact countries, and 
those of the wider world. Many scholars of the Cold War have accordingly taken up 
Tony Smith’s injunction to study the epic struggle using a pericentric framework in which 
“governments of countries such as North Korea and China, East and West Germany, 
Great Britain and Israel, Egypt and Cuba (as well as movements as different as the PLO 
and the Sandinistas) … had principal roles to play.”27 Our understanding of the NPT 
would be equally impoverished if we failed to account for the contributions of these 
middle and small powers; it was, after all, an Irish foreign minister who first put forward a 
non-dissemination compact and a Mexican deputy foreign minister who added articles to 
the NPT calling for disarmament progress and preserving nuclear rights. 
Though the study of international nonproliferation diplomacy is amenable to a 
pericentric framework, the roles played by U.S. presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon 
Baines Johnson, and their national security teams, remain central. Shane Maddock’s 
Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present 
recasts the revisionist thesis by underscoring how habits of thought molded by cultural 
representations of race, national identity, and technology blinkered U.S. foreign 
policymakers. Though a weighty new interpretation of the cultural determinants of U.S. 
nuclear diplomacy, the argument grows less compelling once the breakdown of the 
bipolar Cold War order in the 1960s curtails the freedom with which American leaders 
can impose their preferences on the international system. Articles by Hal Brands on the 
NPT and the multilateral nuclear force, by contrast, capture how alliance relationships 
                                                
27 Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” 
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impeded nuclear cooperation between the superpowers during the Johnson presidency.28 
Scholars have previously examined the complex and dynamic relationship between West 
Germany, NATO nuclear-sharing, nuclear diplomacy, and Soviet-American détente in 
which Bonn’s pursuit of nuclear assets for security and political ends blocked the 
convergence of Soviet and American views on nuclear security.29 However, the question 
of what cleared the obstruction remains? Francis Gavin’s article in International Security 
evaluating the Gilpatric Committee on Nuclear Proliferation conclusively demonstrates 
how “[u]nder President Lyndon Johnson, the United States transformed its nuclear 
strategy.”30 His observation raises additional questions though. Why did the Gilpatric 
committee’s findings take so long to influence the decision-making process? Against what, 
or whom, was the strategy directed: the spread of nuclear weapons as the abstract menace 
outlined by nuclear strategists or, as Dane Swango has recently argued, chiefly West 
Germany and India? What do the answers to these questions have to say about Soviet-
American détente, the making of the NPT, and the legacy of Johnson’s foreign policy? 
Lastly, the significance of domestic politics, social turmoil, and internationalist principles, 
which the treaty makers and orthodox writers took for granted, has now vanished from 
accounts. Jeremi Suri maintains that détente was orchestrated by global elites so as to 
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permit them the latitude to quell internal dissent.31 How did social change affect the first 
manifestation of détente—the NPT? Is it possible to understand the signature triumph of 
postwar nuclear diplomacy without reference to the Vietnam-era peace movement, the 
social milieu of arms control, or the tenets of liberal internationalism?  
 
Summary of the Argument 
The making of the nonproliferation treaty and the creation of a new global 
nuclear order was the rare case in which a new international order was founded in 
peacetime rather than as a result of a major war.32 Its origins stemmed from an evolving 
understanding of the relationship between international laws, norms, and institutions and 
the revolution in strategic space-time brought on by the advent of thermonuclear 
warheads and ballistic missiles. The endurance of Cold War alliances and interests 
nonetheless slowed the pace at which Soviet and American policymakers could broker a 
nonproliferation treaty, while the Vietnam War militated against a U.S. offer of robust 
security assurances requested by India in exchange for its continued forbearance. The 
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concurrent negotiation of a Latin American nuclear-free-zone, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 
the activities of the international community in Geneva and New York City, and 
domestic pressures on Johnson to bring his signature peace initiative to fruition supplied 
the impetus to finalize the treaty. The pull of the Cold War and the combined push of a 
nascent international community and non-aligned efforts resulted in a the final treaty in 
whose original meanings Wilsonian tenets such as sovereign equality of states were more 
clearly enshrined than Soviet or American leaders would otherwise have preferred. In its 
paradoxical fusion of deterrence and disarmament, however, the treaty set new and 
meaningful precedents. International policymakers noted from the start that the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons authorized an international hierarchy 
based on the founding principle that distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate 
nuclear powers were valid and enforceable.    
A series of crises with nuclear overtones catalyzed the international effort to bring 
order to the Nuclear Age. Beginning with the Second Taiwan Straits crisis in August 
1958, the international community emerging in the midst of decolonization sought to 
ward off the risks attending nuclear anarchy through a portfolio of international 
prohibitions on environmental contamination and limitations on the diffusion of nuclear 
science, know-how, technology, data, and arms. The antinuclear movement and a 
dawning recognition among Soviet and American leaders after the Cuban Missile Crisis 
that regional instability could lead to all-out thermonuclear war lent impetus to 
negotiations for a nuclear-test ban treaty. However, Soviet unwillingness to open its 
territory to international inspections combined with both sides’ abiding interest in 
improving their nuclear forces spoke against a comprehensive solution. Instead, the U.S., 
U.K., and U.S.S.R. brokered a limited nuclear test-ban treaty (LTBT) prohibiting the 
detonation of nuclear explosives under water, in outer space, or in the global commons. 
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The settlement displayed a sovereign conception of environmental regulation by 
specifically banning the release of the harmful radioisotopes that crossed national borders. 
The compact moreover failed to end nuclear testing. The United States and Soviet Union 
took their tests underground and China and France conducted them aboveground in 
defiance of international norms. Nevertheless, the LTBT ushered in a new phase of 
international nuclear diplomacy during which the superpowers had a concerted interest 
in staving off the arrival of new nuclear states irrespective of alliance affiliation.  
The establishment of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961 
and the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in 1962 during the 
presidency of John F. Kennedy added new institutional and social mechanisms for 
constructive nuclear diplomacy in the United States and the world. Washington’s 
adoption of a new strategic culture in which nuclear scenarios were highly abstracted 
encouraged a zero-sum approach to nuclear diplomacy. The concept of strategic stability 
informed U.S. nuclear strategy though it failed to account for the challenges posed by 
proliferation. Its proponents nevertheless sought to reconcile their belief in the systemic 
advantages of balanced nuclear threats with the corollary that new states would seek 
nuclear weapons to assure their own security. The result was a coherent yet self-
contradictory way of thinking about nuclear weapons inside the Beltway that fused realist 
assumptions and internationalist methods and upheld nuclear deterrence while 
promoting arms control. This strategy of security internationalism owed as much to the 
thinking of Reinhold Niebuhr as Thomas Schelling and became the polestar of efforts by 
William Foster and the U.S. Disarmament Agency to broker a nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty from July 1963 to July 1968.  
The Cold War alliance system retarded progress toward a Soviet-American 
agreement on the content of a nonproliferation treaty. The political implications of 
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European nuclear security were the crux of the dilemma. In the West, the controversy 
revolved around a proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) in NATO to soothe 
West German anxieties in regards to U.S. nuclear commitments in Europe and Bonn’s 
political capital amid European integration. In the East, Warsaw Pact misgivings related 
to empowering the West Germans in future negotiations to resolve the German question. 
The Soviet and American co-chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 
Disarmament in Geneva discussed the merits of an entente with a nonproliferation treaty 
at its core. However, European relations impinged on the superpowers’ freedom and 
willingness to accept costs in Europe to minimize risks in the Middle East and Asia. The 
moment of inertia occurred at a pivotal moment when a looming nuclear test by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) converged with a commitment to nuclear prohibitions 
in the Republic of India. This state of affairs opened a window for a more widely adhered 
to, and qualitatively different, nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The failure to achieve a 
treaty in 1963 and 1965 thus bore witness to the power of contingency in nuclear 
diplomacy and the continued pull of European geopolitics during the mid-Cold War.  
Soviet and American negotiators redoubled their efforts to orchestrate a treaty 
after the Chinese test. The effect on Indian nuclear policy was equally consequential. 
Nuclear prohibitionists at the heights of government barely succeeded in fending off a 
potent challenge to a longstanding policy of nuclear forbearance. The Chinese feat 
galvanized the arms control cabal inside the Beltway, whose constituents in the U.S. 
Congress, Department of State, National Security Council, Department of Defense, 
Disarmament Agency, and a blue-ribbon committee to advise on the matter sought to 
elevate the status of nonproliferation, and of nuclear prohibitions more generally, in U.S. 
grand strategy. Security assurances, either negative (pledges not to use nuclear weapons 
against non-nuclear states), or positive (promises to aid non-nuclear victims of nuclear 
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attack or threat), were a major consideration of states contemplating the step of formally 
renouncing a right to nuclear weapons. Indian nuclear policy remained open to a 
nonproliferation regime that featured robust security assurances from the superpowers 
along with a CTBT and a general cut-off in fissile-material production (enriched uranium 
and plutonium) needed to build nuclear warheads. The Vietnam War lessened the 
desirability of placing limits of U.S. nuclear choices in the view of military officials though 
and toughened Soviet attitudes toward cooperating with the United States in Geneva.  
By late 1966, the Cold War rivals had largely resolved the question of finessing 
what forms of NATO nuclear-sharing a settlement would permit. However, the problem 
of the Indian attitude toward signing a treaty had worsened. Domestic politics in the 
context of the Vietnam War provided the decisive impulse that persuaded Lyndon 
Johnson that a nonproliferation treaty was more important and achievable than the MLF, 
whose support in the United Kingdom had evaporated and whose creation the French 
had always opposed. With opinion polls reflecting a trust deficit in the U.S. electorate in 
regards to Johnson’s peace credentials, and Robert Kennedy and others identifying 
themselves with a more dovish outlook, White House political advisers convinced the 
president to embrace a treaty acceptable to Soviet leaders as a peace gesture before the 
1966 mid-term elections. With the Soviets and Americans still deadlocked on the non-
acquisition and non-dissemination articles, however, the non-aligned grouping in Geneva 
orchestrated a United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for a treaty “to 
embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear 
and non-nuclear Powers.”33 
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The negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva 
were not the only epicenters of international nuclear diplomacy in the late 1960s. Talks 
for a treaty to denuclearize Latin American occurred in parallel, both complementing the 
process and shifting the parameters of global accord. Championed and engineered by 
Mexican Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alfonso García Robles, the movement to 
cordon off the rest of the Western Hemisphere from the hazards of nuclear weapons 
demonstrated the global scope of efforts at nuclear prohibition and the significance of 
memories of the Second World War, the imagined repercussions of nuclear war for the 
global commons and succeeding generations, and the guidance of internationalist 
principles. The talks in Mexico in the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 
February 1967, whose content manifested a less adulterated version of nuclear 
prohibition thanks to the region’s lack of nuclear powers and the exemplary tradition 
promoted by Bolivarian internationalism. U.S. anticommunism, insistence on its nuclear 
weapons’ freedom of transit in the Caribbean and through the Panama Canal, and fear of 
setting precedents with regard to peaceful nuclear explosives long touted by the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission obstructed and nearly upended the hemispheric enterprise.  
The Latin American nuclear-free-zone talks had a measurable impact on 
nonproliferation proceedings in Geneva and New York City. The resumption of the 
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in late February 1967 was nevertheless 
hampered by continuing disagreement concerning the appropriate formal relationship 
between the safeguards regimes of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Ad referendum talks benefited from the close 
personal relationships that had flourished between Soviet and American diplomats in 
Geneva, helping to bring about the joint tabling of draft treaties by the superpower 
delegations in August 1967. Moscow and Washington were increasingly disillusioned with 
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the efficacy of their bilateral safeguards with Cold War allies; however, the fissiparous 
character of West German politics and Johnson’s unwillingness to exacerbate them 
delayed a final resolution until January 1968.  
Non-aligned delegations in Geneva seized on a draft treaty’s presentation to offer 
amendments intended to invest a global nuclear order with an acceptable balance of 
rights and obligations between nuclear haves and have-nots and industrial and developing 
countries. The triumph of the Treaty of Tlatelolco illustrated that non-aligned powers, 
including those in the Global South, could achieve meaningful agreements in the nuclear 
arena. A Mexican working paper outlined four new articles that envisaged formal rights 
to peaceful nuclear activities, nuclear explosives supplied by nuclear powers, and 
provisions that treaty signatories with nuclear weapons take seriously nuclear-free zones, 
arms control, and disarmament. These amendments would become Articles IV, V, VI, 
and VII of the treaty with lasting implications for the treaty’s character and legitimacy. 
The Mexican working paper as well as Sweden’s continued advocacy of a reference to a 
CTBT received widespread support from the non-aligned grouping at the ENDC. Soviet 
and American officials accordingly acquiesced to their incorporation into a full draft 
treaty. By contrast, Indian pleas for stronger assurances from Moscow, London, Paris, 
and Washington went unheeded. Superpower disagreement in regards to a non-use 
pledge’s application to Europe and U.S. reservations about expanding its military 
commitments, or limiting its nuclear options, in the context of the Vietnam War 
frustrated India’s diplomatic outreach.  
The Soviet and American co-chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Conference on 
Disarmament tabled a full draft nonproliferation treaty on January 18, 1968 to 
widespread astonishment. Numerous allies and non-aligned delegations requested a 
smattering of revisions to increase its flexibility, authorize periodic review conferences, 
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and strengthen the enumerated rights and non-binding disarmament provisions. These 
changes failed to mollify those states whose opposition to a treaty was by then 
irreconcilable in the absence of more robust security assurances, or an explicit right to 
indigenous development of peaceful nuclear explosives. Though the ENDC failed to 
endorse the treaty, U.N. General Assembly resolutions dictated the presentation of a 
nuclear nonproliferation treaty before the world assembly, which entitled the U.S. and 
Soviet delegations to table the revised document for consideration.  
The climate of opinion in New York City was less hospitable than anticipated, 
though treaty irreconcilables failed to organize an effective opposition. The superpowers 
directed their considerable powers of persuasion at near-nuclears and non-aligned states 
in the Global South while permitting a flurry of last-minute amendments and reassuring 
regional blocs that key countries such as Israel and South Africa would vote in favor. The 
result was a sufficiency of support and a treaty that delegations from such countries as 
Mexico, Sweden, Japan, Italy, and West Germany had for reasons of national interest 
and basic principle nudged closer to liberal internationalist principles such as the 
sovereign equality of states. France flirted with vetoing a critical security assurances 
resolution in the United Nations Security Council on account of its misgivings about 
discriminating among states based on their legal nuclear status and then empowering 
permanent members of the Security Council possessing nuclear weapons to enforce those 
distinctions.  
The debates at the United Nations in 1968 thus anticipated the ongoing disputes 
as to whether the NPT and the nonproliferation regime that it authorized were primarily 
intended to encapsulate a grand nuclear bargain, or to ward off the further spread of 
nuclear weapons. They also spoke to the question of whether the preferences inscribed in 
the treaty were necessary evils or grating injustices. The arc of the nonproliferation 
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treaty’s making substantiated both theses. For those who championed the regime as a 
crucial skein of international order in an otherwise anarchic world by which to manage 
these weapons of mass destruction, Foster was right to draw attention to nuclear have-
nots’ many contributions in inscribing original meanings of their choosing in the treaty’s 
preamble and body. For those who criticized a treaty for authorizing a nuclear cartel, or 
perpetuating “nuclear apartheid,” Soviet-American collaboration was a necessary and 
undeniable ingredient in the treaty’s drafting and achievement.  
An acknowledgement of how contingent, how undetermined if not unlikely was 
the conclusion of the nonproliferation treaty, can illuminate more clearly the original 
understandings that it represented. A nonproliferation bargain struck in 1963, or 1965, 
would have looked quite different from the collection of articles and principles at which 
the international community finally arrived in summer 1968. The superpowers evidently 
feared descending inadvertently yet ineluctably into an all-out thermonuclear war on 
account of their global web of alliance commitments. Yet, the realpolitik invoked by the 
German question’s resolution and Europe’s future more generally were just as 
consequential. The original intents of non-aligned authors were generally less self-
interested, but the positions espoused by Eastern and Western policymakers were often 
equally principled.  
The roles played by Alfonso García Robles and William Foster, for example, who 
viewed the proceedings from such distant vantage points, were illustrative. Both accepted 
that an imperfect and self-contradictory regime was preferable to nuclear anarchy. Both 
regarded the brokering of nuclear prohibitions as part and parcel of a protracted process 
of consensus-building and tough negotiations. The legitimacy of the global nuclear order 
depends on the continuation of that debate rather than its exhaustion. If international 
history bears out one axiom, it is that all things come to an end. The longevity of any 
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political arrangement that marries power to principle relies fundamentally on the airing 
of differences so as to build consensus over time.  
 
Summary of the Chapters 
A prologue recounts the circumstances and purpose of the Irish Resolutions 
advanced by Irish Foreign Minister Frank Aiken from 1958 to 1961, highlighting the 
catalytic effect of nuclear crises on his thinking and action. Chapter One discusses the 
establishment of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the intellectual 
and political development of a strategy of security internationalism and then explores 
prospects for a nuclear nonproliferation treaty after the Cuban Missile Crisis and before 
the first Chinese nuclear test with particular reference to India. The diplomatic middle 
ground of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament strengthened the hand of 
non-aligned and non-nuclear states in international nuclear diplomacy. Soviet overtures 
to embrace a nuclear condominium with the United States came to naught, however, 
given the preponderant focus assigned to Europe, and West Germany in particular, in 
1963 and 1964. The proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) in NATO became 
the locus of disputes between and within the Eastern and Western blocs regarding the 
content of a nonproliferation treaty’s non-acquisition and non-dissemination articles. The 
United States seriously contemplated attacks on Chinese nuclear facilities, even reaching 
out to Soviet officials to request their tacit acquiescence. In the wake of the test, Johnson 
outlined a vague promise to come to the aid of a nuclear victim; nonetheless, India sought 
to leverage its non-nuclear status into more credible assurances from both superpowers.   
Chapter Two continues the investigation of international nuclear diplomacy in 
the wake of the Chinese test and explains why the MLF project took precedence over the 
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NPT in U.S. nuclear policy despite the weight of pro-treaty support. It begins by 
chronicling the domestic reaction in India to the Chinese test and New Delhi’s efforts to 
make headway with the United States on security assurances and a more comprehensive 
package of nuclear prohibitions as the White House reviewed its nuclear policies in light 
of the new Asian security dynamic. The Vietnam War interfered with the provision of 
robust security assurances by the U.S. as well as Soviet-American cooperation in the field 
of nuclear diplomacy. Moscow called for a meeting of the hapless United Nations 
Disarmament Committee on account of the regrettable optics among communist states of 
treating with Washington amid the Sino-Soviet split and the war in Southeast Asia. 
European dissension regarding the desirability of a “hardware solution” for NATO’s 
nuclear-sharing dilemmas disrupted the Western common front in Geneva when the 
ENDC resumed in summer 1965. The ensuing debacle did little to impel forward 
movement on cooperative nuclear efforts. Track-two diplomacy managed to dampen 
some of the fallout for Soviet-American relations, but the non-aligned delegations seized 
the opportunity to pass a United Nations General Assembly resolution highlighting their 
preferred balance of mutual obligations and rights.  
Chapter Three examines how the superpowers brokered a working understanding 
regarding how to harmonize a nonproliferation treaty’s strictures with nuclear-sharing in 
NATO. By the beginning of 1967, India’s attitude toward the NPT rather than that of 
West Germany was the primary concern of Soviet and American policymakers. The 
removal of French forces from NATO’s integrated command occasioned a revival of the 
MLF project; however, the Pastore congressional hearings on the nonproliferation treaty 
in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy combined with domestic disillusionment with 
Johnson’s lack of peace achievements to push the White House to abandon the scheme 
and embrace a treaty. The efforts of chief presidential adviser Bill Moyers in drawing the 
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president’s attention to a treaty’s electoral benefits proved decisive. Meanwhile, an 
ingenious non-use formula advanced by Soviet Premier Andrei Kosygin discomfited 
Washington, while Vietnam limited U.S. willingness to devise guarantees ample enough 
to satisfy the Indians. A phase of high-level trust-building between the superpowers 
fostered agreement and enhanced cooperation in Geneva, where the Soviet and 
American co-chairmen, William Foster and Alexei Roshchin, found an acceptable 
formula to permit nuclear-sharing and consultations in NATO, but not a joint force, 
while leaving the future of a European nuclear force open to interpretation.   
A hemispheric campaign to keep nuclear weapons out of Latin America occurred 
alongside nonproliferation talks. Chapter Four explains why and how a multilateral effort 
to form a nuclear-free zone unfolded in Mexico City. Though the original Brazilian plan 
preceded the Cuban Missile Crisis, the harrowing episode quickened efforts by Mexican 
Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alfonso García Robles to negotiate a pact. García 
Robles was an accomplished legal expert and practitioner whose memories of the Second 
World War, antinuclear outlook, background in United Nations administration, and faith 
in the region’s exemplary tradition of internationalism drove him to orchestrate four years 
of tough, but ultimately successful negotiations. The U.S. strategy of containment 
through alliances of necessity, including those with military dictatorships, was a hindrance 
to the making of a Latin American nuclear-free zone. Headstrong allies in Brasília and 
Buenos Aires and U.S. demands vis-à-vis Cuba, free transit for its nuclear weapons, and 
restrictions on peaceful nuclear explosives nearly wrecked the talks. The chapter ends by 
highlighting U.S. Ambassador Fulton Freeman’s roll in salvaging the treaty and calls 
attention to how the Treaty of Tlatelolco impinged on efforts to enact global prohibitions 
by setting precedents and producing a second near-nuclear country with irreconcilable 
views on the NPT—Brazil. 
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Chapter Five illuminates what happened after Soviet and American officials 
concurred on nonproliferation language in Articles I and II, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
opened for signature. The outstanding issues in negotiations were now East-West 
differences regarding the treaty’s safeguards and non-aligned demands to preserve their 
rights and minimize their sacrifices in a new global nuclear order. The legitimacy of a 
treaty was of mounting importance. The Soviet and American delegations finally resolved 
the safeguards controversy through clever thinking abetted by increasingly cordial, even 
friendly, social encounters in Geneva. The social determinants of effective arms control 
diplomacy are examined through the lenses of the diplomatic community in Geneva and 
the personalities of George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev. When high-level attempts to 
foster Soviet-American détente at the Glassboro summit faltered, the international 
community in Geneva found a route through the impasse by superimposing IAEA 
oversight on Euratom safeguards. Although the breakthrough in summer 1967 failed to 
yield immediate dividends in the form of a consensus Article III, Foster and Roshchin 
tabled identical draft treaties in late August. The presentation of a draft treaty prompted 
non-aligned representatives, as well as some non-nuclear allies, to request amendments 
that reflected their interest in a generous and equitable treaty regime. A Mexican working 
paper outlined initial drafts of Articles IV, V, VI, and VII, eliciting general approval from 
the non-aligned grouping as well as Western skeptics such as West Germany and Italy. 
However, Johnson’s reluctance to deny West Germany their goal of Euratom autonomy 
in the context of European integration talks delayed the end of the safeguards controversy 
until after the New Year. 
Chapter Six relates the final phase of negotiations for the NPT at the Eighteen-
Nation Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations. Soviet misgivings about 
nuclear proliferation on the periphery after the Arab-Israeli crisis the previous June 
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allowed Foster and Roshchin to present a full draft treaty on January 18, 1968 to the 
collective astonishment of the international community. The forthcoming Conference of 
Non-Nuclear States in August set a target date by which the three nuclear powers in 
Geneva—the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R.—wanted to finalize the treaty. Nevertheless, the 
imperative of amassing a sufficiency of international support in Geneva and New York 
City so as to legitimate the regime strengthened the position of treaty skeptics and 
spoilers. The constellation of interests and demands at the ENDC, which met from mid-
January to mid-March, resulted in significant changes to the treaty, most consequentially, 
the authorization of periodic review conferences to assess its performance and fairness. 
The drafting process then moved to the United Nations, where the whole universe of 
nation-states debated its merits in the Political Committee. Soviet-American collaboration 
was conspicuous once the NPT aroused more opposition than expected. A combination 
of diplomatic pressure, the isolation of irreconcilables such as India and Brazil, and a new 
slate of Mexican amendments proposed by García Robles won over the majority of 
delegations. The chapter concludes by examining the implications of the United Nations 
General Assembly vote and the source of French and Indian misgivings about a 
subsequent resolution to vest security assurances in the nuclear-armed members of the 
United Nations Security Council. 
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Prologue: The Irish Resolution 
A new approach to the question of how to ease nuclear tensions between the 
United States and the Soviet Union sprung from an unlikely source in summer 19858 
even as the U.S. government danced around the question of whether and, if so, how far 
to aid French nuclear ambitions. The creation and expansion of the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) enabled states of comparatively light geopolitical gravity to 
leverage their interests and ideals through an international forum increasingly 
representative of the expanding universe of nation-states. The spreading principles of 
liberal internationalism had made self-determination the polestar by which anticolonial 
helmsmen the world over steered.34 Irish Minister of External Affairs Frank Aiken 
personified the strange journey on which once colonized nations had traveled since the 
First World War and the creation of the League of Nations.  
 A native of Armagh born in 1898, Aiken joined Sinn Féin and the Irish 
Republican Army to fight for the cause of the day—the independence of Ireland from 
British rule—rising in time to chief of staff whose actions included proclaiming the cease 
fire in 1923 that brought the insurrection to a controversial end. After the declaration, 
ratification, and recognition of the Republic of Ireland and its addition to the UNGA in 
1955 as part of a 16-nation deal struck between the East and West, Ireland modified its 
wartime position of neutrality in order to pivot toward the West. The appointment of 
Aiken as Foreign Minister heralded an era of greater independence and anticolonialism 
reflecting Aiken’s own political experience and ideals. This combination of Western 
orientation and anticolonial identity made possible the four-year process by which Aiken 
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added nuclear non-dissemination to the lexicon of disarmament.35 The deeper 
motivations behind Aiken’s decision to adopt this brainchild were rooted in the 
development of Irish national identity and foreign policy from 1955 to 1961. The UNGA 
was a “focal point” of Irish statecraft after its admission to the body.36 Aiken’s tenure as 
Foreign Minister was primarily concerned with enacting a strategy that made use of the 
UNGA as a platform for Ireland’s principles and preferences. His deft use of the General 
Assembly enhanced his country’s sway “out of all proportion” to its size, although its 
initiatives lived or died according to his ability to build consensus.37 Irish action at the 
United Nations from 1955 to 1965 consisted of three strands—Irish national interest, 
anticolonialism, and the pursuit of an international order in which the rights and 
privileges for small, postcolonial powers were preserved and expanded. Aiken’s years on 
the front lines of the Irish freedom struggle were representative of his generation and his 
proposals for nuclear non-dissemination bound up in Irish support for self-determination, 
which was itself rooted in Ireland’s “historical memory” of British colonialism.  
On September 9, 1958, Aiken enunciated before the General Assembly his belief 
that nuclear weapons ought to be restricted to what he termed “the nuclear club.”38 
Though the term “nuclear club” was greeted as a neologism, in fact The New York Times 
had printed the term in almost a year before in an editorial by C. L. Sulzberger in which 
he observed: 
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 [T]he Russians hint they are prepared to accept a formula for limiting atomic 
weapons to the three powers now possessing them—the United States, U.S.S.R., 
and Britain. What this means is that Washington and London would guarantee 
neither France nor West Germany could have such armament if Communist 
China is likewise excluded.39 
The speech was an important milestone in arms control history. Disarmament talks had 
previously intimated the desirability of a world free from nuclear dangers, including that 
of the “Nth-country” eventuality, by highlighting the desirability and practicality of a 
non-dissemination pledge among other measures. Aiken now implied that the possession 
of nuclear arsenals by the three existing nuclear powers was legitimate and unlikely to 
change. The proposal’s advancement by a small, neutral, non-nuclear, postcolonial state 
gave the idea a patina of universal support. Momentously, it distinguished nuclear 
nonproliferation (as the program would come to be called) from disarmament on 
procedural rather than normative grounds. Nuclear nonproliferation remained 
inextricably linked to nuclear disarmament: 
[T]ry to imagine whether, if nuclear war broke out, we would not then regret 
having failed to make the sacrifices which might have helped to avoid it. … While 
the ‘nuclear stalemate’ may have saved us from a third world war, we should leave 
nothing undone to secure the eventual total abolition of nuclear weapons.40 
Aiken’s remark indicated that his reasoning was neither purely antinuclear, nor 
chauvinistic, but instead mindful of the manifest paradox of nuclear brinksmanship—the 
balance of terror was effective yet brittle; bilaterally stable, yet unsustainable over time.  
Aiken’s pioneering suggestion that the United Nations General Assembly pass a 
“non-dissemination” resolution did not emerge like Athena from Zeus’s head. It was a 
continuation of earlier efforts that summer to put forward schemes that he felt would help 
to pacify by means of international legal solutions two regions then in turmoil—Central 
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Europe and the Middle East. The twelve session of the UNGA in 1957 had seen Ireland 
strike a more autonomous posture relative to the Algerian conflict, Central Europe’s 
demilitarization, and African and Asian decolonization. As a small state, Ireland 
recognized the UNGA’s capacity to amplify its diplomatic influence. By calling for 
peaceful resolutions to those problem areas where postcolonial territorial disputes and 
Cold War containment collided, and siding frequently with the non-aligned states, the 
Emerald Island enhanced its international prestige and accumulated moral capital to 
expend in furtherance of its national interests. Furthermore, Ireland invested in 
smoothing over tensions that might lead to general thermonuclear war on account of its 
proximity to Great Britain. In summer 1958, two events highlighted the potential of 
regional crises to escalate and exacerbate superpower enmity. Together, they help to 
explain what truly motivated Aiken to make his non-dissemination appeal.  
In July 1958, the Middle East was rocked by the overthrow of the Iraqi Hashemite 
monarchy by forces sympathetic to the Soviet Union. In response, the U.S. deployed 
more than 15,000 troops to neighboring Lebanon and the U.K. sent forces to Jordan. 
Tensions in the Middle East were already fraught after the Suez Crisis showed how 
combustible was the brew of Nasserism, Israeli adventurism, and Franco-British 
neocolonialism. Aiken seized on the Iraqi imbroglio to put forward a 10-point plan aimed 
at easing regional tensions: legitimate Arab unification; recognize Israel as a “historic 
fact;” resettle and recompense Palestinian refugees; sign a mutual non-aggression pact; 
safeguard the region’s communications, transport, and oil supplies; and establish an 
equitable process by which to finance any expropriations. The program was all-inclusive 
and ambitious; however, Aiken chiefly wanted the scheme to form a diplomatic 
framework on which to build peace talks. The plan had one more item that attested to 
Aiken’s growing interest in restricting nuclear weapons and foreshadowed his impending 
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non-dissemination proposal: parties to the compact would disavow the manufacture or 
use of nuclear weapons. In a conversation with Indian diplomats, Aiken observed: 
[T]o tackle the existing problems in such a manner would be much more realistic 
and fruitful than to concentrate attention, as the west has tended to do, on 
disarmament. Armaments, after all, are only the manifestations of a lack of mutual 
confidence, and the real problems are political in character.41 
At the end of July, Freddy Boland, an Irish diplomat in New York, surveyed Aiken’s 
Middle East peace plan and underlined the presence of two rivalries: East versus West; 
Arab versus Israeli. Boland viewed regional tensions through the prism of thermonuclear 
war and, in an “exhaustive” study of Aiken’s scheme, asserted that after East-West issues 
were resolved, “the Arab-Israeli problem, even if it continues unsolved, will certainly not 
constitute anything like the danger to world peace which exists at present.”42 In regards to 
nuclear weapons, he placed the onus of non-dissemination on the nuclear powers not to 
bring atomic weaponry into the volatile region. Boland was more concerned about Sino-
Soviet influence along the arc from Algeria to Afghanistan, and convinced Aiken to drop 
the explicit call for the UN to recognize Israel and its extant borders. In the end, the draft 
resolution that Aiken submitted at a Emergency Session on August 14 gained approval 
after being significantly watered down, in particular losing those sections pertaining to 
regional neutralization or denuclearization.  
The outbreak of another crisis in East Asia that August prompted Aiken to 
expand the denuclearization element of his grand design to yield a method of resolving 
the internationalization of the nuclear question following the Lucky Dragon Incident in 
1954 and the Suez Crisis in 1956. Aiken’s Middle East plan evolved into an “areas of 
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law” resolution of 1958, which advocated the establishment of a U.N. supervisory quasi-
mandate in the Middle East and Central Europe. The overarching thrust of these 
proposals hinted at the long-term, political objectives to his non-dissemination plan; the 
scheme would achieve what was possible in order to build confidence for more lasting 
designs. Communist China began shelling the disputed islands of Quemoy and Matsu on 
August 23, 1958. The Second Taiwan Straits Crisis brought the U.S., the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), and the Soviet Union harrowingly close to nuclear conflict. 
The islands, which had been controlled by Chinese nationalist under the command of 
Chiang Kai-shek since the Kuomintang’s exodus to Formosa and were a locus of tensions 
between the communist mainland and the U.S.-backed government-in-exile. The 
predicament posed by Quemoy and Matsu was akin to that posed by Berlin. Quemoy 
and Matsu lay 103 and 94 miles from Formosa, respectively, but less than ten miles off 
the coast of Fukien Province in the P.R.C. Consequently, the non-strategic islets made 
appealing nearby targets for artillery shelling when mainland China wanted to send a 
message to Formosa and the United States.  
Brinksmanship over Quemoy and Matsu occurred at that same moment that 
cracks in the Communist monolith were appearing. The ascension of Khrushchev to 
power and his denouncement of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had irked Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). Khrushchev had addressed the CPSU on February 25, 1956, 
attacking Stalin in a bid to cement his leadership and, it seemed, sincerely address the 
immorality, mismanagement, and terror of the Stalin’s three decades of rule.43 The First 
Secretary and newly christened Chairman of the Council of Ministers described his 
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predecessor’s “capricious and despotic character,” contrasted him unfavorably with Lenin 
who “used severe methods only in the most necessary cases” during “a civil war,” faulted 
him for “ideological errors,” and charged him with “intolerance, brutality and … abuse 
of power.”44 The Chinese Communist Party’s reaction was swift and antagonistic. 
Notwithstanding his annoyance with Stalin’s realpolitik and waffling after the Second 
World War, Mao emulated his cult of personality and Machiavellian tactics, which he 
saw as integral to the unyielding resistance to capitalist states and extreme measures 
justified by the logic of dialectical materialism. A rebuttal came quickly in the form of an 
article in the People’s Daily published on April 5, 1956, which defended Stalin for having 
“creatively applied and developed Marxism-Leninism” and “defended Lenin’s line on the 
industrialization of the Soviet Union and the collectivization of agriculture.” Rather than 
slur the dead communist dictator, Mao’s mouthpiece declared that “[i]t was … natural 
that the name of Stalin was greatly honoured throughout the world.”45 
For now, the “honeymoon” period in Sino-Soviet relations endured though Mao 
himself declared afterwards that Khrushchev’s Secret Speech had “created serious 
cracks” between the allies. The divergent conclusions drawn by the two principals in 
regards to the nature of modern warfare would pry these cracks open, giving rise to 
ideological ferment and intramural jockeying in the world communist movement.46 Mao 
was affronted by Khrushchev’s two foreign policy initiatives: support for peaceful 
transitions to communism via popular fronts in parliamentary coalitions and cooperation 
in the nuclear realm. These conciliatory positions stemmed from Khrushchev’s 
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conclusion that, despite the general perception that the “correlation of forces” between 
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. was narrowing after Sputnik’s otherworldly triumph in early 
October 1957, Soviet-American conflict was far-fetched. From this reasoning sprang new 
Soviet formulations of “peaceful coexistence” and “Soviet-American cooperation for the 
settlement of world problems.” The Moscow International Conference of Communist 
Parties was the debut for the Soviet Union’s new foreign policy. There, twelve principal 
communist parties and all 64 deputations in attendance endorsed a multi-point “Peace 
Manifesto;” however, the conference turned on the lessening of trust between the CPSU 
and the CCP of which Khrushchev and Mao were the undisputed leaders.47 Considering 
the recent Soviet offer to supply China with sensitive nuclear assistance after Stalin’s 
death, the truth likely lay somewhere in between. 
It was Mao’s speech on November 18, however, that stole the show. The CCP 
chairman began by proclaiming that communist states had gathered the socioeconomic 
momentum to overtake the capitalist world, dramatized by the recent launch of Sputnik 
with its economic and military symbolism and encapsulated in his slogan, “[t]he east wind 
prevails over the west wind.” Mao’s intent was to underscore his perception that 
international tensions could not long stymie the spread of communism. In a similar vein, 
Mao forecast that not only would the Soviet Union catch up to the United States in terms 
of steel production by 1972, but China would likewise surpass Great Britain. This 
pronouncement of the Great Leap Forward with its tragic aftermath, in combination with 
his presumptuous remarks about Khrushchev’s recent leadership clash with a “Anti-Party 
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Group” led by Vyacheslav Molotov, signaled to fellow attendees that Sino-Soviet amity 
teetered on the brink. Yugoslavian Communist Party leader Edvard Kardelj scrawled in a 
note that day, “[n]ow begins the struggle between the Russians and the Chinese for the 
ideological leadership role in the international workers’ movement.”48 
By far the most explosive revelation in Mao’s address at the Moscow Conference, 
however, was his remarks about the winnability of nuclear war. Mao’s views on the 
geopolitical and sociopolitical repercussions of a Third World War fought with 
thermonuclear weapons became an object of dispute in Sino-Soviet polemics from years 
to come. The Chinese would not publish the verbal record until 1992, though Pravda 
published a more or less identical text in September 1963 in response to Beijing’s refusal 
to sign the LTBT. According to the People’s Daily, Mao declared: 
At present another situation has to be taken into account; namely, that the war 
maniacs may drop atomic and hydrogen bombs everywhere. They drop them, 
and we do the same. Thus there will be chaos and lives will be lost. The question 
has to be considered for the worse. The Politburo of our party has held several 
sessions to discuss this question. If fighting breaks out now, China has only hand 
grenades and not atomic bombs—which the Soviet Union, however, does possess. 
Let us imagine, how many people will die if war breaks out? Out of the world’s 
population of 2.7 billion, one-third—or even half—may be lost. It is they and not 
we who want to fight; but when a fight starts, atomic and hydrogen bombs may be 
dropped. I debated this question with a foreign statesman. He reckoned that if an 
atomic war were fought, all of humanity would be annihilated. I said that if worse 
came to worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain. Imperialism 
would be destroyed, and the whole world would become socialist. In a number of 
years there would be 2.7 billion people again and definitely more. We Chinese 
have not yet completed our [socialist] construction, and we desire peace. 
However, if imperialism insists on fighting a war, we will have no alternative but 
to make up our minds and fight to the finish before proceeding with 
construction.49 
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Though the effect of the crack exposed by Mao’s statement would remain latent 
throughout the nuclear crises of the next five years, in time the rift would widen into a 
yawning Sino-Soviet split.  
Nevertheless, relations between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and 
Chinese Communist Party had stayed in a “honeymoon” phase until the outbreak of the 
Second Taiwan Straits Crisis. Unbeknownst to Khrushchev and Mao, the United States 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) envisaged using nuclear weapons if the crisis escalated. On 
August 8, 1958, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met with Undersecretary of State 
Christian Herter, among others, to discuss US military contingency plans in the event 
that the P.R.C. tried to seize the islands by force. Dulles worried that President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower and “responsible officers” might not appreciate that in light of the islands’ 
greater integration with Formosa since the last crisis, “an attack on the Offshore Islands 
would now constitute an attack on Formosa itself,” raising the prospect of a binding U.S. 
military counterattack. Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles, recently Secretary 
of the Air Force, reckoned that a determined Chinese incursion could only be stopped if 
“the Mainland air bases themselves were bombed with atomic weapons.” The group 
agreed that the State Department and Defense Department would draw up a list of 
eventualities to which the Joint Chiefs would proffer “military planning on an urgent 
basis.”50 
The Joint Chiefs responded five days later with a memorandum for Herter. In the 
memorandum, Gerard C. Smith, director of the Policy Planning Council, conveyed the 
“understanding that current JCS war plans called for nuclear strikes deep into 
Communist China including military targets in the Shanghai-Hangchow-Nanking and 
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Canton complexes where population density is extremely high” using “low yield” 
warheads including “weapons having a yield comparable to 20 KT weapons dropped on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” Smith predicted that “such hostilities” would lead to “millions 
of non-combatant [deaths],” and set in train Soviet nuclear attacks on Formosa and the 
U.S. Seventh Fleet “at least,” which “under our present strategic concept” of massive 
retaliation would “signal for general nuclear war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.”51 
Turmoil in the Middle East and East Asia accordingly represented the geopolitical 
context in which Aiken presented the Irish resolution. The palpable explosiveness of the 
Arab-Israeli feud warranted in his eyes the restriction of nuclear weapons from seemingly 
peripheral areas where superpower interests, alliance networks, postcolonial territorial 
disputes, and nuclear capabilities increased the likelihood of major armed conflicts. The 
Second Taiwan Straits crisis, which U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Henry Cabot Lodge 
described as “appear[ing] at the U.N. to threaten to bring about a general war,” 
dramatized the ability of a rogue state to push the world to the brink of a thermonuclear 
war whose tragic aftermath its leader had publicly belittled and even affirmed.52 In his 
September 1958 speech to the United Nations, Aiken in effect replied to Mao’s notorious 
remarks, stating that “if general war is brought upon the world for any motive, however 
good or however bad, it will neither democratize nor communize it; it will annihilate it.” 
The differential calculus between developed and underdeveloped states of the imagined 
post-attack environment was also adumbrated. Communist China again lurked in the 
background. Countries where urbanization, industrialization, and modern agriculture 
were far advanced had more to lose, in theory, than developing countries where the 
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majority of the population subsisted through subsistence farming.53 Considering the 
likelihood of regional instability provoking superpower clashes or rogue, underdeveloped 
states regarding nuclear forces as instruments of attack, rather than deterrence, the 
nuclear peril did “not merely increase in direct ratio to the number” of nuclear club 
members, but “in geometric proportion.”54  
 After announcing his intention in September to pursue a non-dissemination 
agreement by means of a United Nations General Assembly resolution, Aiken went about 
canvassing and cajoling his fellow delegates. The nuclear powers were of course key to 
shepherding through the resolution. The British and Soviets were noncommittal while the 
French were openly skeptical because of their active pursuit of a military capability. To 
assuage French sentiment, Aiken told the French and other delegates that his plan would 
presume their admittance into the nuclear club.55 Aiken recognized that U.S. 
acquiescence was especially pivotal. He spoke to Thomas J. Hamilton of The New York 
Times, who penned a front-page article, “Ireland Would Limit A-Bomb to 4 Nations” 
based on the interview. Hamilton reported that Aiken repeatedly invoked the example of 
the Baruch Plan to justify a scheme that would divide the world into nuclear “haves” and 
“have-nots.” He related Bernard Baruch’s warning in 1946 “that once the smaller powers 
had learned to produce nuclear weapons there would be great danger that even a small 
war would become a nuclear war.”56 
On October 17, Aiken introduced his draft resolution at the Political Committee 
amid a debate on general disarmament. Disarmament talks at the U.N. had descended 
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into a desultory enterprise, where the Soviets and Americans jockeyed to score 
propaganda points and disagreed over the composition of the U.N. Disarmament 
Commission to the extent that the U.S.S.R. threatened to boycott the group in April 
1958 unless a “parity principle” was established whereby the number of communist states 
would balance those of neutrals and Western-oriented states. Aiken thus shared a 
common viewpoint that “while we all wish for complete nuclear disarmament … it is 
quite vain to expect it in the immediate future.” In place of more profitless speeches, 
Aiken suggested a resolution whose preambular language would read: 
[T]he aim of the United Nations in the field of disarmament is an effective general 
agreement on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass 
destruction which will provide for the cessation of the production of such 
weapons, the destruction of existing stocks and the progressive limitation of 
conventional armaments; [and, second,] that the danger now exists that an 
increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons may occur, 
aggravating international tension and the difficulty of maintaining world peace 
and thus rendering more difficult the attainment of the general disarmament 
agreement envisaged in paragraph one.57 
To address this danger, Aiken called for the creation of an ad hoc committee to evaluate 
the problems posed by the further spread of nuclear weapons and propose measures to 
solve them at the next session of the General Assembly.  
States from many foreign policy orientations supported the measure. A group of 
non-aligned countries including Mexico, Ceylon, Burma, the United Arab Emirates, and 
India lent their voices in the Political Committee. One of the more advanced states 
without nuclear weapons, Sweden, endorsed the resolution. And a smattering of NATO, 
SEATO, and Warsaw Pact allies—Poland, Norway, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand—spoke positively albeit with conditions. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. were more 
ambivalent. The Soviet representative exclaimed that a non-dissemination resolution 
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would not deal with the greater issue of disarmament, but he did not dismiss the idea 
outright. The French, anxious to dispel any legal barrier to their nuclear ambitions, were 
unappeasable though, and the British and Americans ultimately rejected a non-
dissemination agreement owing to doubts in regards to enforcement. Lodge told Aiken 
that his scheme was “unacceptable” while U.K. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs 
Commander Allan Noble, objected that such a course of action “would be impossible to 
control.” British and, likely, U.S. concerns revolved mainly around China and the 
question of “control.” The Irish delegation’s report to Dublin accordingly stressed the 
“Anglo-American preoccupation with control,” a touchstone of perennial discord 
between the East and West in disarmament negotiations that Western diplomats insisted 
be enforced with control mechanisms that infringed on Soviet fixation on territorial 
opacity. Perversely, Aiken’s attempt to make an end run around the stasis of disarmament 
talks by promoting a more limited goal ran aground on the same obstacles then stymieing 
nuclear test-ban and broader disarmament progress—the question of control. In Noble’s 
telling, a non-dissemination resolution might not be worth the paper on which it would be 
printed; “more precisely, it would be impossible to keep the Soviet Union from supplying 
nuclear weapons surreptitiously to the People’s Republic of China”—a valid concern in 
light of contemporaneous Soviets transfers of technology, blueprints, and training to 
China.58  
The United States had a second, unspoken reservation foreshadowing a key 
hurdle that would afflict for nonproliferation negotiations for the next decade—the 
European security dilemma. Eisenhower and Dulles wanted to guarantee better the 
security of NATO allies, in particular West Germany, as Soviet advances in nuclear 
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weaponry and ballistic missile technology exposed the continental United States to 
nuclear attack for the first time. The Soviet launch of the first man-made satellite, Sputnik 
1, set off a wave of recrimination, national soul-searching, and anxiety in the U.S. and 
heralded an age of mutual vulnerability. Khrushchev’s announcement that year that 
Soviet missiles would henceforth target West European cities, including Berlin, lessened 
confidence in the efficacy of the extended U.S. deterrent. To shore up its allies’ faith, the 
Eisenhower administration made plans to stockpile tactical nuclear weapons in central 
Europe for three purposes. First, the munitions would offset Soviet conventional 
superiority along the Iron Curtain. Second, the emplacement of nuclear weapons in the 
FRG would reassure West Germans of U.S. investment in their defense. Finally, the 
presence of tactical nuclear weapons would symbolize the tip of the U.S. nuclear sword. 
In the event of a Soviet assault through the Fulda Gap, the use of tactical nukes would 
predictably escalate to a general thermonuclear war. In effect, the forward positioning of 
U.S. nuclear assets inextricably bound American security to the inviolability of West 
German territory.  
In the end, Aiken’s resolution never came to a full vote because of the opposition 
of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States in the Political Committee. U.S. 
disapproval was the deathblow. Washington was not willing to trust Moscow and doubted 
that a UNGA resolution would stop it from supplying the P.R.C. with sensitive nuclear 
technology and know-how. As in disarmament and test-ban negotiations, the lack of a 
reliable monitoring system proved decisive. Furthermore, the U.S. preferred not to allow 
any barriers—material or legal—on its extended nuclear posture despite Aiken’s pledge 
that the resolution would not impinge on U.S. plans to install tactical nukes in West 
Germany. Finally, the U.S. continued to place faith in its own safeguards as codified by 
the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. 
 43 
Despite its failure in 1958, Aiken resubmitted his proposed resolution to the 
United Nations the next three years. His tenacity would bear out his conviction that the 
assembly was “a body in which the small nations have an influence such as they have 
never before possessed in their history.”59 The resolution continued to afoul of the U.S., 
U.S.S.R., and France. Washington was reluctant to bestow the UN’s imprimatur on a 
resolution that might subject its nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO to unwanted 
scrutiny. By contrast, Soviet diplomats preferred that a resolution bind the Americans’ 
hands. They may also have feared affirming a principle of which their nuclear assistance 
to China was then in violation. Aiken’s concession that an arrangement to shut the 
nuclear club’s door would grandfather France in failed to win over Paris. He pressed on 
nevertheless, hoping that nuclear prohibitions would chip away at nuclear threats while 
bolstering UN authority over matters of war, disarmament, and peace. When he spoke to 
the Political Committee on December 1, 1960, he warned that the ongoing 
miniaturization of nuclear warheads brought closer the day when “fanatics” and 
“revolutionary groups” might acquire them.60 He proclaimed that the resolution would 
help to control what former Canadian Foreign Minister Sidney Earle Smith once called 
“uncontrollable anarchy:” 
It is the duty of statesmen, we submit, to reject all strategic conceptions which 
imply the spread of nuclear weapons and the risk of nuclear war and to insist that 
their military planners conform to the first requirement of sane policy in the 
nuclear age: the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons until we can evolve a 
system of international order which will enable us to get all these weapons out of 
national armouries and which will guarantee all nations greater security than their 
weapons and forces now give them.61 
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The draft resolution on the prevention of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons 
therefore did not represent “an end in itself,” but an effort to halt the state of play while 
those present in New York City and their successors worked to ensure that they did not 
“hand on to our children a much more difficult [disarmament] program than the one 
which we are forced to face today.” 
The first French nuclear explosion in February 1960, the cessation of Soviet 
nuclear assistance to China, and Aiken’s success in meeting U.S. concerns about nuclear-
sharing in Europe paved the way for the passage of Resolution 1665 (XVI) at the 
Sixteenth session of the UN General Assembly in 1961. It called upon all states, and in 
particular those possessing nuclear weapons, to broker a treaty that barred the transfer of 
control over, or information necessary to the manufacture of nuclear weapons to another 
state.62 During the session, the assembly also passed resolutions commending a continued 
moratorium on nuclear testing, the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty, the merits of a 
nuclear-free zone in Africa, and a declaration that the use of nuclear or thermonuclear 
weapons constituted “a crime against humanity and civilization.” On the occasion of his 
long-awaited resolution’s passage, Aiken explained his intent when putting it forward: 
Our basic objective was to prevent the danger of nuclear war becoming greater 
during the period of time it must take to evolve and strengthen a general accepted 
system of world security based on international law and law enforcement.63 
Almost seven years would pass before the international community enshrined the basic 
principle found in Resolution 1665 (XVI) in an international treaty that prohibited the 
dissemination or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Forty-five years after it opened for 
signature, a global debate continues as to whether the global nuclear order empowered by 
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the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has lived up to Aiken’s original 
intent.  
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Chapter One | The Nonproliferation Treaty That Never Was 
 
While we are rather willing and even eager and relieved to agree with a historian’s finding that we 
stumbled into the more shameful events of history, such as war, we are correspondingly unwilling to 
concede—in fact we find it intolerable to imagine—that our more lofty achievements, such as economic, 
social or political progress, could have come about by stumbling rather than through careful planning. … 
Language itself conspires toward this sort of asymmetry: we fall into error, but do not usually speak of 
falling into truth. 
 
Albert O. Hirschman, “The Principle of the Hidden Hand,” 1967 
Introduction: An Approximation of Peace 
Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
William Foster stood at the lectern before the World Council of Churches on June 15, 
1964 and conjured the words and figure of the Protestant theologian and philosopher 
Reinhold Niebuhr to explain his job. “In his famous Gifford lectures at Edinburgh in 
1939,” Foster related, Niebuhr had expressed his belief that “[t]he task of creating 
community and avoiding anarchy is constantly pitched on broader and broader levels.” 
“That continues to be true in 1964,” he noted, “to an ever-increasing degree.” The two 
groups represented that day, he averred, the spiritual community and the nation-state, 
were both in the business of meeting this expanding challenge: 
We who represent the State are charged with … avoiding anarchy as we attempt 
to turn the world back from what could be a fatal arms race. You who represent 
the Church are charged, as the church has always been charged, with the task of 
creating community. I think the mere fact that we, who have such interrelated 
and vital tasks set before us, are meeting together today, bodes well for the future 
of mankind.64 
Foster described his mission in terms of Niebuhr’s conception of an “impossible 
possibility,” and the perpetual quest to attain “a tolerable approximation of this ethic in 
the form of justice.” While Niebuhr had spoken to the quixotic pursuit of an ideal 
                                                
64 William Foster, Draft, “Possible Remarks for World Council,” 15 June 1964, William C. Foster Papers, 
George C. Marshall Library, 3. Hereinafter referred to as Foster Papers, GCML.  
 47 
Christian life, Foster found that his admonition spoke equally to “the field of 
disarmament” where “we might think of our ultimate goal of GCD [general and 
complete disarmament] as a difficult – yet – possible possibility.” The final object might 
lie beyond the horizon of sight, and perhaps the lifetimes of those present, but “the 
negotiating table” and “the various collateral measures,” such as a fissile material cutoff 
treaty (FMCT), a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) and a nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty (NPT) represented “more readily achievable approximations which will hopefully 
pave the way for the goal of GCD.65 
This chapter addresses the simultaneous U.S. pursuit of the MLF in NATO and 
the NPT. Was a nonproliferation treaty achievable in 1963 or 1964 and, if so, what 
factors affected its chances of success? Relatedly, why did United States policy give 
priority to the MLF despite the non-negotiable opposition of Eastern bloc leaders and the 
tepid support of NATO allies besides West Germany? Lastly, would a nonproliferation 
treaty have garnered broad international support before or after the Chinese nuclear test 
in late 1964, in particular from those states most likely to proliferate—the F.R.G., India, 
and Israel? Soviet-American agreement on the non-dissemination and non-acquisition 
articles existed, but was stymied by the rebelliousness of East European states amid the 
Sino-Soviet split, the Euro-centrism of the U.S. State Department (which consistently 
preferred the MLF to the NPT), the ad-hoc nature of U.S. nonproliferation policy and 
grand strategy more generally and the onset of election seasons in the U.K. and, more 
decisively, in the U.S.  
There was a window of opportunity in early 1964 to stop nuclear aspirants, 
particularly India, from moving closer to a military nuclear program with major 
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implications for international security, proliferation trends, and the final text of the 
nonproliferation treaty. To support these claims, this chapter begins with an institutional 
history of the U.S. Disarmament Agency, placing it in the context of a nuclear paradigm 
of security internationalism coalescing around 1963 in which nuclear deterrence and arms 
control were deemed the chosen means of averting nuclear anarchy. Next, the 
interrelated history of American nuclear diplomacy, U.S.-F.R.G. and U.S.-Indian 
relations, Warsaw Pact politics and Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament 
sessions in 1964 are discussed. The chapter concludes with a brief account of the 
explosion of a nuclear device on October 16, 1964 at the Lop Nur testing grounds in the 
Tarim Basin of the Xinjiang region in People’s Republic of China’s, including the U.S. 
effort to prevent it by means of a preemptive strike sanctioned by the U.S.S.R. as well as 
the Indian and world reactions to the event. 
The tenability of Soviet-American strategic stability through nuclear deterrence 
seemed to require a halt to the spread of nuclear weapons. In a 1965 article for Foreign 
Affairs, titled “New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament,” Foster focused on the 
proliferation challenge after noting Moscow and Washington’s “real progress” on the 
White House-Kremlin hotline, outer space treaty, fissile material cutbacks and, most 
notably, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). On the other hand, there was “an 
increasingly realistic appreciation that agreement on [GCD] will not be achieved early 
enough … to control the atom.”66 Other means were needed to govern nuclear anarchy. 
Soviet-American relations had improved since the crisis in Cuba and, though superpower 
brinksmanship no longer seemed an impending threat, the “time factor” on proliferation 
was more urgent: 
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For a decade and a half the Soviet Union has had nuclear weapons; hence the 
prospect of a delay of, say, a year or two in reducing the capabilities of the Soviet 
Union and the United States to damage each other may not seem terribly critical 
in itself. But a delay of a year or so, or perhaps even of months, in the 
implementation of measures bearing on the nuclear-proliferation problem could 
well mean the difference between failure and success.67 
Foster’s call for urgency in 1965 alluded to the failure to head off China’s nuclear blast in 
October 1964 and the looming threat of an Indian response. The implication was clear. 
While the Soviet-American nuclear standoff was stable, the spread of nuclear weapons to 
other regions, including those as volatile as South and East Asia, the Middle East, and 
Latin America posed significant risks. After acknowledging the case for “limited 
proliferation” beyond Europe (most likely to India or Japan), he rebutted it on two counts 
as “implausible and inconsistent with the attitude we have taken with respect to Europe:” 
proliferation could not be controlled and the U.S. with its “world-wide commitments” 
would be unavoidably entangled in “any conflict on a scale where nuclear capabilities 
would be significant.”68 The modernist assumption that states were chiefly defined by 
their material capabilities skewed his thinking with regard to how non-European leaders’ 
would see nuclear risks. The likelihood of nuclear-weapons use would “almost certainly 
increase as the number of fingers on the trigger increases,” even more so because 
underdeveloped states like Communist China would have “relatively little to lose.” Any 
nuclear-weapons use meanwhile risked global total war: 
Of course, the use of a few nuclear weapons by any power—even of one such 
weapon and even with an intent to localize the effect—might lead to their use in 
large numbers by other powers, with cataclysmic consequences.69 
The extrapolation from local use to global cataclysm was paradigmatic of the emerging 
nuclear orthodoxy. Foster inferred that the limits of strategic stability and U.S. 
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commitments in hot spots accordingly demanded the securitization of peace. The 
implications were counterintuitive. Disarmament would increase the chances of war. 
Soviet-American brinksmanship would guarantee the peace. Even so, the Cold War 
strategy of containment against the U.S.S.R. now called for a supplemental strategy of 
global nuclear containment to resolve the explosive contradiction of a catalytic nuclear 
war. Foster and the U.S. Disarmament Agency would act as the institutional fulcrum of 
that strategy through a program of security internationalism—strategic stability through 
deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation.  
 
“A Bureaucratically Independent Conscience” 
The character of William Foster has remained outside the limelight of NPT 
history in spite of the pivotal role he played in its negotiation. As a result, his personal 
importance as an ambassador of and driving force behind the treaty has been eclipsed. 
Bill, as friends, colleagues and politicos called the ACDA’s first and longest-serving 
director, transformed the fledgling agency from the custodian of a “third rail” of US 
foreign policy into an interdepartmental and international clearinghouse whose activism 
was instrumental in bringing about the LTBT and NPT.70 President John F. Kennedy 
pinched the idea of an arms control agency from his rival for the Democratic presidential 
nomination in 1960, Hubert Humphrey, whose campaign pledge itself built on steps 
made by Eisenhower’s secretary of state, Christian Herter, to foster “continuity and depth 
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in the review, development, and negotiation of policy” relating to arms control by 
formalizing the practice.71  
The proposed agency cried out for an enterprising stepfather. The Disarmament 
Agency elicited support or skepticism depending on whether the individual was wedded 
or antagonistic to the notion that conflict among nations and people was governable.72 
Foster was named director in September 1961 when Kennedy signed the inaugural 
statute and would stay on in that capacity until 1969. He was a businessman with 
considerable experience in transatlantic diplomacy, a keen sense of civic duty, a sharp eye 
for public relations, and a reputation as a tireless operator and respected manager. 
However, he was also an organization man whose insistence on clear channels of 
communication, decision-making and review disenchanted some experienced nuclear 
diplomats.73 Born on April 18, 1897 in Westfield, New Jersey, Foster studied at MIT 
before serving as a pilot in the US Air Corps in the First World War. After the war ended, 
he found a job as an engineer for the Packard Motor Company and for Public Service, a 
New Jersey utility. During the Second World War, Foster joined the government as a 
consultant for the War Production Board where he rose to the rank of Special 
Representative to the Secretary of War on aircraft procurement before serving as 
Undersecretary of Commerce from 1946 to 1948. When Roosevelt’s Secretary of State 
George C. Marshall needed a deputy to help implement the Marshall Plan, he called on 
Foster to perform the duties of Deputy Special Representative in Europe and, 
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subsequently, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration itself.74 Foster 
also acquired a firm basis in the economics of atomic energy while working for the 
Nuclear Utilities Corporation. He thus brought a wealth of contacts and experience to his 
position as Disarmament Agency director. 
A key question was how to integrate the Disarmament Agency into the foreign 
policymaking apparatus. Should the agency report to the secretary of state, or to the 
president? An independent agency would signal how seriously the Kennedy 
administration took arms control and disarmament, but might bog down policymaking 
unnecessarily and make the Disarmament Agency a dwarf among federal giants—the 
State Department and Defense Department. Edmund A. Gullion, an Eisenhower 
administration holdover and acting deputy director of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Administration (ACDA’s predecessor), explored the two possible 
arrangements in a 1961 memorandum for Kennedy.75 An executive agency would show 
the seriousness with which the US took arms control, attract the best minds including the 
technical experts needed to untangle the knotty problems related to, for instance, a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, foster scientific and strategic ingenuity and, most 
important, serve as a platform from which to resolve disputes among departments whose 
parochial interests might impede needful steps towards arms control. Gullion nevertheless 
preferred the second option of keeping the ACDA under the Department of State’s 
umbrella. He cited factors such as the need to uphold the centrality of Foggy Bottom in 
foreign policy, tap its institutional memory and its resources, and take advantage of the 
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secretary of state’s seniority among presidential lieutenants. He warned though that the 
agency needed autonomy in legislation, financing, and staffing.76  
Gullion’s biggest concern was that an autonomous agency would bow to the 
mighty Pentagon on matters of national security.77 Kennedy’s special adviser on 
disarmament and arms control, John J. McCloy, on the other hand, worried about the 
State Department. The root problem was the susceptibility of broad agreements, which 
arms control and disarmament always constituted, of getting lost in the shuffle due to the 
compartmentalized makeup of Foggy Bottom, where the most influential and experienced 
bureaucrats worked in offices with regional or bilateral foci. In his Senate testimony, 
McCloy proclaimed arms control and disarmament too important to be “buried in the 
State Department,” and insisted that the Disarmament Agency possess statutory authority 
and hence a congressional imprimatur. He urged a reluctant Senator J. William 
Fulbright, the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to back 
this course of action.78  
Kennedy chose to split the difference on account of Gullion and McCloy’s advice. 
The final legislative act created the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as a 
semi-autonomous agency reporting to the secretary of state, but enjoying separate 
statutory authority and its own budget, as well as direct access to the president upon the 
secretary’s notification. This “two-hat” arrangement in which the director would report 
to the secretary and the president alike, left State in its traditional role as the architect of 
U.S. foreign policy while satisfying those who wanted an independent agency freed from 
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its infighting. As a result of McCloy’s lobbying, the agency would report to Congress 
semi-annually. Although this would subject it to partisanship, in compensation the 
statutory mandate allowed Foster and his deputy, Adrian Fisher, to call on congressional 
support when the executive branch proved recalcitrant.  
Elite opinion on the agency was split. Eisenhower’s Secretary of Defense Robert 
Lovett worried that the Disarmament Agency would become “a mecca for a wide variety 
of screwballs,” while Kennedy’s Secretary of State Dean Rusk asserted that 
“[d]isarmament is a unique problem … reach[ing] beyond the operational functions the 
Department [of State] is designed to handle.”79 The agency afforded a partial solution to 
Eisenhower’s farewell warning of an ever more prevalent and pernicious “military-
industrial complex” in American politics. With hindsight, the Disarmament Agency’s 
record under Foster would exceed initial expectations.80 Though it would suffer from 
partisan rancor afterward, in its heyday it supplanted the State Department’s Policy 
Planning Council as the primary author of U.S. grand strategy. By the end of the decade, 
the agency had negotiated the LTBT and the NPT, becoming arguably the main driver 
of strategic thought in the Johnson years with the National Security Council (NSC) 
preoccupied with Vietnam.81 The Disarmament Agency’s success in harnessing nuclear 
diplomacy to the goal of a more stable world testified to the messy process by which 
democratic and bureaucratic states design grand strategy and raised the question of 
whether, by 1968, Cold War containment referred solely to the Soviet Union.82 
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Foster’s managerial skill and personal steel were indispensable to navigating the 
thorny maze of the U.S. national security state. Given the zeitgeist of Cold War America, 
where nuclear arms control and disarmament schemes were often smeared as 
appeasement with analogies drawn readily to Munich, Foster was careful to chart a 
course between the Scylla of unilateral disarmament and the Charybdis of an unending 
race for nuclear supremacy.83 He kept the essence of his worldview tucked cagily away. 
The job of a government official, he seemed to believe, was to execute policy rather than 
make it. Even so, Foster worked assiduously behind the scenes to build consensus and 
outmaneuver bureaucratic rivals by cultivating allies, finessing opponents and using the 
media and congress to push the US toward constructive engagement on arms control.  
Notwithstanding his reputation as a consummate mandarin, Foster’s affinity for 
arms control policy apparently ran deeper. His writings, correspondence, and record in 
office reveal an abiding faith in the power of a rules-based global order to forestall 
interstate conflict through dispute settlement, collective security and arms control. Foster 
seems to have been a pragmatic adherent of the Wilsonian tradition in U.S. foreign 
relations that originated in the legal utopias of the nineteenth century when European 
elites foresaw a world where international councils and legal procedures would mend any 
tears in a patchwork of sovereign nation-states, at least on the European continent.84 The 
postwar thrust of US foreign policy fused the idealism and moralism of liberal 
internationalism with a strategy of containing Soviet power by encircling the U.S.S.R. 
with military power.85 It is arguable that the orientation of U.S. foreign policy changed 
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markedly from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration.86 Nonetheless, the liberal 
internationalist persuasion was far from unified in 1962; perhaps, it never had been.87 
Harkening back to idealist thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mills and 
Woodrow Wilson, internationalists differed with respect to how they prioritized various 
elements of the liberal order: sovereignty, institutions, participation, roles and 
responsibilities.88 However, the class of policies under the heading of nuclear 
nonproliferation belied an easy separation of realism and internationalism, or hard and 
soft power.89 The prolonged terror of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which dramatized global 
fears of the cataclysmic aftermath of thermonuclear war, was the cause of some of the 
consensus. Related to these fears, however, was the rise of a new paradigm of 
internationalist thinking in which collective security and strategic stability were 
increasingly linked in a hybrid type of security internationalism.  
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A 1965 letter from Foster to Professor Louis B. Sohn was revelatory of the new 
school of internationalist thought. Sohn was a leading expert on the United Nations and 
international law, then teaching at Harvard Law School. His book, World Peace through 
World Law, co-authored with Grenville Clark, made his reputation and exemplified the 
internationalist mentality of the early Cold War. Published in 1958, the study spelled out 
an ambitious U.N. reform agenda in which the parliament would revise its charter, confer 
member states with votes proportional to their population, replace the U.N. Security 
Council with a veto-less Executive Council, bring the P.R.C. into the fold, and constitute 
a world police force in place of defunct national militaries. In the letter, Foster thanked 
Sohn for sharing a rebuttal he had made of Admiral Arleigh Burke’s hostile critique of the 
Disarmament Agency. Burke was the former Chief of Naval Operations and co-founder 
of the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown University and had pushed for a 
limited U.S. deterrent reliant on nuclear submarines in the late-1950s. Foster praised the 
professor for his “penetrating attack” on Burke’s “biased presentation,” which trivialized 
the utility of arms control talks. Burke’s conclusion that strategic stability ought not be 
weakened by “idealistic” arms control initiatives was, according to Foster, “vulnerable to 
the many points that you made.”90 In particular, he noted the notion that the reduction of 
an enemy’s nuclear forces by means of treaty agreements was materially equivalent to 
their reduction through military action.  
Sohn’s book and Burke’s article were intellectual touchstones by which to 
triangulate Foster’s views. Sohn was among the foremost theorists of international law 
and global governance. He was also involved in the famed Summer Study on Arms 
Control put on by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences at MIT in 1960. The 
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symposium led to a special issue of Daedalus on “Arms Control, Disarmament, and 
National Security,” as well as Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin’s influential Strategy 
and Arms Control. His intellectual fingerprints were on the prefatory note of the Daedalus 
issue penned by editor Gerald Holton, a fellow Harvard professor of the history of 
science.91 In the Daedalus issue, Holton’s introduction began by echoing a common theme 
in antinuclear discourse; namely, that humankind’s scientific and technological 
achievements had outpaced his capacity for reasoned action. To support his point, he 
quoted from William James’s essay, “The Moral Equivalent of War:” 
When whole nations are the armies, and the science of destruction vies in 
intellectual refinement with the sciences of production, I see that war becomes 
absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity. Extravagant ambitions will have 
to be replaced by reasonable claims, and nations must make common cause 
against them.92    
Holton added that whereas war had once served as “an inherent necessity of the social 
process,” it now embodied “an absurd monstrosity.” The advent of “nightmarish” 
nuclear weapons had in the intervening years “propelled us with a most unhistoric speed 
to a historic discontinuity.” The catalytic thrust of that epochal change was the universal 
abhorrence of thermonuclear war. “Never before in history,” Holton observed, “have the 
opposing commanders themselves openly professed their general revulsion from war.” In 
contrast to Bertrand Russell, Krishna Menon, and Albert Schweitzer’s belief that national 
leaders could not rationally control their nuclear arsenals, Holton suggested that social 
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theory was indeed catching up: “the art and science of controlling war have for the first 
time shown signs of genuine promise.”  
The preface was illustrative of the volume’s tenor, which was itself representative 
of an emergent nuclear orthodoxy in the American social sciences that attempted to 
securitize peace through deterrence. Collectively, contributions by nuclear thinkers from 
a range of disciplines promoted and attempted to reciprocally calibrate nuclear 
deterrence and arms control. The essay by Thomas Schelling, for example, used concepts 
and frameworks that would define a generation of international relations and economic 
thought. The realist school of international relations theory of which Schelling was an 
author had arisen amid the bipolar structure of the Soviet-American conflict and the 
arms race. Its intellectual founders, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Schelling 
sought to make sense of a postwar world where two superpowers with opposing groups of 
smaller powers arrayed in their orbits eyed each other warily across a planet made 
smaller and more fragile by intercontinental ballistic missiles and thermonuclear 
warheads. Morgenthau had proposed the basic realist assumption that states acted as 
unified rational actors in search of security and power in an anarchic system, while 
Niebuhr had promoted the need to find imperfect solutions and approach world affairs 
amorally predicated on the maxim of the “impossible possibility” of moral state 
behavior.93 Schelling took Morgenthau’s anarchic system and Niebuhr’s skewering of pre-
war U.S. neutralism and added a sophisticated methodology of game-theoretic modeling 
and cost-benefit analysis. The irreducible dilemma for these thinkers was the idea of total 
war in the thermonuclear age.94  
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Schelling approached nuclear warfare through abstraction and analogy. Whereas 
the infamous econometric study of Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, dwelt 
expansively and cold-bloodedly on the societal and environmental effects of total war, 
Schelling accepted its suicidal implications and interpolated state behavior along an 
continuum of material benefits ranging from mutual advantage to mutual annihilation. 
Schelling’s belief that nuclear war could not be won eventually prevailed over Kahn’s 
optimistic take, helping to stave off, for instance, further investments in civil defense. The 
denaturalization of nuclear war of course had other corollaries, namely, the 
marginalization of nuclear weapons effects as a schematic externality. But Schelling’s 
framework suffered from a related omission that troubled Morgenthau and Niebuhr as 
well: how to deal with the twin problems of extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear 
proliferation. His models could make bold predictive claims about how two opponents 
might maneuver toward the least bad outcome amid a crisis with a minimum of 
communication and transparency. In Strategy and Arms Control, Schelling rigorously 
explained how arms control was a critical component of nuclear strategy by relating it 
tightly to deterrent postures.95 Nuclear proliferation was thus the fly in the ointment of 
the nuclear orthodoxy. Games such as “Prisoners’ Dilemma” and “Chicken” on which he 
based his theories of deterrence and compellence presupposed bipolar relationships of 
two actors, whether individuals or states. In these bilateral scenarios, Schelling thought 
that Soviet-American acceptance of the territorial status quo would permit stable 
deterrence, arms cuts, and possibly incremental disarmament.96 But what about the 
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credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Western Europe, Pierre Gallois’s theory for 
asymmetric deterrence, and the “Nth-country” conundrum? Schelling and Halperin 
devoted a mere four paragraphs to questions of extended deterrence, nuclear 
proliferation, and nonproliferation.  
 
The Limits of Peaceful Coexistence 
By the winter of 1964, the conspicuous obstruction to synchronizing Soviet-
American views on nonproliferation was the U.S. attempt to institute nuclear sharing 
through a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) in NATO. The project, which the State 
Department devised and the F.R.G. seized upon, would have assembled a fleet of surface 
ships armed with nuclear-tipped Polaris missiles, manned by crews of mixed nationality 
from three members, and subjected to the integrated command and control of the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The U.K., France, the German 
Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), Poland, and the Soviet Union opposed the scheme with 
varying and fluctuating degrees of vigor.97 By early 1964, the U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw 
Pact allies in the United Nations Disarmament Committee (UNDC) and the Eighteen 
Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) had decided the non-dissemination and 
non-acquisition articles of a prospective treaty ought to prohibit “access to” nuclear 
weapons explicitly. The preferred U.S. language, which stressed “control of” (i.e. 
authority to fire) the weapons, was unacceptable. It was surprising that the U.S. 
supported a collective nuclear force until 1966 in the face of broad and vigorous 
opposition given that the scheme and the larger question of NATO’s stability and future 
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were chief impediments to an otherwise popular nonproliferation treaty.98 In actuality, 
the language specified for Articles I and II has proven among the least contentious, 
indicating that Soviet-American disagreements over nuclear-sharing in NATO were 
symptomatic rather than causative. The failure of the Johnson administration to divest 
itself of the MLF was indicative of a lack of investment, coordination, intelligence, 
leadership, and imagination in extra-Vietnam foreign affairs in the mid-1960s. The MLF 
was never acceptable to NATO allies, Warsaw Pact rivals, or the U.S. Congress. Nor was 
it as popular with the West German public and their leaders as inferred by State 
Department “theologians.” Furthermore, British and American experts deemed the 
project technically unsound for a variety of reasons. Despite these centripetal forces, key 
U.S. officials held onto the belief that an ingenious scheme rather than an international 
regime was the best means of averting proliferation in strategic regions, particularly in 
Europe. In the final analysis, the MLF would delay a nonproliferation treaty when Soviet-
American unity could have yielded a stronger document at a crucial moment when the 
next round of proliferation to India and Israel was evident and perhaps avertable.  
The steady support of the multilateral force by the State Department resulted 
from two groups with differing but nonetheless interrelated objects. First, theorists in 
State’s Policy Planning Council and Economic and Agricultural Affairs bureau, such as 
Henry Owen, Robert Bowie, Walt Rostow, and George Ball, saw Jean Monet’s quest to 
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federalize Western Europe as the shape of things to come. Relatedly, these “theologians” 
along with other key national security experts were concerned that growing Soviet 
nuclear stockpiles and resulting American vulnerability would wreck the credibility of the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella. France’s decision to build nuclear weapons and chart a political 
course that diverged ever more from NATO confirmed these fears. The rupture with 
France imperiled the Atlantic alliance as French President Charles de Gaulle openly 
sought primacy in Europe and courted Bonn with the Franco-German Treaty of 
Friendship in 1963 and talks for a European Economic Community (EEC). Greater 
participation by the F.R.G. in NATO’s nuclear policy, they believed, would relieve 
doubts of U.S. credibility after Sputnik and the Cuban Missile Crisis showed the United 
States mainland was not invulnerable to attack. Only NATO nuclear-sharing in concert 
with steady West European integration could allay West German insecurity, square them 
with nuclear Britain and France, keep Bonn out of de Gaulle's sphere of influence, and 
thereby enable a NATO defense posture that was united and credible. 
Second, the prospect that other European countries, in particular the Federal 
Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, and Italy, might follow the French lead in developing a 
military nuclear capability led a second United States contingent to support a MLF for its 
nonproliferation value. The F.R.G. had renounced atomic, biological, and chemical 
weapons (the ABC agreement) at the London and Paris conferences and the Modified 
Treaty of Brussels in 1954, which formally ended British, French, and American 
occupation of West Germany and recognized it as a sovereign state. This had permitted 
West Germany’s entry into NATO, however, the renunciation failed to dispel the fears of 
neighbors (allies and adversaries) who had twice suffered the bloody consequences of 
German militarism in the past fifty years. The French nuclear test in 1960 heightened 
concerns that West Germany would emulate its two historic rivals—Great Britain and 
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France. Senior members of the Johnson administration, most prominently Secretary of 
State Rusk, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara and Attorney General Robert Kennedy shared the belief that proliferation 
would unfold relative to mathematical trajectories and technological trends rather than 
political calculations. They consequently saw enhanced NATO nuclear-sharing, perhaps 
through a collective nuclear force, as the least bad option to preempt more European 
nuclear powers and, potentially, to rollback the British and French military nuclear 
programs.  
Sputnik had been the catalyst for a "hardware solution," as the multilateral forces 
and its British cousin, the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF), were called. As the Western 
hemisphere became more vulnerable to Soviet ICBMs, skepticism among Europeans 
mounted that American and Canadian leaders would leave their cities and natural 
resources hostage to peaceful Soviet conduct in the Old World. To counteract these fears, 
Eisenhower sent large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons to West Germany under the 
command of NATO Strategic Allied Commander Europe, General Lauris Norstad, and 
extended the scope of the U.S. nuclear deterrent by promising “massive retaliation” in 
case of Soviet aggression.99 Henceforth, U.S. troops armed with atomic artillery and 
supported by F.R.G. divisions, NATO nuclear-armed fighter-bombers, and Strategic Air 
Command would reinforce the deterrent’s credibility in the eyes of Western Europe and 
its menacers.  
Initially, the Soviet Union was not strongly opposed to a multilateral nuclear 
force. In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev wanted to improve relations 
with Bonn in order to reduce military spending, lessen East-West tensions, and pave the 
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way for a nonproliferation treaty that might halt, or at least stigmatize, Chinese pursuit of 
an atom bomb. The Soviet Union would not assume a hardline stance against German 
access to nuclear weapons until Khrushchev was forced from power and Communist 
China entered the nuclear club in October 1964.100 Khrushchev had pursued a dual-
track policy toward the F.R.G. throughout the 1950s, seeking to freeze the territorial 
status quo in Europe and keep nuclear weapons out of German hands.101 The Sino-Soviet 
split and frequent clashes between the communist giants for leadership of world 
communism led the Soviet general secretary to soften his stance toward Bonn, which was 
growing increasingly vocal in regards to German reunification.  
When Khrushchev began talks with the United States on a nonproliferation treaty 
in October 1963, he suggested that a U.S. pledge that nuclear arms would be kept out of 
German hands would suffice. He noted that a difference of views existed about “West 
German revanchists … get[ting] their hands on nuclear weapons,” and proposed the 
U.S.S.R. would announce its willingness to sign an agreement “even in the case that [it] 
will not contain a statement prohibiting outright the creation of multilateral nuclear 
forces in NATO.” The non-dissemination article “would provide that nuclear weapons 
would not be transferred directly or indirectly, or through military alliances to the 
national control of states that do not yet possess such weapons and that these countries 
would not be assisted in the production of such weapons.” In the coming years, the U.S. 
position would more or less repeat this formula.102 In return, Washington would declare 
that Bonn would not obtain “the possibility of being in charge of nuclear weapons.”  
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Khrushchev’s permissiveness unsettled his allies in Poland and East Germany. 
The leader of the Polish Communist Party, Wladyslaw Gomulka, was stunned by the 
Soviet readiness to eschew a clear proscription of the MLF when he read Khrushchev’s 
letter informing him of the position. Where the communiqué emphasized that a 
nonproliferation treaty would feature an exit clause similar to that of the LTBT so as to 
afford the Eastern bloc states an escape route if NATO nuclear arrangements developed 
along impermissible lines, Gomulka wrote pointedly in the margins, “[p]rohibit the 
creation of multilateral nuclear forces now, and you will not [need to] reserve yourself the 
right to tear up the treaty!”103 Gomulka leapt into action, telephoning Khrushchev on 
October 2, 1963 and following the conversation up with a 4000-word letter six days later 
in which he conveyed his desire to confer about the “deeply troubling thoughts” he had 
concerning the worsening of Sino-Soviet relations and Khrushchev’s intention to broker a 
nonproliferation pact with the United States. The Polish leader presumed that 
Khrushchev’s rush to conclude a treaty with the U.S. had its origins in the Sino-Soviet 
split. As a result, he proposed a conference of the First Secretaries of the Central 
Committees of the Warsaw Pact states to consider the matters, and the Polish Politburo, 
responding to Gomulka’s summons, agreed unanimously that the country could not 
support the permissive Soviet position without express limitations on multilateral nuclear 
forces.  
Gomulka laid down four principles in the letter behind Poland’s stout opposition 
to an increased West German role in NATO nuclear arrangements. In time, these 
principles would harden into pillars of an unyielding wall of Eastern resistance to a 
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narrow definition of nuclear proliferation in first and second articles of the NPT. First, 
any failure to forbid a NATO force in which access to, and control of, nuclear weapons 
would be shared at the operational and command levels risked being interpreted as 
“silent consent.” Second, the multiplication of so-called “hands on the trigger” subverted 
“the spirit of the Moscow Treaty,” which “proclaims as its main goal the quickest possible 
achievement of an understanding on universal and complete disarmament.” Third, to 
exhibit flexibility on joint nuclear forces would deprive the socialist camp of a handy 
whipping boy to help stop the F.R.G. from gaining access to nuclear weapons “in any 
form”; Gomulka declared this struggle was “a fundamental link in our general political 
line” and its abdication “would inevitably bring serious harm to the socialist camp.” 
Gomulka intimated that Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership courted defections in the 
struggle for the leadership of world communism if a treaty was concluded that caused 
“harm … for our countries and our parties, especially in the case of Poland, and to an 
even greater degree for the German Democratic Republic.” Finally, the Soviet policy of 
seeking rapprochement with Bonn and the United States would only improve the 
F.R.G.’s position vis-à-vis its cherished and outspoken campaign to reunify the German 
nation. The German question loomed large and kowtowing to Washington and Bonn 
risked strengthening West Germany in NATO and against East Germany, which also 
raised the prospect of “atomic blackmail against the Warsaw Pact states.”104  
The Sino-Soviet split was foremost in Gomulka’s mind. He was loath to watch the 
havoc that a nonproliferation treaty struck unbeknownst to Beijing would wreak on the 
international communist movement. Gomulka accordingly did more than reject 
Khrushchev’s policy; he condemned the Soviet program of peaceful coexistence through 
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nuclear diplomacy wholesale. West Germany, he specified, was the sole NATO country 
with an interest in the scheme; the U.K. and France were antagonistic because they did 
not want more nuclear peers among the “imperialist states.” The British displayed serious 
concerns that a hardware solution would exacerbate world tensions, but its “special 
relationship” with the U.S. blunted these criticisms for now. As for the U.S., the MLF was 
a shrewd tactic. By performing an end run on de Gaulle, it would bolster its supremacy in 
Europe through a reinforced NATO with a stronger West Germany at its heart. 
Chancellor Adenauer, he acknowledged, had “deftly used … [the] struggle for hegemony 
in Western Europe” between the U.S. and France “for its policy [of reunification] and its 
drive to attain nuclear weapons.” Gomulka doubted that a united socialist front could 
halt NATO’s momentum toward closer nuclear coordination; nevertheless, a 
nonproliferation treaty would cause harm even if it lacked an MLF. Soviet-American 
efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons with the P.R.C. as the primary target would 
make already deep rifts within the socialist camp cavernous. It was far better, in his 
opinion, for the Warsaw Pact to exploit the matter and thus raise contradictions among 
the capitalist states. Arms control talks were a wedge with which to pry the United States 
and France apart, not a knife with which to slit one’s own throat.  
The Limited Test Ban Treaty had galvanized Sino-Soviet divisions by exposing 
the degree to which Moscow denied Beijing a voice in “important international matters;” 
Gomulka therefore advised that “[a]n understanding with the Chinese Communist Party 
on the basis of a sensible compromise is thus necessary from every point of view.”105 If an 
MLF was created, the U.S.S.R. should grant nuclear weapons to the P.R.C., evening the 
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playing field. Gomulka restated that promoting solidarity among the socialist states was 
key for security against imperialist aggression: 
Without the unity of the socialist camp, there is not and cannot be a true 
relaxation [of tensions], there is not and cannot be a possibility of curbing 
imperialism and of safeguarding humanity against the catastrophe of nuclear war. 
Gomulka’s pushback was determined and thus decisive enough to shape a far tougher 
Soviet line on the compatibility of multilateral forces with a nonproliferation treaty. The 
dilemma of trying to appease the nuclear aspirations of West Germany while also 
pursuing a nonproliferation pact with the Soviet Union bedeviled the United States 
government struggling to shore up its Atlantic alliances. Meanwhile, Moscow 
encountered stiffer than expected resistance from its East European allies in its efforts to 
marginalize the P.R.C. and thwart its quest for nuclear weapons. Scholars of the Cold 
War have periodized the Soviet-American contest in several ways. They generally portray 
the years from Stalin’s death to Nixon’s election as an ambiguous period of both 
engagement and confrontation with the German question the central object of tug-of-war 
before superpower détente and China’s opening transformed the global arena.106 The 
halting pursuit of a nonproliferation treaty, however, attested to how contingent and in 
fact unstable the whole bipolar structure of the Cold War truly was during these years. 
While U.S. and Soviet interests, forecasts of nuclear technology trends, and intelligence of 
likely proliferators aligned, key actors in both of the alliances stymied the movement 
toward peaceful coexistence with nuclear arms control as its linchpin. Furthermore, the 
non-aligned movement with Egypt, India, Indonesia, and China in its vanguard began to 
fracture as regional nuclear dynamics and the Sino-Indian leadership struggle hindered 
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the building of consensus.107 With these global political processes in mind, the multilateral 
negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty resembled less a U.S. imposition or a superpower 
condominium than a collective recasting of the global order to modulate nuclear dangers 
and lessen the centripetal forces pulling apart the bipolar arrangement of power. In 
essence, global elites hewed toward international solutions—whether supranational or 
regional—because a long tradition of resolving contradictions in interstate affairs through 
such collective arrangements informed it and an increasingly messy international system 
demanded it.    
Soviet officials acknowledged that United States policymakers had originally 
conceived the multilateral force in order to forestall a situation in which West Germany 
obtained nuclear weapons independently or through French channels, and as part of 
Eisenhower and Kennedy’s attempts to coax de Gaulle to sacrifice the force de frappe. 
Nonetheless, Gomulka’s determined effort to divert Khrushchev from his conciliatory 
path worked. When Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov met with the 
Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of the G.D.R. two weeks later on October 14, 
he relayed a Soviet position that had been radically revised. Kuznetsov admitted that the 
U.S.S.R. viewed U.S. support for a collective nuclear force through the lens of nuclear 
nonproliferation. From 1959 to 1960, “the USA developed the idea … to maintain the 
unity of NATO and its [nuclear] monopoly in the military alliance … to urge France to 
give up on nuclear weapons, or, at the very least, to freeze the development of [French] 
nuclear weapons,” he continued, and “to prevent [West Germany] from obtaining 
nuclear weapons itself.” Rusk had accordingly informed Gromyko on August 8, 1962, 
that a nonproliferation agreement could specify that any “state possessing nuclear 
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weapons will undertake the obligation not to transfer them to third countries,” and non-
nuclear-weapon states would vow not to make or try to acquire nuclear weapons. Two 
weeks later, the Soviet Union responded with more stipulations barring “the transfer of 
nuclear weapons through military alliances” and the transfer of technical data about their 
production.108  
United States officials proposed compromise language on April 12, 1963 that 
inched toward the Soviet position. The conciliatory move led Khrushchev to believe that 
a nonproliferation regime was viable from which a nuclear-armed P.R.C. would be born 
estranged. Nuclear-weapon states “would undertake the obligation not to transfer any 
sort of nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly through military alliances, into the national 
control of states that do not dispose of such weapons” along with reciprocal pledges from 
nuclear have-nots to abstain from their pursuit or relevant assistance through the 
aforementioned channels. After Gomulka’s offensive, however, Soviet authorities, now 
anxious to firm up their remaining comrades in the socialist camp, had seen fit to include 
language that categorically rejected a nonproliferation treaty consistent with a NATO 
multilateral nuclear force. “[P]ositive outweighs the negative” in the second U.S. 
proposal, Kuznetsov admitted, after all, an agreement to outlaw dissemination was better 
than nuclear anarchy; however, the Soviets thought that a mutually acceptable 
agreement must bind the German’s hands more tightly. Not only could there be no 
transfer directly or indirectly through military alliances, but also “not into the control of a 
military unit or individual member of the military,” belonging to “the unified armed 
forces of the military alliance.” East German General Secretary Walter Ulbricht asked if 
these strictures would apply only to the United States. Kuznetsov replied that, if the 
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Federal Republic acceded, the reciprocal pledge of states without nuclear weapons would 
bind nuclear powers such as France as well. Ulbricht and Foreign Minister Lothar Bolz 
registered their support. The Soviet Union, recently so eager to conclude a 
nonproliferation pact, had deemed a multilateral force irreconcilable with a 
nonproliferation treaty at the urging of their Polish and East German allies.109 The battle 
lines has been drawn. 
Following Johnson’s unexpected rise to the presidency, the United States 
undertook a review of the multilateral force, which Kennedy had never fully backed, but 
to which Johnson felt beholden as an unelected successor. Eisenhower also remained an 
advocate of the scheme. Johnson met with Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, Ball, and Rostow 
on December 6, 1963 to discuss the matter. They decided that MLF supporters in Foggy 
Bottom would brief key members of Congress and the group of seven NATO nations 
meeting in Paris at the North Atlantic Council. In a note to Johnson, Bundy outlined his 
analysis of the situation, noting that “a tension … [had] existed for many months between 
MLF advocates in [the] State Department and President Kennedy,” who had “wanted to 
avoid getting pinned to a very complex and difficult treaty.” Furthermore, West 
European support had yet to materialize behind the venture; Bundy echoed Kuznetsov’s 
opinion that “only the German Government [is] clearly and solidly in favor,” but 
suggested that a decision could be postponed until after the presidential elections.110 
 
Window of a Condominium 
As the superpowers revisited their preferences relative to NATO nuclear-sharing, 
the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was set to meet at the beginning of 
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1964. Before the first session, East Germany set out a proposal for both German states to 
renounce nuclear armaments, production, and multilateral forces, which amounted to a 
strong signal that the Warsaw Pact wanted the MLF demolished. Washington dismissed 
the East German overture as sheer propaganda; in truth, nuclear abstention was a bitter 
pill for Erhard to swallow given the conventional superiority of communist forces in 
central Europe. Rusk and Foster were nonetheless hopeful that a deal was attainable. 
Even the French were showing signs of life. Ambassador Pelen conveyed his government’s 
heightened interest in happenings at Geneva though “of course, they could not 
participate.”111 The French felt the West was primed to take the initiative at the ENDC 
on a package of arms control and nonproliferation measures, such as a fissile-material 
cutoff treaty (FMCT). However, Alphand reported from New York that Foster was 
cautious because the two sides were fixating on different issues. “Washington was 
preoccupied with China and Moscow with the MLF,” Foster had related, and 
“nonproliferation would have to be discussed in a narrow fashion.”112 If the committee 
were to forge progress, it would begin with limited measures rather than a grand bargain.  
Rhetoric had yet to slow down to match the lagging pace of viable agreement. 
Only seven weeks after Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson voiced commitment 
to his predecessor’s legacy of which nuclear diplomacy was a centerpiece. At his first State 
of the Union Address on January 8, 1964, Johnson vocally embraced “new proposals at 
Geneva toward the control and eventual abolition of arms” and a cutback on stateside 
production of enriched uranium by 25 percent.113 Rusk was insistent that U.S. deeds in 
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Geneva match the president’s words. The secretary of state charged Bundy and other 
officials with national security portfolios to investigate “whether we had anything in the 
Geneva kit that met the language of the President’s State of the Union Address.”114 At a 
retreat at Camp David the following week, arms control experts from the State 
Department, Pentagon, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), and the Disarmament Agency held round-table talks to determine how 
best to put Johnson’s words into action. A report issued by the World Council of 
Churches captured the tenor of the moment—“The Test Ban and Next Steps: From Co-
Existence to Co-operation.”115  
Johnson delivered a major address on January 21 over nationwide television and 
radio, laying out a package of U.S. proposals featuring “collateral measures.” The speech 
highlighted the need for international safeguards without distinguishing between a 
universal regime administered by the IAEA, preferred by AEC Commissioner Glenn 
Seaborg, and an ad-hoc system preserving a role for Euratom, which the theologians 
wanted. Johnson had specified the speech’s “main objectives” in a letter to Khrushchev: 
nonproliferation, a fissile-material cutoff treaty, the redirection of fissile materials to 
peaceful uses, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, limitations on nuclear weapons systems, 
and progress toward general and complete disarmament.116 The letter also presented an 
ambitious set of concrete proposals formulated at an extraordinary meeting chaired by 
Johnson and attended by Rusk, McNamara, Fisher, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
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Maxwell Taylor, CIA Deputy Director Marshall Carter, and White House aides Bill 
Moyers and Jack Valenti. The cabinet agreed on a platform comprising the need to ban 
the use of force to settle international disputes (boilerplate to dispel Khrushchev’s attack 
on “imperialists” as warmongers); produce a verified freeze on offensive and defensive 
nuclear weapons of strategic types; halt the production of fissile material for weapons 
work; establish observation posts to prevent an accidental war or surprise attack; and a 
non-proliferation treaty. The only item that failed to achieve broad consensus was 
unconditional U.S. support for nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa. Though 
Fisher pushed for their inclusion, Taylor retorted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff feared such 
a statement might trap the U.S. if a Warsaw Pact country suggested making Europe a 
nuclear preserve as well. Ultimately, the military argument carried the day. The United 
States endorsed regional solutions, but the support was contingent on a lack of restraints 
on its ability to station and transport nuclear weapons at places and times of its choosing.  
Johnson was committed to carrying forward Kennedy’s drive to improve relations 
with the Soviet Union. The new president saw arms control diplomacy as a lectern from 
which to preach “peace” as the ultimate goal of U.S. foreign policy. In his national 
address, Johnson concluded with the lofty remark that “[d]isarmament is not merely the 
government’s business. … [i]t is everyone’s business.” According to AEC Chairman 
Glenn Seaborg, however, Johnson’s focus on Soviet-American détente by means of 
nuclear diplomacy was foreshortened by other events in the international field. “The 
Vietnam War,” he stated, had already begun to “consume him.”117 Over the next three 
years, U.S. efforts to prevent a series of Southeast Asian regimes from falling under the 
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sway of nationalist forces would jam concurrent efforts to halt the tide of nuclear spread 
in South Asia.  
Foster relayed Johnson’s address in Geneva three days later. It was his first speech 
since Kennedy’s death, and he put forward the suite of “collateral measures” as a 
continuation of his predecessor’s legacy and a means by which to break the diplomatic 
impasse on disarmament. “Each of these proposed steps is important to peace … [none] 
is impossible of agreement,” Foster suggested. He summed up, “[t]he best way to begin 
disarming is to begin.” He compared the measures to the LTBT, “a modest step perhaps, 
but one which was achievable in today’s world.”118 The emphasis on the U.S. side was to 
avoid being seen by non-aligned nations as indifferent to negotiated settlements and put 
forward trust-building measures, which Khrushchev called “a policy of reciprocal 
example.” These small steps promised to build confidence and goodwill at minimal risk.  
The Soviets submitted their proposals on January 28. The lead Soviet negotiator 
and ENDC co-chairman, Semyon Tsarapkin, called for the removal of foreign forces 
from alien territories (a shot across NATO’s bow), a reduction in total troop numbers and 
military budgets, a nonaggression agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the 
establishment of nuclear-free zones, especially in Europe (the Rapacki Plan), a 
nonproliferation accord, the destruction of bomber aircraft, and a final consummation of 
the CTBT. When Foster compared the two packages, he noted the Soviet and American 
proposals overlapped in two areas: nuclear nonproliferation and a strategic freeze on 
bomber aircraft. He underlined this overlap in the notes for his forthcoming meeting with 
Tsarapkin.119 The Soviets remained adamant, however, that a nonproliferation treaty was 
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impossible until the MLF was scuttled; “non-dissemination is nice,” Tsarapkin told a 
correspondent of the Agence France-Presse, “but the chief obstacle is the American push for 
a multilateral force.”120 
The first tête-à-tête failed to bridge the Soviet-American divide, though 
nonproliferation was still a priority for both nations looking to head off the P.R.C. at the 
nuclear pass. Foster delivered his second speech to the ENDC on February 6, when he 
presented an argument to assign the highest priority to a nonproliferation treaty, citing 
the transnational and even planetary aftermath of a thermonuclear war, and equivalence 
between Soviet-American brinksmanship and proliferation: 
Non-nuclear nations have frequently expressed the fear of being caught in the 
cross fire of a nuclear exchange between the two nuclear sides. Certainly the 
deadly fallout which would result from such an exchange would not be confined 
within any particular set of national boundaries. But I think it is equally true that 
the security of non-nuclear powers will be decreased as among themselves by the 
wider dissemination of national nuclear weapons capabilities.121 
The speech concluded with a plea to move forward seriously toward a mutually 
acceptable pact to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, “a conclusion to which both 
moral sense and national self-interest lead us.” The universal import and global stakes 
created a concert of interest between East and West. “The interests of both nuclear sides 
overlap in this area,” Foster averred; in addition, he observed that “the interests of the 
non-nuclear powers overlap with each other and with the existing nuclear powers.”122  
The official Soviet reply to Foster’s speech bordered on outright rejection. The 
next day, Tsarapkin was at his most vociferous, castigating the U.S. for contemplating the 
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provision of nuclear weapons to the Bundeswehr. The Soviet Union, he (falsely) 
proclaimed, had never considered such a course of action with the G.D.R., or the 
P.R.C.123 He questioned the entire premise of a treaty barring the transfer of nuclear 
armaments or sensitive expertise, data, or equipment. “It was unnecessary to ask nuclear 
powers to undertake not to provide nuclear weapons to states without them,” he insisted, 
“since none of them had that intention.” De Gaulle would habitually assert such claims in 
the coming years. The crucial matter was to convince states not then possessing the atom 
bomb to forgo its development. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. exchanged oratorical blows in the 
session regarding the G.D.R.’s proposal that both German states publically forsake the 
military option. Tsarapkin read a lively denunciation of the F.R.G.’s “revanchist and 
militarist” stance. Foster lamented the “return of the Cold War” to the room, and 
belittled the call for a nuclear-free Central Europe by East Germany (whose existence the 
United States did not recognize) “as originating in a nongovernmental organization.”124  
The heated rhetoric made for good theater. Nevertheless, conversations outside of 
the plenary hall indicated its superficiality, if not downright artifice. Private discussions 
between Foster and his Soviet and Indian counterparts attested to a broad consensus 
emerging on nonproliferation in the ENDC in early 1964. The catalyst for this growing 
harmony between the residents of the East, West, and South was the prospect of a 
nuclear-armed China The secondary consideration was the constant maneuvering of 
non-aligned and non-nuclear states to push the superpowers toward a middle ground in 
the field of nuclear diplomacy. When Tsarapkin attacked Washington for its imperialist 
adventure in Vietnam, Foster suggested to Rusk in a cable sent on February 11 that the 
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purpose of such criticism was perhaps not rank antipathy, or even scoring points with 
Third World delegations, but instead to “suggest again if [the] U.S. as [the] world’s 
gigantic power and also [the] large Soviet Union were to reach agreements[,] all troubles 
in [the] world could be readily controlled by us.”125  
In a subsequent dialogue, Tsarapkin assured Foster that his over-heated remarks 
did not amount to [a] return to [the] Cold War.” He cautioned that non-aligned and 
non-nuclear states, including their allies, were carving out a “middle ground” from which 
to pit the superpowers against on another: 
[Tsarapkin] [r]eiterated time and again that our two countries are self-sufficient 
and therefore have … no need to encroach upon each other, that they both bore 
great responsibility for what went on in [the] world and … they had to pay [the] 
price for this responsibility. They took line that all other countries, including 
France, China, India, UAR, … even [the] G.D.R., were playing [the] U.S. and 
U.S.S.R. against each other and were trying obtain advantage from differences 
and contradictions between them; they could do it in present circumstances but if 
U.S. and U.S.S.R. were to agree with each other everybody else would have no 
choice but to fall in line.126 
The telegram to Rusk related the Soviet desire to improve relations with the U.S. at a 
critical moment when alliance fractures, Third World territorial disputes, and the 
revolution in strategic space-time heightened the risk of a superpower clash. Tsarapkin 
was speaking in his formal capacity as an ENDC co-chairman and in his informal role as 
a Soviet interlocutor, not as an architect of Soviet foreign policy. Even so, Soviet 
diplomats seldom overstepped their orders from the Kremlin. As the U.S. national 
security community absorbed the impact of Kennedy’s death and his replacement by a 
less internationally minded president, and European theologians in Foggy War contended 
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against de Gaulle amid European integration, Moscow seemed ready to embrace Soviet-
American partnership in the nuclear realm, beginning with a nonproliferation agreement. 
At least, this was the assessment of the U.S. delegation in Geneva. At a staff meeting on 
February 27 to discuss “Mission and Tactics,” the need to work with allied and non-
aligned delegates was downplayed and the benefits of cozying up to the Soviets 
emphasized. The drift was that delegations besides that of the Soviet Union were of 
marginal importance.127 
 
Falling Angel 
Along with the German question, the P.R.C.’s expected entry into the nuclear 
club and its implications for India’s defense policy were key areas of joint Soviet-
American interest. The LTBT, the direct Kremlin-White House phone line, and 
Johnson’s pledge to carry Kennedy’s torch in foreign affairs made the winds of early 1964 
seem favorable. The widespread notion that Communist China would soon test an 
atomic device raised the stakes. The threat of a Chinese bomb was especially troubling for 
the Republic of India because it posed a direct challenge to the country’s longstanding 
policies of peaceful coexistence, non-alignment, and antinuclearism with their roots in 
Gandhian non-violence. Jawaharlal Nehru had elevated these principles into mainstays of 
Indian foreign policy in the attempt to recast the international system and India’s place 
within it through soft power. Nonetheless, his record in the nuclear field was checkered. 
On the one hand, he had almost singly swung the non-aligned movement behind nuclear 
disarmament and arms control in the 1950s, first advancing and then constantly pushing 
for a nuclear test-ban treaty. There was a stark difference, however, between Nehru, the 
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politician, and his spiritual mentor, Mahatma Gandhi. These divergent paths were 
apparent in a resolution drafted jointly by Gandhi and Nehru and endorsed by the Indian 
National Congress on August 8, 1942: 
While the All India Congress Committee must primarily be concerned with the 
independence and defence of India in this our danger, the committee is of [the] 
opinion that the future peace, security and ordered progress of the world demand 
a world federation of free nations, and on no other basis can the problems of the 
modern world be solved. Such a world federation would ensure the freedom of its 
constituent nations, the prevention of aggression and exploitation by one nation 
over another, the protection of national minorities, the advancement of all 
backward areas and peoples, and the pooling of the world’s resources for the 
common good of all.128 
Gandhi invoked the resolution at the 1945 San Francisco Conference, but in truth he had 
reservations about its penultimate clause. He was skeptical of Western culture with its 
unreflective thirst for science and industry, and had doubted whether grafting it onto non-
Western societies would result in “the advancement of all backward areas.” For him, 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki illustrated “the most diabolical use of science” and commended 
the adoption of traditional Indian and Jain Buddhist beliefs by international society, in 
particular ahimsa, or non-violence against living beings.129 Nehru, by contrast, embraced 
the logic of development and the value of advanced science and modern industry. He saw 
them as springboards with which India could overleap the gulf between the industrial and 
developing worlds—the nation’s agrarian past and its glittering future.130  
Nehru had imbibed Whiggish notions of limitless growth and abundance through 
scientific discovery and technological exploits, and a related faith in technocratic 
governance while a student at Cambridge University. Classic liberalism held that human 
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potential was mainly bound up in the technological stage of advancement; to this precept, 
Nehru added a critique of colonialism. Nehru believed as many Indians did that the 
material advantages that European metropoles had wielded over their colonial 
possessions paved the way for the Age of maritime Empires and the imposition of the 
British Raj. India could most swiftly bridge the gap between itself and the imperial 
powers by leapfrogging them via innovative technological platforms. His views about the 
interaction among science, technology, and society guided how he thought the 
international system would operate after decolonization.131 
These foundational ideas were clearly expressed in Nehru’s response to skeptics 
who felt the strict secrecy of the 1948 Atomic Energy Act, which established the Indian 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEC), betrayed the ulterior motives of India’s supposedly 
peaceful program: 
[A]tomic energy is a vast source of power that is coming to the world … Consider 
the past few hundred years of history, the world developed a new source of power, 
that is steam—the steam engine and the like—and the industrial age came in. 
India with all her many virtues did not development that source of power. It 
became a backward country … it became a slave country because of that … Now 
we are facing the atomic age; we are on the verge of it. And this is obviously 
something infinitely more powerful than either steam or electricity. … [I]f we are 
to remain abreast in the world … we must develop this atomic energy quite apart 
from war—indeed we must develop it … for peaceful purposes. … Of course, if 
we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious 
sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way. But I do hope 
that our outlook in regard to this atomic energy is going to be a peaceful one for 
the development of human life and happiness and not one of war and hatred.132 
The ghost of the colonial past haunted Nehru’s words; in Itty Abraham’s phrasing, Nehru 
located India in world-historical space, “where it [was] one among many, and where the 
                                                
131 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Essential Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003); 
Shashi Tharoor, Nehru: The Invention of India, 1st ed (New York: Arcade Pub, 2003); V. R. Krishna Iyer, 
Nehru and Krishna Menon (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993). 
132 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 20. 
 83 
historical epoch [was] marked by a non-human entity”—the presiding technological 
regime—the Nuclear Age. The face shown by India to the world should reflect Gandhian 
moral principles and faith in collective security; even so, if the choice was between an 
ethical stance and a return to subjugation, the country could ill afford nuclear 
forbearance. The legacy of British colonialism and the historical myth that India had 
suffered 150 years of colonization due to a technological gap led Nehru and his Congress 
Party to support nuclear power reflexively.  
The dual-use applications of nuclear facilities, research, scientists, funding, and 
reactors appeared self-evident to Indian observers in 1948. George Perkovich 
characterizes Indian nuclear policy as entailing, from the beginning, a secret quest for a 
nuclear bomb. Such “nuclear ambivalence,” he asserts, presented itself in the Atomic 
Energy Act and found personification in the close relationship between Nehru and Homi 
Bhabha, the director of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, chairman of the 
IAEC and, after 1954, and secretary of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (IDAE). 
Both men were nationalistic in outlook and objectives, Western in education and self-
image, and elitist in upbringing and tastes. Both were reared amid great wealth and 
power, educated at Cambridge, blessed with superior intelligence, recipients of global 
acclaim, and besotted with Western culture. The “Nehru-Bhabha relationship,” 
Perkovich asserts, “constituted the only potentially real mechanism to check and balance 
the nuclear program;” instead, it was hampered by their overly “friendly and symbiotic” 
dealings.133  
There was a fundamental contradiction between the global and the national in 
Nehru’s worldview. Implicit in the resolution, for example, was faith in international 
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institutions such as the United Nations as the ultimate arbiters of interstate affairs. Against 
this globalist vision stood Indian nationalism coexisting with a historical anticolonialism 
that associated territory with a national community. Thus, Nehru and his lieutenant, 
Krishna Menon, the Indian Ambassador to the U.K. and subsequently the U.N., had 
waged a “crusade” against nuclear weapons testing and armament through 1963. 
Simultaneously, Nehru superintended the expansion of peaceful nuclear energy, which he 
saw as key to India’s development. He supported the work done by Homi Bhabha and his 
subordinates at the IAEC and Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, whose exploits 
would later facilitate a “peaceful” nuclear explosive program. India was ambivalent about 
its nuclear future in the early 1960s. Whether it would tilt toward acquiring a military 
capability, or forbear it, hinged on public opinion, regional threats, and the ability of a 
“strategic enclave” of nuclear scientists to shape policy.134  
Taking into account the sluggish development of military applications though, 
India’s early nuclear history was driven less by ambiguity than by hedging.135 Nuclear 
technology’s so-called “dual-use” character means the precise origins of a military 
program are murky; to specify them is ultimately a matter of interpretation.136 Though 
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they were brethren, Nehru and Bhabha were long dead when Indira Gandhi placed her 
country’s nuclear program on a military footing in 1971. Doubtlessly, Bhabha made 
decisions when he was India’s nuclear superintendent whose motives held military 
implications, for instance, the promotion of a plutonium-dependent breeder reactor. 
These decisions had international dimensions as well; Bhabha had succeeded in 
September 1956, for instance, in preventing the new IAEA safeguard regime from 
overseeing plutonium reprocessing.137 Even so, India’s nuclear development was 
conditioned primarily by economic geography and political economy. The subcontinent 
lacked natural uranium but possessed a wealth of thorium-232; hence, the establishment 
of a breeder program reliant on plutonium and thorium reflected available domestic 
resources. On the other hand, the breeder program (ground broke at Trombay on a 
plutonium reprocessing plant in April 1961) alarmed American onlookers, among others, 
who were reluctant to permit fuel reprocessing that could surreptitiously yield enough 
fissile material to sprint to an atomic explosive in short order. Though Bhabha never 
denied the appeal of nuclear weapons, the choices he made while head of the IAEC were 
common to most national nuclear programs. Global elites viewed nuclear power as 
having the ability to spring India into modernity through widespread electrification. 
Laying the foundation for an advanced nuclear regime had the added benefit of allowing 
Indian officials to hedge their bets on the military option. They could delay a definitive 
policy decision with little to no sacrifice in terms of capability. Whether or not Bhahba 
had in mind peaceful explosives or nuclear weapons in the 1950s, initiating the subcritical 
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testing necessary to fabricate a plutonium-based explosive warranted a prime ministerial 
order.138 As such, the launching of a military nuclear program needed a political 
command.  
India’s staunch opposition to nuclear weapons began to crack with the Sino-
Indian War in 1962 and the signing of the LTBT in 1963. On October 20, 1962, at the 
apex of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a month-long conflict ensued when the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army launched attacks against Indian military positions in Aksai 
Chin and across the Nanka Chu River. The conflict was fought over a disputed colonial-
era border, the northern McMahon Line, along which the Indian Army had deployed 
units in a provocative forward line, against the backdrop of Indian encroachment in 
Tibetan politics and, more broadly, Sino-India rivalry for Afro-Asian leadership. The 
outcome was a decisive Chinese victory, but ultimately a return to the territorial status 
quo ante bellum. Though India lost no territory (in a remote, rarified, and rugged region), 
the military setback was a national embarrassment that led to the sacking of Menon 
whom Nehru had recently appointed Defense Minister.  
The fiery Menon was infamous for his upbraiding of imperialism, his pride in 
Indian achievement, and his asceticism cloaked in bespoke suits. He incarnated Indian 
soft power in the post-independence era, fronting rhetorical campaigns for decolonization 
and disarmament and against imperialist adventures in Suez and nuclear testing’s 
                                                
138 Evidence of India hedging was exemplified by a note that Ashok Kapur reported Nehru to have 
scribbled in the margin of a letter from Bhabha that outlined the pertinent details of the Indo-Canadian 
nuclear deal to construct CANDU: “Apart from building power stations and developing electricity there is 
always a built-in advantage of defence use if the need should arise.” Quoted in ibid., 63.. Perkovich 
maintains that India began theoretical work on nuclear explosives in late 1967, when Raja Ramanna, the 
director of the physics group at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, instructed Rajagopala Chidambaram to 
derive the equation of state for plutonium, “a study necessary to design a nuclear explosive with a 
plutonium core.” This line of thinking begs the question, however, of at what abstruse point in the study of 
nuclear physics a bomb-decision has been made. Moreover, the formulation of an equation of state remains 
academic until the politico-technical decision to initiate sub-critical testing of plutonium or enriched 
uranium is made. Ibid., 139–144. 
 87 
environmental effects. His speech to the UNGA on November 2, 1959 on the subject of 
disarmament exemplified Menon’s views and how India sought to leverage its moral 
capital to establish norms of international behavior: 
We firmly believe that it is possible to disarm this world. … For thousands of years 
men have talked about turning their weapons into plough-shares. But the time has 
now come when, if they do not turn them into instruments of peace, they will no 
longer be here to turn them into anything.139 
Menon was neither an idealist nor an ideologue. He took a dim view of a U.N. Police 
Force, narrating it as a farce in which “Field Marshall [Dag] Hammarskjold[‘s]” would 
be placed in charge of a “large quantity of arms to convert him into a new Napoleon.” 
“This is going the wrong way,” he concluded sardonically.140 As a U.N. Ambassador, he 
consistently placed collective security above India’s parochial interest. In his final speech 
to the UNGA in 1962, he endorsed the principle of a non-dissemination treaty as of 
primary importance and claimed that India lacked the “national ego to possess atomic 
weapons.” He kept these positions as Defence Minister, increasing spending on materiel 
and troops, but categorically opposing a military nuclear program. Menon’s sacrifice in 
the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War lessened his influence within the government and 
consequently the status of antinuclear principles in the government. He would 
nonetheless remain a vocal and respected luminary in the Congress Party, offsetting 
Bhabhi’s pronuclear declarations with fierce yet reasoned appeals for nuclear restraint 
and Indian moral leadership.141 This leadership surfaced in the Indian response to the 
signing of the Moscow Treaty in August 1963. Its longstanding championship of a 
nuclear-free world and Nehru’s legacy as an original author of a test ban led India to sign 
the LTBT with alacrity.  
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Indian nuclear diplomacy began to change once the partial test-ban treaty took 
the hazard of transnational fallout out of the nuclear equation. The test ban preserved the 
global commons and was universal; by contrast, a nuclear nonproliferation treaty would 
formalize differences among states in the sensitive field of national security. At the time, 
however, a nonproliferation treaty enjoyed broad support from world leaders and other 
ENDC delegations, including the Indian contingent in Geneva. U.N. Secretary General 
U Thant sent a message upholding the need for “concrete measures” to improve East-
West relations, employing his bully pulpit to push for real achievements. Jawaharlal’s 
cousin, B.K. Nehru, the interim representative to the ENDC on leave from his 
ambassadorship in Washington, declared in early February 1964, “[t]he next few months 
are of crucial importance, for if there is a lack of progress in our work the earlier gains 
may be lost.”142 This urgency stemmed in part from a general sense that Soviet-American 
détente was necessary and fragile, and in part from the question of whether the 
international community could embark on a nonproliferation settlement with a Chinese 
test on the horizon. Nehru castigated China for refusing to sign the LTBT, but his 
remarks on nonproliferation were affirmative albeit non-committal. He concurred with 
Thant that “our efforts must be directed to reaching an agreement of general and 
complete disarmament;” however, he conceded, “it is also vitally important to maintain 
and strengthen détente.” India hoped for collateral measures that could “bring about a 
further improvement in the international atmosphere;” the first such measure that he 
mentioned was non-dissemination.143 Though reserved, the pronouncement was 
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significant given that it came from a Nehru; nonetheless, the Indian position on a 
nonproliferation treaty remained clouded.  
B. K. Nehru’s ambivalence reflected shifting attitudes toward nuclear weapons 
that foreshadowed shifts in state behavior as well. Early proliferation warnings dwelt 
excessively on material indicators and postulated that the spread of nuclear weapons 
would follow a mathematical logic whereby each new member of the club would 
accelerate a global chain reaction. The reality was that each country evaluated the 
nuclear option through the lens of its own security interests (often regional), bureaucratic 
politics, and public declarations.144 The nuclear orthodoxy resulting from the work of 
Thomas Schelling, Albert Wohlstetter, and others, had forged a mental space where 
nuclear deterrents were justifiable as instruments of peace. And a minority discourse 
associated with Pierre Gallois, a French military officer and strategists, had legitimated 
the notion that nuclear deterrents were not the sole preserve of the superpowers because 
their efficacy did not necessarily depend on a symmetry of nuclear forces. McNamara had 
given an exact accounting on February 19 of what the U.S. nuclear arsenal would 
comprise in 1969 in order to assure U.S. allies of its prodigious size, commensurate 
credibility, and total deterrent effect. Canadian diplomats cited this disclosure when they 
told the French observer in Geneva, Bernard de Chalvron, that they “were looking into 
the efficacy of a nominal deterrent of 100 missiles”—their own force de frappe.145 Though 
most governments seized the cheaper option of evaluating a sovereign deterrent’s 
expected costs and benefits, the revelation that Canada had pondered the military option 
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showed how the stigma had weakened. Might even India, the foremost champion of 
general and complete disarmament and peaceful co-existence, waver? 
How world statesmen viewed and debated general and complete disarmament 
exemplified the growing normalcy of nuclear deterrence and the corresponding traction 
of the nuclear orthodoxy. The U.S. deterrent had shielded the Atlantic alliance since 
1949. Likewise, the U.S.S.R. relied increasingly on nuclear weapons on top of Warsaw 
Pact conventional forces in Europe. For years, Soviet diplomats had nonetheless insisted 
that disarmament was an end best achieved through reciprocal and unverified 
declarations rather than incremental steps as preferred by the West. Disarmament talks 
were often disparaged as breeding grounds for propaganda fights, tedious arcana, and 
outright deception; even so, U.S. officials spent large amounts of time, energy, and 
thought evaluating how best to disarm.146 Indian leaders had worked diligently to 
stigmatize nuclear weapons and push for general and complete disarmament. Now 
though, they showed greater flexibility in their rhetoric at disarmament forums. In 
remarks made to the U.N. First Committee on October 30, 1963, Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
sister, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, a major political figure in her own right (her attacks on 
South African apartheid were legendary), praised Andrei Gromyko’s concession that a 
multi-stage plan would leave “a certain number of missiles by the two great Powers to the 
end of the last stage of disarmament.” “Mr. Gromyko’s agreement,” she opined, “[was] 
the most significant development on the disarmament plan this year.”147 This rhetorical 
shift signaled with what import the international community viewed Soviet-American 
détente. It showed as well that nuclear deterrence was seen more and more by Indian 
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elites, among others, as a stabilizing force rather than a moral evil to be extirpated from 
the world.  
Indian policy on nuclear weapons and nonproliferation was highly malleable in 
1964. Indian diplomats and scientists released a number of trial balloons at the U.N., 
ENDC, and Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, along with bilateral 
feelers to the U.S. and U.S.S.R., to broadcast their mounting sense of insecurity relative 
to China and resultant contemplation of nuclear alternatives. The Indian nuclear 
industry’s chief booster and, in the coming months, an increasingly outspoken advocate of 
an Indian Bomb, Homi Bhabha, delivered one such address in early 1964. Though 
Bhahba would publically support a military nuclear program later that year, his speech at 
the Pugwash Conference in Udaipur, India, reflected Indian foreign policy: 
[N]uclear weapons coupled with an adequate delivery system can enable a State 
to acquire the capacity to destroy more or less totally the cities, industry and all 
important targets in another state. It is then largely irrelevant whether the State so 
attacked has greater destructive power at its command. With the help of nuclear 
weapons, therefore, a State can acquire what we may call a position of absolute 
deterrence even against another having a many times greater destructive power 
under its control.148 
Behind the allusion to asymmetric nuclear deterrence lurked the figure of Gallois. Later 
in the speech, Bhabha conjured the image of the P.R.C. He warned that “a country with 
a huge population always present[s] a threat to its smaller neighbors,” which “they can 
meet either by collective security or by recourse to nuclear weapons.” He observed that it 
would require security guarantees from “both the major nuclear powers” to replace the 
security afforded by a national deterrent. Several states had the technical means and 
human and financial capital to build nuclear weapons “within the next 5 or 10 years,” 
reflecting the pervasiveness of Nth-country estimates and implying not too subtly that 
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India stood among them. Bhabha’s private conversations were as candid as his public 
remarks, and India’s capacity to develop a military nuclear capability was common 
knowledge among international observers. A trio of individuals who would eventually 
hold the reins of Indian nuclear policy sat in the audience that day: Vikram Sarabhai, 
future chairman of the IAEC; V.C. Trivedi, India’s lead negotiator in nonproliferation 
talks; and Indira Gandhi, the future prime minister.149 
The nuclear scientist held back from an insistence on India’s right to go nuclear. 
Instead, he conceded that the further spread of nuclear weapons would heighten global 
insecurity and imperil superpower détente. Bhabha identified two means by which the 
superpowers could persuade countries, such as India, to abandon their circumstantial 
leanings toward nuclear weapons. Either the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could blaze a trail toward 
nuclear disarmament, or they could issue joint security guarantees to put the minds of 
jumpy statesmen at ease.150 The task of preventing a nuclear India would toughen after 
China’s test in October. For now, however, even India’s most avid nuclear optimist had 
conceded that India could forgo a nuclear capability under two conditions. Whether a 
non-nuclear India was attainable by means of disarmament (a quixotic hope) or Soviet-
American nuclear assurances (a singular response to a universal threat) would determine 
the strength and scope of any nonproliferation treaty. For now, however, a window of 
opportunity seemed narrowly open.  
Comments by B.K. Nehru at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in 
February 1964 expanded upon Bhabha’s observations. After again decrying the P.R.C.’s 
failure to sign the LTBT, Nehru remarked that India considered it insufficient “to rely for 
international peace-keeping on the limited deterrent in the hands of the two great 
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Powers.”151 He declined to outline how international security could be strengthened 
without nuclear spread. Days later, Tsarapkin expressed his government’s 
acknowledgement of “an intimate link between the retention and abolition of national 
nuclear deterrents and the problem of international peace-keeping.” This was 
unsurprising given India’s importance as a key non-aligned, left-leaning state on which 
Moscow bestowed favors, endorsements, and arms sales for purposes of political, 
ideological, and economic influence.152 New Delhi’s willingness to sign a nonproliferation 
treaty would depend on the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to allay its 
security fears through unilateral or mutual security assurances, or to rid the world of 
nuclear weapons beginning with the People’s Republic of China. 
Washington began to reassess its approach to South Asia in light of changing 
politico-military circumstances. The U.S. had long relied on Pakistan as a regional 
bulwark against Soviet influence and a staging ground for surveillance in the form of 
seismic monitoring and U-2 over-flights. Though self-professedly non-aligned, India had 
tacked toward Washington as soon as the 1962 Sino-Indian War (and Cuban Missile 
Crisis) broke out, pleading for military aid in the form of twelve squadrons of fighter jets, 
some B-47 bombers, and light equipment for its infantry. The U.S. also promised to 
deploy the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to pacify the Indians. The U.S. arms 
package upset Pakistan, where President Mohammad Ayub Khan would resist domestic 
pressure to invade Kashmir, but remained unwilling to make “a positive gesture of 
sympathy and restraint.”153  
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The Johnson administration had sent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Maxwell 
Taylor to South Asia to discuss security matters in December 1963. In India, former 
Finance Minister Morarji Desa answered Taylor’s queries about the ramifications of a 
Chinese nuclear explosion in India with the suggestion that there would be “political 
pressure on the G[overment] o[f] I[ndia] to produce nuclear weapons, which [it] could 
attain in a couple of years if it decided to try.”154 Rusk informed the U.S. Embassy in 
Karachi, where Pakistan was receiving $625 million per year from Washington, to 
prepare the Pakistani leadership to accept more U.S. support heading to India in order to 
buttress Indian and Pakistani “self-defense” as an “essential element” in “our 
subcontinental policy of deterring Chinese Communist expansionism.”155 U.S. policy to 
India now ran along two axes: military assistance and nuclear nonproliferation. With the 
U.S. ever more embroiled in Vietnam, and South Asia the feared next front of 
communist subversion, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations hoped that weapons 
transfers and low-interest loans would moderate India’s socialist leanings. In New Delhi, 
U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles lobbied for Washington to urge India to “place 
reasonable limits on its military forces.” In a December 6 telegram, he underlined 
Taylor’s proposal for a three-to-five-year military assistance program including the 
provision of high performance aircraft. He also proposed assigning a naval task force in 
the Indian Ocean for part of each year to “ease Asian fears … following detonation [of a] 
Chicom nuclear device.”156  
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Bowles sent a follow-up telegram four days later to reiterate his point. He urged 
the State Department and White House to recognize that “India … is the only major 
nation that wholly shares our views in regard to China.”157 The desire to revise U.S. 
policy in South Asia, tilting toward India and away from Pakistan without alienating 
Karachi, stemmed in part from a tactical objective of preventing a Soviet sale of MIG-21s 
to New Delhi against which Bowles and Taylor cited military, financial, and public 
relations arguments. With Vietnam teetering and China the bête noire in early 1964, 
Bowles warned that “if Southeast Asia goes under, India with its 450 million people 
becomes [the] political, economic and military front in conflict with China in Asia.”  His 
rationale was geopolitical rather than ideological. With Eisenhower’s domino theory 
regnant and Ngo Dinh Diem dead, “an economically viable, politically stable, Western-
oriented India is of absolutely basic importance to US security interests between [the] Sea 
of Japan and [the] Mediterranean.”158 The result was a U.S. promise of $500 million in a 
mixture of low-interest financing and grants to assist the Indian military buildup.159 The 
resistance of the Pentagon, which feared upsetting relations with Pakistan, stymied a large 
portion of a planned arms sale to India including a fleet of F-104s. As a result, Prime 
Minister Lal Badahur Shastri, who had replaced Jawaharlal Nehru after he died from a 
heart attack in May, reached an agreement with the Soviet Union to supply dozens of 
MIG-21s together with a factory with which to build hundreds more.  
Though Foggy Bottom was excited at the prospect of improving U.S.-Indian 
relations, Rusk worried that an Indo-Pakistani conventional arms race would lead 
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inexorably to a nuclear arms race. In a conversation with Mexican Foreign Minister 
Manuel Tello on February 21, 1964, Rusk observed that arms control no longer 
encompassed the superpowers alone; he spotlighted the South Asian rivals along with 
Israel and the U.A.R., and Ethiopia and Somalia as the regional powers most likely to 
engage in arms races. He noted “a coincidence of policy in Moscow, London, 
Washington and Paris in an effort to achieve nuclear arms control.”160 He could only 
have meant nonproliferation; it was the only measure then generating traction in Geneva 
and on which France had a tacit interest. Three days later, Deputy Director of Research 
George C. Denny, Jr. sent Rusk a memorandum from Foggy Bottom warning him that 
India was capable of launching a military nuclear program in short order given the 
political will: 
New information has recently come to hand on the Indian reactor and plutonium 
separation facilities which suggests that within four to six months India will be 
able to [and] may intend to produce weapons-grade plutonium free of any 
safeguards. While we have no other evidence that they are starting a nuclear 
weapons program, they are now in a position to put together a crude device 
within 1 to 3 years of the start up of their plutonium facility, scheduled for May of 
this year.161 
A report in March from the Department of Energy underscored the spread of technical 
means of producing fissile material and atom bombs, although it left India out of its 
forecasts. These findings identified a new threat vector in nuclear acquisition strategies. 
Where previous forecasts had focused on plutonium generated on the back-end of the fuel 
cycle as the most likely route along which a country might pursue nuclear weapons, an 
engineering working group at the Union Carbide Company’s Nuclear Division had 
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experimented with gas centrifuges to ascertain how states at various levels of industrial 
development might obtain sufficient fissile material in the form of highly enriched 
uranium to outfit an atomic explosive. This enrichment pathway’s small footprint lent 
itself to clandestine operation, the report concluded, and would make it “feasible for the 
countries described in this report which do not now have a nuclear weapons program to 
produce enriched uranium.”162 The non-communist countries identified as technically 
capable of utilizing the enriched uranium pathway were West Germany, England, the 
Netherlands, and Japan, with Brazil and France on the fringes. Though a technical 
capacity was a necessary but not sufficient condition for a country to go nuclear, the 
implications were clear. Additionally, new intelligence (whose sources might have 
included the Indian leadership) suggested that India, Israel, and Sweden were more 
nuclear-capable then expected.  
Thomas Hughes, director of the State Department’s Office of Intelligence and 
Research, asked CIA Director John McCone to revise the Nth-country forecasts in the 
agency’s National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) by fall 1964.163 Predictions were therefore 
multiplying that a nuclear India was in the cards. The NIE published on October 21 
concluded that “India, and perhaps Israel and Sweden” were the most likely to develop 
nuclear weapons, but “there will not be a widespread proliferation … over the next 
decade.” With regard to New Delhi, the decision would boil down to how quickly China’s 
arsenal expanded, what happened in Sino-Soviet relations, and the availability of “outside 
assurances.” With India’s current plutonium production capable of fueling a dozen 
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Hiroshima-size atom bombs by 1970, “the chances are better than ever that Indian 
[would] decide to develop nuclear weapons within the next few years.”164 
 
Explosives and Elections 
With the 1964 U.S. presidential election on the horizon, Foster remained 
sanguine about Soviet-American agreement on the essence of a nonproliferation treaty. 
The State Department had strongly recommended that the U.S. distance itself from the 
Gomulka Proposal for a nuclear-free-zone in Europe owing to its disadvantages for 
NATO’s defense posture.165 Foster had instead focused his energy on his frequent 
conversations with his co-chairman, Semyon Tsarapkin. This itinerary went unbroken 
even when a KGB agent in the Soviet delegation named Yuri Nosenko defected to the 
CIA in Geneva—a significant diplomatic incident.166 Foster believed that the 
“atmosphere [was] good,” and the “mutual interests of the United States and the Soviet 
Union appeared increasingly clear.” Moreover, McNamara’s disclosure of the country’s 
massive nuclear power had shown the Soviets the wisdom of a nuclear freeze. Finally, he 
doubted that space-based systems or anti-missile defenses would revolutionize strategic 
affairs in the near future.  
                                                
164 CIA National Intelligence Report number 4-2-64, “Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
over the Next Decade,” NPTC, CWIHP, 7. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115994. 
165 State Department, Memorandum for the Record, “The Gomulka Proposal,” 2 April 1964, Box 10, SF-
Disarmament, NSF, LBJL. 
166 Hervé Alphand, Washington, Telegram to Paris, “Interview with one of William Foster’s confidants at 
ACDA,” 13 March 1964, Box 768, Cote 517INVA, AMAEF, 1. Nosenko had been recruited by the CIA in 
Geneva in 1962 and insisted on his urgent need to defect because of his belief that the KGB had identified 
him as a turncoat. At his debriefing, he provided information that corroborated Soviet claims they had 
never recruited Lee Harvey Oswald due to perceived mental issues. Nosenko claimed he had handled the 
Oswald case himself, but was harshly dealt with in light of American suspicions of Soviet involvement in the 
Kennedy assassination and the contradictory testimony of another defector. T. H Bagley, Spy Wars Moles, 
Mysteries, and Deadly Games (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
 99 
According to a member of the U.S. delegation at Geneva, Tsarapkin was equally 
interested in a Soviet-American agreement. He had informed Foster that Soviet 
intelligence was perfectly aware of the state of talks between the U.S. and the F.R.G. 
“They have asked you to renounce, after a certain amount of time, your veto rights for 
the Europeans’ sake, or even for them alone,” Tsarapkin reportedly said, “and you have 
not set them straight.” Foster informed Tsarapkin that his reservations about the MLF 
were much ado about nothing; “no promises had been made to the Germans and, 
regardless, the problem would not arise for a dozen years. “This was more than enough 
time,” Foster concluded, “for us to reach an understanding in this area.”167 On the other 
hand, Jacob Beam of the Disarmament Agency and Foy Kohler, the U.S. ambassador to 
the U.S.S.R., were both of the opinion that Soviet action was paralyzed by the Sino-
Soviet split; according to Kohler, they were “obligated to filter all foreign policy moves 
through the litmus of their quarrel with the Chinese.”168 The Soviets appeared to hang in 
the balance, vacillating between preventing a nuclear P.R.C. from arising and averting 
defections by their Eastern European allies if they appeared to tack too far toward the 
United States.  
Washington and Moscow still courted the F.R.G., which tied Foster’s hands even 
as he tried to shake those of Tsarapkin on a deal. Though Gomulka had thwarted 
Khrushchev on the MLF, the Soviet leader had vexed the communist leaderships in both 
Poland and East Germany. Khrushchev and Ulbricht rebuffed Erhard’s attempt to whet 
their appetites t for reunification with commercial sweeteners for East Germany and the 
Soviet Union, whose financial and agricultural sectors were in trouble. Khrushchev 
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nevertheless invited the chancellor to visit Moscow at the end of March in order to clear 
the air. Foggy Bottom meanwhile scrutinized relations with the F.R.G. in connection to 
the MLF. Its diplomats canvassed U.S. allies in NATO, in particular Italy and Great 
Britain, and organized a demonstration featuring a mixed-manned U.S. destroyer. The 
White House’s position on reconciling NATO nuclear-sharing and nonproliferation 
language had ossified. In a letter from the President to Erhard on March 4, Johnson 
noted “little significant progress” in Geneva and touched on the talks primarily in relation 
to “achiev[ing] a free and reunified Germany.” Though he discussed the Cyprus and 
Vietnam crises and West German help with applying sanctions to Cuba, he failed to 
mention the multilateral force.169  
A full accounting of whether the administration should align itself behind a more 
integrated role for West Germany and other NATO members in nuclear-sharing 
arrangements or, alternatively, Soviet-American nuclear cooperation occurred in the 
Oval Office on April 10. The president presided over a late-afternoon meeting attended 
by Ball, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Thomas Finletter, Foster, Rostow, Bundy, and a 
few others. Ball began the meeting by “stressing the danger of perpetuating German 
discrimination” in NATO’s nuclear forces, “emphasizing the need for giving the 
Germans a legitimate role … but ‘on a leash.’” He cited the lack of congressional 
opposition (a questionable claim) and the potential to secure an agreement by the end of 
the year. Bundy declared that even though there was a “consensus,” “serious 
reservations” existed among U.S. foreign policymakers such as McNamara, Foster, and 
the Joint Chiefs. That being said, the collective force would preserve the U.S. role in 
Europe and offer incentives for the British and French to relinquish their atomic arsenals. 
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Ball and Finletter framed the question as one of resolve. The British and Italians, they 
posited, hesitated because they doubted the levels of investment under Kennedy and, 
then, Johnson. It was mixed U.S. signals, rather than political conditions, that unsettled 
the allies.170  
Foster interrupted at this point in the discussion. He called into question the 
existence of Bundy’s “consensus” and pressed home Moscow’s “strongly negative view” of 
the scheme. He warned that the MLF could end up “tying U.S. hands in such [a] way 
that it could be immobilized in future disarmament and non-dissemination discussions.” 
He directly contradicted a recent memorandum from Foy Kohler in which the U.S. 
Ambassador in Moscow averred that “Soviet leaders find [the] MLF less objectionable 
than the kinds of MRBM arrangements that might come about in its absence” and 
maintained there was “no evidence” that the MLF impeded progress. Foster disagreed 
categorically, asserting that “[i]t did not coincide with his impressions from his talks” with 
Tsarapkin in Geneva. Foster stopped short of fully condemning the MLF, but advised 
that, if it must be policy, it should be completed with “all deliberate speed.”171 
Johnson approved further steps in spite of Foster’s dissent. Officials from the State 
Department would brief members of the key committees on Capitol Hill and emphasize 
to NATO allies the superiority of the MLF to known alternatives without “trying to shove 
the project down the[ir] throats.” Foster could have hammered his points home more 
strongly; the MLF was undeniably what obstructed a nonproliferation treaty. However, 
the deck was stacked against pro-treaty voices before the meeting began. Bundy’s 
impartiality and Rusk’s absence were decisive. Rusk held a broad portfolio and was well 
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informed about nuclear-weapon programs in Israel, Sweden, and India. Ball ran the show 
in his absence, accentuating the positives and repackaging the negatives as further 
grounds for U.S. commitment.  
While the Johnson administration failed to embrace a global treaty, more limited 
measures such as limiting peaceful nuclear assistance gained traction. That same month, 
the State Department refused an F.R.G. request for a fast-burst reactor named Triga. 
Shortly afterward, Johnson and Khrushchev simultaneously announced major cutbacks 
in the production of enriched uranium, as well as plutonium in the U.S. Though largely 
immaterial relative to an accelerating nuclear arms race, the joint announcement did 
signal the superpowers’ willingness to cooperate.  
Cooperation on nonproliferation by contrast stagnated that summer. Johnson’s 
oral message to Khrushchev on May 1 neglected the matter entirely.172 The Soviet 
premier’s disarming response and the lack of American follow-up were symptomatic of 
policy inertia. Khrushchev expressed support for a joint Soviet-American initiative on the 
desalination of saltwater by means of nuclear power. He also urged greater action and 
personal engagement in the Geneva talks: 
Now you are in favor of our [disarmament] representatives … being instructed to 
make a really persistent effort to reach agreement in this important area. Why 
not? Let them work a little longer, and a little harder; we have to explore every 
possibility to the end …. We shall give our representative in the Committee of 18 
the necessary instructions. And to increase the chances of success, to ensure that 
the disarmament negotiations do not again sink into routine, let us both follow the 
work of our representatives more closely; let us prod them a little if that is needed. 
… I am thinking that sometime soon it might be useful to instruct our ministers of 
foreign affairs to examine the course of the negotiations[;] … for example, during 
the XIX Session of the General Assembly of the UN. … Let us see what concrete 
results can be achieved by our ministers. And then, perhaps, the need will arise for 
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us to meet. We understand that similar views are current in Washington also. But 
this is, of course, a matter for the future. We should not run too far ahead.173 
Khrushchev was right that disarmament talks and especially the most achievable 
measure—a nonproliferation agreement—were moribund and therefore “matters for the 
future.” In light of American inflexibility on the MLF, it would take a high-level decision 
to prioritize international arms control in order to untangle the Gordian knot of 
international nuclear diplomacy. The impasse was partly caused by the complaints 
against U.S. nonproliferation being leveled by Bonn’s representatives. West German 
obstreperousness came through in a conversation between U.S. Ambassador and Acting 
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Llewellyn Thompson and Ambassador 
Knappstein on August 5. The West German envoy passed along an aide-mémoire 
conveying “great concern” about how assiduously Foster and his aides worked for a 
nonproliferation treaty in Geneva. The Germans felt the issue was being “exploited by 
the Soviets as a welcome means to discredit [them] in the eyes of the world.”174 As a 
result of West German complaints and U.S. bureaucratic politics, the Eighteen Nation 
Committee on Disarmament was little closer to a nonproliferation treaty when it recessed 
on September 17. 
The United States and the United Kingdom were poised to elect new 
governments in October 1964. With Barry Goldwater’s defeat of Nelson Rockefeller at 
the Republican convention, Johnson faced a challenger whose isolationist and 
unorthodox views on U.S. military power matched his libertarian domestic beliefs in the 
degree of their nonconformity with the postwar liberal consensus.175 The candidacy of 
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Goldwater, whose views on nuclear weapons diverged considerably from the nuclear 
orthodoxy, brought the negotiations in Geneva and New York City to an effective halt.176 
The Soviets had an inkling of what to expect from Lyndon Johnson. By contrast, Barry 
Goldwater had suggested that selective proliferation to U.S. allies and proxies might be in 
the country’s interests. Soviet delegates in Geneva informed the French that they 
expected scant progress to occur during the elections.177 
Goldwater’s observations about the strategic advantages of selective proliferation 
and the military utility of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe or for defoliation purposes 
in Vietnam contradicted a core tenet of the nuclear orthodoxy—nuclear weapons’ sole 
legitimate use was deterrence and their spread was impermissible. The notion that U.S. 
commanders should treat them as equivalent to conventional weapons and that their 
spread could actually enhance national security were so far beyond the norms that they 
essentially torpedoed Goldwater’s presidential chances. Goldwater’s undoing came at the 
hands of a little girl in a field of daisies. The “Daisy Ad” aired only once on national 
television because of its controversial nature. In it, a young girl was seen picking petals 
from a daisy and struggling to count them correctly before a male voice replaced hers, 
ominously intoning the digits from ten to zero, when a fiery mushroom cloud replaced 
the bucolic scene. The voiceover informed the audience: “These are the stakes, to make a 
world in which all of God’s children can live, or to go into the dark. We must either love 
each other, or we must die.” The campaign advertisement ended with a voice directing 
the audience to “Vote for President Johnson on November 3rd; the stakes are too high for 
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you to stay home.”178 The Daisy ad was significant in numerous respects—the invention 
of the campaign attack ad, the limits of political discourse, and Johnson’s stratospheric 
victory. In many ways, the little girl in the field foregrounded the constellation of images, 
fears, and pathos that thermonuclear war evoked: the death of a generation, the 
obliteration of nature, and the association of peace and love with the heavy burden of 
paternal political leadership.  
The United Kingdom underwent a parliamentary election as well that would 
vault the Labour Party into Whitehall once more. The Labour Party had more than 
flirted with unilateral nuclear disarmament when the party’s union-backed elements 
trumped agitators from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament when writing the 
electoral platform.179 Harold Wilson’s shadow defense minister, Denis Healey, came out 
against the MLF on whose desirability the Conservative Party had repeatedly 
equivocated. London had a strong stake in international nuclear diplomacy, which 
allowed the country to capitalized on its status as a nuclear power and for which the 
British invoked their national identity as a moral standard.180 The Conservative 
government under Macmillan wanted to replicate its key intermediary role in test-ban 
negotiations. Nuclear proliferation presented a threat to Britain’s global prestige based on 
strong sterling, moral capital, and nuclear power, as well as its status as a major power in 
Europe. Furthermore, the British Isles’ compactness made the country vulnerable to even 
a small thermonuclear attack. A modern deterrent based on the Polaris missile system 
gave Britain a seat at the table while massive protests at Aldermaston and London 
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organized by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament made proactive nuclear diplomacy 
a political necessity; the country’s pursuit of moral capital would appease domestic 
audiences and burnish its global reputation. U.K. Foreign Minister Richard Austen 
Butler arrived in Geneva on February 24 in hopes that Gromyko would follow his lead. 
His primary reason for arriving was not to hasten a nonproliferation treaty, or other 
measures encompassed by disarmament, but instead not “to allow the opposition [Labour 
Party] to outstrip [the Conservative Party] in the disarmament field.” The ENDC could 
not be allowed to “interrupt its work.”181  
The United Kingdom’s investment in nuclear arms control received a boost when 
Harold Wilson and the Labour Party won the general parliamentary election on October 
16, 1964. Notwithstanding the subtraction of unilateral disarmament from the Labour 
Party’s platform in the leadership contest between George Brown and Wilson in 1963, 
Wilson felt obliged to lend tangible support to arms control to offset sky-high costs and 
recurrent controversy attending the country’s pursuit of a Polaris submarine fleet. 
Whether drafted by Conservative or Labour MPs, the U.K. Foreign Ministry viewed a 
nonproliferation treaty as a continuation of their policy of moral leadership and, after the 
blast of a Chinese nuclear device on the same day as the election, a means by which to 
stop the Commonwealth state of India from following in the P.R.C.’s footsteps.182 Foreign 
Minister Patrick Gordon Walker, who would leave office after failing to win re-election to 
Parliament, brought the defence editor at The Times, Lord Alun Chalfont, into the Wilson 
government as the first Minister of Disarmament.183 For the moment, however, the U.K. 
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played only a bit part in Geneva as the forthcoming parliamentary elections transfixed 
public attention and hindered government action. 
The United States had regarded the People’s Republic of China in possession of a 
nuclear arsenal as the worst case of the Nth-country problem. As a result, its leaders had 
contemplated a preventive strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. Foster recorded that 
Kennedy seriously considered sacrificing the MLF to buy Soviet tacit support for an U.S. 
attack.184 Under Kennedy’s instructions, Bundy explored a range of options to 
reconnoiter and destroy the Communist Chinese nuclear program, such as U-2 
overflights and CIA intelligence gathering, the dispatch of National Chinese commandos, 
and contingency plans to conduct a decisive bombing raid. The Joint Chiefs began 
evaluating options for “aborting the ChiCom nuclear capability” in spring 1963 and 
released a top secret report in April outlining four options. First, the United States could 
attempt to influence the P.R.C.’s political orientation through international agreements 
such as a test-ban treaty. Second, the application of sanctions through an embargo 
mechanism could also modify the communist power’s incentives for action. Third, the 
U.S. could put in place a full-scale blockade of the country. If these three options failed to 
achieve an end to the P.R.C.’s nuclear ambitions, the Joint Chiefs envisaged destroying 
its nuclear facilities: 
Fourth Level:  Destruction of Nuclear Installations –  The fourth level of action 
thus might be taken either deliberately or in connection with a containment of 
ChiCom offensive action.  Jointly conducted U.S.-Soviet air strikes, using 
conventional rather than nuclear weapons, would destroy a selected minimum 
complex of installations in China that would together constitute the actual or 
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potential nuclear capability.  This action would not involve invasion or land 
combat in China.”185  
Acting Chairman of the Joints Chief Curtis LeMay nevertheless advised that it was 
“unrealistic to use overt military force” because a bombing strike was operationally 
difficult and either a unilateral blockade or a bombing raid could prove 
counterproductive without the tacit or public Soviet acquiescence. The action would 
appear illegitimate to the international community and risk retaliation or escalation in 
East Asia without Soviet backing.  
With this goal in mind, Bundy met with Anatoly Dobrynin, the longstanding 
Soviet ambassador to the United States, on May 17, 1963 to gauge whether Moscow was 
willing to work with Washington to put an end to Beijing’s nuclear program. Dobrynin 
dismissed the overture by citing the MLF project which the Soviet ambassador 
complained “did not make it easier for the Soviet Government to deal with the question 
of Chinese nuclear ambitions,” probably because of the tensile forces that both matters 
exerted on the Soviet relationship with East European allies.186 Dobrynin refused to 
address the Chinese nuclear threat while a multilateral nuclear force remained on the 
table.  
The interest of United States policymakers in staving off the P.R.C.’s entry into 
the nuclear club wavered after Kennedy’s death. A review by Robert Johnson of the 
Policy Planning Council at the State Department downplayed the threat posed to the 
country by a Chinese nuclear capability. He maintained that the sizable disparity 
between the vast U.S. arsenal and the nascent P.R.C. force could not justify the level of 
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consternation among U.S. security experts. “Communist China will try rather to use its 
nuclear capability,” he soothed, “to weaken the will of Asian countries” as well as to 
undercut U.S. military power in the region and elevate its global prestige.187 He 
concluded that Soviet cooperation was “more likely to be tacit than explicit.”188 In a 
subsequent report, Johnson asserted that a U.S. strike was not justified in light of the 
threat, would only serve as a spoiler delaying the program by, at most, four or five years, 
and entail “great political costs or high military risks.” The only desirable basis for such a 
preventive move would be in response to a clear provocation or aggression on the part of 
the P.R.C. In place of military action, he recommended covert operations and 
partnership with Khrushchev in marginalizing Mao’s China by means of arms control 
diplomacy and most likely a nonproliferation treaty.189  
Robert Kennedy’s views on the hazards of a nuclear-armed China and the 
benefits of enhanced Soviet-American cooperation paralleled those of his fallen brother. 
The attorney general had lunch with Dobynin on July 7: 
“Dobrynin had expressed his concern about the Chinese, who wanted a war in 
which other societies would be destroyed, while there would be 200 million 
Chinese left. Khrushchev said that this was building a civilization on a graveyard 
and the Poles and Russians had asked where such a policy would leave them. But 
the Chinese had not given any ground. ... The Ambassador had spoken of the 
dangers of nuclear proliferation and said the Soviet Union was ready to sign an 
agreement right now if only the United States would give up the MLF. He 
believed the MLF would not help, and we should reconsider our commitment to 
it. … The Attorney General asked him what would happen if the Chinese tested a 
nuclear weapon. The ambassador’s answer was that the test would be the first step 
toward a real delivery system. The Chinese economy was in bad shape and the 
Ambassador indicated no immediate concern about this danger. The Attorney 
General then reported to me that he had heard from a reportedly reliable 
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journalist of the London Observer that Tito in Poland had said that the Soviets 
were determined not to permit the development of a Chinese nuclear weapon. 
(This is a separate matter which the Attorney General did not discuss with 
Dobrynin.)190 
The conversation bespoke two cardinal considerations in the exploration by the U.S. 
security establishment of a Soviet-American modus vivendi to prevent a nuclear P.R.C. 
First, they were the recipients of conflicting information, even in a single piece of 
correspondence. Second, scenario planning may have proceeded without presidential 
guidance given Johnson’s disdain for the Kennedys.191 
The U.S. Air Force supplied Bundy with intelligence on July 13 that “evidence 
[was] growing that the Chicoms are making progress in their nuclear program.” The 
report noted the existence of a test site in the Tarim Basin, signs of activity at the Shuang-
Ch’eng-Tzu missile test range, and the recent criticality of the Pao-T’ou reactor. The 
paper concluded that the impact on Asian affairs would be “very large,” especially in 
regards to psychological factors; the P.R.C. would “acquire overnight the stature of a 
nuclear power in [Asian] minds.” Accordingly, the U.S. intelligence community believed 
that a P.R.C. nuclear test was impending by the end of the summer.192 However, it was 
unclear how to stop the program. The military command in the Pacific suggested the 
covert interception or degradation of critical components for the P.R.C. program, but at 
this last stage, the odds of success were minimal.193 Walt Rostow pushed for a presidential 
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review and a National Security Action Memorandum.194 When CIA Director McCone 
briefed the president on July 24, he noted that five facilities associated with the Chinese 
Atomic Energy program were being assembled or in operation, indicating the P.R.C. had 
overcome many of the technical hurdles to a nuclear test.195  
The Gulf of Tonkin incident on August 2 raised the stakes in Asia enormously as 
Johnson and his national security team readied for escalation in Vietnam. The same 
month, a National Intelligence Estimate drawing on aerial photography from a U-2 
overflight based out of Pakistan captured images of the Lop Nur test site “indicate[d] that 
the Chinese Communists will detonate their first nuclear device in the next few 
months.”196 The U.S. assumption that the plutonium pathway represented the most likely 
method by which a country would generate fissile material sufficient to fuel a bomb led 
the intelligence estimate to the erroneous conclusion that China probably still lacked 
enough plutonium; however, it admitted that the P.R.C. could have obtained fissile 
material from a foreign source or an unknown facility. The report overlooked the 
likelihood that the Chinese nuclear program would make use of high-enriched uranium.  
The imminence of a Chinese nuclear test weighed on Johnson’s inner circle of 
foreign policy advisers. At a Tuesday lunch meeting in Foggy Bottom on September 15, 
Bundy, McCone, McNamara, and Rusk concurred that military action was inadvisable, 
but if military action between the two states did break out, they would think seriously 
about seizing the moment to bombard the facilities. They also held out hope for options 
involving the Soviet Union as a co-conspirator: warning the Chinese of a test’s 
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consequences, negotiating a comprehensive test ban to stigmatize a Chinese test, and 
“even a possible agreement to cooperate in preventive military action.” They reported 
their collective position to the President that night, and determined to send Rusk to feel 
out Dobrynin once more. In the end, it was Bundy who went to see the Soviet consul on 
September 25. Again, he found it hard to direct Dobyrnin’s attention to matters other 
than NATO nuclear-sharing. Bundy expressed the interest of the Johnson administration 
to engage the U.S.S.R. in “private and serious talks” concerning what to do about the 
anticipated Chinese test. Dobrynin replied that his government had “already, in effect, 
taken [it] for granted.” The rise of a nuclear China, he explained, had little bearing on 
Soviet security and only a “psychological impact in Asia.” He acknowledge the “depth 
and strength” of the rift between the two communist giants, which he attributed to Mao’s 
“megalomania” and bemoaned the deafness of Chinese ears to Soviet technical advice in 
regards to the Great Leap Forward. When Bundy spoke about the substance of U.S. 
friction with the P.R.C., Dobrynin “gently remarked” that the alliance treaty between the 
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China still stood.197 With the Chinese test only 
two weeks away, Washington had tried to recruit Moscow to cooperate on a preventive 
military strike, or a diplomatic response, but had elicited only polite refusal. Instead, the 
White House and the State Department tried to mitigate the ultimate impact by dropping 
hints in the media and in speeches that a test was only a matter of time.  
On October 16, the People’s Republic of China tested a nuclear explosive whose 
residual fallout was quickly registered by U.S. instruments. Khrushchev was deposed as 
general secretary of the Soviet Union on the same day. Beijing moved quickly to 
announce the successful event, proclaiming their feat had “broken the superpower 
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monopoly,” promising to never fire first, and calling for the elimination of all nuclear 
weapons. U.S. seismic and electromagnetic stations in the region, and radioisotope 
readers aboard Air Weather Service flights based in Japan all confirmed the feat. The full 
U.S. National Security Council met the next day. Rusk pointed out the explosion’s effects 
in Asia were short-term fear of fallout and “serious, long-run effect[s] … in Japan and 
India.”198  
The White House moved quickly to blunt the impact by enunciating the first 
pledge of nuclear assurance outside of an alliance framework. Bundy drew up an outline 
for a presidential speech in which he advised downplaying the revolutionary nature of the 
“crude device” and emphasized the need to state that “every new aspirant to the ‘nuclear 
club’ increase[d] the danger of atmospheric contamination and of nuclear war.”199 In a 
nationally televised speech on October 18, Johnson reiterated that U.S. authorities had 
anticipated the Chinese test whose security impact was marginal given that years would 
pass before the P.R.C. developed a sizable arsenal. He challenged the Soviet Union to 
collaborate on nonproliferation, which endangered humankind and its environment, and 
which required abiding superpower cooperation. He then pledged U.S. support for those 
countries that forwent the nuclear path; “the nations that do not seek nuclear weapons 
can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, 
then they will have it.”200 
Though superficially a robust pledge, the language was sufficiently ambiguous to 
permit multiple interpretations. What did “strong support” entail? What counted as 
“nuclear blackmail?” Was it an explicit menace, or a regional adversary? These questions 
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became increasingly germane as U.S. intelligence indicated that India and Japan alike 
would reassess their nuclear options in the Chinese test’s wake. The detonation at Lop 
Nur had incited a major political battle over the future of nuclear power in India that 
would consume the nation’s government. Johnson chose a measured response, appointing 
an expert committee of former government officials to re-evaluate United States 
nonproliferation policy in a world increasingly fraught with nuclear dangers.201 
The closing window for Indian acquiescence mirrored the vanishing opening for a 
hardware solution to NATO nuclear-sharing problems. Thus far, the Soviet Union had 
only reluctantly bowed to its allies’ preferences for the creation of a multilateral nuclear 
force. On October 7, however, West German Chancellor Erhard took the self-defeating 
step of intimating that the F.R.G. would form a bilateral nuclear force with the U.S. if 
other NATO allies, most notably France and the U.K. (whose nuclear options would be 
reviewed by a nuke-averse Labour Party), refused to go along, noting that “a beginning 
had to be made.”202 Erhard was more explicit and emphatic three days later when he 
vowed that West German “soldiers must get all the weapons that our potential enemy 
has.”203 His comments increased the volume of criticism directed at the MLF from 
NATO allies. They also deepened East European adversaries’ consternation and, when 
the Chinese fait accompli removed the rationale for further concessions by Moscow, the 
Warsaw Pact rallied against a German finger grower closer to the proverbial nuclear 
trigger. On November 15, the Soviets declared that they considered the MLF 
irreconcilable with a nonproliferation pact and, on December 7, Gromyko delivered a 
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strong denunciation of the MLF at the U.N. General Assembly, characterizing the 
beleaguered fleet as an impediment to German reunification.204  
Erhard’s speech set the stage for a contentious 34th NATO Ministerial Meeting 
held in Paris from December 15 to 17. De Gaulle informed Rusk at a noon meeting on 
the first day, where the French president reiterated that German acquisition “either 
directly or indirectly of nuclear power would not be acceptable to France, nor he felt to 
any other European country, certainly in the East, nor did he feel in the West.” He 
warned “that the MLF would destroy NATO as we knew it.”205 This forewarning 
presaged the tone of conversations for the rest of the meeting. The White House shot off 
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No. 322, signed by Johnson, but 
formulated by Ball, to set down guidelines for the NATO round tables. While Rusk, 
McNamara and their staffs were not to antagonize either the U.K. or France, or appear 
to try and circumvent European “consensus,” they should urge their allies to take West 
German viewpoints seriously. As to veto rights, the NSAM specified that a multilateral or 
Atlantic force “must provide for United States’ consent to the firing of the nuclear 
weapons,” while leaving open the possibility of a future European state that could prompt 
the charter’s revision. The memorandum highlighted how a collective force could help to 
stem, or even reverse, the tide of nuclear proliferation, which reflected the scheme’s two 
longstanding and interwoven objectives—to appease the F.R.G.’s nuclear appetite and 
potentially to fold the U.K. and French deterrents into a coordinated body. If the desire 
to “advance the principle and practice of collective strategic defense, as against the 
proliferation of separate nuclear deterrents,” was still unclear, the United States would 
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“warmly support” the addition of “strong undertakings” in the textual language for “our 
basic policy” of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.206 
 
Conclusion 
After the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Soviet Union and United 
States envisaged arms control diplomacy as a platform on which to base better relations. 
A vital area of mutual interest, a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, was quickly seized upon 
as the most appealing next step to reduce tensions, avert thermonuclear war, and 
formalize their ascendant positions in the ideological, nuclear, and geopolitical orders. 
The superpowers found common early ground on the language for the non-dissemination 
and non-acquisition articles; however, U.S. and Soviet allies as well as non-aligned states 
established a diplomatic middle ground from which to balance the nuclear giants against 
one another. Poland and East Germany opposed Khrushchev’s decision to tacitly 
vouchsafe a multilateral nuclear force in NATO that would enhance the F.R.G.’s position 
in European geopolitics. West Germany and its advocates in the State Department 
meanwhile impeded U.S. nuclear diplomacy at the Eighteen Nation Committee on 
Disarmament to ensure that the MLF stayed in play. The result was diplomatic stasis 
when a nonproliferation treaty elicited support from a sufficiency of key nations.  
Alas, one such nation was India whose leadership of the non-aligned movement 
and espousal of peaceful co-existence through global governance the 1962 Sino-Indian 
conflict had sorely injured and the signing of the LTBT depleted. Though the Indian 
position on a nuclear nonproliferation treaty remained pliable, Homi Bhabha was quick 
to point out to domestic and international audiences that India possessed the means by 
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which to nuclearize in short order, and might require either general and complete 
disarmament, or an unprecedented joint guarantee of its nuclear security by both nuclear 
superpowers. Johnson’s decision to go ahead with the MLF lowered the window of 
opportunity to lock India into a nonproliferation regime. The Chinese test in October 
1964 nearly closed it. Henceforth, India’s adherence hinged on the realization of two 
implausible goals—U.S.-Soviet partnership in South Asia, or nuclear abolition. 
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Chapter Two | Guaranteeing the World: Internationalizing 
Nuclear Security 
 
“First, we are proposing new agreements to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now 
possessing them. Today’s uncertain and unsatisfactory balance of terror will be all terror and no balance, if 
dozens of nations, large and small, have their own nuclear trigger.” 
 
The White House Remarks of the President over Nationwide Television and Radio on the Disarmament 
Conference in Geneva, LBL, NSF, SF, Disarmament, Box 13 
Introduction: “A Problem from Hell” 
Soviet Ambassador Semyon Tsarapkin opened the 218th plenary of the Eighteen-
Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) on July 27, 1965 in the Council Chamber of 
the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Following a welcome speech from United Nations 
Secretary-General U Thant given by Special Representative Dragoslav Protitch, the 
Chairman greeted the 17 lead negotiators and their entourages seated around the 
horseshoe table. Framed by José Maria Sert’s baroque murals whose sepia and gold 
scenes limned the progress of humanity through the ages, Tsarapkin bemoaned the 
inertia in international nuclear diplomacy since the Moscow Treaty. “The forces of 
imperialism which opposed disarmament and are against reducing international tension,” 
he claimed, were “stubbornly striving to turn the course of events.” This militarism was 
on display in conflicts “in Viet-Nam, in the Congo and in Latin America,” whose peoples 
were “victims of imperialist aggression.”207 William Foster, the Director of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), rose soon after to lament Tsarapkin’s use of 
the chair’s prerogative to inveigh against U.S. foreign policy. “The dangers posed by the 
arms race, and particularly the threatened proliferation of nuclear weapons,” he warned, 
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would “not wait until the guns are stilled.” He carried a message from President Lyndon 
Baines Johnson: 
The Bible describes ‘death’ as the fourth horseman of the Apocalypse saying: ‘And 
hell followed after him.’ Our genius has changed this from a parable to a 
possibility. For the wasting power of our weapons is beyond the reach of 
imagination and language alike. Hell alone can describe the consequences that 
await their full use.208 
He noted that one key to bringing order to a world of mounting nuclear arsenals and 
multiplying nuclear powers was to ensure the security of states without the armaments. 
Another was to apply international safeguards to the peaceful nuclear activities of all 
states. To the first end, the United States had assured countries without nuclear weapons 
the previous October of its “strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail.” 
Long contemplated relative to the Soviet-American standoff, the further spread of nuclear 
weapons now raised thorny questions with respect to how the international community 
could afford security on a planetary scale as the superpowers locked horns over an 
escalating war in Southeast Asia.  
The nuclear test conducted by the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) on 
October 16, 1964 lent new impetus to global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear 
weapons. Nevertheless, in the ensuing fourteen months neither the United States 
government nor the international community succeeded in outlining a viable treaty. The 
roots of discord were many and stemmed in part from the Johnson administration’s 
failure to harmonize its thinking on NATO relations, South Asian policy, nuclear 
diplomacy, and grand strategy. A window of opportunity remained open in 1965 for a 
nonproliferation treaty with a liberal definition of dissemination and acquisition, a robust 
inspection regime, United Nations security assurances, and some linkage between vertical 
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and horizontal proliferation, most likely centering on further limits to nuclear testing. 
Most relevant U.S. agencies were supportive and an international majority for a just, 
secure, and robust treaty existed in Geneva and New York City. The United States failed 
to capitalize due to a focus on U.S.-led European integration, the Vietnam War, and key 
policymakers’ reluctance to embrace cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. The 
nuclear have-nots found their own coordination upset by a deepening Sino-Indian split in 
the non-aligned bloc while Moscow calibrated its policies ever more tightly to its own 
troubled relationship with Beijing. An impasse in efforts to achieve a nonproliferation 
treaty thus arose even as the capacity and desire for military options in key states grew. 
This chapter evaluates the course of international nuclear diplomacy from 
October 1964 to December 1965. It begins by assessing the Republic of India’s reaction 
to the Chinese test in view of U.S. efforts to mitigate its impact on New Delhi. Powerful 
members of India’s nuclear community proselytized for a Bomb, but the moderating 
influence of prohibitions in the Congress Party kept policy changes limited to preparatory 
work on peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs) and pleas for security assurances for nuclear 
have-nots through the United Nations. In the United States, the creation of a blue-ribbon 
task force led to a report outlining an internationalist strategy to combat proliferation. 
The State Department killed the report, though the arms control cabal in Washington 
eventually publicized its findings through articles, congressional speeches, and press leaks. 
Sino-Soviet tensions and the arrival of U.S. troops in Vietnam delayed the convention of 
the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. In its place, a conference of the United 
Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) revealed unity among the nuclear have-nots 
in support of security assurances, an expanded test ban, and a nonproliferation pact, 
although differences of opinion arose over China. When the ENDC finally met in July, 
the Western Four found themselves at odds over nuclear-sharing arrangements and the 
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merits of non-aligned demands for security assurances and disarmament linkages. The 
United States and the world thus stumbled in the months following the “test shot heard 
round the world,” failing to devise an effective response to the expected growth of the 
nuclear club. Nonetheless, the contours of a workable treaty clarified as Washington 
pondered how to respond to far-flung requests for the internationalization of nuclear 
security.  
 
Reading Schelling in New Delhi 
A clash between Indian hawks and doves transpired in late 1964 and 1965. 
Nuclear science and technology’s dual-use potential and the human, political, and 
financial costs, and prestige benefits of a military capability encouraged policymakers to 
hedge on nuclear bets.209 In the Cold War, there was an incentive for states developing 
their nuclear sector to delay a final decision to place the program on a military footing. 
The early measures needed to attain the know-how, facilities, materiel, and personnel 
necessary for a bomb-making capability, such as trained scientists and technicians, 
uranium or thorium supplies, and power plants capable of yielding kilograms of Pu-239, 
were largely indistinguishable from those of a peaceful program. Hence, the costs of 
retaining a military option were lower than those of an irreversible repudiation, which 
included diplomatic leverage, nuclear fuel-cycle options, and plausible deterrence. 
Moreover, the establishment of a standby or threshold capacity aided the peaceful 
program through “technical feasibility, affordability, and political (internal as well as 
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external) viability.”210 Governments such as that of India opted to retain a military option 
and engage in hedging behavior so as to maintain flexibility in the face of unforeseen 
events in the security environment. In Churchill’s apt phrasing, they pursued “the art 
rather than the article.”211 
New Delhi was a captive audience for China’s test. Indian leaders had been 
equivocal about atomic energy since the twilight of the British Raj. The rift between 
Mahatma Gandhi’s ideal of an Arcadian, rural society and Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision of a 
modern socialist economy arose in part from their divergent backgrounds and outlooks. 
While a student at Cambridge University, Nehru imbibed Whiggish notions of economic 
growth and commodity abundance by virtue of scientific and technological discovery and 
a related faith in technocratic governance. Classic liberalism held that human potential 
was keyed to the stage of economic development; to this precept, Nehru added his 
critique of colonialism. He believed that Europe’s material advantages had enabled the 
age of empires. India could surmount the gulf most swiftly by leapfrogging it via 
innovative technological platforms. His understanding of the interaction among science, 
technology, and global society guided how Nehru thought the international system would 
function amid decolonization.212 
The object of superpower nonproliferation efforts had been to thwart a Chinese 
military program. Once a Chinese bomb was matter of fact, the likelihood of Soviet-
American accord and Indian consent for a rule-based nuclear regime dropped. The 
Indians were rhetorically entrapped, however, by years of staunch opposition to nuclear 
war, militarism, and proliferation, and support for arms control, international law, and 
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collective security.213 B.K. Nehru summoned these time-honored principles in Geneva on 
September 1, 1964: 
Our approach to this question, I need hardly say, is governed by India’s basic 
policy…. We have taken a firm decision that our nuclear capabilities shall be used 
only for peaceful purposes. We have always been opposed and continue to be 
opposed to the manufacture, use, or possession of nuclear weapons.214 
Nehru acknowledged the prevailing wisdom that responsible “nuclear Powers” with “a 
good understanding of the situation” recognized the futility of nuclear war and had 
“tacitly agreed not to use such weapons.” He articulated his country’s support for 
collective security rather than bilateral deterrence though by endorsing an Ethiopian 
proposal to outlaw nuclear-weapon use categorically. Such a stricture subverted nuclear 
deterrence, which India then upheld only to stabilize the international system in the early 
stages of general and complete disarmament.  
The ambivalence of Indian nuclear diplomacy echoed in elites’ voices, many of 
whom denied that nuclear weapons had redeeming qualities. The desirability of a nuclear 
umbrella through the final disarmament stage, for instance, elicited censure from staunch 
prohibitionists. Krishna Menon attacked B.K. Nehru by name in the Lok Sabha for 
supporting the umbrella, “contend[ing] India should continue to urge elimination [of] all 
nuclear weapons at [the] beginning of GCD.” Menon preferred the Ethiopian resolution. 
B.K. Nehru’s ambivalence was more representative. He split the difference and presented 
deterrence as tolerable to expedite disarmament. In a September 15 speech to the 
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ENDC, he repeated that India was uninterested in nuclear weapons and championed a 
nonproliferation agreement that addressed the arms race:  
[T]he use – or even contemplated use – of nuclear weapons is nothing short of a 
crime against humanity[,] … a violation of the United Nations Charter and the 
rules of nuclear law. It is not enough … to take steps to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons to other countries. … [T]he possession of nuclear weapons by 
some countries is in many ways a temptation for others also to acquire them.215 
Though his attempt to frame nuclear weapons in terms of human rights fell on deaf ears 
in the U.S., Foggy Bottom greeted Nehru’s public support for a nonproliferation treaty 
and his rejection of the military option with approval. The affirmation “presented [the 
U.S.] with [the] opportunity to make any later Indian action to acquire nuclear weapons 
considerably more difficult.”216 India’s moral stance against nuclear weapons would entail 
significant audience costs if it chose to alter the policy. Foster was among those who 
welcomed Nehru’s speech. His Italian counterpart, Roberto Gaja, warned him that he 
should not praise the address too loudly though: “no western power should [raise the 
possibility of joint sponsorship]. “Let the Indians lead.”217  
China’s test challenged Indian forbearance and its ambitions to play a starring 
role in Afro-Asian politics and global nuclear diplomacy. The Indian press and foreign 
policy circles had to date largely ignored nuclear security questions.218 While Nehru and 
Homi Bhabha often noted that India could build atom bombs in a few years, their 
projections aimed less at extolling the military option than at pointing to the most 
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conspicuous landmark of nuclear prowess. Nehru wanted a thrifty foreign policy based on 
moral capital rather than brute force so as to conserve resources for import substitution, 
poverty alleviation, industrial planning, modernization, and democratic stabilization.219 
Nehru’s views also sprang from the principles of non-violence and anticolonialism. His 
loud support for a test-ban treaty and nuclear prohibitions in general limited policy 
options, but the formula had nonetheless survived India’s defeat at China’s hands in the 
1962. When members of the Jana Sangh Party entreated the prime minister to seek a 
nuclear deterrent, Nehru asked if India would not show its “utter insincerity” to “go in for 
doing the very thing which we have repeatedly asked the other powers not to do?”220  
On the surface, New Delhi appeared calm in the face of a Chinese bomb. Nehru 
downplayed the repercussions and reckoned “there would be little public impact in India” 
though other states in the region might be “cowed.” Foreign Minister M. J. Desai, on the 
other hand, admitted that “there would be political pressure … to produce nuclear 
weapons” and recited the mantra that India “could attain [them] in a couple of years if it 
decided to try.”221 U.S. observers focused on threats and capabilities rather than 
declarations though when evaluating Indian nuclear affairs. Recent U.S. intelligence 
reports confirmed the estimates, warning that Indian engineers were relocating spent fuel 
rods at an accelerated clip from the Canadian-Indian Research Reactor (CIRUS) to a 
plutonium recycling facility at Trombay. A follow-up report by the Department of State’s 
Director of Intelligence and Research advised that the Indian nuclear program was “in a 
position to begin nuclear weapons development if they choose to do so,” though “no 
evidence” existed of a weapons program yet. With “unsafeguarded weapons-grade 
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plutonium” now on hand though, only a “major political decision” now stood in the 
way.222  
Prime Minister Nehru died on May 27. Lal Bahadur Shastri quickly emerged as 
his successor on account of his Gandhian piety and lack of enemies and seemed disposed 
to maintain Nehru’s forbearance policy in light of his abhorrence of nuclear weapons. 
Nonetheless, a debate began to gather steam that summer over the relationship between 
Indian security, deterrence, and development. U.S. officials became more concerned as 
evidence of an impending test in western China mounted. Against this background, 
Bowles shot off a detailed memorandum on September 16 repeating his call to strengthen 
the U.S. position on the subcontinent. He listed the three options now facing the Shastri 
government with regard to China: an ultimatum reminiscent of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
a prohibitively expensive nuclear deterrent, or relying on moral capital. Bowles had 
floated the idea to CIA Director John McCone of providing India with intelligence on 
China’s nuclear program. McCone worried though that more data would drive the 
Shastri administration further down the nuclear road. Bowles reckoned this a 
“miscalculation” and requested more dialogue:  
The more opportunity we have to talk to the Indians … the more likely we are to 
persuade them that the nuclear deterrent that could provide a real threat to 
Chinese cities was beyond their capacity and that the ultimate solution may be 
some kind of understanding with us.223 
In the end, the State Department chose to keep New Delhi informed through official 
pronouncements rather than backchannel communications. On September 29, U.S. 
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Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced that China might test its first nuclear explosive 
“in the near future” in hopes of minimizing the blast’s ultimate impact in Asia.  
Following the announcement, Indian leaders were most concerned about losing 
standing in Afro-Asians’ eyes and viewed the Sino-Indian nuclear relationship through 
the prism of non-aligned politics. In early October, B.K. Nehru told Assistant Secretary 
of State William Talbot that the statement had occasioned “great disquiet” in India. He 
asked that Rusk make a speech to “praise India’s policy against making nuclear weapons 
and commend it as [an] example to others” before the Conference of Non-Aligned 
Nations met in Cairo.224 Such a paean might sway Afro-Asian opinion and thereby 
“redress the psychological balance to [a] considerable extent.”225 Nehru repeated this 
message to Foster later that evening.226 Shastri gave a speech brimming with Gandhian 
ideals about appropriate technology, nonviolence, and nuclear prohibition at the Non-
Aligned Conference. He implored the states gathered in Cairo to turn China off its 
nuclear path and assured them that Indian nuclear scientists were under orders “not to 
make a single experiment, not to perfect a single device which is not needed for peaceful 
uses of atomic energy.”227  
China exploded its first nuclear device at Lop Nur on October 16. The Indian 
reaction was muted at first by Rusk’s forewarnings and news of Khrushchev’s ouster the 
previous day. A clamorous, expansive, yet ultimately inconclusive debate soon erupted 
about the desirability of nuclear weapons in the Indian public sphere and corridors of 
power. The contest pit Shastri and his antinuclear allies in the Congress Party against 
                                                
224 Talbot was Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 
225 Department of State, Telegram to New Delhi & Cairo, “Indian response to ChiCom nuclear test,” 7 
October 1964, Box 128, CF—India, NSF, LBJL, 1. 
226 Ibid., 2. 
227 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 65; Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma. 
 128 
Bhabha, partisan rivals, and party hawks. On October 18, Johnson pledged the “strong 
support” of the United States against “nuclear blackmail;” though non-binding, the soft 
assurance marked the first time that the superpower had used the threat of force to bolster 
the security of a non-aligned state. Shastri nonetheless wanted a more tangible response 
to such a tectonic shift in Asian geopolitics. At a cabinet meeting the next day, he pressed 
Bhabha “to propose some new and dramatic means [to] demonstrate India’s capability in 
the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”228 Bhabha proposed a peaceful nuclear 
explosive program, which Shastri authorized despite its military implications.  
United States policymakers wanted to confine a Sino-Indian nuclear rivalry to the 
realm of symbolism. One tactic was to burnish India’s moral capital by “compliment[ing] 
… its nuclear restraint.” National Security Council (NSC) staffer Robert Komer advised 
National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy that the White House should heed Nehru’s 
plea and praise Shastri for taking the “high road of non-proliferation.” American 
statements should recite the leitmotifs of India’s nuclear virtue and scientific prowess 
“contrapuntally” in accompaniment to New Delhi’s quest for leadership of the non-
aligned movement. He referenced an attached CIA report on “Indian Government 
Policy on the Development of Nuclear Weapons,” which forecast that India would not 
launch a military program soon. This analysis contradicted a more alarming National 
Intelligence Estimate rushed out in the wake of Lop Nur. The evaluation pointed to India 
as the state most likely to develop a nuclear-weapon capability (Israel and Sweden were 
next) in the next ten years, placing the odds at “better than even,” and assigning the 
minimum time at “one to three years.” The estimate forecast that India could have as 
many as a dozen Hiroshima-size bombs by 1970 at a modest cost of approximately $220 
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million, and postulated the decision would hinge on “the scope and pace of the Chinese 
program, any changes in Sino-Soviet relations, and outside assurances.”229 Bolstering 
India’s reputation as the exemplary non-nuclear-weapon state might help “augment such 
inhibitions.”230 The report overrated the rapidity and harmony with which the Indian 
political establishment would proceed; even so, it rightly characterized New Delhi’s 
nuclear calculations as predicated on hedging. Cultivating the requisite human capital 
and industrial capacity would precede a green light from the prime minister.  
Shastri reaffirmed Indian forbearance repeatedly. China’s test nevertheless 
shattered the political consensus in favor of the policy. Media voices ranged the spectrum 
with English-language newspapers favoring the prohibition and Gujarati- and Marathi-
language papers “outspoken” in their appeals to “national interest” rather than “world 
opinion” in calling for a reappraisal. The shift in press attitudes commenced in 
September after Rusk’s alert. The previous August, the Statesman had questioned the fiscal 
wisdom of a modern deterrent in light of the country’s broader economic troubles. 
However, it reversed course on October 9, waving off objections related to ethics, 
strategy, and reputation to weigh the financial burden more optimistically. Though 
monies for military procurement represented a theft from development, the value of 
security was incalculable.231 The Times of India proposed that the U.N. admit the P.R.C. 
so that the nuclear powers could settle matters there; more tellingly, the Indian Express 
cataloged the “pros and cons” of a military option and found that, “on balance,” security 
desiderata favored it. 
                                                
229 "National Intelligence Estimate Number 4-2-64, “Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Over the Next Decade”" 21 October 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CIA 
Mandatory Review Appeal, 7. Obtained and contributed by William Burr, 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115994 
230 Robert Komer, Letter to McGeorge Bundy, cc’d to Spurgeon Keeny, “India & nonproliferation,” 20 
October 1964, Box 128, CF—India, NSF, LBJL. 
231 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 65–66. 
 130 
Elite opinion was split as well. Menon came out against the military option in a 
speech in Bombay on October 23, decrying an Indian Bomb as “the height of folly” and 
espousing Indo-Soviet cooperation.232 However, Menon’s star faded and Shastri wanted 
to improve relations with the U.S. after Khrushchev’s fall. Rusk instructed Bowles to 
solicit Shastri’s views in order to learn where concerts of U.S.-Indian interest might exist 
in arms control diplomacy and, “most important, to reinforce Indians in their decision 
not to initiate a nuclear weapons program.”233 Cooperating on nuclear diplomacy and 
furnishing peaceful technological assistance emerged as key U.S. tactics vis-à-vis the 
Indian nuclear question. The main concern was New Delhi’s attitude toward 
international nuclear diplomacy. Rusk wanted the “the primary impact [of China’s test 
to] be political” rather than security-related and instructed Bowles to portray the Chinese 
proposal for a world disarmament conference as a ploy by which to distract from the 
“flouting [of] world hopes that [the] atmosphere would no longer be polluted by nuclear 
tests.” He should also highlight the event’s global significance and warn that “limited” 
nuclear arsenals such as those of France and the PRC did not enhance security but rather 
increased the “danger of [a] world nuclear war.”234 
While Rusk strove to hold the line, Indian hawks went on the offensive. Defense 
Ministry officials questioned whether forbearance remained prudent and opined that 
longstanding nuclear policies were reversible. At a press conference in Bombay, Defense 
Minister Y.B. Chavan called China’s blast a “new factor” to account for when planning 
for the country’s defense. There was “always [the] need for rethinking [a] policy 
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question,” he averred, when faced with a “dynamic political situation.”235 The most 
significant assault on the status quo came from Bhabha though and bore on the question 
of affordability.236 Even though Bhabha lost influence when Nehru died, he was a 
formidable advocate of the military option.237 He gave an address on All India Radio on 
October 24 in which he argued that peaceful and military nuclear explosives were cheap 
and useful tools with which to shore up national development and security alike. He 
invoked Gallois’s theory of a limited deterrent and his own estimation that India needed 
one to three years to develop one. He low-balled the project cost by omitting 
expenditures related to facilities, manpower, fuel reprocessing, and infrastructure, 
claiming that one ten-kiloton explosive would cost $350,000, and a two-megaton device a 
mere $600,000. He compared those costs to the $300 million needed to acquire two 
million tons of TNT in spite of their very different usages. Total spending for an arsenal 
of 50 A-bombs, or 50 H-bombs, he extrapolated, would require $21, or $31.5 million. 
Indian and U.S. scientists tried to correct these “grossly misleading” figures, but hawks 
cited them as gospel when arguing for the military option.  
In the face of this dissent, Nehru informed Foster in Geneva on November 3 that 
after a review his government had “reconfirmed” its forbearance policy. He neglected to 
mention that Shastri had sanctioned initial studies on peaceful nuclear explosives. Nehru 
admitted that there was strong pressure for a nuclear test “to offset the genuine 
psychological advantages which the Chinese had obtained in Southeast Asia by virtue of 
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their explosion.” The Chinese proposal for a five-power conference was also seen as a 
challenge to India’s position in Asia and the non-aligned world. He expressed doubt 
though that the soft guarantee that Johnson’s had made in October would hold true if 
Beijing had the support of Moscow in a nuclear action against India.238  
The controversy was still unresolved when the All India Congress Committee 
assembled in West Bengal on November 7. Before the meeting, Minister Mehr Chand 
Khanna had publicly called for India to join the nuclear club. At the conclave, more than 
100 delegates requested a closed session to discuss “an independent nuclear deterrent to 
protect [India] against any possible threat from China.”239 Shastri, Menon, and Desai 
evoked “the Mahatama’s teaching and Nehru’s legacy” to uphold the prohibition.240 
Shastri denied the objectivity and accuracy of Bhabha’s cost estimates, while Desai 
warned that if the military budget was already stealing resources from the commonweal, 
the cost of nuclear arms could prove “crushing.” A majority nonetheless backed the 
military option. By means of appeals and politicking, Shastri and his allies managed to 
push through a resolution stating that India “would continue to utilize nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes and … would not enter into a nuclear arms race.” The Hindustan Times 
described the outcome as “nothing short of a miracle,” though Shastri was forced to 
imply that forbearance had its limits: “[w]e cannot at present think in terms of making 
atomic bombs in India;” he instead declared that “[w]e must try to eliminate the atomic 
bombs in the world.”241 The time-bound statement left open the question of how long 
forbearance could last. In fact, Menon rebuked Shastri for not “know[ing] what … future 
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policy will be on so fundamental an issue.”242 The prime minister meant the tenure of his 
government, later clarifying that “[s]o long as we are here, we won’t make the 
[B]omb.”243 
American diplomats used a variety of tactics to entrench this mindset. They urged 
New Delhi to display the country’s technological prowess through peaceful ventures and 
schemed to entrap the non-aligned stalwart rhetorically. Indian decision-making seemed 
to hinge on security assurances, foreign aid, and arms control. However, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff were loath to offer more than Johnson had pledged in October, deeming a soft 
guarantee “appropriate” because it “did not commit the United States to any specific 
military course of action.” Furthermore, Chairman Curtis LeMay warned against policies 
that “could alienate U.S. allies, especially Pakistan.”244 Because of these military 
reservations related to Cold War alliances, Washington would have to rely on technical 
assistance. Bowles suggested that a senior official of the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) travel to New Delhi to discuss a incentive package: space-based assistance, a 
subterfuge where India would claim to have furnished the crucial intelligence on the 
Chinese test, a “Plowshares operation,” and a campaign to rally world opinion against 
nuclear weapons. In the final case, Washington might endorse “by overt and covert 
means” an Indian resolution at the United Nations calling for nuclear testing to cease in 
order to bind “Shastri and other world leaders” to “this position as firmly as possible.” 
Bowles even recommended awarding these leaders the Nobel Peace Prize or honorary 
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degrees to commend their peaceful behavior.245 The ulterior motive was to “strengthen” 
Indian resolve in time for April, when the CIA figured Shastri would seal his country’s 
nuclear fate. 
Washington adopted blandishments and material aid to Indian science and 
technology as its cardinal nonproliferation tactic.246 The White House singled out the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy and space technology as projects that could “capture the 
imaginations of Indians and Afro-Asians and conclusively demonstrate the advanced 
progress of Indian science.” Peaceful nuclear explosions were included. The AEC upheld 
the value of PNEs in a November report that discussed the “merit” of talking to Bhabha 
about Project Plowshare and its capacity to solve some of India’s “basic development 
problems,” such as re-routing rivers. Officials in the AEC believed that Plowshare blasts 
were possible without violating the LTBT and waved off the danger of such cooperation 
enabling the military option.247 As threshold states increasingly insisted on their rights to 
peaceful nuclear explosives in the coming years, United States authorities continued to 
justify their utility even as they strove to erect firewalls against the transfer of sensitive 
nuclear technologies.  
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American interest in offering technological carrots to discourage nuclear-weapons 
work led to a high-level mission in January 1965. Johnson sent science adviser Jerome 
Wiesner to New Delhi at Bowles’s behest “to tout Indian scientific prowess and avert 
proliferation” before Bhabha visited the U.S. in February and the Afro-Asian Conference 
convened in Algiers in April. Shastri had voiced enthusiasm for scientific promotion, 
collaboration, and assistance from the U.S.248 The package’s elements now consisted of 
assistance to India’s space program, rocketry, satellites, plutonium and thorium recycling, 
breeder reactors, and “Plowshare experiments.”249 These carrots were linked to 
diplomatic calculations regarding whether to back Indian nuclear diplomacy at the 
ENDC, whose convention was delayed by Soviet-American discord over the relationship 
between nonproliferation and NATO nuclear-sharing. Wiesner and others fretted that 
New Delhi would table a stricter treaty precluding the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) or 
existing transit rights in an effort to stymie or reverse China’s nuclear breakout.250 Other 
U.S. policymakers regretted the lapse in international nuclear diplomacy, which had 
foiled an opportunity for India to exercise leadership in the field.251 Even so, Bowles was 
instructed to answer vaguely if asked about a nonproliferation treaty’s “exact wording,” 
or the likelihood of security assurances from the United States with the Soviet Union, or 
without it. 
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In Karachi, U.S. diplomats tried to allay President Ayub Khan’s fears about 
India’s nuclear controversy. According to Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy, the 
debate had “no closer or more apprehensive observer than Pakistan,” which resented the 
“looseness” of inspections on the CIRUS reactor.252 McConaughy worried that beyond 
its proliferation impulse, an Indian bomb could have the “most profound and potentially 
adverse impact on [the] delicate balance of strategic forces at play on [the] subcontinent.” 
Pakistani fear of the Indian “colossus” might impel its to pivot toward China and lead to 
a tendency “to overreact,” possibly in the form of preemptive strikes against Indian 
nuclear facilities, or in Kashmir, or the launch of Pakistan’s own nuclear-weapon 
program. He counseled that Washington enlist Ayub’s “understanding … and tacit 
acquiescence” for US efforts to reassure India up to the point of a “nuclear umbrella.”253  
That winter, Indian leaders strove to improve their diplomatic and security 
positions and to persuade Washington or Moscow, or both, to extend nuclear assurances. 
A December U.S. National Intelligence Estimate hypothesized that a green light 
depended on “the cost of a nuclear weapons program and of a delivery system, the pace 
and scope of the Chinese program, and the importance the Indians attach to assurances 
from the U.S. and other nuclear powers.”254 On December 4, Shastri enjoined the 
nuclear club to “guarantee nonnuclear nations safety from atomic attack,” calling the 
United Nations the “proper forum” for debating the merits of security guarantees and 
their relationship to nonproliferation.255 Washington was noncommittal. Britain on the 
other hand offered its support when Shastri visited London. U.K. Defense Minister Denis 
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Healey backed a “solemn and effective guarantee” from nuclear powers, excepting, 
China against nuclear blackmail or attack.256 In an interview with British Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson, Shastri insisted that a universal guarantee was needed so as not to 
contradict India’s non-aligned status. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had reservations though 
about a joint Soviet-American guarantee, or a specific guarantee to a non-aligned state, if 
such a pledge was “not offered to all of the allies of the United States.”257 Meanwhile, 
Llewellyn Thompson complained that Bowles was so keen on a unilateral guarantee that 
he had exceeded his authority. Bowles had reason to overstep his orders. He related that 
Indian sources with cabinet-level access had told him that Shastri had instructed Bhahba 
“to proceed with [the] first stages of producing [the] atomic bomb.” The Indian 
leadership would apparently reassess the decision after a year in light of how nuclear 
testing raised China’s profile and any progress made in reversing China’s nuclear gains.258 
In a press conference at the Trombay reprocessing plant on January 22, Shastri 
praised Indian efforts at the United Nations to devise a stronger and more balanced 
approach to nuclear diplomacy. He championed a threefold portfolio comprising 
nonproliferation and comprehensive test-ban treaties in concert with disarmament 
talks.259 To placate India, a nonproliferation treaty should include provisions for security 
guarantees and a four-environments ban on nuclear testing that would stigmatize further 
Chinese nuclear testing. Bowles was vexed by Washington’s foot-dragging and protested 
against the “apparent decision … to hold [India] at arm’s length on [its] proliferation 
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resolution.” He believed that nonproliferation efforts would receive a boost if India took 
the “lead position as [a] non-nuclear country that is easily capable of producing [these] 
weapons,” underscoring the optical value of its postcolonial and non-white character as 
well.260 He criticized the American affiliation with the Irish Resolution, which risked 
alienating Shastri when there was a “fifty-fifty opportunity to so commit India to [the] 
cause of nonproliferation that [they] would hold to its present moderate position.”261 A 
legitimate sense of Indian leadership in the realm of nuclear diplomacy, Bowles asserted, 
would afford India the international stature it might seek otherwise from nuclear 
weapons. Wiesner concurred that the “best of all [constructive actions] would be to 
support the Indian Resolution,” which all non-aligned states in Geneva had then 
endorsed.262 For now, however, Foggy Bottom supported only the minor fillip of letting 
Shastri announce the next Chinese explosion jointly with Rusk.263  
 
A Rearguard Action 
The Chinese test also reignited strategic thinking in the United States about the 
nuclear question. Johnson authorized “a higher-level, harder look at the problem of 
nuclear spread” in October for the purpose of formulating “a better policy than we would 
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be able to get by using our interhouse machinery.” U.S. nuclear policy had proven ad-
hoc, uncoordinated, and patently insufficient to the task. In essence, the administration 
had failed to harmonize the views of those who regarded nuclear policy through a 
national lens with those who traced the trend lines with a transnational compass. On 
November 1, 1964, the White House announced the task force that would assume the 
name of its chairman, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric. The Gilpatric 
Committee and its final report were significant less for their immediate impact on U.S. 
nuclear policy than in illustrating the sources of continuing policy inertia during a critical 
period of upheaval and opportunity in world affairs.264  
Llewellyn Thompson was increasingly out of sync with the Disarmament Agency, 
the Pentagon, and the White House. Foster circulated a memo on December 3 outlining 
a five-plank disarmament platform to present the new Soviet leaders as they “weigh the 
competing pulls from Peiping and Washington.” The recommendations included “an 
intensified effort to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement, which clearly commits all 
parties to halt proliferation in any form,” and “the reinstitution of negotiations … [for] a 
comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).” He warned that a General Assembly debate 
could prove embarrassing to the U.S. if “arguments over the MLF … so embitter the 
atmosphere as to preclude the needed early action to prevent nuclear spread.”265 
Members of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, including Chairman 
Chester Holifield (D – CA) had voiced doubts about a collective nuclear force in NATO 
at an annual meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum.266 He thought that the moment 
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had arrived for constructive Soviet-American nuclear diplomacy and wanted to “indicate 
our willingness to include in such an agreement … an assurance that the US will keep its 
veto.”267  
The memorandum drew a quick response from MLF supporters. In a response 
one week later, Thompson outlined “a collection of arguments designed to assure that no 
action will be taken … in the foreseeable future.” His mistrust of the Soviets’ willingness 
to abide by the four-environments test ban championed by India struck NSC deputy 
Spurgeon Keeny as especially troubling. He called the memorandum a “remarkable 
document that essentially calls into question our entire arms control and non-proliferation 
policy.” Keeny concluded: 
I think it is most important that the Thompson memorandum does not become 
the State Department’s formal position. If it does, the President will be faced with 
a serious problem that the State Department is effectively preventing the pursuit 
of his stated policy on arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.268 
His vexation echoed the depth of discord among key agencies. The State Department 
and the Disarmament Agency squared off over the priority accorded a nonproliferation 
treaty at a meeting of the Committee of Principals to discuss Foster’s memorandum on 
December 21.269 The Gilpatric Committee for which Keeny served as first author was 
tasked with bridging that gap.  
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The Gilpatric Committee held three meetings between December 1, 1964 and 
January 8, 1965.270 It surveyed options, foresaw contingencies, and weighed priorities 
while others dealt with day-to-day matters. At the second meeting, the cadre discussed an 
analysis warning “though public opposition may be strong, government-military elite in 
some countries (e.g., India, Japan) … [could make a] nuclear decision … advanced under 
the guise of a peaceful program.”271 Even though India and Japan were prime candidates, 
the document warned that more Asian states—Pakistan, Indonesia, Australia, South 
Korea, and Taiwan—might follow suit. In the Middle East, U.S. intelligence was 
monitoring Israel’s Dimona reactor, which Egypt watched closely as well; in Europe, 
Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany, and Italy had the means and the motive; and, 
among Latin American states, the line-up of suspects featured Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico. Even allied South Africa was suspect. Averell Harriman interrogated Seaborg in 
late December about a scheduled delivery of U-235 to the country. Rusk had posited the 
merits of selective proliferation in a National Security Council meeting in late November, 
hypothesizing that “the Japanese or Indians might desirably have their own nuclear 
weapons.”272 Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reaffirmed that day that 
there was “no question” that official policy remained to halt nuclear spread. The 
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Gilpatric Committee nevertheless assembled at a critical juncture in the policymaking 
process.273  
The group outlined and evaluated four strategies along a continuum that ranged 
from the devaluation of nonproliferation to its enshrinement as the central pillar of 
United States foreign policy. The strategies related to six policy issues: European 
proliferation, extra-European proliferation; existing nuclear powers; U.S. nuclear 
weapons policy; peaceful uses of atomic energy; and safeguards. The zero option, 
“selective relaxation of efforts to retard proliferation,” expanded upon Rusk’s observation 
that the arrival of some new nuclear powers, such as India or Japan, might enhance U.S. 
security. In this view, allies might begrudge Washington’s interference without modifying 
their behavior. At the other extreme, option three propounded an “all-out effort to stop 
and roll back nuclear proliferation,” wagering that the long-term value of a highly select 
nuclear club was worth the short-term costs to bilateral relationships. Options one 
(present course) and two (“hold the line”) embodied strategies that assigned 
nonproliferation a secondary or high status relative to a willingness to incur “costs and 
risks” elsewhere.274 Salient questions—security assurances, multilateral forces, 
international laws, Soviet-American dialogue, fissile-material cutbacks, technology 
transfers, and test-bans—were plotted according to these benchmarks.  
The task force was independent, but heard the counsel of key officials. State 
Department Counselor Walt Rostow recounted previous nuclear diplomacy through a 
Manichean filter, “contrast[ing] Soviet policy since 1956 (overhanging threat of nuclear 
war, pressure on Berlin as a divisive issue in the West, and maneuvers to get US to start 
                                                
273 Memorandum of Conversation, “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—Course of Action for 
UNGA—Discussed by the Committee of Principals,” 23 November 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XI, 
Document 50.  
274 Gavin, “Blasts from the Pasts,” p. 109.  
 143 
conflict) against successful U.S. policies of shoring up world security while working to lessen 
tension.”275 He omitted the period of détente ushered in by the LTBT, advised that 
nonproliferation should not be pursued “to the exclusion of … other US objectives,” 
stumped for “the need to avoid premature U.S. reinsurance or ‘loss of options’” in Asia, 
and supported a multilateral force in Europe and an “MLF or weapons pool” in Asia. 
The promotion by U.S. diplomats of nuclear-sharing in Asia akin to that in NATO had 
evidently outrun the White House’s ability to control it. To  wrote Bundy in December to 
counsel that only a National Security Action Memorandum would stop officials at the 
Pentagon and Foggy Bottom from praising the concept in front of Asian leaders.276 
Raymond Garthoff’s meanwhile remarks illustrated the State Department’s institutional 
unease with multilateralism and preference for “country-to-country” solutions.277 While 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering Dr. Harold Brown reported that national 
detection capabilities would soon allow a total test ban with only two or three inspections, 
a figure to which Soviet negotiators had acquiesced in May 1963.  
Secretary McNamara reduced the issue to a basic binary set. In “Model A,” the 
United States assumed the mission to stave off new members of the nuclear club. In 
“Model B,” the U.S. came to terms with new entrants. He maintained his preference for 
“Model A” because of his conviction that “the more nuclear power are, the more there 
are likely to be.”278 Rusk disagreed. He highlighted the troublesome case of India for 
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which allied security guarantees did not exist and favored an “Asian nuclear defense 
community” outfitted from a U.S. nuclear stockpile, or a British “[C]ommonwealth 
nuclear committee.”279 As for West Germany, Rusk portrayed their nuclear ambitions as 
a matter of time rather than inclination and warned that Bonn would resort to a nuclear 
partnership with France, or its own deterrent, without the MLF. McNamara put the 
scheme’s chances at fifty-fifty; however, American policymakers hoped that a joint force 
might rollback the British and French deterrents. Rusk claimed that Wilson’s government 
would play ball on vetoes, which Assistant Secretary of State George Ball sustained when 
he contended that a West German signature on a nonproliferation treaty was unthinkable 
without its participation in “nuclear defense arrangements.” Rusk softened the assertion, 
relating that West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein had disclosed to him 
earlier that day that Bonn’s nuclear diplomacy was now more linked to reunification than 
to nuclear-sharing.  
Discussions then turned to the central dilemma of U.S. nuclear diplomacy since 
the Cuban Missile Crisis; Allen Dulles pressed Rusk “if he would sacrifice a great deal in 
terms of other policies in order to get non-proliferation.” Rusk portrayed the French case 
as illustrative of the pitfalls of treating nonproliferation as more important than good 
relations with an ally, though he acknowledged that the threat might become overriding 
in the Middle East. Gilpatric then hit on the crux: “how we can approach the problem on 
a case-by-case basis when each case has so much impact on [the] others[?]” Rusk took 
issue with the premise, replying that “each case is different.”280 Two assumptions figured 
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in his answer: his negative assessment of Soviet cooperativeness and his belief that nuclear 
policies represented a national affair. He doubted the worth or the reliability of a Soviet-
American nuclear guarantee as well as Moscow’s willingness to consent to any number of 
inspections to verify a CTBT.281 Thompson echoed Rusk’s skepticism, maintaining that 
the Soviets were indifferent to proliferation excepting the case of West Germany. In a 
revealing moment, Rusk let slip that nuclear aspirants outside of Europe (e.g. India and 
Israel) were the most pressing threat. United States nonproliferation efforts thus bore 
increasingly on the Global South even as the multilateral treaties that would enact and 
legitimate a global nuclear order risked entangling its European allies.282  
The Gilpatric Committee deviated from the Cold War orthodoxy to call for a 
“rearguard action to keep proliferation to the minimum.” The conclusion stemmed in 
part from a consensus that atomic armaments risked a global contagion and in part from 
a conviction that a world with dozens of nuclear powers was an ignoble legacy for future 
generations. Gilpatric noted that he found it “impossible” that nuclear weapons could be 
“compartmentalized, quarantined, or regionalized,” and drew an analogy between their 
catalytic threat and the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. To the communicable and 
catalytic metaphors were added ecological tropes such as generational justice. The 
remarks of George Kistiakowsky, Eisenhower’s science advisor and a Manhattan Project 
veteran, were representative:  
Dr. Kistiakowsky felt that for our own lifetime we might prefer to live in a “Model 
B” world, but his thoughts about his grandchildren have changed his mind and 
commit him strongly to seek the “Model A.” … We must wage a campaign to 
keep proliferation at a minimum and be prepared to lose individual battles, but 
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not the overall war. … He felt the non-European world is at least as important as 
Europe in the light of growth in population and technological innovations. … He 
also thought that our own example will be essential and that we should press 
measures of arms limitation and increasing understanding with the Soviet Union. 
The committee supported “Model A” with the caveat that “Model B” remained viable if 
Model A failed. The committee heeded Gartoff’s entreaties to shield Polaris from strategic 
arms cuts and that an Atlantic nuclear force presented a unique opportunity to rollback 
the British deterrent. The Soviet-American balance of terror, on the other hand, went 
unquestioned. Herbert York captured the general ambivalence about security assurances, 
speculating that, “in the short run,” American lives should not be used as hostages, 
though he admitted “nervousness about the long run.” Kistiakowsky added that 
assurances were “essential,” but not to be given “promiscuously.” The group agreed that 
a robust nonproliferation strategy could lead to nuclear containment from which the 
country would reap a “net security advantage.”283 
Keeny set these judgments down in the final report, which abjured the maximal 
position, but nonetheless sought to set nonproliferation as a cornerstone of United States 
grand strategy. The report counseled shoring up the existing framework with a brace of 
new measures. The core proposal was to encourage more accommodation on 
longstanding obstacles to multilateral pacts, tighter controls on nuclear exports and 
technology transfers, threats of economic sanction against suspect nations, and a renewed 
commitment to ramping down the Soviet-American arms race. Nuclear proliferation was 
deemed a paramount threat owing to its potential to disrupt the Soviet-American nuclear 
standoff, siphon resources from development, foment hostility among regional 
adversaries, and hinder arms control and disarmament. Proliferation also jeopardized the 
United States’ superpower status because, in time, new nuclear powers would “constitute 
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direct military threats,” undermine U.S. power and influence, and perhaps occasion a 
return to isolationism.284 In response to Rusk’s musings that an Indian or Japanese 
nuclear arsenal might bolster security, the report warned that nuclear spread was 
uncontrollable. It would trigger a “chain reaction of similar decisions” by countries such 
as Pakistan, the U.A.R., and Israel, whose nuclearization might unshackle the hands of 
European states, where the U.S. ought to stop assisting and instead try to rollback the 
French and British deterrents. In sum, the analysis presumed that nuclear weapons 
embodied a transnational threat rather than an object of national self-determination.  
To ward off these hazards, the U.S. needed an “energetic and comprehensive” 
policy mix of multilateral pacts to rein in proliferation generally and targeted pressure to 
solve the hard cases. Citing the “broad support for multilateral measures,” such as the 
Irish Resolution and the LTBT, the committee requested a fresh look at the merits of a 
hardware solution with the proviso that a nonproliferation treaty “should not wait, or be 
dependent upon,” its resolution. Furthermore, “all members agreed” that software 
alternatives such as consultative committees merited urgent exploration. In essence, the 
Gilpatric Committee held that an expeditious treaty was worth more than appeasing 
West Germany on nuclear-sharing. A CTBT was desirable if new technologies could 
reconcile Soviet and American inspection quotas, and nuclear-free zones in Latin 
America, Africa, and even the Middle East deserved flexibility on questions of verification 
and transit. Respecting bilateral measures, the report dwelt on how best to discourage 
New Delhi, promoting a “credible assurance” if India was confronted with a nuclear 
threat and a readiness to take “parallel action” with the U.S.S.R. or the U.K., or both. 
Scientific help that would not contribute to a military program and “a larger role in the 
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United Nations” contingent on staying non-nuclear, were also specified as ways to whet 
India’s appetite for increased stature. The findings advanced scientific and prestige 
“alternatives” for Japan as well, while promoting assurances and compellence relative to 
the Israel-U.A.R. dyad.  
Despite its unanimity, its members’ stature, and its moderation, the report was 
quickly buried. Bundy described the report as “coming down hard on one side of this 
tough question,” even though it certified positions that many agencies had held for years. 
On the one hand, the result sprang from the majority of arms controllers on the 
committee and a task force’s natural tendency to seek a higher priority for its object of 
inquiry. On the other hand, it was the opposition of Rusk, whom Bundy depicted as 
possessing “real doubts about some of the recommendations,” which proved fatal.285 He 
was resistant to security assurances and invested in hardware solutions for Europe and 
perhaps Asia. The report’s emphasis on Soviet-American cooperation also cut against the 
grain of the beliefs shared by Rusk and Ball that Soviet animus toward a hardware 
solution stemmed from an effort to divide the West and that Moscow’s attitude would 
toughen amid the power transfer, the Sino-Soviet split, and the Vietnam War.286 
Gilpatric’s membership in the class of New England Brahmins from which Johnson felt 
estranged may have contributed as well.287  
In the final analysis, the Gilpatric Committee revealed a continuing disconnect 
among key United States bureaus and officials whose fondness for either bilateralism or 
multilateralism in the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs were at odds. The rift resulted from 
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divergent views of the significance of nuclear weapons: were they subsidiary to Cold War 
containment, or did the risk of the knowledge and material needed to build them 
spreading across borders demand a turn to nuclear containment and Cold War 
moderation? The report held that U.S.-Soviet arms control and nonproliferation were 
inextricably entwined in view of the need for equity, reciprocity, and legitimacy in 
multilateral covenants: 
[I]t is unlikely that others can be induced to abstain indefinitely from acquiring 
nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union and the United States continue in a nuclear 
arms race. Therefore, lessened emphasis by the United States and the Soviet 
Union on nuclear weapons, and agreements on broader arms control measures 
must be recognized as important components in the overall program to prevent 
nuclear proliferation.288  
The architects of Johnson’s foreign policy were aware in early 1965 that the themes of 
vertical and horizontal proliferation were increasingly linked in international nuclear 
diplomacy. For now, however, the White House quietly noted its receipt of the report 
without sanctioning its findings. 
 
Elements of a Global Nuclear Order 
The State Department and the Thompson Committee reviewed the assurance 
question in March 1965. The CIA had restated during the previous month that “chances 
[were] better than even that within the next several years India [would] decide to develop 
nuclear weapons” unless assurances were granted by the U.S., the U.S.S.R., or the U.K., 
or some combination thereof.289 Thompson raised an alternative. U.S. officials could 
persuade India to issue a warning that it would repulse nuclear threats “from anyone” 
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and felt “confident” that the other nuclear powers would come to its defense. The U.S. 
would then declare publicly that a nuclear antagonist would pay a “heavy price,” which 
would toughen Johnson’s soft guarantee while still preserving the military’s “freedom of 
action.”290 When Thompson’s proposal languished, Keeny became frustrated about the 
lack of a policy. In a letter to Bundy on March 16, he derided the U.S. position as 
“disturbingly thin” and Rusk and Thompson as “clearly very loathe [sic] to go very far in 
offering specific guarantees to India.” He admitted that this stemmed in part from 
Shastri’s reluctance “to accept unilateral U.S. guarantees” because they would impinge 
on his country’s non-aligned status; however, neither Rusk nor Thompson thought along 
the lines of a solitary pledge. He offered two suggestions to “strengthen the package.” 
Washington could convince the Indian government to open its facilities to inspections by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in an effort to burnish its peaceful 
credentials. Second, Johnson could request a joint congressional resolution endorsing his 
soft guarantee. Keeny penned in the margins that Bundy thought that guarantees 
through the British Commonwealth bore consideration as well.291 In truth, the 
abundance of plans betrayed the lack of one.  
In early March, Rusk sent Ambassador at Large Averell Harriman to New Delhi, 
where the Democratic grandee found himself in broad agreement with Bowles. Harriman 
was chosen because of his role in securing U.S. military aid during the 1962 Sino-Indian 
border war and in response to forecasts that China would soon test a second nuclear 
device. He described the Indian leadership as now more favorably inclined toward the 
U.S. In an interview with Shastri, the prime minister affirmed the importance of 
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nonproliferation and the utility of nuclear powers extending security assurances that 
accorded with non-alignment. He corroborated that Shastri had discussed a nuclear 
shield with Wilson when he visited London in December; the Indian prime minister 
believed that “it would be unwise for India, as only one of the non-nuclear powers, to 
seek a shield for itself alone;” instead, the “Chinese threat” required a nuclear umbrella 
covering “all non-nuclear states.”292 Harriman sensed that Shastri had over-estimated 
Soviet willingness to engage on arms control and security guarantees; even so, his 
correspondence showed an Indian state amenable to U.S. influence and eager for non-
nuclear solutions to China’s feat. With the United Nations General Assembly and the 
Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament adjourned and U.S. officials uneasy about 
a joint Soviet-American guarantee, however, Harriman could not envisage a treaty 
package on which the “Indians, West and Soviets agree[d].”293  
While United States policymakers debated how to relieve Indian insecurity, 
Bhabha and other nuclear hawks sounded out American help with peaceful nuclear 
explosives. Bhabha and B.K. Nehru met with Ball, Robert Anderson and David T. 
Schneider on February 22 to discuss how the U.S. could assist India with its nuclear 
ventures. After praising the virtues of nuclear energy when compared to coal plants in 
much of India, Bhabha adduced the national interest in offsetting prestige gained by 
China among Afro-Asian states. They could dampen the “noise” put out by the nuclear 
blast with their own “dramatic ‘peaceful’ achievement.” After emphasizing the help that 
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the P.R.C. had allegedly received from the Soviet Union, he implied the possibility of a 
technology transfer by estimating that an Indian explosive could take 18 months, or “with 
a U.S. blueprint … six.”294 The scenario was revisited when Foster spoke to Indian 
Chargé d’Affaires Avtar Krishna Dar, who related that Bhabha wished to exhibit the 
scale of Indian scientific and technological achievements. Dar intimated that a 
“Plowshare project would be very visible” and “the easiest.”295  
In May, the U.S. State Department finally found a potential platform on which to 
base a nuclear guarantee—the United Nations General Assembly. Bowles was 
enthusiastic. He encouraged Rusk in late April to urge the Indians to work with the 
U.S.S.R. or the Irish at the U.N. Disarmament Committee to draft a resolution for a 
multilateral assurance.296 Rusk outlined his thinking on May 5, dwelling on the benefits of 
a guarantee backed by a UNGA Resolution. If tabled by a non-aligned state, the motion 
would achieve a host of vital and interrelated ends by recording signatories’ “intention … 
to provide or support immediate assistance to” the victim of a nuclear threat. The 
language would respect non-alignment, hasten a nonproliferation treaty, deter the 
Chinese from nuclear threats, and be “palatable … to [the] Soviets by being optically 
directed against China as little as possible.” On the final count, the initiative would finesse 
the “Soviet reluctance to make a clearly defined public choice between India and 
Peiping.”297 He told Bowles to let Shastri approach the Soviets first to which the 
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ambassador responded that New Delhi was preoccupied with a recent exchange of fire 
with Pakistani troops in the Rann of Kutch. Shastri and Indian Foreign Minister Swaran 
Singh raised the subject with Soviet leaders when they visited Moscow from May 12 to 
19. Premier Alexei Kosygin tried to soothe them by calling Mao’s Bomb “a small toy.”298 
However, when Singh inquired about security assurances through the UNGA, their “first 
reaction” was “an attempt to bury [the] question by suggesting its inclusion in [an] 
eventual general disarmament agreement.” After Singh pushed for a more concrete 
response, his interlocutor expressed that the Kremlin needed more time to look at the 
options, which Singh took as a positive sign since the proposal was not rejected out of 
hand.299  
United States relations with the subcontinent underwent a major trial that 
summer, drawing attention away from the nuclear issue at a crucial moment. In mid-
April, Johnson chose to postpone visits by Pakistani President Ayub Khan and Indian 
Prime Minister Shastri in fear that their arrivals would prejudice the congressional review 
of foreign assistance to both countries. The Pakistani incursion into the Rann of Kutch set 
off a wave of skirmishes, saber-rattling, and joint mobilizations culminating in a Pakistan 
thrust into Kashmir on August 5, which in turn triggered an all-out war between India 
and Pakistan. The conflict was the result of mounting tensions between the regional rivals 
and illustrated the U.S. quandary of wanting to improve relations with India without 
alienating Pakistan, which although a member of SEATO and CENTO was gravitating 
more and more toward Communist China.  
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The effects on U.S.-Indian nuclear diplomacy were incidental yet unfortunate. 
Shastri was indignant at his trip’s cancellation by Johnson, which he perceived as 
deflating his political capital and which deprived the leaders of an opportunity to sort out 
the mess relating to assurances. U.S. neutrality in the conflict succeeded in alienating 
Islamabad and New Delhi alike. In Bowles’s words, India was in a “angry, unreasonable, 
and indeed irrational mood due to … lingering humiliation from [the] Chinese attack, 
Chinese prestige gains with [the] nuclear bomb which India could also produce, Indian 
Army’s alleged defeat at [the] hands of [the] Pak[istan] Army in Kutch, and [a] frustrated 
feeling that [the] US … does not understand their position.”300 Johnson captured his own 
frustration with South Asia when he groused that he had discovered “over the last few 
months how little influence we had with the Pak[istanis] or Indians.”301 By the time that 
Indian and Pakistani diplomats brokered a cease-fire in September with the help of Soviet 
mediators, the United States had lost much of its own political capital in the region. 
 
“A Vain Dialogue” 
Tensions between nationalism and internationalism infected the conduct of 
multilateral nuclear diplomacy in the aftermath of China’s explosion and Khrushchev’s 
fall. The French government subscribed to a view of nuclear weapons upholding states’ 
rights to develop them. At first, Pierre Gallois’s concept of a “limited deterrent” 
legitimated the force de frappe; afterward, French officials found themselves in the tricky 
situation of defending nuclear sovereignty while feeling uneasy about the ungoverned 
                                                
300 Chester Bowles, Telegram to the Department of State, “Shastri in Present Crisis,” 10 May 1965, FRUS, 
1964-1968, Vol. XXV, Document 119. 
301 Memorandum for the Record, “Meeting with the President on Kashmir,” 2 September 1965, FRUS, 
1964-1968, Vol. XXV, Document 178.  
 155 
spread of weapons of mass destruction, especially to West Germany.302 French 
philosopher and strategist Raymond Aron was increasingly critical of the force de frappe; 
however, his article, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” in the January issue of The 
Atlantic Monthly, warned that international measures were ineffectual in the foremost 
preserve of the national interest—the security sphere.303 A report by the French Ministry 
of External Affair’s Office of Political Affairs and Disarmament echoed Aron’s thinking, 
maintaining that a nonproliferation treaty was untenable given the sovereign prerogative 
in security matters and superfluous because it was against nuclear powers’ interests to aid 
other states’ military nuclear ambitions. With that said, French policy on multilateral 
pacts would prove subject to revision once the force de frappe was “credible and secure.” 
Although neither the Limited Test Ban Treaty nor a nonproliferation treaty were likely to 
halt the nuclear revolution in strategic space-time, they might prove effective at delaying 
it by altering the policy calculus of key states.304  
The United Kingdom was more heavily invested in nuclear internationalism, and 
its hard-charging Minister for Disarmament, Lord Chalfont, strove throughout the spring 
to reconvene the ENDC. After visiting New York City and Washington in late February, 
Chalfont joined Foreign Minister Michael Stewart in a meeting with Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko at which they pushed for the Geneva talks to resume.305 On 
March 31, Chalfont addressed the North Atlantic Council, where he characterized the 
Chinese test as a “momentous change” and warned that pressure on India to follow suit 
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might open the floodgates. He reported on the frostiness of his reception in Moscow, 
which he attributed to Soviet attacks on U.S. escalation in Vietnam, and that Soviet 
officials were opting to move negotiations to the rambunctious, 114-nation United 
Nations Disarmament Committee rather than the Eighteen Nation Committee on 
Disarmament.306 
The Soviet Union was increasingly critical of the United State presence in 
Southeast Asia after the launch of Operation Rolling Thunder, the landing of the first US 
combat troops (3500 Marines) near Na Dang, and the trailblazing use of napalm in 
March. By the end of 1965, the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam would reach 
184,300.307 Soviet support for Hanoi and the country’s reunification under Ho Chi Minh 
dated back to Stalin’s recognition of the Viet Minh in 1950. Though China was the chief 
purveyor of aid, Moscow refused to take a backseat to Beijing in its rhetorical support for 
Hanoi, repeatedly haranguing the U.S. for its imperialist aggression against the 
Vietnamese people.308 The new chill in Soviet-American relations spread to nuclear 
diplomacy. The Soviet call for a convention of the United Nations Disarmament 
Committee signaled an unwillingness to partake in substantive arms control talks.   
The session began in New York City on April 26 under the chairmanship of 
Egyptian diplomat Mohammed El Kony. The proceedings began on a positive note, 
when the American and Soviet delegations agreed that a minimal ICBM umbrella could 
abide through the stages of disarmament for purposes of strategic stability.309 The 
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paramount subject of discussion, however, was a nuclear nonproliferation treaty to which 
further curtailments to nuclear testing were now linked. As the embryonic Soviet-
American détente calcified in the crucible of Vietnam, the common Western front, 
already strained by the kerfuffle over nuclear-sharing arrangements and French 
truculence, showed signs of cracking. Italy plead that disarmament savings go to 
developmental ends. The nonproliferation package that the Canadian delegate, General 
E.L.M. Burns, laid out was primarily intended to “make the treaty more palatable to the 
nonnuclear states.”310 He volunteered that security assurances and arms cuts should offset 
pledges by the non-nuclear states to quit the field. Furthermore, the treaty should have a 
limited duration, enter into force only with the ratification of key advanced nuclear states 
(e.g. Canada, the F.R.G., India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, and Sweden), and feature an 
inspections regime monitoring nuclear and non-nuclear countries alike. Since Britain had 
already backed India on security assurances, the United States appeared out of tune with 
its European partners as well as the non-aligned bloc. 
The non-aligned contingent, whose numbers had swollen thanks to 
decolonization, was increasingly proactive. French Ambassador Roger Seydoux observed 
that “Third World interest in progress in disarmament negotiations seemed to parallel a 
clearer recognition of the role that small powers felt entitled to play in the United 
Nations.”311 He underscored the “general movement that had arisen in favor of a total 
ban on nuclear testing, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and Beijing’s 
participation in the disarmament talks.” Japan, Sweden, and Algeria, among others, were 
calling for China and France to send delegations to Geneva. Sweden’s disarmament 
minister, Alva Myrdal, pushed hard for a nonproliferation package that included a fissile-
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material cutoff and a comprehensive test ban. In Geneva, Sweden served more and more 
as an “interdependent source of expertise as well as spokesman for the other seven less 
economically developed nonaligned states.”312 Its defunct nuclear-weapon program 
underlay its “military-scientific expertise” and Myrdal’s reputation and personality made 
her an “honest broker.” U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson recapitulated the suite of 
limited U.S. proposals submitted to the ENDC in January 1964, but also expressed 
Washington’s interest in an expanded test-ban treaty “in the light of new and recent 
means of detection that we have acquired.” He announced that his country supported 
nuclear-free zone talks in Latin America, but kept silent on the matter of security 
guarantees beyond reiterating the non-binding soft guarantee from the previous October. 
Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland vowed that the United States was eager to 
discuss the merits of stronger guarantees, albeit in Geneva.313  
Among the non-aligned delegations, Indian diplomats played the “most active 
role.” They sought primarily “to place the issue of nonproliferation within the framework 
of collective security.”314 B.N. Chakravarty condemned China’s second test shot on May 
4, before itemizing the five elements of a grand bargain by which the nuclear have-nots 
could abide. First, the nuclear powers would not supply the weapons to those states 
without them. Second, they would pledge not to wield them against the have-nots. Third, 
the have-nots would receive guarantees against nuclear blackmail through the United 
Nations. Fourth, the international community would bring about a treaty fully banning 
nuclear tests and freeze the number of existing weapons and delivery systems. Finally, the 
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nuclear have-nots would pledge not to acquire them.315 He quoted Singh’s recent 
remarks to the UNGA, where the Indian Foreign Minister had maintained that “[t]he 
importance of non-proliferation cannot be over-emphasized … [it] is as important as that 
of banning nuclear tests” warranting treatment “as a matter of highest priority.” 
Evidently, Shastri felt that this speech had not yet received an adequate reply.316 Seydoux 
noted that non-aligned states lead by the Indian delegation were increasingly inclined to 
demand assurances from the nuclear powers in the absence of full disarmament. Cracks 
in the edifice of non-nuclear solidarity did exist. Israel and Japan, for example, were more 
interested in retaining the United States nuclear umbrella and in the intrusiveness of 
safeguards.317 
On May 12, Irish Foreign Minister Frank Aiken warned that time was short for a 
treaty to halt nuclear spread whose urgency necessitated action by the international 
community. Aiken propped up the Western line that proliferation entailed a passage of 
control over rather than access to nuclear weapons and cited the need for non-nuclear 
states to welcome inspections. He sounded nonetheless broadly sympathetic to non-
aligned positions, whose salience he described as having grown since 1961. These 
included the necessity of security guarantees and the question of whether the 
international community could treat nonproliferation separately from disarmament.318 
The foremost champion of nonproliferation sounded increasingly in tune with the Indian 
campaign to fortify a pact with security guarantees and equalize it through linkages to 
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nuclear arms control and disarmament. Closing the nuclear club’s door, though, still took 
precedence.  
As the international community came together around a promising arms control 
package, the matter was garnering more attention from the chattering classes and 
legislative branch in the United States. Foster set out to break the stalemate by publishing 
an article in the July issue of Foreign Affairs, “New Directions in Arms Control and 
Disarmament.” Because he wrote in his official capacity as director of the Disarmament 
Agency, he solicited comments from key insiders, policy experts, and foreign 
counterparts. Foster accepted the majority of edits submitted by Rusk, for example, but 
his decision to clarify two sections rather than excise them illustrated the roots of policy 
disagreement. The first section touched on the relationship between the credibility of 
extended nuclear deterrence and security assurances for countries threatened by China: 
One of our difficulties in NATO has been the growing feeling, most notable in 
France, that the U.S. commitment to NATO was of diminishing credibility as 
Soviet capacity to damage the U.S. increased. Undoubtedly, with the passage of 
time a similar erosion of confidence would occur with respect to any assurances 
designed to counter the Chinese threat too. But we probably do have a number of 
years during which Chinese nuclear capabilities will be so small relative to those of 
the U.S. (or of the U.S.S.R.) that American (and/or Soviet) assurances for any 
country would be credible assuming of course at least some degree of American 
(and/or Soviet) concern about the viability of the country in question. 
Rusk wanted this section removed entirely, but Foster demurred. He quoted French 
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville instead to the effect that NATO allies lacked 
confidence in the U.S. deterrent so as to avoid an undocumented claim, and “softened” 
his argument about the “erosion of … credibility” that would occur as Chinese nuclear 
power waxed.319  
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The second contention centered on McNamara’s recent statement to the House 
Armed Service Committee that United States and Soviet forces were now so large, 
diverse, and survivable that a counter-force attack could not bring about a nuclear 
victory. Rusk doubted that mutual assured destruction now heralded the end of the 
“strategic nuclear-arms race,” or the ability to remove “some strategic capabilities on a 
reciprocal basis.” Foster moreover claimed that U.S.-Soviet arms control was important 
“in dealing with nuclear proliferation.”320 Not because “of our setting a good example,” 
he clarified, but to dilute the putative worth of nuclear weapons by reversing the arms 
race and fostering “a world order in which the role of nuclear weapons would be 
diminished.” These acts required Soviet-American entente.  In the short-term, the offer of 
security assurances was critical. In the long-term, without forward progress on arms 
control, “it is hard to see how … we can hope to put any limits of the membership in the 
nuclear club.”321 Behind this analysis was a perverse consensus among the Disarmament 
Agency, the Pentagon, and Soviet diplomats; Tsarapkin was said to have reviewed the 
article with Foster “word by word.”322 
Foster piece’s echoed many of the Gilpatric report’s findings; meanwhile, the U.S. 
Congress began to weigh in. The issue was the disparity in peace efforts between the 
Kennedy and Johnson years—a sore point for an unelected president who resented the 
Massachusetts family and found himself mired in a foreign war. When Rusk testified 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 28, Senator Joe Clark (D-PA) 
scolded the Johnson administration for “backsliding” since Kennedy’s assassination. They 
started by debating where to draw the line between national sovereignty and “the 
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common law of mankind.” Rusk stated that international laws and institutions were 
needed for transnational threats; “there are no such things as sovereignty with respect to 
epidemic diseases, for example, because disease does not recognize political borders.” In 
the security field of which nuclear policy was a subset though, Rusk questioned whether 
the U.N. had matured enough to enforce rules and settle disputes. Clark turned to 
disarmament:  
[S]ince President Johnson went into the White House I have never heard the 
words general and complete disarmament uttered from his lips, your lips or from 
anybody else, and my question is have we returned from the position which 
President Kennedy put us in? … [S]ince the death of President Kennedy the 
whole steam has gone out of bringing the Russians back and attempting to get 
together with them and, possibly, to see if we can’t bridge the gap between the 
plans for general disarmament and our own. This seems to have been a casualty 
from the Kennedy … administration.323 
Clark thought that the MLF was stymieing progress on “other far more important 
matters,” such as a nonproliferation pact. He disagreed with Rusk’s assessment that the 
U.S.S.R. schemed to weaken NATO and observed that Soviet fears were rational “with a 
little sense of empathy.” “Which do you think is more important,” he asked, “coming to a 
comprehensive talk with Russia or shoring up a NATO organization which shows every 
sign of disintegrating?”324 Johnson called Clark’s remarks “a great injustice” and 
demanded an apology.325 The White House drafted a summary of disarmament efforts to 
date under Johnson and the State Department entered an aide-mémoire into the 
congressional record for purposes of damage control; Bundy promised Johnson he would 
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“fold both of these documents around a stick and beat Joe Clark over the head with it 
tomorrow at breakfast.”326  
Johnson soon found himself on the defensive again from a man even more 
intimately related to his predecessor—Senator Robert Kennedy of New York. In his 
maiden speech on the Senate floor on June 23, Kennedy warned that U.S. foreign policy 
had come unglued: 
I rise today to urge action on the most vital issue now facing this nation and the 
world. This issue is not in the headlines. It is not Vietnam, or the Dominican 
Republic, or Berlin. It is the question of nuclear proliferation.327 
He called on the Johnson White House to give “central priority” to nonproliferation and 
exert “the greatest additional effort.” In this vein, he asked that the U.S. contemplate 
talks with China and adopt the Gilpatric report, whose recommendations matched his 
own and which White House Press Secretary George Reedy stated was still under review 
by State, Defense, the AEC, and other agencies. It was clear that Kennedy spoke on 
behalf of the Disarmament Agency to end the executive-branch “dissension” in regards to 
the report.328 He wanted to sacrifice the MLF to hasten a nonproliferation treaty, and 
backed an expanded test ban, nuclear-free zones in Latin America, Africa, and possibly 
the Middle East, Soviet-American arms control, more investment in the IAEA, and a shift 
toward conventional capabilities to dispel the aura of prestige encircling nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, he invoked his brother’s legacy and the renaissance of liberal 
internationalism in his final year, when the compass of global security was broadened to 
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accommodate strategic stability and environmental justice, most notably, in the 
nonproliferation and preservationist functions of the LTBT. The speech spelled out the 
planetary scope of nuclear threats fourteen times and the duty to future generations of 
“children” on five occasions.329  
Johnson was not unschooled in the art of legitimating diplomacy in Cold War 
America through paternalistic appeals to “our children … and our posterity” so as to 
dispel the calculus of realpolitik and the specter of communism. The president bore a 
longstanding and mutual grudge against Robert Kennedy, whom he suspected of 
gunning for the Democratic presidential nod in 1968. His portrayal of nuclear diplomacy 
as a “moral” issue could burnish his peace credentials against the backdrop of military 
escalation in Vietnam and a blossoming antiwar movement. Johnson undoubtedly 
resented the junior senator’s attempt to tip the scales in favor of the arms control cabal 
two days before the president was to deliver a speech commemorating the United 
Nations’ 20th anniversary. Six days later, the New York Times reported on the Gilpatric 
report’s counsel that a nonproliferation treaty trumped an Atlantic nuclear force.330 
Given the report’s secrecy (only Foster was privy in ACDA), the story likely sprung from a 
leak made to air the grievance of a nonproliferation treaty supporter in the upper reaches 
of the Johnson administration.  
Cracks were continuing to show in the Western edifice at the nuclear assemblies. 
China exploded a second device on May 14, exposing new divisions in the non-aligned 
bloc at the UNDC. India, Japan, Taiwan, and a smattering of Western and Pacific 
powers condemned the action. However, most non-aligned nations refrained from 
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expressing disapproval. India’s delegate in Geneva, V.C. Trivedi, described the blast as 
“an attack not only on all that we stand for and all the efforts that we are making but … 
also an attack on all of humanity” because of the genetic and health risks to present and 
future generations.331 Foster’s article had postulated that a developed China might 
eventually alter its opposition to nuclear diplomacy following a change in leadership. 
Chinese Vice Chairman Zhou Enlai agreed that nuclear arms posed different threats 
according to a country’s geography and stage of development. He told the Chinese 
Politburo in May that “the Americans and the Japanese need to realize that if atomic 
bombs fall on their heads, their losses will be greater than ours” since “Japan has a 
population of 100,000,000 concentrated on those not so large islands, and with so much 
industrial infrastructure.” He still fretted that the U.S., or the U.S.S.R., or both, might 
conduct a “massive strike” against Chinese nuclear facilities.332 Meanwhile, numerous 
delegations construed the second test as “the best demonstration of the urgency of a 
nonproliferation treaty.”333  
The non-aligned now treated the Chinese case as more alarming than the French, 
though its members disagreed on how best to coax Beijing into the fold. Procedural 
politics unfolded along the lines of a deepening Sino-India split. On June 4, thirty-three 
delegations signed a Yugoslavian proposal to convene a world disarmament conference 
where China would participate, recalling the Cairo Resolution recently issued by the 
Non-Aligned Conference there that had received widespread support. Meanwhile, five of 
the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC (Burma, Ethiopia, and the U.A.R. 
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demurred) submitted a competing resolution authored by India calling for a four-
environments test ban and security guarantees to accompany a nonproliferation 
agreement. The proposal received 24 signatures. 
For their parts, the superpowers were pulling in opposite directions. The Soviet 
Union pushed for a quixotic ban on nuclear-weapon use and the elimination of military 
bases on foreign soil in an attempt to strike at the pillars of NATO defense. Nikolai 
Fedorenko repeatedly tried to tone down provisions designed to flog China and generally 
afforded “an honest defense for an absent party.”334 The United States rehashed 
Johnson’s package from January 1964 and sought to limit the agenda to the ENDC. In 
truth, both sides bided their time. U.S. policymakers expected little and desired less from 
the cacophonous ensemble. Many delegates attributed Soviet stalling vis-à-vis the ENDC 
to the Sino-Soviet split, concluding that Tsarapkin and Fedorenko “would not give the 
go-ahead until July when the Algiers conference could not longer serve as a tribunal for 
China to denounce a vain dialogue or worse yet a Russo-American collusion.”335  
The United Nations Disarmament Committee closed up shop on June 16. The 
Yugoslavian resolution advocating a world disarmament conference had passed after 
minor revisions with 89 votes and 16 abstentions, including the U.S., which instead 
endorsed the ENDC. The achievement was symbolic rather than concrete since a world 
conference remained far-fetched while China looked askance at nuclear diplomacy. A 
second resolution passed on June 15 entrusting the ENDC to meet “as soon as possible” 
to draft a treaty for general and complete disarmament, study as a priority an extension of 
the test-ban treaty to underground tests, accord special priority to a nonproliferation 
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treaty, and embrace the need to assign disarmament savings to Third World 
development. In sum, the meeting confirmed that Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet split 
complicated Soviet-American nuclear relations; it attested as well to mounting 
disharmony among the non-aligned, which were universally in favor of nonproliferation 
measures but “divided as to their real content according to a cleavage revelatory of their 
real intentions”—the China question. Notwithstanding the “violence” with which the 
Soviets and Americans initially clashed over Vietnam and the Federal Republic, their 
subsequent interactions and private contacts betrayed a readiness to cooperate. U.S. 
policymakers wanted to identify points of commonality before China engaged more 
actively in international politics. For now, though, the prevailing mood was that of 
pessimism with Tsarapkin “gloomy about [the] prospect for a nonproliferation treaty.”336 
 
“The Debacle in Geneva” 
West German interlocutors intimated a lessening of interest in a hardware 
solution in summer 1965. Chancellor Schröder announced on July 2 in an interview in 
General Anzeiger that West Germany would accept a nonproliferation treaty given “some 
form of nuclear organization,” reinforcements to counterbalance the 700 Soviet IRBMs 
in Europe, and Soviet support for real steps toward reunification.337 The chancellor’s 
broad categorization implied that solutions other than an MLF were permissible. In 
conversations with Ambassador Knappstein though, Rusk distanced himself and his 
department from the mounting congressional criticism. The French government gave the 
notion of a collective nuclear force the “cold shoulder” that summer. In a July 12 
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conversation with Couve de Murville, Rusk reiterated the need for a collective nuclear 
force to dissuade the West Germans from building their own nuclear arsenal. De Murville 
countered that the MLF would only whet Bonn’s appetite, which was why the French 
had backed off a European force. Though de Murville envisaged an Anglo-French joint 
arrangement in time, he felt that West Germany should “be obliged to accept” a non-
nuclear status for the foreseeable future.338  
The hardware solution would accordingly depended on West Germany. A letter 
to Bundy from Professor Henry Kissinger of Harvard University, recently returned from 
sojourns in London, Paris, Rome, The Hague, and Bonn, related that a collective force 
was untenable given the political climate in European capitals including Bonn. Kissinger 
concluded that a majority in favor of the MLF did not exist “within the government” of a 
single state besides the Federal Republic. Even in Bonn, it would be “the subject of 
acrimonious partisan debate.”339 In place of a hardware solution, he observed that 
McNamara’s consultative committee had been “well received.” Kissinger concluded that 
European divisions and Foggy Bottom’s fixation on NATO nuclear-sharing revolved 
around the de Gaulle challenge. With Italy unwilling to defy French pressure and the 
U.K. opposed to plans with a larger West German role, the State Department seemed 
more interested in “us[ing] the Federal Republic as the alibi and the battering ram for its 
one-sided, almost obsessive, anti-French bias.” High-level consultations on nuclear 
strategy and posture could easily replace the MLF and break the logjam. Even if the idea 
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proved “unsatisfactory,” its failure would pave the way for a new structure that would 
doubtlessly prove superior than “the obsessive reiteration of the old slogans about nuclear 
control.340 Proponents of an Atlantic force were undeterred as U.S. officials carried on 
debating the constitution of global nuclear governance. Seaborg pushed for a robust 
safeguards regime under the auspices of the IAEA in the U.S. News & World Report. He 
also questioned the hardware solution’s appeal, which disquieted West German 
diplomats. As the resumption of the ENDC loomed, Seaborg was mystified by to “the 
extent to which the MLF continued to be a sticking point in the formulation of a U.S. 
negotiating stance.”341  
There were nonetheless points of consensus in Soviet-American views of 
nonproliferation diplomacy. This became apparent in back-channel talks in June. Paul 
Doty, a Harvard biochemist and future founder of the Center for Science and 
International Affairs, landed in Moscow on June 9 with a Dr. Long.342 They had been 
invited as “private citizens and as scientists” by Vice President of the Soviet Academy Dr. 
Mikhail Millionshchikov, who was an “old acquaintance” from Pugwash.343 Their 
mission was to allay Soviet fears about the impact of Vietnam on U.S.-Soviet relations. 
Millionshchikov related that Soviet leaders doubted Johnson’s sincerity as a “man of 
peace” and his interest in “reasonable negotiations.” The next day, Millionshchikov and 
Vladimir Pavilchenko welcomed Doty and Long to the Presidium of the Soviet Academy, 
where they spoke about Vietnam, détente, and nuclear talks. Doty conveyed the “strong 
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desire” among U.S. policymakers for better relations with Moscow and singled out 
Geneva as where the superpowers might broker “agreement in the arms control and 
disarmament area.” He assured his Soviet listeners that almost nobody in Washington 
wanted the multilateral force “with any degree of seriousness,” but the Soviets ought not 
to insist on a “public burial.”344 Millionshchikov was curious about how to square IAEA 
and Euratom safeguards, and speculated a treaty was feasible “somewhere between the 
Irish resolution and the more recent Indian proposals.”345 He felt that the nuclear club 
excepting China needed to help India and acquiesce to nuclear have-nots’ requests for 
them to “now make some explicit contributions.” The meetings signaled that détente and 
a nonproliferation treaty were still on the table; even so, Doty noted the Communist 
Party accorded the visit little visibility.346 On the other hand, the participation of 
Millionshchikov, who had access to military-industrial planning, and that of Pavilchenko, 
the Soviet commissar at Pugwash, attested the seriousness of official interest.347  
There were still proponents of nuclear prohibitions at work in the White House. 
The machinery of U.S. nuclear policymaking began to turn following Kennedy’s speech 
and Doty’s visit. Bundy circulated National Security Action Memorandum No. 335 on 
June 28, which authorized a new look at the arm control and disarmament portfolio, 
including a treaty to stem the tide of proliferation.348 The Disarmament Agency was 
charged with its drafting. Two weeks later, Tsarapkin notified Foster that the U.S.S.R. 
was ready to convene in Geneva. Bundy attributed the delay to China as well as Soviet 
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power struggles and reminded Johnson of the need “for us to keep in front on the subject 
of disarmament” on account of the reputational benefits and because “the Soviets may be 
about to make a real concession;” after all, “[i]n April of 1963, no one would have 
predicted a test ban treaty.”349 His counsel was inspired by suggestions made by Komer a 
week before with regard to how to fix the damage caused by Vietnam. After itemizing the 
many challenges facing Johnson’s foreign policy, Komer underscored the difficulty of 
maintaining goodwill and constructive nuclear diplomacy’s potential to help: 
I only recite this catalogue of horrors to make the point that we’ll have an 
especially difficult time ahead in maintaining the Administration’s foreign policy 
momentum … Two elementary ways of doing so come quickly to mind. First, the 
tougher the line we feel compelled to take in Vietnam and similar crunches, the 
more we ought to offset their impact by positive and constructive initiative in 
other fields like disarmament. … Let’s face the fact that the things we have to do 
in Vietnam and elsewhere are a heavy burden for us to bear in the Afro-Asian 
world as well as Europe.350 
Averell Harriman was sent to Moscow for consultations while rumors circulated of Israeli 
nuclear ambitions. Talking with Foster, Arieh Dissentchik, the editor-in-chief of the 
Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv, mentioned that Israel wanted its Arab neighbors to believe that 
it was “four or five years ahead in know-how in the nuclear field and could quickly take 
the last steps to make the weapons.” These suspicions, he explained, would make them 
“think twice” and thus constituted “a vitally important deterrent.”351  
In the weeks before the Geneva talks restarted, United States policymakers 
debated the viability of a test-ban treaty, freezes on nuclear warheads and delivery 
vehicles, and negotiating tactics. The NSC wanted certain measures to keep India, Israel, 
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and Japan non-nuclear. A nonproliferation treaty was the central focus though. The 
dissemination and acquisition language and the source and scope of monitoring were 
sticking points whose answers implicated a host of questions about West Germany, 
NATO nuclear-sharing, Soviet ploys, and the consequences of positive and negative 
assurances: protection against external nuclear threats for non-aligned, non-nuclear states 
and pledges to forswear the use of nuclear weapons against them, respectively.352 Foster 
and Tsarapkin met in mid-July to hash out the procedural details.  
The Disarmament Agency draft treaty evoked strong opinions from the AEC, the 
military, and the State Department. Its weak safeguards article made Seaborg “very 
unhappy.”353 The Joints Chiefs of Staff were of a mind and wanted stronger, on-site 
inspections on “all peaceful nuclear activities” to the point of opening peaceful U.S. 
nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection as a “fall-back position.” The NSC was lukewarm, 
though, about the import of safeguards, which Keeny called “ nice to have, [but] … 
certainly not critical.”354 In the end, the U.S. dropped the obligation for non-nuclear 
states to apply IAEA safeguards on peaceful activities in response to West German 
pushback. The Joint Chiefs were “strongly opposed” to the commitments for and limits 
on nuclear-weapon use outlined by the Disarmament Agency draft. Negative assurances 
in particular “would decrease U.S. power and flexibility for achieving security objectives,” 
“advance a total prohibition against nuclear arms,” and stigmatize their battlefield use. 
Moreover, such a voluntary renunciation could serve as a precedent against the use of 
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napalm or Agent Orange in Vietnam.355 They were amenable to a U.N. resolution that 
was “general in nature” and did not “imply commitments,” but they still counseled 
against pursuing a treaty “aggressively.”356 In the U.K., the Wilson’s government was 
trapped by domestic opinion and its own campaign promises into writing its own, tougher 
draft treaty.357 In a preview of coming attractions, the United States, West German, and 
British delegations traded “fierce exchange[s],” when the Western powers met in Paris for 
preparatory meetings at the North Atlantic Council.358 
The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament opened on July 27 with 
Tsarapkin launching an attack on United States foreign policy and Foster relaying a 
presidential message rife with apocalyptic imagery.359 The doomsday themes suited the 
fortunes of the Western Four, who had as many positions among them as there were 
delegations. The U.K. government hoped the proceedings would corroborate Wilson’s 
campaign promise to conduct British foreign policy as a nuclear prohibitionist.360 
Whitehall misread the tealeaves in U.S. domestic politics though and concluded that 
nonproliferation was finally a major priority; as a result, Wilson oversold a treaty that 
would rule out a nuclear-armed Germany in perpetuity and address the growing numbers 
of nuclear aspirants. Sir Paul Gore-Booth intimated to French listeners that Britain was 
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preoccupied with finding a solution to the spread of nuclear weapons in light of growing 
Israeli, Egyptian, Indian, and Indonesian interest in them.361 London was therefore more 
sensitive to Soviet misgivings and out of sync with Washington, where the State 
Department had succeeded in thwarting the Disarmament Agency’s efforts to inscribe a 
liberal reading of proliferation to which Moscow might adhere.  
The British draft treaty conflicted with the United States version on three counts. 
First, the dissemination and acquisition articles barred the evolution of NATO nuclear-
sharing into a pan-European force ruled by majority, which the F.R.G. desired and the 
U.S. viewed as a sop to Bonn’s nuclear ambitions and as a way to reduce gradually the 
number of independent arsenals. At first, the British forbade nuclear weapons transfers to, 
or the establishment of, an “association of States.” In response to U.S. protests, Whitehall 
revised the clause to read “any action which would result in the acquisition, by any state 
or organization not now possessing it, of an independent power to use nuclear 
weapons.”362 West German officials worried about British opposition to a European 
option and the “slow-down” of the MLF. However, the bad press that attended the 
publication by the Frankfurter Algeminer Zeitung of German instructions to its ENDC 
observer in Bonn to resist a treaty curbed British flexibility. Additionally, the Foreign and 
Disarmament Ministries were increasingly out of step in Bonn and with Washington. 
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröeder wanted a linkage to reunification, while 
Disarmament Minister Swidbert Schnippenkoetter focused on salvaging a hardware 
solution. Rusk backed a multilateral force of some kind, but was loath to link nuclear 
diplomacy to the German question.  
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Second, the British treaty had a clarifying article that defined “nuclear state,” 
“non-nuclear state,” and “control,” the last of which U.S. policymakers feared would 
present the Soviets with an easy target for broadsides against the multilateral force. Lastly, 
the draft treaty possessed an article authorizing inspections by the IAEA of the nuclear 
facilities of non-nuclear states, which Canada backed and non-nuclear states viewed as 
“discriminatory.” At that stage, Foster wanted to preserve a potential linkage at the 
bargaining table to security assurances “that the non-aligned would demand in any 
event”, where he could push for a relaxation of non-aligned demands for safeguards or 
assurances in exchange for better terms on the other. Such “hard bargaining” might 
occasion the safeguards clause’s “scaling down,” or the “alternative” of having it cover 
non-military facilities worldwide. For now, though, he admitted that “we would not 
allude to this possibility.363 A reference to IAEA safeguards in the draft Latin American 
nuclear-free zone treaty indicated that Mexico might argue on the behalf of the IAEA 
among the non-aligned.364 However, India and Brazil resisted and Foggy Bottom worried 
that the United States position that Euratom safeguards were equivalent to those of the 
IAEA would prove distracting at that time.365 
Canada aimed to alleviate nuclear have-nots’ misgivings about an unequal treaty. 
Its draft treaty featured security assurances, disarmament linkages, and a withdrawal 
clause similar to that of the LTBT, which allowed a state party to leave in case of 
“extraordinary events.”366 After it was nixed, Canadian Counselor Robert Cameron 
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lamented that the Americans had not “gone further in meeting the concerns of the non-
aligned.”367 Italy was “perhaps even more stringly [sic] opposed than [the] U.S. to [the] 
U.K. initiative,” but criticized the U.S. draft treaty as well, which was unrevised since 
April 1963 and “no longer (if ever) acceptable to [the] Third World.”368 Italian 
Ambassador Francesco Cavalletti proposed the addition a paragraph to the preamble 
with a hortatory reference to arms control and disarmament.369 U.S. officials were 
amenable to a withdrawal clause and a non-binding reference to disarmament. The 
Italian Foreign Ministry worried about allied disunity if the U.S. and the U.K. tabled 
separate drafts. Mostly, it had misgivings about a global nuclear order that would 
discriminate against Italy. Rome had reservations about limits on commercial technology 
and wanted to hedge its nuclear bets.370  
The White House wrote British Foreign Minister Stewart in early August to voice 
its disapproval of British opposition to the European option given the need for unity and 
expediency in Geneva “in the presence of the Soviet Union, and the Bloc, and non-
aligned countries.”371 The State Department could not support the British language lest it 
permit the multilateral body to dictate NATO policy.372 A delegation from Bonn 
meanwhile arrived in Geneva to fight for a hardware solution and against onerous 
safeguards. In the interest of solidarity, Foster begged Chalfont to pocket his draft treaty 
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and instead note British “reservations” with respect to the U.S. version. The Western 
chorus thus more resembled a graceless cacophony than a compelling concert. 
Foster tabled the draft treaty on August 17, valorizing its purpose with lofty words 
from President Johnson calling on the assembly to reflect on its duty to “[t]he fate of 
generations yet unborn.”373 Neither Canada, nor Italy, nor the U.K. co-sponsored the 
motion so as not to draw attention to British misgivings. Chalfont heeded Foster’s 
admonition and indicated his government’s concerns with the draft treaty’s allowance of a 
veto-less European force; in truth, the White House shared these qualms, having stated 
that it would never place nuclear arms under a foreign government’s control for all of 
Foggy Bottom’s support for European union.374 Caught between better relations with the 
U.S.S.R. on nuclear matters and disquieting its West German ally, the U.S. sent mixed 
signals that resulted in confusion and distrust. Foster characterized the difference of 
opinion as “more theoretical than real,” and tried to clarify that U.S. acquiescence to a 
European nuclear force hinged on further deliberations even if such a federation arose.375 
He avoided the worst-case scenario; nonetheless, Western discord weakened his position 
in Geneva, ensuring that the Soviets dug in their heels, and helping the non-aligned 
members to promote their agenda.  
Izvestia published a scathing article on August 4 condemning “German 
revanchists” for holding up progress in Geneva.376 Shortly after Foster tabled the draft 
treaty, Tsarapkin asked if it would ban access to nuclear weapons through a multilateral 
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force. Foster responded obliquely that it would not “preclude” a nuclear power from 
stationing nuclear weapons on another state’s territory, nor “certain other possible 
arrangements for participation of our NATO allies in their nuclear defense.”377 The 
Kremlin found Foster’s reasoning unpersuasive and rejected the draft treaty because, they 
argued, states lacking nuclear weapons could still obtain access to them through military 
alliances. At the final plenary of the conference, Tsarapkin warned against “West 
German revanchists and militarists who are striving to get their hand on nuclear 
weapons.”378 The French observer wondered why the Soviets had agreed to participate, 
speculating that, like the British, the Soviets had misread the degree of fluidity in U.S. 
nuclear policy in view of the Gilpatric Report and Kennedy’s speech.379 Foster wired the 
State Department to express his uncertainty regarding the thrust of Soviet objectives:  
If the concern expressed by the USSR regarding acqusition [sic] by the FRG of 
nuclear weapons indirectly through some arrangement within NATO is genuine, 
that concern should be allayed by the draft treaty. If on the other hand, the real 
Soviet aim is to divide the NATO alliance, then there is nothing we can do ….380  
Foggy Bottom answered that although “unlikely,” a veto-less European force had merits, 
including the ability to subsume the British and French deterrents, which would lessen 
nuclear risks in Europe and carry with it political advantages for the U.S. position in the 
Old World.381 The United States stood pat on a strict definition of proliferation that the 
Soviets would not stomach for reasons of nuclear security and European political 
dynamics. 
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Signs were accordingly mounting that a treaty would prove increasingly difficult 
and costly. Trivedi complained to Foster that linkage between nonproliferation and 
nuclear-sharing were “of less interest to India than to [the] Atlantic Community and [the] 
U.S.S.R.” He now called a comprehensive test-ban treaty the “best hope.” New Delhi 
seemed to have lost hope in a nonproliferation pact.382 Myrdal pushed hard for a CTBT, 
which she praised for its equality and efficacy, while Swedish newspapers questioned the 
appeal of an agreement to close the nuclear club that lacked its newest members—France 
and China. Italy proposed a second alternative—a unilateral non-acquisition declaration. 
In this scheme, the nuclear have-nots would pledge not to seek or develop nuclear 
weapons if no new states entered the club and real progress was made in halting the arms 
race. Foster warned Amintore Fanfani, the proposal’s author, that Washington would 
only countenance such a reference in a speech, or in the preamble, and that the U.S. and 
West Germany’s  “initial favorable reaction” would not last if nuclear disarmament was 
made the “basic premise” of the moratorium’s survival.383 The U.S. would not assent to a 
nonproliferation accord that was contingent on arms control and disarmament progress. 
Trivedi demurred as well, though for different reasons. He wanted a “reduction in 
nuclear weapons stocks” to come first.384  
The Soviets refused to table a draft treaty in Geneva as a symbol of their dismay. 
Instead, Tsarapkin presented a document to the United Nations on September 24 that 
formalized Moscow’s intolerance for an expanded West German role in NATO nuclear 
defense. Two paragraphs barred a variety of means of transferring nuclear weapons “to 
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the ownership or control of States of groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons,” 
including “the transfer of nuclear weapons, control over them or over their emplacement 
and use,” to the armed forces of a non-nuclear power, including “under the command of 
military alliances.” Notwithstanding the formal nails the Soviets were trying to drive in 
the scheme’s coffin, Foster and others remarked upon the document’s moderation; it did 
not rule out creation of the McNamara Committee.385 The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. still 
appeared willing to “maintain their dialogue at any price.” Peaceful coexistence was 
needed not only in spite of the Vietnam crisis,” but “to prove that the problems caused by 
the Vietnam War were not insurmountable as long as Washington still spoke to 
Moscow.”386 
The eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on 
Disarmament emerged from the debacle in Geneva more cohesive than before. In answer 
to the Soviet and American offerings, which failed to meet their priorities or allay their 
fears concerning a prejudicial global nuclear order, the group came together to introduce 
a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 2028 (XX) laid out five 
cardinal principles for a satisfactory nonproliferation treaty. First, it should be “void of 
any loop-holes.” Second, it “should embody an acceptable balance of mutual 
responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.” Third, it should 
move to world closer to general and complete disarmament and, “more particularly, 
nuclear disarmament.” Fourth, there should be “acceptable and workable” mechanisms 
with which to implement the treaty. Lastly, the treaty should not interfere with the 
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establishment of nuclear-free zones in regions that wanted them. 387 The resolution passed 
the General Assembly on November 19. The set of principles reflected the tenor of 
conversations in Geneva, where the non-aligned grouping had taken advantage of the 
absence of Soviet-American leadership seize the initiative and imprint their preferences in 
that year’s U.N. authorization calling for the committee to forge ahead in its efforts to 
broker a nonproliferation treaty. 
The German question and its links to broader European political trends were the 
keys to the continuing struggle between the arms control cabal and pro-nuclear voices in 
the Johnson administration. When the Western Four briefed the North Atlantic Council 
after the ENDC wound up, the West German representative asserted that nuclear 
nonproliferation was not an aim in and of itself and that the Western powers ought to 
safeguard the prospect of a collective nuclear force or a European deterrent.388 Bonn’s 
position on NATO nuclear-sharing and international nuclear diplomacy was shaped by 
the internal power struggle in the Christian Democratic Party between Erhard and 
followers of Konrad Adenauer, who preferred to tack closer to France rather than rely on 
U.S. goodwill and hopes for an Atlantic force. The elections in the Federal Republic on 
September 19 widened the gap between Gaullists and Atlanticists in the coalition, which 
raised troubling questions about the future of U.S.-F.R.G. relations and NATO nuclear-
sharing.  
The Geneva debacle also seized the attention of the leaders of the elite-based 
movement for European economic and political integration in which Erhard was a firm 
believer. Jean Monnet, the French political economist and diplomat, was the chief 
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architect of the campaign for European unity in political and economics affairs. Like Ball, 
he had come to regard a collective nuclear force in Europe, whether the U.K.-led 
Atlantic Nuclear Force or the U.S.-led multilateral force, as offering a timely 
psychological stimulus to integrationist forces. A September letter to Foster outlined the 
standpoint of his Action Committee for a United Europe: 
Monnet’s Action Committee for a United Europe has, of course, been quite 
discouraged by the halt to progress in Western Europe in the direction of political 
collaboration and unification. De Gaulle’s policies are the chief cause of this … 
Monnet’s chief concern has been to maintain an optimistic psychological 
atmosphere – one that seems to indicate some momentum. For this reason 
primarily, he has come to favor the MLF/ANF. In his review, the inter-allied 
activity associated with the Force’s creation and subsequent allied cooperation in 
managing it can become the nucleus of further political development. He sees 
defense questions as essentially political and diplomatic problems (as they largely 
are), and this makes him willing to use a military vehicle to achieve these political 
objectives.389 
There was “one sharp latent difference” in the political objectives of the West German 
foreign ministry, the U.S. State Department, and the Action Committee though. Monnet 
was chiefly interested in a collective nuclear force as the kernel of a European nuclear 
force.  
 
Conclusion 
On November 23, 1965, Glenn Seaborg related the conclusions of a study 
commissioned by US Atomic Energy Commission and undertaken by Union Carbide 
into how new gas centrifuge technology might facilitate clandestine programs to develop 
nuclear weapons. The AEC was attempting to firewall information relating to these 
centrifuges internationally, though West Germany was mounting “strong resistance” to 
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the arm-twisting. The study categorized states according to their stage of development. 
Group X were the most advanced and included West Germany, Sweden, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and Italy; Group Y possessed “limited internal industrial activity,” for 
example, Brazil, Israel, India and Yugoslavia; Group Z were far down the industrial scale. 
Though even the Group X countries would require eight years, or five years with access 
to US information (the figures were twelve and seven for Group Y), to construct a 
sufficient number of gas centrifuges and then produce a critical mass of U-235, the 
relatively small size of the facility (approximately one acre) made its detection and 
inspection a major intelligence challenge.390  
By the end of 1965, the United States was facing a transformed security 
environment in the wake of a Chinese test using an U-235 core, mounting evidence that 
Israel and India were contemplating seriously a military option, and unsettling news that 
uranium enrichment had become easier to execute and more difficult to detect. Elements 
of the United States national security apparatus, including the Disarmament Agency and 
Congress, were growing less and less patient with the impasse on a nonproliferation 
treaty. In October, Foster pushed Johnson to acknowledge that a nonproliferation treaty 
was imperative in light of global trends even if “it would not permit a mixed ownership 
NATO nuclear force.”391 The next chapter covers the period of international nuclear 
politics that spanned November 1965 to February 1967, during which the Johnson 
administration finally sacrificed the MLF and the Soviet Union and the United States 
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began to align their diplomatic postures in the nuclear assemblies, where a grand bargain 
between the nuclear haves and have-nots began to clarify.  
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Chapter Three | Killing It Softly: The MLF’s Demise and 
Détente’s Rise 
 
[Fred Dutton] said it was a combination of declining polls, an unsuccessful legislative program and the 
need for some fresh initiatives to point to in the next campaign. The combination of these 3 factors, he says, 
led to the Test Ban Treaty.  
 
Fred believes that the President is in serious trouble, that we are going to get clobbered at the polls this fall 
and that there is a serious need for new initiatives. I did not, of course, mention the Non-proliferation 
Treaty to him, but this would precisely fill the bill.” 
 
Hayes Redmon, Memorandum to Bill Moyers, “Fred Dutton and Peace Issue,” 9 June 1966, Box 12, 
Office Files of Bill Moyers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library 
Introduction: Peace, the NPT, and the Cold War  
A close associate of Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Nikolai Fedorenko 
buttonholed French Ambassador Roger Seydoux in New York City on March 30, 1967. 
The Soviet attaché related to Seydoux that Soviet and American positions on a 
nonproliferation treaty were "very close right now," and negotiations for a nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty were headed for "a decisive phase." The biggest hurdle remaining 
was not "the adhesion of the Federal Republic of Germany [but] the treaty's acceptance 
by the Indian Government." “Doubtlessly,” Seydoux cabled to the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, “the importance that Moscow accords to Chinese political developments 
and its effects on neighboring countries were not unrelated.”392 Bonn continued to work 
for references to disarmament and an “acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and 
obligations” among nuclear haves and have-nots. West German observers were acutely 
worried about the "implications of certain treaty clauses on its nuclear industry's 
development." Soviet officials pressed those of West Germany to cooperate behind closed 
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doors; even so, the Kremlin’s focus pivoted toward Asia. The attaché noted "the 
implications" that Chinese political instability and nuclear testing held for “all the 
neighbors.”393 The field of action in world nuclear affairs was tilting from the Industrial 
North, where West Germany and other advanced industrial powers worked to retain 
access to the future nuclear emporium, to the Global South, where New Delhi “surged” 
against the pact with Brasília in tow. 
By early 1967, intelligence and rumors of military research in the Indian and 
Israeli nuclear programs, the domestic political climates in the United States and West 
Germany, the efforts of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and 
the behavior of the international community in Geneva produced a narrowing alignment 
of Soviet and American views regarding the wording of the treaty’s nonproliferation and 
safeguards articles and the end of attempts to fabricate a hardware solution to the 
German question. On December 16, 1966, U.S. officials presented West German Vice 
Chancellor Willy Brandt with a compromise draft treaty endorsed by the Soviet Union. 
The superpower entente ushered in a new phase of international nuclear diplomacy. 
Indian officials had grown disenchanted with a treaty barring their entry into the nuclear 
club. Washington’s reluctance to offer security guarantees in league with Moscow owing 
to its military commitments in Southeast Asia meanwhile afforded United States 
diplomats with scant leverage to change their minds.  
This chapter takes account of the winding path of bilateral and multilateral 
nuclear efforts to broker a nonproliferation treaty from November 1965 to February 
1967. Non-aligned solidarity and French unruliness posed challenges to United States 
interests in a nonproliferation treaty and European predominance. The Federal Republic 
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of Germany (F.R.G.) tried to salvage a hardware solution for its nuclear and diplomatic 
woes after the United Kingdom abandoned the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) scheme, 
which Europeanists in Foggy Bottom abetted by safeguarding the NATO multilateral 
nuclear force (MLF) from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin’s broadsides and mounting 
scrutiny from the U.S. Joint Committee for Atomic Energy (JCAE) chaired by Senator 
John Pastore (D – NH). The idea of a Soviet-American “partnership for peace” promoted 
by the arms control cabal in Washington struck a chord amid the Vietnam War. U.S. 
dithering though foiled substantive progress at the Eighteen Nation Committee on 
Disarmament (ENDC) that spring, when Kosygin proposed an ingenious guarantee 
devised to please neutrals and discredit the West. The Pastore Resolution’s unanimous 
passage, British and Canadian admonitions, growing Soviet-American collusion in 
Geneva, and Undersecretary of State George Ball’s resignation altered the White House’s 
calculus in autumn 1966. The final straw was Bill Moyers’s campaign to persuade 
President Johnson that nuclear statesmanship could yield electoral capital. Johnson chose 
not to “wring” the Germans’ necks, but after a period of high-level trust-building, 
Disarmament Agency Director William Foster and Soviet diplomat Alexei Roshchin 
found suitable language for a non-transfer clause blocking a hardware solution.  
British Disarmament Minister Lord Chalfont declared the Cold War “outdated” 
that summer as debates about peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs), international 
safeguards, and security guarantees unearthed fault lines between the Industrial North 
and the Global South. These gulfs would only deepen as Pastore’s fear that the United 
States might become the world’s policeman began to invest the nonproliferation talks 
with a significance transcending that of the epic struggle between capitalism and 
communism.  
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Fighting the Middle Ground 
With West German elections over and non-aligned members seizing the initiative 
in Geneva and New York City, United States and Soviet policymakers began to consult 
more sincerely on nuclear questions. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy met 
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on November 24, 1965 for “the most candid and 
cordial conversation of [their] three-year acquaintance.”394 Both men acknowledged the 
difficulty of either government stating a position on how NATO security arrangements 
affected nonproliferation talks without knowing the other side’s intentions. On the one 
hand, Soviet statements had been inconsistent, sometimes denouncing only the MLF and 
at other times separate consultations and existing arrangements as well. On the other 
hand, the U.S. and NATO were unclear among themselves with respect to the Special 
Committee’s character and divided between “believers in collective weapons systems and 
believers in consultation.” They concurred that private communication of Washington’s 
“real plans and preferences” was needed.  
Dobrynin assured Bundy that Soviet policy resulted from unease with 
proliferation to Europe and Asia rather than a Trojan horse with which to attack NATO. 
The tidal wave of Chinese criticism of the Soviet Union’s nuclear diplomacy “should 
prove its sincerity.” Bundy related his impression to Johnson that the Soviets would 
countenance nuclear arrangements in NATO that stopped short of a hardware solution 
for now and “clearly” maintained the status quo insofar as “German access to the nuclear 
trigger.”395 The ANF or a Special Committee might be feasible. Bundy began to urge the 
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State Department to ease off on the MLF; in a letter to Rusk, he underscored Johnson’s 
decision to let the Germans and British hash out the details and “members of this 
Government [who] instinctively and insistently press their own preferred tactics [needed 
to] mak[e] sure they [were] in line with the President’s thinking.” Likely referencing the 
debacle in Geneva the previous summer, he groused that “[w]e have had this kind of 
pulling and hauling before, and we ought to try to avoid it this time.396” 
The State Department still viewed the MLF as the military centerpiece of a 
European political framework inclusive of the United States and a means thereby to stave 
off General Charles de Gaulle’s quest for a French renaissance; Assistant Secretary of 
State George Ball reported from Paris that the nuclear question had grown “so important 
and symbolic to the Germans” that they wanted to confront the French with a collective 
force as a “fait accompli.” With European discussions proceeding, Ball brooded that the 
Europeans could be “so afraid of being alone with Germany, so awed by De Gaulle, so 
doubtful of American constancy, so divided among each other, and so persuaded that a 
safe deal with the Soviets is possible that they would follow de Gaulle's vision of a Europe 
from the Atlantic to the Urals.” The apprehension overestimated the general’s leverage 
and Soviet willingness to normalize East-West relations. “I often get frustrated in this 
job,” Ball admitted, “but I don't yet think that Europeans are that dumb.”397 He was 
right. Unlike Ball and other Europhiles in Foggy Bottom, Bundy was more intrigued by 
the merits of the Soviet-American establishment of a global nuclear order. “[N]o one now 
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wants the MLF.” Bundy hyperbolized. “I think we may … make some money with 
Moscow if we tell them privately before we sink it publicly.”398  
President Johnson met West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard on December 
20, 1965 in the Oval Office, where Erhard pushed Johnson to support a "multilateral, 
integrated system" and "closer integration of NATO allies in the nuclear field." The 
outcome of the September elections widened the rift in the Christian Democratic Party 
between Erhard’s Atlanticists for whom the United States was embraced as the protector 
of Europe and Konrad Adenhauer’s Gaullists for whom the Federal Republic’s destiny 
lay with France and European union.399 The administration held the line on a hardware 
solution the previous summer in hopes of aiding Erhard’s electoral chances.400 Now, 
Erhard was pushing Johnson to take a Europe-first stance, contending that “agreement 
on non-proliferation presuppose[d] agreement on nuclear sharing.” He forewarned that 
domestic opinion made it "impossible to assume that Germany will go forever without a 
nuclear deterrent.” Moreover, the plunging cost of nuclear technology and ever-
expanding diffusion of nuclear know-how meant that many small powers would soon 
have the wherewithal to acquire them since their costs were light compared to 
conventional forces. A hardware solution was the sole way to keep the 15 countries in 
NATO from joining the nuclear club, “the best guarantee of peace,” and one that "would 
also be in the Soviet interest."401 The political currents ran deeper though. In early 1966, 
Henry Kissinger reported that, according to Erhard, most German officials outside of the 
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Foreign Office were dubious about a joint force, but he was hesitant to disclaim the 
option because of the pressure being applied by the State Department.402  
Johnson was non-committal. Although Europeanists maintained that a hardware 
solution would help nonproliferation, neither the Eastern bloc nor key NATO allies 
concurred. Johnson prevaricated, musing the nonproliferation treaty would have to wait 
for a resolution in Vietnam and that the "best solution" was for the U.K. to disarm 
unilaterally, leaving the U.S. as the lone guardian of Europe.403 Erhard handed him a 
draft plan outlining a variant of a hardware solution that made concessions to British 
demands to retain veto rights. When West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder 
met with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Ball that afternoon though, he 
disparaged the plan, admitting he did not think it could constitute "an adequate basis" for 
discussions. Having recently visited London, Schröder admitted that he saw Wilson's plan 
to form an ANF made up of U.K. and U.S. Polaris submarines and British V-bombers as 
the “cornerstone." He agreed with Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that new 
forces were expendable; they merely wanted a "share” in the "handling" of nuclear 
weapons.404 
Johnson wrote Wilson three days later to confess that an ANF solution would 
"give [him] some problems with Congress, and I am sure [it] will not be easy for you," 
but it represented the way forward.405 Wilson was more and more convinced though that 
the ANF was infeasible for a litany of reasons: domestic opinion, Polaris’s cost, French 
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rebelliousness, and the technical impracticality of command and control. The Special 
Committee presented a more attractive option. Wilson backed the ANF when he met 
Johnson in January. However, he quickly changed tack, endorsing the benefits of a 
"forum for discussion of nuclear policy, strategy and planning." Days before the ENDC 
was set to reconvene on January 27, David Bruce, the U.S. Ambassador in London, 
informed Johnson that Whitehall now opposed West Germany’s inclusion in a joint 
nuclear force.406 The British seemed ready to abdicate a hardware option while insisting 
that nuclear powers retain vetoes in perpetuity. 
  
“A Partnership for Peace” 
The hardware option started to lose traction when ACDA Deputy Director 
Adrian “Butch” Fisher executed an end-run around the State Department and convinced 
Senator John Pastore (D – NH) to hold hearings in the JCAE on the state of American 
nuclear diplomacy.407 Fisher was on good terms with many congressional Democrats 
from his days on Capitol Hill.408 As the committee’s chairman, Pastore sat at the nexus of 
nuclear policy inside the Beltway.* Unlike Robert Kennedy, he enjoyed a close 
relationship with the president, who years before relinquished his own seat on the JCAE 
to accommodate and perhaps recruit Pastore. A week after the State of the Union address 
on January 12, 1966, which dwelt on Vietnam and the Great Society, and contained just 
two paragraphs about nuclear policy, Pastore introduced a resolution commending the 
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president for his nonproliferation efforts.409 He touted the relative importance of nuclear 
threats in his accompanying speech. “[I]f peace were to settle on Vietnam with today’s 
sunset,” he admonished, “the night would be filled with an even greater danger … 
proliferation.”  
Pastore’s definition of proliferation fused its horizontal and vertical dimensions; 
“the expansion of the nuclear club” and the “amplification of the ‘over kill’ … in the 
hands of the titanic two.”410 He portrayed nuclear war chiefly with reference to the 
cataclysm associated with an all-out thermonuclear exchange, referencing the sobering 
conclusions of the 1959 hearings on “The Biological and Environmental Effects of 
Nuclear War.” He also linked the Senate’s treaty prerogative to the Disarmament 
Agency’s “ultimate goal” of an international system where the rule of force was 
“subordinated to the rule of law” and where “a changing world” was managed 
“peacefully.”411 He believed that “rational” sovereignty could be reconciled with 
“international undertakings” to manage the nuclear weapons that endangered the 
“Chinese, Russian, American and, indeed, all the peoples of the world.”412 His wanted 
tougher safeguards, calling for IAEA inspections on nuclear facilities (singling out India’s 
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reprocessing plant at Trombay) and for nuclear suppliers to apply them on dual-use 
exports. To set a good example, he advocated that the plutonium separation facility set to 
open in Buffalo adopt IAEA safeguards. To win over states lacking nuclear weapons, he 
favored security guarantees and civilian assistance. The resolution saluting the president 
for his efforts to date and enjoining him to move forward expeditiously to solve “nuclear 
proliferation problems” attracted the sponsorship of 55 Senators.413  
Excepting West Germany, the major European powers were dead set against 
German military forces having a hand in nuclear security. On January 21, British Special 
Minister on Disarmament Lord Chalfont notified U.S. officials that the U.K. was 
squarely against a multilateral force and for veto rights. He urged them to show more 
flexibility on the nonproliferation language. Although he did not reference the Pastore 
Resolution, he reported that Whitehall would accept a safeguards article specifying IAEA 
oversight since the new Anglo-American bilateral agreement already entailed such an 
obligation.414 In Paris, de Gaulle had repulsed repeated overtures by U.S. officials to 
comply with a hardware solution. NATO nuclear-sharing ran counter to his vision of a 
“European Europe” that stretched “from the Atlantic to the Urals” to challenge the 
bipolar Cold War order.415 Though he backed German reunification and thirsted for 
greater autonomy from the United States, his thinking in regards to a German nuclear 
role had been staunchly negative since 1964. Before then, he had assumed that Germany 
would eventually develop the weapons and that the MLF was a farce. Hence, for reasons 
of national pride he refused to place the force de frappe under NATO or European 
command. Now, he dismissed a hardware solution on the grounds that the Germans were 
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a militaristic and untrustworthy people. He had made this view clear to Ball in an August 
1965 interview.416 
A software solution, on the other hand, attracted more and more proponents. The 
contours of the Special Committee began to take shape at a December meeting of NATO 
defense ministers in Washington, where the principals established three working groups to 
iron out the administrative protocols, structures, and procedures. The Soviets were 
treating the Special Committee as indistinguishable from a hardware option though. In a 
conversation at the U.N. between Foster and Tsarapkin on January 12, the Soviet envoy 
underlined his government’s opposition to any form of West German access to nuclear 
weapons including by means of a "Special Committee." More telling though in Foster's 
judgment was a Pravda article published two days before that had revealed continuing 
Soviet interest in a nonproliferation treaty. Mostly, though, he was relieved that Soviet 
officials were keeping the lines of communication open. Even so, a Soviet-American 
consensus on NATO nuclear-sharing and global nonproliferation remained elusive.417  
Official Soviet and United States’ positions were thus still far apart. Kosygin sent a 
“pen-pal” letter on January 11 taking Johnson to task for his "policy of satisfying step by 
step the nuclear claims of the Bonn Government." He accused the Federal Republic of 
trying to acquire nuclear weapons and the U.S. of supplying its German allies with 
"atomic information," training with nuclear explosives, and artillery "capable of carrying 
nuclear shells." He even cited a “Western press" report claiming that  "West German 
planes and missiles manned by West German military personnel [had] even [been] 
equipped with [U.S.] nuclear warheads." In his eyes, Bonn had openly admitted that it 
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would defy a nonproliferation treaty prohibiting a hardware solution and the U.S. had in 
effect eschewed a nuclear entente with the U.S.S.R. in the interest of giving access to 
nuclear arms to “West German revanchists.” The Kremlin would oppose a "multilateral 
or an Atlantic nuclear force," or even an "atomic committee." He was "ready to begin 
businesslike negotiations to prepare ... a non-proliferation treaty."418 Johnson’s foreign 
policy team thus confronted strong albeit equivocal Soviet opposition to any 
modifications to NATO defense policy.  
Facing British reticence, Soviet vituperation, and a growing domestic peace 
movement, the Committee of Principals met in the conference room in Foggy Bottom to 
devise language with which to respond to Kosygin and frame the president’s forthcoming 
message to the ENDC. Johnson’s foreign policy team began by discussing Vietnam’s 
impact on the climate for nuclear diplomacy. Foster wanted a sanguine response 
maintaining Communist attacks on U.S. actions in Vietnam represented cause for greater 
efforts, which Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Rusk characterized as naïve. “The 
facts of life" were that "Vietnam was an obstacle to disarmament." As to the Pastore 
Resolution, Humphrey and Rusk advised Johnson to uphold it lest the omission betray 
that "the Senate's position ... [w]as contrary to that of the administration."419 Kosygin’s 
objection to the Special Committee was worrisome. The Eastern bloc had opposed 
hardware solutions since late-1963; now it was attacking a software option as well, which 
called into question existing nuclear arrangements in Europe and lessened the prospects 
for agreement in Geneva. Inertial support in Foggy Bottom kept a hardware solution on 
the table though. Keeny offered three substitute clauses to replace a muddy obligation not 
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to increase “the total number of States and other Organizations having independent 
power to use nuclear weapons,” and thereby reassure the Soviets while still “fully 
protect[ing] our interest in nuclear arrangements that will keep the Germans with us."420 
The revised text, whose new fourth article defined “control” as the “right or ability to fire 
nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision of an existing nuclear weapons state,” 
complied with British views on veto rights but failed to satisfy Soviet concerns about 
"access.”421 For now, though, the revisions were held in reserve in case a window for 
Soviet-American accord opened.  
The middle road pleased neither Moscow nor Bonn. Ball’s fingerprints were 
evident on the non-dissemination clause, which was "a shade more binding" but 
"consistent with everything we have said to the Germans."422 Despite the partiality, 
French Ambassador Roger Seydoux noted that West Germany begrudged the 
proceedings, which presented Bonn with “a frightful dilemma:” either consent without a 
quid pro quo on reunification, “or refuse and find itself in an intolerable political and 
psychological position."423 The National Security Council opted for a low-level approach, 
instructing Foster to show the revisions to West German Disarmament Minister Swidbert 
Schnippenkoetter in Geneva and “challenge [him] to make an issue of this wording in the 
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face of Western Four agreement.” Keeny was relieved that the initiative might ”contain 
the possibility of an agreement with the Soviets,” though he worried that the White 
House would not “stand our ground if [the West Germans] object[ed] at a high level.”424 
The AEC was in the midst terminating projects to assist the F.R.G. with fast-breeder and 
plutonium reprocessing technology. In response, the West German nuclear establishment 
diversified its investment for research and development in nuclear fuel and reprocessing. 
Though the nuclear powers in Geneva fretted that West German nuclear plans might one 
day take a military detour, the Erhard government was principally concerned with losing 
political leverage for reunification and market share in the global nuclear emporium.  
The political wrangling over nuclear-sharing and nonproliferation had reached an 
impasse. Allies and adversaries alike stood their ground against a hardware solution and 
the new language failed to bridge the gap between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Washington 
wanted a treaty that inscribed a political definition of proliferation to dissuade new actors 
from playing the game of deterrence while Soviet leaders strongly resisted new countries, 
especially West Germany, having military access to nuclear weapons or participating 
more closely in nuclear planning with their political corollaries. Would the treaty codify a 
meaning of proliferation based on “control” or “access,” and would Soviet officials 
acquiesce to current nuclear-sharing arrangements perhaps supplemented by more 
intergovernmental consultation? In essence, what form and depth of nuclear-sharing 
would Moscow allow in NATO and still go along with a nonproliferation treaty?  
Key experts in the White House were pessimistic. The new draft treaty was the 
product of Foster’s ad referendum talks in London; ergo, its "principal purpose” was “to 
appease the British." It was unlikely to be "significantly more acceptable to the 
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Soviets."425 Keeny complained the accepted revisions were superficial and advised not to 
"table it before [the North Atlantic Council] (NAC) and presumably the ENDC,” where 
Soviet-American talks were ongoing. Meanwhile, the CIA concluded that a "significant 
breakthrough in Geneva appear[ed] doubtful,” while acknowledging that “[a]gainst the 
backdrop of the Vietnam War many would consider even the agreement to resume talks 
an accomplishment.”426 
 
Small Steps in Geneva 
The Eighteen National Committee on Disarmament reconvened on January 27, 
1966. Pope Paul VI bestowed his imprimatur on the proceedings, citing Pope John 
XXIII’s speech, “Pacem in Terris,” when calling for renewed commitment to 
disarmament. The U.S. draft treaty predictably failed to foster harmony; nevertheless, the 
sessions and backroom meetings helped to signal intent, reduce misperceptions, and 
consolidate Soviet-American détente in the nuclear arena. The eight non-aligned 
members continued to play the “more significant and influential role” they had assumed 
the previous year, while the co-chairman endeavored to play down their 
disagreements.427 Tsarapkin delivered a long tirade on "German revanchism" and U.S. 
aggression in Vietnam at the first meeting; however, the Soviet emissary had assured 
Foster earlier in a tête-à-tête that Vietnam was not an insuperable barrier. When he 
passed through Paris en route to Geneva, Foster had rendezvoused with French 
representative at the North Atlantic Council P. O. Alphand. Foster related to him that 
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Washington was less rigid on the MLF than it seemed. Furthermore, Tsarapkin and he 
had agreed that Vietnam should not stand in the way of progress in Geneva.428 Personal 
diplomacy once again belied and softened the more bellicose public posturing.  
Security assurances were at the front of the agenda for non-aligned members. The 
issue of nuclear assurances, both positive in the form of promises to defend and assist 
states from nuclear threats, and negative in terms of pledges not to level the weapons 
against those states lacking them, were becoming more central as states without nuclear 
weapons weighed in heavily in Geneva and New York City. U.S. officials contemplated 
negative security assurances, but it was Kosygin who seized the moment to burnish Soviet 
bona fides, allay non-aligned states’ concerns, and discomfit West Germany all in one fell 
swoop. He declared on February 1 that the U.S.S.R. would honor a promise not to use 
“nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers, signatories to the treaty, which have no 
nuclear weapons on their territory.”429 His guarantee implicated Beijing and came on the 
heels of a polemic in the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, The People’s Daily, 
lambasting the Soviet Union for conducting nuclear diplomacy with the U.S. against the 
backdrop of the Vietnam War.430 The Western bloc confronted a dilemma because such 
an assurance would leave countries on whose territories the U.S. stationed nuclear 
weapons out in the cold. The non-aligned members, on the other hand, met the proposal 
with enthusiasm; on February 22, Mexican delegate Gomez Robledo called it in 
“complete concordance” with a proposal by Nigeria the previous year for a “firm 
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undertaking” by nuclear powers “not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Powers 
under any circumstances whatever, or to threaten to use them.”431 
While those in Washington debated how to deal with the Soviet overture, Foster 
began the laborious process of explaining and justifying the U.S. position to his Soviet 
counterpart. Foster request a sit-down from Tsarapkin on February 3 to talk about the 
recent exchange of letters between Kosygin and Johnson. The Soviet co-chairman had 
yet to read Johnson’s reply, but agreed that a private meeting was "desirable."432 On 
February 10, he notified Foster that Moscow had sent word to press on in their bilateral 
meetings.433 Foster and Fisher had spoken earlier that day about the president's letter 
laying out the new line that veto rights were sacrosanct. Fisher relayed that the final 
product was "a compromise between 1600 [Pennsylvania Ave.] and Ball."434 Chalfont 
was hopeful in spite of the nuclear-sharing hurdle and wanted a co-chairmanship for 
himself, testifying to Britain’s desire to maintain its leadership position in international 
nuclear diplomacy.  
Foster met Tsarapkin on February 14 at the Soviet villa, where the Soviet 
diplomat claimed the letter expressed "no change in U.S. position." Foster protested that 
the term “access" only sowed "confusion," while the U.S. position got to the heart of the 
matter: states’ abilities to fire nuclear weapons independently. Tsarapkin was unmoved 
and repeated Moscow’s stance that "no ingenious definition” would alter the Soviet 
Union’s antipathy to any form of West German “access” to nuclear arms. Foster pressed 
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the co-chairman on how he interpreted access and how it related to the various scenarios 
under review. The previous year, Tsarapkin had asserted that the MLF and the ANF 
were "obstacle[s];" now, Kosygin added the Special Committee and "Existing 
Arrangements." Tsarapkin maintained "they all amounted to [the] same thing, access in 
one form or another and this made it impossible for any progress to be made." Foster 
expanded on his government’s conception of proliferation in relation to hardware and 
software solutions in NATO; still, "Tsarapkin was unimpressed." Soviet-American 
differences had actually widened in the past year.435 The co-chairmen nevertheless 
concurred that debate on other matters should be wrapped up expeditiously at the 
conference so that delegations could turn their attention to the nonproliferation 
quandary.  
Dramatic events in India transformed the complexion of the non-aligned 
grouping in Geneva. India exemplified the deepening North-South fault line in nuclear 
politics. It was a country whose nascent nuclear industry and mounting conflicts with a 
nuclear-armed China to the North and an unfriendly Pakistan to the West led observers 
to worry that it would not long forgo the military option. The U.S. was working behind 
the scenes to dissuade the leading non-aligned country and longstanding critic of nuclear 
weapons from a martial course. Betty Goetz Lall, the American wife of Indian diplomat 
Arthur S. Lall, informed U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles in New Delhi that India’s 
atomic energy czar, Homi Bhabha, "thought India had an opportunity to extract political 
concessions from the big powers in return for not going nuclear." Lall quoted him as 
saying that "India should use its nuclear abstention as leverage to prod the United States 
and the Soviet Union into agreeing on disarmament measures," which would help Shastri 
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defy public pressure and "indicate Soviet movement toward the U.S. and away from 
China." The outcome would "be highly significant for India's basic security interest."436 
Her account may have reflected her and her husband’s antinuclear beliefs; nonetheless, 
the disclosure illuminated how the Sino-Soviet split affected Bhabha and Prime Minister 
Lal Bahadur Shastri’s outlooks on international nuclear diplomacy. 
At least, that was the thinking until the two men’s deaths rocked Indian nuclear 
policy in January 1966. The Indian delegation had customarily served as ringmaster and 
rabble-rouser among the non-aligned group, staking its moral prestige on the promotion 
of equality, university, and common security in global nuclear diplomacy. The end of the 
Second Kashmir War with the signing of the Treaty of Tashkent rejuvenated Indian 
energy in the field. Peace on the subcontinent came at a price though. Prime Minister 
Shastri collapsed and died of an apparent heart attack in the Uzbek capital after the 
farewell reception on January 11.437 Two weeks later, Bhabha perished on board Air 
India Flight 101, when it slammed into Mont Blanc. India’s chief nuclear hawk and dove 
thus both left the diplomatic scene within a two-week span. The British thought the death 
of the “only Indian atomic scientist of international class” (more reflective of British 
prejudice than Indian capabilities) would lessen hawks’ influence in New Delhi.438 In 
actuality, Indian nuclear diplomacy grew more truculent now that V.C. Trivedi, whom 
British officials described as a “partisan of the tendency to afford India with the atom 
bomb,” operated without “precise instructions” while Indira Gandhi solidified her control 
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over the Congress Party.439 The French and Americans hoped that the peaceful end of 
the conflict would ease Indo-Pakistan tensions, while Gandhi’s rise could make India 
more pliable to Soviet influence. For now, though, Trivedi could write Indian nuclear 
policy from Geneva. 
The newfound autonomy and advantageous terms of reference set by UN 
Resolution 2028 emboldened Trivedi. In a speech on February 15, he upheld the tenets 
of “non-intervention in the internal affairs of States” and “respect for their independence, 
integrity and sovereignty,” while castigating Beijing for twice defying international norms 
by testing nuclear explosives in the global commons. He bewailed the lack of progress 
toward a total test-ban treaty given the global consensus, proliferation corollaries, and 
planetary ambit. With respect to nonproliferation, he specified three alternatives: 
Fanfani’s moratorium, a “balanced” treaty combatting the horizontal and vertical trend 
lines, or nuclear deterrence based on alliance blocs. Invoking the non-aligned statement 
of the previous fall, he rebutted accusations that states lacking nuclear weapons wanted to 
smuggle general and complete disarmament, or nuclear disarmament, into the package; 
on the contrary, they only held that “[a] non-proliferation treaty will need to deal with 
the disease instead of dealing merely with the symptoms.”440 The draft treaties ought to 
“embody a more comprehensive approach, and a global approach" by addressing the 
spread and racing of nuclear arms and by avoiding the establishment of three classes of 
states: nuclear powers, non-nuclear-weapon states, and allies of nuclear powers. This last 
point defied the U.S. insistence on leeway for a multilateral force in Europe. He ended by 
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reciting the verdict issued by Jawaharlal Nehru from a British prison on August 2, 1933, 
when he lamented the “[g]reat failure at world efforts at co-operation” at the World 
Disarmament Conference in Geneva. “No country was prepared to consider the question 
from a wider international point of view,” Nehru had claimed, because for each 
“disarmament means that other countries should disarm or lessen their armaments while 
it kept up its own strength.”441 
By questioning the proceedings in the former setting of the hapless League of 
Nations, the speech challenged the Soviet and American co-chairmen, whom Trivedi 
compared to "a Mogul emperor of India who was a drunkard himself but who prohibited 
drinking throughout his empire." Though the superpower delegations enjoyed special 
privileges, the non-aligned members worked constantly and assiduously to delineate a 
middle ground between them.442 Thus far in 1966, they had bent their efforts to 
obtaining either “negative” assurances of nuclear non-aggression, or “positive” pledges of 
support from the nuclear powers. According to a Journal de Genève article of February 11, 
“the most "capable" do not want to give up arming themselves … without being sure that 
they will be protected against nuclear attack, wherever it comes from.” They wanted 
more “than the stabilization of the status quo; they desired a world where security was 
afforded to all.”443 Whitehall believed that Trivedi’s address was a play for time owing to 
the power vacuum in New Delhi. Nonetheless, the fit of pique could not be dismissed in 
light of India’s status as the presumptive head of the non-aligned movement and the 
cardinal threshold state. Italian delegate Francesco Cavaletti cautioned the North Atlantic 
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Council that Trivedi’s intervention was symptomatic of neutral repugnance at a 
prospective treaty regime lacking equal sacrifices from the nuclear powers. He intimated 
that Italy’s proposal for a three-year moratorium, stemming in part from growing Italy’s 
own nuclear ambitions, “had kept its value.”444  
On February 17, Tsarapkin gave a long tirade against Bonn’s nuclear pretensions. 
The speech vexed Foster. When Tsarapkin claimed the Bundeswehr and Erhard were 
pursuing nuclear weapons and cited an Institute of Strategic Studies report that West 
German reactors could generate enough plutonium to make 170 atomic bombs per year 
by 1972, Foster scribbled to ACDA Counselor George Bunn: “I suppose [the] use of 
“Red Herring” would be undiplomatic, although it would be fun.” “[E]veryone in this 
room, including Ts[arapkin] himself,” he griped, “knows this is ridiculous” since all West 
German reactors were under safeguards. The main challenge was still Trivedi’s criticisms 
though. Bunn jotted back that Mexican delegate Tello Macias had advised “just before 
the meeting … that we not take on Trivedi because that might cause [the] 8 [non-aligned 
members] to join ranks.” “Mexico wants to take him on Tues[day].” “I said you were 
leaving” (to return to Washington for the JCAE hearings) and it was “difficult for you to 
follow Mexico, but I would tone down the statement if I could.” Bunn made “minor 
changes,” deleting Trivedi’s name and adding a reference to Mexican leadership, whose 
envoys seemed adept at concilating their northern neighbors and their non-aligned 
counterparts alike.445  
In spring 1966, the nuclear question flummoxed United States policymakers even 
as Vietnam preoccupied them. The Committee of Principals met on March 2 to discuss 
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Kosygin’s offer of assurances for non-aligned, non-nuclear-weapon states. How to 
guarantee the security of states outside the U.S. alliance system had confounded 
Washington since before Lop Nur and the non-aligned grouping had heartily welcomed 
Kosygin’s proposal. The limits had heretofore stemmed from fears of watering down the 
U.S. deterrent, alienating allies, or contradicting non-aligned neutrality. Johnson’s foreign 
policy team resolved once more that, at the “present time,” it was not “advisable” to 
display a willingness to extend security guarantees as part of a grand bargain. The 
reasoning had altered significantly though. Changing strategic and economic factors now 
militated against further obligations. In mid-February, the State Department had 
instructed the U.S. delegation in Geneva to give a “positive indication [of] our readiness 
[to] support effective assurances for states undertaking [an] obligation not [to] acquire 
their own nuclear weapons.”446 Now, Foggy Bottom informed Fisher that “[b]ecause of 
Viet Nam … we do not believe it wise to raise questions of additional commitments.”447 
With the U.S. military bogged down in Southeast Asia and the nuclear have-nots 
outflanking the superpowers in Geneva, Fisher was ordered to coordinate with his Soviet 
counterpart more closely:  
You should also seek [to] persuade Tsarapkin of [the] wisdom of allowing 
assurances question [to] simmer with [a] minimum of U.S. and Sov[iet] public 
comment until key issues in [the] treaty are resolved and we are in [a] better 
position to assess how best [to] meet [the] joint interests of U.S.S.R. and U.S. on 
the one hand and [the] needs of non-nuclears on the other.448 
The co-chairmen’s prerogative of setting the agenda let them play for time until a 
common posture was taken, enabling them to make offers from a position of strength. 
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According to Rusk, “premature agitation” on the issue of security assurances “might only 
encourage non-nuclear powers to seek [a] more extravagant price for their adherence to 
[the] treaty and to play one nuclear power against one another.” 
 
“Policing the World” 
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy called Rusk, Foster, Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara, and Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Glenn Seaborg to testify 
on the state of United States nuclear diplomacy in February and March 1966. Pastore’s 
resolution energized a “cabal” of nuclear prohibitionists in the administration such as 
Foster and Seaborg, who subscribed to internationalist mechanisms for addressing 
transnational and planetary threats, and who judged nuclear weapons primarily through 
a cataclysmic prism.449 The State Department, on the other hand, was disposed to lock in 
the country’s balancing role in Europe by way of a multilateral force. Divisions among 
key nuclear policymakers thus came visibly to the fore at the hearings. As the director of 
the powerful Pentagon, McNamara represented the critical swing vote.  
Rusk with Foster in tow was called as the first witness on February 23. Rusk had 
testified to the Senator Foreign Relations Committee the previous Friday with regard to 
Vietnam and the antiwar protests. Pastore greeted the secretary by linking proliferation to 
U.S. engagement in anticommunist struggles abroad, where a few atom bombs might tip 
the scales decisively.450 Rusk acknowledged that the spread of nuclear weapons would 
dent the preponderance of power held by the U.S., but he worried more about how they 
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could transmute “historic ethnic and territorial disputes” in “the hotter spots of the 
world” into catalysts of a Soviet-American war. It was a “chain reaction” initiated by a 
“irresponsible nuclear action by anybody, anywhere” that kept him up at night.451 Even 
so, he still believed that the construction of a NATO multilateral nuclear force and U.S. 
nonproliferation policy were reconcilable. Pastore pushed him on the question of security 
guarantees, asking if they would make the U.S. a “world policeman?” Rusk cautioned 
that Moscow might balk at pledging to confront Beijing in case of a Chinese threat and 
intimated that disarmament rather than guarantees was the main object of non-aligned 
diplomacy.452 Pastore asked if a global regime was tenable with both France and China 
“recalcitrant.” Rusk parried that nuclear powers were by nature disinclined to help new 
states join the club and kept the focus on Europe. Non-aligned acquiescence was 
imperative, but the “most difficult problems” resided not in the communist camp but in 
“the free world.”453 
Questions about deterrence, guarantees, and a universal compact were main 
topics when Foster testified on March 1. He painted a rosy picture of recent progress in 
Geneva. Instead of rebuffing the U.S. draft treaty and withholding its own, the Soviet 
Union had submitted a comparable document and proposed an “article-by-article 
discussion of the two draft treaties.”454 The Soviet-American relationship was thus 
evolving from polemical dueling and procedural parrying to sustained, constructive, and 
even concerted dialogue. Foster saw this as proof of Moscow’s “serious intent” to work 
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out a treaty, the decisive factors being China’s tests and the cheapening and broadening 
of nuclear technology, both of which increased the odds of catalytic nuclear war. Pastore 
agreed, noting that “proliferation concerns civilizations, not just governments;” even so, 
he again warned that guarantees might “place the United States in the role of policing the 
world.”455 Foster held that Kosygin’s recent proposal and the orthodox logic of nuclear 
threat and counter-threat meant that demands for assurances were “reasonable.” When 
asked about the benefits of a congressional resolution, Foster stated that the hortatory 
impact on the White House and the positive signal sent to states such as Italy, India, and 
the Soviet Union that the American people and their government were serious about a 
treaty would “help very much.”456  
When Seaborg spoke that afternoon, he advocated IAEA safeguards that would 
afford more “credible assurance” than bilateral arrangements and whose international 
scope would “take safeguards out of the marketplace,” where competition would 
eventually lead to a “reduction to the lowest common denominator—no safeguards at 
all.”457 Seaborg was reticent to share his frustration with the lax safeguards article in the 
current draft treaty; it took steady prodding by Representative Craig Hosmer (D – CA) 
for him to admit that he “would like to see [the language] stronger.”458 He also indicated 
that safeguards would work best if applied throughout the fuel-cycle to permit “cross-
checks on the flow of materials”459 He noted that the inclusion of an IAEA safeguards 
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article in the Latin American nuclear-free zone draft treaty had set an encouraging 
precedent for the nonproliferation talks in Geneva.  
McNamara’s testimony the next week was pivotal. The Pentagon had been 
decisive in the Senate’s decision to ratify the LTBT in 1963; its views now rested on the 
anticipated military impact of a nonproliferation treaty. McNamara depicted nuclear 
spread as a supreme danger and explained that the U.S. needed to make the international 
climate inhospitable for such states as India, West Germany, and Japan to deem nuclear 
weapons in their national interest. He feared that even small wars would spiral out of 
control since nuclear weapons’ effects on strategic space-time shrunk the window for 
diplomacy and raised the likelihood of a major power intervention that could set in 
motion an unmanageable sequence of nuclear threats, counter-threats, and volleys.460 He 
refused to distinguish among proliferators; Switzerland and Czechoslovakia were 
interchangeable in his mind. He promoted the multilateral force’s original goal—to 
reassure allies about U.S. credibility—but praised more expansively the North Atlantic 
Council’s progress toward constituting a “Special Committee.” He resisted weighing in 
explicitly, but his testimony implied that consultative mechanisms could achieve the same 
ends. His support for a nonproliferation treaty was unequivocal:  
I do think that as a nation, we sometimes fail to accept small penalties in order to 
achieve large gains … there are certain problem associated with the 
nonproliferation treaty … [b]ut there are many more serious problems associated 
with a world in which we don’t have a nonproliferation treaty.461 
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With nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO the chief hurdle to Soviet-American 
accord, the hearings served Fisher and Pastore’s purpose of revealing the majority in 
favor of compromise. 
The consensus that nuclear arms were a global threat influenced the committee’s 
decision to recommend their curtailment. McNamara’s account of how the Special 
Committee helped to enlighten European officials about the peril of thermonuclear war, 
in whose “process the world, in a very literal sense, would be virtually destroyed,” 
illustrated the fear at the resolution’s heart.462  The Federation of American Scientists, 
United World Federalists, Unitarian Universalist Association, Friends Committee on 
National Legislation, and the Council for a Livable World endorsed the resolution. It was 
Hosmer who best captured the normative thrust of proceedings though: “being for 
proliferation is like being for sin and against motherhood.”463 
 
Strangling Germans 
In March 1966, President Charles de Gaulle declared he was removing French 
forces from NATO integrated military command, calling into doubt the future of the 
Atlantic defense community. Johnson eschewed heated rhetoric or direct confrontation 
with the French general, and the multilateral force enjoyed a brief Indian summer as U.S. 
policymakers sought answers to the French challenge. However, the course of 
negotiations in Geneva and the Pentagon’s inclination to consult rather than form a 
collective force led McNamara to present a revived MLF to the British in such a way as to 
nudge Wilson toward the Special Committee and a NATO Nuclear Planning Group 
(NPG). Johnson’s presidency was more and more bound up in Vietnam, and he was 
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hesitant to issue the MLF’s death warrant. National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, who 
replaced Bundy on April 1, thought Johnson wanted to avoid "wringing the German's 
necks." His predecessor, Bundy, believed Johnson wanted to soft-pedal nuclear-sharing 
and nonproliferation so as to keep "the Germans on board."464 He preferred for events to 
take their course rather than risk a breach with Bonn while the tensions between the allies 
mounted over Franco-German rapprochement, balance-of-payment imbalances, and the 
American desire to draw down conventional forces in Europe on account of Vietnam.465 
As the United States tried to mitigate the impact of the French exit, the Eighteen 
Nation Committee on Disarmament continued through May 10. The non-aligned states 
were adamant that preserving the status quo was not enough and pushed for more than a 
Soviet non-aggression pledge and a soft U.S. vow to help those facing nuclear threats. 
Sweden, India, and Mexico concurred that a total ban on nuclear testing was necessary in 
concert with a nonproliferation treaty.466 The drive to strengthen the LTBT revealed the 
prevailing sense among non-aligned states that universal pacts were preferable in nuclear 
diplomacy and that nuclear testing represented a prolongation of European imperialism. 
The Ethiopian delegate’s statement (made without instructions from Addis Adaba) 
censuring the French for exploiting the African continent as an “experimental 
wilderness,” when they exploded another nuclear weapon in the Sahara that year, 
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illustrated the tenacity of the postcolonial symbolism.467 With respect to how 
nonproliferation implicated disarmament, the U.A.R. representative made the 
consequential comment to Foster that his murkier formulation of “steps for disarmament” 
might serve as a useful “fallback position” for the United States.468  
The State Department still held that European stability was a greater priority than 
a multilateral nonproliferation treaty; however, the tide appeared in the midst of turning. 
The Policy Planning Council at State touted the treaty as a “moral, legal, and political 
barrier to proliferation,” though it reckoned that India and West Germany’s unique 
geostrategic plights warranted nuclear assurances by means of guarantees and multilateral 
forces, respectively. As for Israel, the analysts deduced that Washington retained enough 
“leverage” to enforce its non-nuclear status.469 In Europe, West Germany and Italy were 
dismissive of the NPG and fretted about an unequal nuclear order. Schnippenkoetter 
carped that an acceptable treaty’s “prerequisites” were “constantly evaporating” and 
inquired of French diplomat Bruno de Leusse de Syon whether Paris’s “aloofness” from 
the Geneva talks matched Bonn’s own “distrust.”470 Leusse’s reply was cryptic. Besides 
Italy, West Germany was more and more isolated in international nuclear diplomacy.  
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East-West dialogue in Geneva took one step forward and one step backward that 
spring. The sessions devoted to nonproliferation resumed on March 22, when Foster 
offered a number of amendments to facilitate an “article-by-article” comparison of Soviet 
and U.S. drafts. Keeny had suggested the key amendment in January, which refined the 
definition of control to mean the “right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the 
concurrent decision of an existing nuclear weapon State.”471 Fisher did not present the 
stronger safeguards article plumped for by the JCAE and the AEC despite Foggy 
Bottom’s desire to submit a full draft treaty in order to divert some attention from 
questions of nuclear-sharing.472 The revised, mirrored articles now included prohibitions 
suggested by the U.S.S.R. against “encouragement or inducement to acquire nuclear 
weapons.”473 The new language was devised to negate the Soviet arguments that granting 
“access” to nuclear weapons amounted to dissemination and to preserve the “European 
option,” a joint nuclear force if Europe integrated politically, if either Britain or France 
chose to place their arsenals in the hands of a continental polity; ergo, the first article 
barred actions that would “cause an increase in the total number of States and 
associations of States” with nuclear weapons, rather than the advent of novel entities. 
Cavalletti outlined the “long-range” stakes of the controversy: “[i]f the possibility of a 
truly-integrated European association is to be left open … the nuclear weapon country or 
countries belonging to it would at a given moment become absorbed into that 
federation.”474 
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The Soviet delegation experienced a major change while Britain and Canada 
pushed the United States to jettison the hardware option in the interest of an agreement. 
In early March, the Kremlin recalled Tsarapkin, whom Fisher described before his 
departure as a “dispirited and worried man.”475 Western participants fretted about the 
new Soviet co-chairman, Alexei Roshchin, a “mid-level official” with a background in 
disarmament whose selection might betray “lessened Sov[iet] interest in [the] ENDC.”476 
In time, though, Western envoys found Roshchin “more approachable” than his 
predecessor.477 Meanwhile, the U.K. made a major push to conciliate the U.S.S.R. 
Chalfont accompanied Wilson to Moscow from February 22 to 24, where they conferred 
with Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev, and thence to Bonn, where Chalfont spoke with 
Tsarapkin about the test-ban and nonproliferation treaties. Rusk begged the British not to 
let the Soviets use Anglo-American differences concerning Atlantic nuclear policy as 
leverage.478 When Chalfont returned to brief the North Atlantic Council, he related that 
Kosygin had dismissed even “McNamara-type consultations” and had presented the 
whole array of nuclear-sharing options as an “insuperable” barrier.479 Chalfont gave 
“emotional pleas,” echoed by Burns, for the West to resolve the issue swiftly and in a 
manner conducive to a treaty; to wit, they “should not involve [a] hardware solution.” If 
the Federal Republic “didn’t like it, it was just too bad,” he carped, with “no one to turn 
to” they had “no political bargaining power.”  
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Fisher admitted the need for a quick settlement, but objected that the “business” 
of the negotiations was arms control as [an] aspect of national security, not as [an] end in 
itself.” Cavalletti concurred, but characterized the Federal Republic as “trying to stop 
[the] non-proliferation effort.”480 Bonn was increasingly reliant on Washington’s good 
graces. Erhard wrote Johnson on February 25 hoping to bring the president around to his 
viewpoint that recent amendments ruling out a European force with majority voting 
reduced Atlantic security.481 Rusk denied the contention though that NATO “must 
finally solve the Alliance nuclear problem before there can be a treaty.”482  On March 26, 
Fisher raised the clashing American and Soviet understandings of proliferation in his first 
co-chairmen meeting with Roshchin, who was critical that the “U.S. was willing to permit 
indirect proliferation through alliances” and a state without a sovereign nuclear arsenal 
participating in decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons, both of which he claimed 
violated the injunction of UNGA Resolution 2028 that a treaty “should be void of any 
loop-holes.”483 The talks were at a “point of no return” with the Soviets ruling out 
hardware and software options equally.  
Excepting India, the non-aligned took a back seat while the Eastern and Western 
delegations publicly quarreled and privately consulted. Against the backdrop of Indian 
combativeness, Fisher broached the issue of floating “mandatory” safeguards to Trivedi; 
the State Department wanted to delay its tabling until after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
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left Washington on March 30.484 In the end, Washington chose not to submit the new 
language at that session, perhaps because of Italian criticisms of the “discriminatory” 
character of imposing mandatory safeguards on non-nuclear states’ peaceful activities 
even though Rusk assured Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani that the United 
States would campaign for treating Euratom measures as equivalent to those of the 
IAEA.485 The session concluded with scant progress toward a treaty, although Cavalletti 
noted at NATO headquarters that “it was necessary to distinguish between the statements 
made in plenary and remarks exchanged in the hallways.” When the Belgian and Greek 
representatives asked him if the Soviets were ready to accept a fait accompli with respect to 
the organization’s nuclear defense, he responded that “it would depend on the nature of 
the fait accompli.” Western solidarity for NATO nuclear-sharing was critical.486 
After the JCAE and Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passed the 
Senate Resolution on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, the U.S. Senate approved 
Pastore’s resolution on May 17 with 84 in favor and no dissenting votes. The Johnson 
administration offered little commentary except to rebut Robert Kennedy’s charges that 
it had needlessly rebuffed China’s dubious proposal of a bilateral pledge not to use 
nuclear weapons first in exchange for a cessation to Beijing’s testing program. Perhaps for 
that reason it took Johnson over two weeks to send Pastore a congratulatory letter, in 
which he called the resolution as “an overwhelming expression of sentiment” and “an 
indication of the support of the American people.”487 His letter to Pastore was a 
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premonition of changes to come rather than an “indication … of Johnson’s changed 
view.”488 The Pastore Resolution indicated that the Senate would greet a nonproliferation 
treaty preferentially, bestowed a congressional imprimatur on the Geneva talks, and 
altered the White House’s calculus in regards to the bond between global nuclear 
diplomacy and peace action. The last factor would play a deciding role as the State 
Department’s grip on nuclear policy loosened as the disarmament committee continued 
to meet that summer. 
The second session of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament lasted 
from June 14 to August 25 and witnessed a minor sea change in Soviet-American nuclear 
relations. Exploratory meetings at the United Nations in May to discuss a treaty 
prohibiting the militarization of Outer Space preceded them, testifying to the potential 
for superpower entente. Furthermore, the Soviets explicitly denied any linkage of 
Vietnam to Geneva. The Soviet mouthpiece, Izvestia, maintained in an article that 
“Vietnam … has not served and must not serve as an obstacle to reaching an 
agreement.”489 Foster apprised Rusk that contrary to public and high-level statements 
disparaging FRG “access,” including “political access” via the NPG, “Soviet and Bloc 
representatives ha[d] now shown awareness of the need to accommodate … continued 
nuclear consultations.” Moreover, Foster’s interlocutors related the Soviet Union would 
not insist on a “formal burial” of the “dead” hardware schemes. Foster underlined the 
optics of nuclear diplomacy in the domestic and global fields against the backdrop of 
Vietnam. The United States “badly” needed to “demonstrate its desire to seriously 
negotiate measures contributing to international security and curbing the nuclear arms 
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race.”490 The point of disagreement was increasingly the United States draft’s allowance 
of a “European option,” especially one featuring majority voting that the U.K. 
strenuously opposed as well.  
The headwinds behind the treaty strengthened as rumors spread that Middle 
Eastern and South Asian states were seeking a nuclear capability. President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser declared on May 8 that the United Arab Republic contemplated a nuclear-
weapon program because “Israel [was] working in this field.”491 Israeli Prime Minister 
Levi Eshkol responded on May 18 with an assurance that Israel would “not be the first to 
introduce [nuclear weapons] into our region,” a claim he and subsequent leaders would 
reiterate often in an effort to keep Israel’s military venture plausibly denied. Inside the 
Beltway, McNamara took the extraordinary step of writing Rusk directly to argue that 
proliferation pressures in India necessitated that “we should reconsider our position on 
the nonproliferation treaty,” in particular the clarity with which the draft barred a 
European force lacking vetoes. He spelled his language preference out to Rusk: 
Each of the nuclear-weapons States party to this treaty undertakes not to transfer 
nuclear weapons into the control of another nuclear-weapon State, any non-
nuclear-weapon State, or any association of States.492 
The fear that India was tilting toward a military option impelled the White House to 
ponder ceding a degree of nuclear latitude in Europe to maintain the status quo in Asia.  
Johnson and Rostow asserted the need for a rejuvenated nonproliferation effort 
vis-à-vis India at an NSC meeting on June 9. Foster met the previous day with Dobrynin, 
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who indicated that Moscow would move forward if a hardware solution were ditched. 
Conversely, they “were not concerned with present U.S. weapons in Germany or with 
the possibility of more substantive consultation.”493 Ball wanted a nonproliferation pact, 
but favored a threshold or comprehensive nuclear test ban. Reported Soviet unease with 
offering a guarantee to confront Beijing in case it made a nuclear threat and the end of 
the payment dispute in the United Nations pointed to the General Assembly as the right 
body in which to vest security guarantees. Though Vice President Hubert Humphrey 
promoted a total ban, the consensus held that a threshold treaty was more attainable in 
light of unbending Soviet resistance to inspections. The resulting report on the merits of a 
threshold treaty banning underground nuclear tests above a measurable limit held that 
“India and Israel deserve[d] special consideration,” implying these two countries were the 
chief objects of U.S. concern in mid-1966. The reasoning cited the snowball effect 
common to proliferation talk: “if these two countries abstain from acquiring nuclear 
weapons, the nuclear aspirations of other potential Nth countries appear to be 
controllable for at least several years.”494 With China conducting its third nuclear test that 
summer, India remained at the focal point of American apprehensions though. At the 
end of the meeting, Johnson instructed Rusk, McNamara, and Foster to review how 
Washington could dissuade New Delhi.495 Foster groused that they would not finish 
NSAM 351 until July 15, preventing him from offering anything substantively new in 
Geneva.496 In the end, the multiagency review reiterated the array of tactics employed to 
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date to delay or discourage an Indian military option: developmental arguments and 
incentives, intelligence sharing, private security assurances to India, steps to boost India’s 
technological and political prestige, contingency planning if all these failed.497 The 
NSAM report could not recommend a “dramatic steps to discourage the Indians from 
starting a nuclear weapons program,” whose costs did not outweigh its benefits.498 In the 
context of that summer’s deliberations in Geneva, the steps rejected were a hastened 
nonproliferation treaty and a multilateral security assurance in league with the Soviet 
Union.  
The State Department and key Western allies began to prioritize the arrival of 
East-West détente by virtue of a nonproliferation treaty over the politico-military 
equation in Europe. At the first plenary session in Geneva on June 14, Chalfont expressed 
how the potential spread of nuclear weapons negated the “sterile argument of the cold 
war – of the traditional military confrontation in central Europe:” 
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In the last quarter of this century the great threats to the peace and prosperity of 
the world will lie outside Europe, in the turbulent and seething world of Africa 
and Asia. If we cannot lift our eyes from the River Elbe long enough to recognize 
the simple facts of life about nuclear proliferation, it is unlikely that we shall find 
common ground for dealing with the appallingly complicated issues which will 
confront us all in the great conflicts of race and economic survival that are now 
taking the place of our outdated and irrelevant cold war in Europe.499 
Foggy Bottom was less ready to proclaim the end of the Cold War. However, Rusk was 
more inclined than ever to conciliate the Soviets as international nuclear diplomacy 
turned increasingly along a North-South axis. When the Committee of Principals met on 
June 17, he suggested “a simplified Article I that would prohibit the transfer of physical 
access to nuclear weapons.” He now gave credence to Roshchin’s claims that existing 
nuclear arrangements were not the “crux of [the] problem,” but rather “physical access” 
to nuclear weapons by the FRG.500 Rusk believed that the Soviets were “beginning to 
move and … prepared to gamble on their estimate that the MLF is dead.”501 New 
language should meet them halfway. McNamara agreed wholeheartedly.  
Other policymakers weighed in. Foster was dubious that a treaty was attainable 
when he visited Bonn and Berlin from June 30 to July 3. He told Foreign Secretary Karl 
Carstens that he “doubt[ed] that there will be any actual arrangements agreed to at 
Geneva,” but he hoped that Soviet-American differences would clarify before the General 
Assembly met that fall.502 Foster spelled out the dynamics in Geneva when he addressed 
the Danish Committee on Disarmament in Copenhagen on June 17. He observed that a 
treaty was so “urgent” because of India’s nascent capability and the Soviet Union was 
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“really interested” on account of Kosygin and Roshchin’s assurances that Vietnam did 
not represent an insuperable obstacle. He stressed that the Geneva talks assumed their 
value from the “informal discussions” they enabled. Danish Foreign Secretary General 
Paul Fischer debriefed Foster about the two disputes holding a treaty back. He agreed 
with Foster that the object of Soviet resistance to nuclear-sharing in NATO was political 
in nature. Bonn wanted the “prestige” granted by nuclear weapons and for this reason 
Johnson had left open the hardware solution. With respect to the European clause, Foster 
conveyed that Washington was loath to make the goal of a united Europe “more 
remote.”503 In private letters though, Foster betrayed frustration; he complained to 
Tsarapkin, whom he saw in Bonn, that the Geneva negotiations “do not appear to be 
making much progress.”504 
Foster’s deputy, Adrian Fisher, endeavored in the meantime to pen a non-
dissemination article that could achieve consensus. Fisher sent a letter to the Committee 
of Principals on June 8 outlining the political relationship of the Soviet standpoint on 
“physical access” to the German question.505 In place of the U.S. term of “control,” and 
the Soviet shibboleth of “access,” Foster proposed the use of “transfer” in the operative 
clause so as to outlaw the “transfer [of] nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear weapon state 
or to any group of states.”506 At a co-chairmen meeting on June 29, Foster inquired of 
Roshchin whether a solution to the “physical access” could pave the way for a 
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nonproliferation treaty in which Washington was “very interested.”507 CIA Director 
Richard Helms advised Rusk that the new formulation was unlikely to prompt Moscow to 
cease fulminating against a hardware solution.508 The AEC warned that a treaty 
forbidding “physical access” would prevent any variant of a multilateral force.509 Ball 
circulated a list of comments on the memorandum laying out the controversy’s stakes. 
Switching the key term to transfer would maintain an emphasis on centers of decision-
making, but place greater curbs on hardware options and the possibility of a European 
force. 510  
The decisive act originated not in the international arena but from the domestic 
sphere. Antiwar voices and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired by J. 
William Fulbright (D – AR) leveled increasing scrutiny, protest, and criticism at the White 
House in regards to Vietnam in 1966. Since joining the president’s election campaign in 
1964, Johnson’s chief of staff and political adviser, Bill Moyers, believed that peace could 
have a magnetic effect on U.S. voters. He was particularly convinced that a blend of 
symbolism and action in the field of nuclear arms control could win the increasingly 
critical votes of women and youths as the baby boomers started to cast ballots. Moyers 
drew Johnson’s attention to its political potential on the first anniversary of the signing of 
the Limited Test Ban Treaty: 
Underneath all the campaign rhetoric, the peace issue and its converse[,] the 
nuclear specter that we are hammering away at, remain the principal political 
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issue of this decade just as the Depression Issue was in the 1930s and 1940s. We 
need to keep finding ways to articulate it through visual situations and official 
actions or reports rather than just more campaign speeches. We particularly think 
that we need to appeal to the affirmative side of the peace issue, which has a 
powerful appeal to women and younger voters.511 
The latent power of nuclear fear was borne out by the guttural reaction to the “Daisy 
Commercial,” which Moyers had approved in 1964, and which helped to assure an 
unprecedented margin of victory with the president carrying almost every state. Moyers 
kept religiously abreast of “flash” polls conducted confidentially for the White House by 
the Gallup organization, beginning with the 1964 campaign. He advised him, for 
example, that “American pride in the United Nations,” which 59 out of 100 Alabamans 
and 82 out of 100 Bergen County, New Jersey residents supported, meant that 
international accomplishments were more lasting in their significance than domestic 
feats.512  
The Americanization of the Vietnam War and the antiestablishment mood to 
which it gave rise jeopardized Democratic chances in the 1966 mid-term elections and 
thus the congressional majority critical to Johnson’s Great Society programs. In summer 
1966, Vietnam ranked first among pressing issues facing the nation by Americans polled, 
more important than inflation, racial integration, taxes, or the elderly. Moyers and his 
assistant Hayes Redmon wanted a major international achievement to boost Johnson’s 
numbers, which had started to dip in June. Polls by Gallup and other survey researchers 
had “the President in bad shape vis-à-vis his public standing” and concurred that the 
“slippage” was clearly due to “the Vietnam situation.”513 Political heavyweights outside 
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the White House also sounded the alarm and identified a breakthrough in nuclear 
diplomacy as a potential remedy. Democratic power broker and John F. Kennedy’s 
former special assistant, Fred Dutton, who would later run Robert Kennedy’s presidential 
campaign, called attention to how a mixture of three domestic factors—“declining polls, 
an unsuccessful legislative agenda and the need for some fresh initiatives to point to in the 
next campaign”—had brought about the LTBT. Dutton noted Johnson’s “serious 
trouble” with regard to the mid-term elections and the commensurately “serious need for 
new initiatives.” Redmon wrote Moyers that “the Non-Proliferation Treaty … would 
precisely fill the bill.”514 Moyers’s assistant had other reasons to support the treaty. He 
had criticized its slow progress in November 1965, when he noted that a “hardware 
solution” would force the White House to “bear the brunt of explaining away a confusing 
policy,” which most neutral countries would interpret as proliferation by another name 
and with which Robert Kennedy “might well have a field day.”515 Improving his 
approval numbers in time to affect the mid-term election while fending off Kennedy fitted 
Johnson’s political interests and his temperament equally.  
The standstill on the treaty because of a small group in Foggy Bottom frustrated 
Moyers and his deputy. Redmon disparaged the indecisive Committee of Principals 
meeting in May on the arms control agenda as “a classic case of not seeing the forest for 
the trees.” With “the Indians, Israelis, etc.” liable to have less and less interest as time 
went by, “the basic issue, of course, [was] a non-proliferation treaty and we must move 
toward this with all possible speed:” 
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Virtually everyone is for it. That includes the voters, the Congress and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. The only people opposed to it are the “theologians” at State. This 
is because of their desire for a “European clause” and “hardware solution” on the 
NATO nuclear sharing problem. … [when] an offer by the President certainly 
puts him on the side of the angels.”516  
With the talks stalled in Geneva, Kennedy courting Eastern liberals, antiwar sentiment 
threatening the domestic agenda, and a strong majority in favor, the case for a treaty 
seemed overwhelming. 
Moyers wrote the president on July 17 to impart his estimation that with “peace 
… still the strongest desire of the American people,” coming to terms with the Soviets on 
the NPT would boost Democratic electoral prospects and cement Johnson’s legacy as a 
great president. In a five-page report, Moyers made a case for supporting the treaty on 
domestic grounds: 
This proposal will be opposed by those at State who keep alive the hope of 
hardware for Germany. And the German government is not going to jump up 
and down with joy. But the MLF Club at State and the German government are 
not the President of the United States.  
Moyers reminded him that he was accountable to the vox populi and that the American 
public ranked the treaty fourth among urgent external matters facing the nation. 
Orchestrating a treaty “would demonstrate statesmanship” while proving that he was 
“not preoccupied with Vietnam at the expense of other policies.” Moyers pointed out that 
the LTBT buoyed Kennedy’s electoral hopes in 1964 and counseled the president to do 
similary by ditching the hardware solution and phrasing the “European Clause” so 
ambiguously as to make the issue “a matter of future interpretation or amendment to the 
Treaty if that ever became necessary.”517 Moyers wanted nuclear diplomacy calibrated to 
mid-term elections whose successful conclusion he felt now hinged less on Vietnam and 
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more on “large and magnanimous Presidential actions that leave a real imprint on the 
public mood."518 In a follow-up memorandum, he compared the theologians to the 
Japanese who had carried on fighting in Guam long after the war had officially ended. 
Though “Secretary McNamara and I are going what we can to unsnarl the situation,” he 
promised, some heavy lifting was necessary to counter the “hearty hand of German 
nuklites” in Foggy Bottom who kept alive an obsolete and “unrealistic dream that not 
even the Germans really expect,” and which kept Johnson from cementing his legacy as 
the president who ended segregation and then brought a semblance of order to the 
Nuclear Age.519 
While Johnson pondered the domestic consequences of his nuclear policies, the 
international community faced problems of defining and verifying peaceful nuclear 
activities. Which agency would oversee which types of safeguards? Were nuclear 
explosives designed for civil engineering purposes qualitatively different than their 
weaponized cousins? U.S. officials fretted that PNEs, whose utility Edward Teller and 
Lewis Strauss had long trumpeted, were technically equivalent to warheads. The Latin 
American talks then underway showed that certain countries wanted a right to PNEs for 
development purposes. The question also evoked the basic dilemma of differentiating 
peaceful from military uses whose separation was a matter of semantics and technical 
sophistication; to wit, a difference in scale and sophistication rather than kind.  
By the mid-1960s, nuclear weapons no longer resembled the unwieldy hunks that 
laid waste to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The knowledge gleaned from two decades of 
testing and consequent engineering had enabled the miniaturization of nuclear and 
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thermonuclear warheads and their emplacement on a growing array of missile types. 
Scientists, weaponeers, and officials in the AEC and the national laboratories at Los 
Alamos and Lawrence Livermore had launched Operation Plowshare to study how 
nuclear explosives might transform civil engineering in ways not witnessed since the 
invention of dynamite: blasting harbors, carving canals, liberating gas from shale 
formations, even melting the polar ice caps in order to terraform the Arctic.520 While 
Plowshare lost steam after the LTBT banned explosions that released nuclear fallout into 
the global commons and across borders, the failure of the U.S. to declare PNEs unsafe or 
illegitimate, or to cancel its program fully, left a gaping hole of technical and legal 
ambiguity in an accord that for now defined nuclear weapons narrowly rather than 
universally. McNamara questioned the connotation of “nuclear devices,” which “might 
be used either for peaceful or military purposes.” Instead of inscribing ambiguity in a 
treaty regarding what exactly constituted a nuclear weapon, Fisher proposed defining a 
nuclear weapon broadly as “any device capable of producing a nuclear explosion.”521  
Canada was pushing for safeguards that were efficacious, non-discriminatory, and 
unobjectionable to the non-aligned bloc. Most important, they should apply to the 
Americans and British to forestall any competitive advantage and protect Canadian 
commercial interests.522 Since Atoms for Peace, Ottawa in league with uranium miners 
and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) had become a major supplier of reactors, 
reprocessing technology, and raw ores. To tap the emerging global nuclear market, 
Canada developed the CANDU power system and fostered relationships overseas 
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beginning in 1956 with the construction of an NRX-type research reactor known as 
CIRUS in India as part of the British Commonwealth’s Colombo Plan. Soon after, 
Canada-based companies including Canadian Westinghouse and AECL sold a 125 MW 
KANUPP power reactor to Pakistan and a 200 MW CANDU power reactor (RAPP-2) to 
India, both of which were financed by 50-year loans on lenient terms. Meanwhile, 
Canadian miners were supplying uranium to West Germany, Japan, Sweden, and 
Euratom. Ottawa had no desire to witness its position in the nuclear market jeopardized 
by international safeguards whose early purpose was the promotion of atomic energy 
rather than its policing.523 When Burns stated Canada’s position at the ENDC, Foster 
worried such non-discriminatory safeguards would hinder the U.S. effort to broker a 
widely acceptable treaty since none of the nuclear-weapon states then submitted 
themselves to IAEA safeguards. The Canadian drive to “share [the] sacrifice” brought 
the West Four “back where we were when we start[ed] considering this provision last 
year.”524  
Western gaps widened even as the gulf between Soviet and American views 
narrowed before diverging once more as summer turned to autumn. Seaborg was 
amenable to placing some U.S. nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, but continued to 
insist on “a strong article on the acceptance of international safeguards by presently non-
nuclear states.”525 McNamara challenged this push for mandatory safeguards in fear that 
nuclear have-nots would balk. The Canadians listed their suggested revisions on August 
18; namely, the establishment of an equitable regime. The West Germans, meanwhile, 
                                                
523 Gordon Edwards, "Canada's Nuclear Industry and the Myth of the Peaceful Atom," in Ernie Regehr 
and Simon Rosenblum, eds., Canada and the Nuclear Arms Race (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1983). 
524 Foster, op. cit. “Safeguards – Canadian objections,” undated. 
525 Glenn Seaborg, AEC, Letter to Rusk, “Physical access and the NATO question,” 1 July 1966, Box 56, 
Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL. 
 232 
were dismayed at the growing likelihood of being locked out of a greater share in nuclear 
politics. And the Italians persisted in advancing the Fanfani proposal for a three-year 
moratorium as a compelling substitute for a legal prohibition. A time limit on any 
prohibition was also becoming a polestar of Italian nuclear diplomacy. With Canada, 
West Germany, and Italy showing signs of revolt against U.S. leadership though, Foster 
felt impelled to alert Foggy Bottom to the “developing strain on Western unity re [the] 
non-proliferation issue.”526 
The Moyers memorandum led the White House to reassess its nuclear policies. 
Johnson publicized his desire to identify an “acceptable compromise” with the Soviet 
Union on July 5, pointing to a victory for the arms control “cabal.” Ball punctured that 
supposition the next day at a press conference, where he ruled out modifications that 
“foreclose[d] possible options” to meet “the legitimate interests on the part of the non-
nuclear countries in Europe in having a share in the management of their nuclear 
defense.”527 He eventually succeeded in fusing the terms into an elliptical clause—“the 
transfer of control”—that failed to bridge the Soviet-American divide. Roshchin was 
guarded in a co-chairmen meeting with Foster on August 8 concerning the cryptic new 
wording, but intimated that the NPG was digestible and the European clause soluble.528 
He observed that “the heart of the matter” had “now boiled down to the question of 
transferring weapons to alliances.” Foster outlined his impression of a treaty that the 
Soviets might tolerate on August 25; most notably, he called for the MLF’s final burial 
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and purposeful ambiguity relative to a European nuclear force in the distant future.529 
The cabal might count on Ball trying to resuscitate the hardware solution, but his 
influence was fading fast. In September, he resigned his post as Rusk’s lieutenant in Foggy 
Bottom in protest against the administration’s Vietnam policies. The leading champion of 
a Europe-first approach to United States nuclear diplomacy had left the stage.  
 
Stabling Horses 
As a hardware solution’s prospects waned, superpower like-mindedness waxed. 
With Ball out of the equation, the American position could evolve. Foster and Roshchin 
opened a window for a compromise that sanctioned the NPG and left the European 
clause ambiguous. Differences over the permissibility and desirability of a future 
European nuclear force were clear; however, the scenario was academic enough to 
warrant equivocation. When George Bunn spoke with Soviet consul Yuli Vorontsov on 
September 9, he repeated that his government would sacrifice neither existing NATO 
arrangements nor consultative bodies, but avowed that a modus vivendi was possible 
"during negotiations rather than in the treaty." “[I]t might be necessary to agree as to 
what each would say publicly about this problem,” Bunn suggested, “if we agreed upon 
treaty language."530 In essence, the two states would foster a “constructive 
misunderstanding” by issuing separate and potentially contradictory accounts of the 
treaty’s original meanings. Rusk reaffirmed that his country was "utterly and completely" 
                                                
529 William Foster, “Impressions of a Non-proliferation treaty that might be negotiable with the Soviet 
Union,” 25 August 1966, Box 56, Histories—NPT, NSF, LBJL. 
530 "Memorandum of Conversation between J. M. Vorontsov, Soviet Embassy, and George Bunn, General 
Counsel, ACDA, “Difference of opinion on MLF and NPT," 9 September 1966, Box 13, NSF, LBJL. 
 234 
opposed to nuclear spread in a conversation with Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki 
on September 23.531  
The task remained to inform the West German government of the fundamental 
shift in American nonproliferation views. Erhard and Schröeder were scheduled to sit 
down with Johnson and Rusk in the White house in late September to discuss offsetting 
U.S. troops in Europe, who were being deployed to Vietnam, the French challenge in 
Europe, and how the U.S. would protect the F.R.G. in a world governed by a 
nonproliferation treaty. The hardware solution was finally on the chopping block. In late 
August, the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic, George McGhee, leveled with 
Foreign Secretary Carstens so that Erhard would not arrive with any misconceptions. 
Johnson had backed a hardware solution contingent on British acquiescence. Wilson’s 
abandonment of his own ANF proposal revealed how weak was British ardor for the 
scheme. McGhee cited the congressional curbs on the transfers of nuclear hardware and 
data, leading Carstens to conclude “that the ambassador was acting under orders from 
Washington and wanted to make it clear to me that the Americans no longer wanted to 
pursue a course leading to a joint nuclear force.” The apparent renunciation of a 
hardware solution by the U.S. worried Carstens, who regarded the matter through the 
lens of West Germany’s diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis reunification. He concluded that a 
“purely consultative solution to the nuclear question [would] not give us enough influence 
in the long run and thus will not be satisfactory.”532 Erhard was less enamored of the 
political advantages of a multilateral force. He chose to heed the ambassador’s overture. 
“Nobody was expecting a “hardware solution” any longer,” he conceded to Johnson in 
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the Oval Office.533 Alterations to nuclear arrangements in NATO would now rely on 
consultative measures.  
Erhard’s coalition began to splinter on account of the sputtering West German 
economy and misgivings about Erhard’s dependence on U.S. goodwill and support for 
Johnson’s war. A new government under the chancellorship of Kurt Georg Kiesinger and 
in league with Willy Brandt’s Social Democrats emerged victorious from the November 
elections. Thereafter, Bonn switched from pursuing nuclear privileges and refusing to 
deal with governments that recognized East Berlin to focusing on improved East-West 
relations. Bonn continued to weigh in on the treaty, but nuclear-sharing was now a 
secondary matter as the U.S. took the first steps toward establishing the Special 
Committee and NPG. When Rusk presented Brandt a joint Soviet-American draft treaty 
ruling out a hardware solution on December 16, the Vice Chancellor and Foreign 
Minister assured Rusk that his government was “ready to forget ‘hardware’ and … the 
European clause.” Brandt had convinced numerous NATO officials that “the new 
German Government will not be bound by the rigid theology of the Adenauer period;” it 
was ready to seek better relations with Eastern Europe and East Germany.534 Voices in 
the West German political arena such as Konrad Adenauer and Franz Strauss continued 
to rail against the treaty and the Kiesinger government worked to ensure that West 
Germany was not discriminated against in a global nuclear order. With the ruling 
coalition “relaxed,” however, in regards to the treaty’s two main obstacles—the hardware 
solution and the European options—the German question in international nuclear 
diplomacy seemed resolvable. Washington could now shepherd NATO through a 
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“systematic” review of the consultative arrangements while proceeding with the task of 
drafting a consensus treaty with Moscow.535  
The terms of the central prohibitions were clearer. Soviet and American officials 
now set about creating an atmosphere of increased confidence and mutual trust. They 
cultivated a common outlook by sharing views, swapping assurances, sustaining contact, 
and stressing commonalities at a series of high-level meetings that fall. U Thant called the 
UN General Assembly into session on September 20 with a lament that “the relationship 
between the big powers has dropped to a new low.”536 In fact, the sessions in New York 
afforded the perfect opportunity to reverse the Secretary General’s verdict. Rusk and 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met at the Waldorf Astoria on September 24. 
Dobrynin, Roshchin, Arthur Goldberg, Foy Kohler, and Llewellyn Thompson were also 
in attendance. Gromyko expressed his desire to work out, thanks to the recent 
"rapprochement,” how to word the treaty "precisely and accurately." Rusk insisted that it 
was “harsh and selfish American policy” not to furnish other countries with nuclear arms 
no matter the scenario. The Second World War’s savage march had left bloody footprints 
on European as well as Soviet psyches. There was consequently "strong opposition within 
NATO” to German control over weapons of mass destruction. He assured "that U.S. and 
Soviet policy on non-proliferation was truly identical," warning that the global threat 
grew more acute each day while states such as India, Japan, and Israel enhanced their 
capabilities. He concluded: "It was important and urgent to act … before the horse 
escaped the stable; then it would be too late to close the door."537  
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Gromyko agreed that the two sides were thinking along the same lines in regards 
to prohibiting transfer through direct, indirect, or alliance channels. He nevertheless 
caviled that Washington desired closer coordination in the defense of NATO through 
burden-sharing, strategic consultations, and nuclear emplacements in order to deter 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. Rusk estimated there was "99%" agreement and 
described the remaining "1%" as "really just a controversy over concepts." Gromyko 
replied that non-nuclear members should not participate in decisions of "ownership, 
control and use of nuclear weapons." Earlier that day, a team composed of Foster, 
Samuel De Palma, and Bunn of ACDA and the duo of Roland Timerbaev and Vladimir 
Shustov of the Soviet delegation in Geneva worked out alternatives to the first article.538 
Foster was in favor of the most general formulation—to “any recipient whatsoever”—
while Gromyko preferred one that might constrain the stationing of U.S. nuclear 
weapons abroad—“directly, indirectly, to military alliances or groups of states.” Rusk 
specified these legal limitations would apply only in peacetime; in case a calamitous war 
did occur, “all bets were off." Though Gromyko set aside the matter of consultative 
mechanisms, he believed there was a “serious misunderstanding" about the "question of 
not granting access to nuclear weapons," a testament to the depth of Soviet fears that a 
German state might commandeer them, or benefit geopolitically from their presence. A 
final agreement remained just out of reach.539 The frank back-and-forth illustrated how 
near the two sides had drawn on the cardinal prohibitions. Roshchin’s verdict was thus 
ambiguous when he met Foster four days later: “Considerable progress had been made 
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and a common understanding reached on the most substantive article of the draft treaty, 
although the Soviet side had not gotten all it wanted and was not really satisfied.”540 
A working group met at Camp David on October 1-2 to prepare for Johnson’s 
meeting with Gromyko the following week. Rusk, Foster, and Rostow agreed to drop an 
"Atlantic solution" and halt the transfer of nuclear weapons, including those of a tactical 
classification, though not of delivery vehicles such as Polaris. Rusk nevertheless advised 
caution.541 The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, spoke with 
Gromyko the next day in New York about a trio of issues: the treaty to demilitarize outer 
space, Vietnam, and nuclear diplomacy. He conveyed the president’s assurance that 
domestic law forbade him from allowing others to launch U.S. nuclear weapons or dictate 
a nuclear action. Gromyko asked if Washington "was really anxious to conclude a non-
proliferation treaty." The ambassador replied "yes," leading Gromyko to repeat that a 
treaty had to ban dissemination "through the structure of an alliance."542 The New York 
Times reported the next day that President Eisenhower thought the use of nuclear 
weapons against Vietnam should not be ruled out.  
Johnson gave a speech at the headquarters of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace 
on the United Nations Plaza in New York City on October 8. The oration was part of a 
peace offensive that his administration had timed to accompany a cessation of bombing 
raids against North Vietnam and in hopes of influencing the mid-term elections. His 
remarks were directed at Europe’s division, touching upon German reunification, 
NATO, and developmental aid before turning to his central theme–East-West détente: 
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[O]ne great goal of a united West is to heal the wound in Europe which now cuts 
East from West and brother from brother. ... This will happen only as East and 
West succeed ... in building a surer foundation of mutual trust. Nothing is more 
important than peace. 
He followed this pronouncement with a series of steps to "build bridges:" a new consular 
accord, cultural exchanges, most-favored-nation status for communist states in Europe, a 
civil aviation agreement, reduced export controls, liberalized travel rules, and an 
executive order authorizing the Export-Import Bank to lend commercial credits to 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Johnson ended by reasserting U.S. 
interest in balancing nonproliferation policy with a "stable military situation in Europe" 
based on "effective Western deterrence," phraseology that permitted maximum latitude 
for Johnson's tête-à-tête with Gromyko two days hence.543   
Reaction in the Eastern bloc to Johnson’s overture was cautious but curious. As 
Johnson and Gromyko prepared to meet in Washington, the Communist leaders of 
Poland and the Soviet Union, Władisław Gomulka and Leonid Brezhnev, met in Moscow 
to discuss the state of world affairs. They dwelt on Sino-Soviet affairs, the Vietnam War, 
Geneva, and the costs and benefits of a world communist conference, where the Chinese 
and Soviets would surely clash. They rightly sensed that Johnson's peace feelers were a 
consequence of the U.S. entanglement in Southeast Asia and Chinese quarreling with 
both superpowers. Gomulka wanted to mend or at least moderate the Sino-Soviet split. 
"[A] calm tactic bore better results,” he cautioned, “than a quarrel eye-for-an-eye." In 
regards to Johnson's statements, Gomulka warned that the U.S. sought “to strengthen its 
propaganda position, as well as to in fact get closer to the U.S.S.R." This 
"rapprochement," he maintained, "serve[d] two purposes:" "[t]o show that despite the 
war in Vietnam, they are able to come to an understanding with the U.S.S.R. ..." and "to 
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all the more pit the Chinese against the U.S.S.R." In effect, Gomulka was thinking in 
familiar black-and-white palate of the Cold War.  
Brezhnev was less a captive of the Cold War mentality. He admonished Gomulka 
for second-guessing Soviet cooperation with the U.S. on common interests such as 
Vietnam, China, and nuclear threats. He voiced his displeasure at the Vietnamese 
Workers' Party for disregarding his counsel to accept "sensible negotiations." As to China, 
the situation "had changed so much” on account of the Cultural Revolution “that we are 
of the opinion that we should tell our party and the nation everything." Moscow would 
rather expose and pillory Mao than conciliate and cooperate with him. Finally, Gomulka 
misapprehended the Soviet standpoint on the ENDC; the conference was “useful" now 
that a period of Soviet-American bickering had ended.544 The renewed Soviet willingness 
to meet the U.S. halfway on nonproliferation reflected an adjustment to tectonic shifts in 
international affairs. The Sino-Soviet gulf and the rising threat of proliferation in Asia 
pointed to a world of decreasing Soviet influence and increasingly volatile and perilous 
regional crises. Cooperation with the United States would help to moderate these 
negative trends. 
Mutually acceptable nonproliferation language beckoned. Johnson welcomed 
Gromyko to the White House on October 10. The Soviet foreign minister endorsed a 
nuclear order that would enshrine prohibitions against the transfer of nuclear weapons 
into the hands of non-nuclear powers or groupings with them. Johnson recapped his 
package of unilateral measures to enhance East-West relations, alluded to Section 92 of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 denying him the right to delegate authority to fire U.S. 
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nuclear weapons, and called for the two sides to "get our pencils out and work out an 
agreement."545 That night, Gromyko and Dobrynin met with Rusk, Foster, Thompson, 
and Averell Harriman to put pencil to paper. Rusk spoke straightforwardly, swearing that 
even though his government had no intention of supplying these weapons to friend or foe, 
the nuclear character of the European balance of power made it imperative that NATO 
members feel assured of their security. Gromyko replied that he was not chasing “a 
provision banning consultation;” “he did not intend to discuss it in connection with the 
treaty.” Though the two sides agreed on the “gut” of the compact, Rusk was adamant 
that the treaty contain no reference to alliances that would possibly subvert the credibility 
of the U.S. deterrent for NATO members.546 The participants left the meeting with a 
palpable sense of progress though the two sides remained wedded to their respective 
language.  
The camps carried on with ad referendum talks in New York about the non-transfer 
clause, safeguards, and the PNE loophole. UN ambassadors Goldberg and Fedorenko 
met in New York on October 13, when Goldberg apprised Fedorenko that the U.S. 
would co-sponsor a proposed Soviet resolution appealing to members of the international 
community to eschew any action hindering the achievement of a nonproliferation treaty. 
On October 20, Fedorenko announced that a nonproliferation treaty faced no 
insurmountable obstacles and praised recent “changes for the better” in U.S. policy to 
which Goldberg reciprocated by praising the “new and promising situation.” 
Notwithstanding the hopeful tone, the emissaries cautioned the body that “concrete 
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practical deeds” were needed to overcome the “important differences remain[ing].”547 
Meetings between Foster and Roshchin in New York City continued to focus on whether 
the key clause should read “any recipient whatsoever” or “non-nuclear-weapons states, or 
groups of non-nuclear-weapons states.”  
United States and Soviet views on PNEs and safeguards were also at variance. 
Washington was generally supportive of mandatory international safeguards administered 
by the IAEA, or an “equivalent” agency (e.g. Euratom). There was enough dissonance 
among the relevant agencies inside the Beltway though to disrupt a common policy. The 
Soviet Union characterized the inclusion of “equivalent” as permitting self-inspection; its 
diplomats conveyed that they would rather have no safeguards than consent to a West 
European exception. A Czechoslovakian and Polish proposal to place their nuclear 
facilities under IAEA safeguards if West Germany did likewise (rather than rely on 
Euratom) and U.S. officials’ serious consideration of the proposal illustrated the elastic 
state of play on safeguards. The superpowers were more like-minded with respect to 
equivalence between “peaceful” and “military” nuclear explosives, though other states 
had different ideas altogether. Indian Ambassador Trivedi described a prohibition on the 
making of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes by nuclear have-nots as “tantamount 
to attempting to stop the dissemination of scientific knowledge and technology,” 
especially in the glittering domain of fusion power. Foster explained his government’s 
position on PNEs and safeguards on November 9 in front of the Political Committee at 
the UN. Invoking UNGA Resolution 2028 (XX), Foster warned that a license in the 
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treaty for the development of PNEs would embody a “major loophole” because the basic 
technology was “inseparable” from that of nuclear warheads.548  
The Soviets acquiesced to the United States position on two counts at the 21st 
session of the United Nation General Assembly. First, Foster convinced Roshchin by 
December 5 that barring the transfer of nuclear weapons to “any recipient whatsoever” 
would preclude the creation of any form of NATO multilateral force. According to 
Seaborg, this compromise “outlawed the MLF but it did not rub the Germans’ nose in 
it.”549 With respect to the European option, the two sides agreed to disagree by eschewing 
precision in favor of deliberate ambiguity.550 Both sides were able to set out their 
interpretation of the treaty’s strictures. Rusk outlined how the U.S. government 
understood the ways in which the nonproliferation articles bore on NATO nuclear-
sharing. The treaty would not affect existing bilateral commitments, the decision of 
NATO members to wage war, the ability to create a permanent committee for nuclear 
planning and consultation, nor the prerogative to assign additional Polaris missile-
submarines outfitted with U.S. nuclear weapons to the Atlantic alliance. If the treaty 
entered into force, the option of forming a multilateral entity remained as long as no 
transfer of “an ownership interest in nuclear weapons” occurred and the U.S. maintained 
control of its warheads. Finally, in the event that a European federation came into being, 
the formation of a collective nuclear force was permitted with the caveat that original 
nuclear powers retain control of their warheads.551 Brandt received the new joint Soviet-
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American nonproliferation draft treaty on December 16. The communiqué laid to rest 
the hardware solution and ushered in a new phase of West German policy vis-à-vis the 
treaty revolving around its implications for peaceful nuclear activities.   
The hardware option’s demise and the “constructive misunderstanding” on the 
European clause paved the way for a Soviet-American settlement at the core of a nascent 
nonproliferation regime. The U.S. deterrent with its basis in nuclear-sharing, training, 
and automatic transfers in the event of war would continue to shield Western Europe; 
however, a peacetime firewall would keep German hands off nuclear weapons, which 
would remain under Washington’s direct command and control. Now that Bonn was 
more keen on political and diplomatic rather than military and nuclear instruments for 
improving its standing relative to the Eastern bloc, the fault lines in international nuclear 
diplomacy now ran North and South as much as East and West. The equivalence 
question with regard to IAEA and Euratom safeguards bore upon the Cold War rivalry. 
But Soviet and American diplomats could draw inspiration from the warmer atmosphere 
of mutual trust and confidence.  
Matters between nuclear and non-nuclear powers were less amicable.  
Henceforth, the contested process of locating the elements of a viable grand bargain 
among the nuclear haves and have-nots became ever more the principal object of 
international nuclear diplomacy. The eight non-aligned ENDC members pushed the 
superpowers to amend the nonproliferation resolution to reflect the “acceptable balance 
of mutual responsibilities and obligations” between the nuclear haves and have-nots and 
its relationship to nuclear, and general and complete, disarmament spelled out in UN 
Resolution 2028 (XX).552 The Soviet and American delegations acquiesced, but they 
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faced a second challenge in the form of an additional section to UN Resolution 2153 
(XXI) urging the ENDC to assign a “high priority” to a nonproliferation treaty. The 
Pakistani amendment provided for a “conference of non-nuclear-weapon Powers” to 
assemble no later than July 1968. If the ENCD failed to broker a compact by then, the 
buck could pass to an assembly to which no nuclear power would receive an invitation.  
 
Who Watches the Watchmen? 
With the nonproliferation parameters set, Soviet-American bilateral talks and 
parallel alliance consultations revolved around the safeguards article. Moscow had been 
lukewarm toward safeguards before the Soviets made an about-face at the UN that fall in 
calling for mandatory IAEA safeguards on non-nuclear-weapon states. Mattias Küntzel 
claims that continuing FRG opposition to IAEA safeguards was rooted in Bonn’s desire to 
keep pathways to the Bomb open via covert routes or collaboration within the European 
Community.553 A more plausible explanation for reservations to IAEA preeminence 
stemmed from commercial interests shared by other nuclear suppliers such as Canada 
and diplomatic calculations related to reunification. Investment in the West German 
nuclear sector expanded twofold in 1967 thanks to the lobbying of the domestic nuclear 
industry, which was eager to export reactors and infrastructure to the developing world 
and gain some independence from U.S. plutonium.554 The motives were not just pacific; 
there were advantages to cultivating a “threshold” capacity akin to India, Sweden, or 
Japan, such as leverage in negotiations for a European defense community, maximum 
latitude for research and development, and hedges against further proliferation in the 
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neighborhood.555 Given the Federal Republic’s commitment to national strength through 
industrialization and the assumed centrality of nuclear power to future energy markets, it 
was rational for West Germany and its Euratom partners would oppose IAEA safeguards 
in order to preserve a competitive advantage. 
By early 1967, German attempts to influence the nonproliferation talks bore on 
the safeguards article.556 Kiesinger and Brandt hoped that Bonn’s acquiescence to a treaty 
might at least contribute to reunification though the co-chancellors differed on the merits 
of East-West détente. U.S. leaders informed their European allies that they agreed with 
the Soviet clause requiring each non-nuclear power to “accept IAEA safeguards on all its 
peaceful nuclear activities as soon as practicable.”557 The linguistic placement of ‘IAEA’ 
before ‘safeguards’ implied that the verification of compliance would run through Vienna 
rather than Brussels, bring inspectors from Eastern Europe into West European nuclear 
facilities, and eliminate any comparative advantages enjoyed by Western Europe. The 
French, meanwhile, were stubbornly absent from Geneva and tepid about Euratom, 
which deprived West Germany and Italy of a key ally.  
The nuclear question remained salient in West German politics. Kiesinger and 
Fran Josef Strauss’s Christian Democratic Party distanced itself from the Social 
Democratic Party when Brandt chose to approve the joint draft treaty. West German 
luminaries began to draw overheated comparisons to previous occasions of Teutonic 
humiliation. Former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer pilloried the treaty as a “death 
sentence” for the F.R.G. and a “Morgenthau Plan raised to the power of two,” referring 
to the scrapped U.S. plan to de-industrialize and dismember Germany after the Second 
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World War. Former Foreign Minister Franz Josef Strauss warned that a strictly worded 
NPT would be a “new Versailles of cosmic dimensions.”558 The analogy illustrated in 
shades of realpolitik the West German fear of a treaty that would codify the country’s 
subservient position in Europe in relation to its historic rivals: Britain, France, and Russia.  
Foster expounded on the treaty interpretations to West German Ambassador 
Heinrich Knappstein on January 18, 1967. Foster reassured him that the joint draft 
treaty’s nonproliferation article’s featured legal ambiguities whose exact meanings would 
be set by U.S.-F.R.G. dialogue. The Soviets might not be “enthusiastic,” but they had 
“agreed that those things which were not prohibited were permitted.” If the NATO allies 
concurred on arrangements below the hardware threshold, Soviet officials would 
acquiesce “if their noses were not rubbed in [it].” If the West demanded that an 
authorization for the European option was “written in large neon lights, there would be 
no treaty.”559 The Special Committee and the NPG were safe because the articles did not 
bar consultations expressly. Moreover, the Soviets had stopped attacking existing plans 
such as Wehrmacht training and Bonn would retain a veto over the release of nuclear 
weapons on its territory. Furthermore, the Soviets had not protested the view that “a new 
United States of Europe would succeed to [the] nuclear assets of [the] U.K. or France.” 
Knappstein asked if the Soviets had “tried to limit peaceful nuclear cooperation other 
than re[garding] nuclear explosives?” Foster replied that there was no other inhibition: a 
major concession given the Federal Republic’s lead in uranium-enrichment and 
plutonium-reprocessing technology. Knappstein inquired whether the disarmament 
statement in the preamble indicated that non-nuclear powers could withdraw if nuclear-
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weapon states failed to reduce their arsenals after five years. Foster answered vaguely: 
“some states might take this view.”560 Placing time limits on a treaty was a novel tactic in 
Bonn’s nuclear diplomacy that would soon spread to other treaty skeptics.  
Soviet-American talks proceeded alongside allied conversations. Rusk met with 
Dobrynin on the same day to confer about how to finesse the PNE issue. Rusk hoped that 
a common position on the subject might steal thunder from India and Brazil’s claims. 
Expedited technical talks might also help to ward off controversy. Dobrynin was hesitant 
lest consultations prejudge decisions that belonged in the political realm. The two 
countries were also still at loggerheads on safeguards. The Soviets rejected language 
“appearing to endorse Euratom safeguards.” Their objections ran the gamut from 
security concerns to alliance equality and included the reasonable warning that a regional 
approach to safeguards would set a precedent by which the Arab League could form a 
“Near East safeguards organization.” They seemed willing to bend on a “transition 
period” between the regimes though and cited no rationale for barring overlapping 
inspections. They went so far as to note their preference for “no safeguards at all” given 
that Euratom safeguards would operate regardless. Nevertheless, key bureaus in 
Washington were keen on a global system that could assure regional rivals their neighbors 
were not carrying on secret work and thereby bolster a treaty’s “durability.” Rusk typified 
these views in an aide-memoire circulated among U.S. embassies: “the nonproliferation 
treaty provides the only foreseeable chance to achieve comprehensive worldwide 
safeguards.”561 For now, however, the Soviet and American delegations in Geneva were 
stuck trying to reconcile regional and global regimes.  
                                                
560 Ibid., 2-8.  
561 Rusk, Cable 127754, “Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Article,” 30 January 1967, National 
Archives, Record Group 59, DEF 18-6, , 2-6, made available by Document 3, NPT, NSA, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb253/doc03.pdf 
 249 
West Germany had come to terms with the emerging consensus. France was more 
ambivalent. The Kiesinger-Brandt coalition in Bonn faced reality—the future of NATO 
nuclear-sharing would not include a hardware solution; a surface fleet of Europeans and 
Americans working side-by-side in the operation of a floating platform of Polaris missiles 
was the price that the U.S. was willing and the F.R.G. obliged to pay in order to unstick 
the nonproliferation talks. “Solving the German problem” remained the principal object 
of West German foreign policy. However, as attested by Brandt in a conversation with 
Rusk on February 8, West German policy in regards to a nonproliferation treaty focused 
more now on ensuring that a global regime did not subject states lacking nuclear arms to 
“discrimination … in the peaceful development of atomic energy.” He called attention to 
a West German firm that was in negotiations to sell a nuclear reactor to another country. 
An U.S. competitor had called into question European companies’ ability “to guarantee 
an adequate supply of reactor fuel,” undercutting its position in the global market. Brandt 
complained that actions such as this “raised the specter of potential unfair 
competition.”562  
Rusk assured Brandt that a treaty would not prejudice the burgeoning nuclear 
market against the Federal Republic’s powerful industry. He brought up a recent meeting 
of the Atomic Industrial Forum where experts had concluded that IAEA safeguards did 
not pose a danger of exposing commercial nuclear secrets to industrial espionage. He had 
less certitude on two other matters: security assurances that were a “real problem to 
nonaligned states such as India” and a strong linkage between horizontal and vertical 
proliferation. Rusk supposed that an affirmation of disarmament was possible in the 
preamble; however, Brandt warned that a nonproliferation treaty risked “dividing the 
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world into three groups:” the nuclear club minus China and France, those that would 
sign because they could not construct the weapons, and those, “like Germany,” who had 
the means but would be “inhibited from doing so by the treaty.”  
The declarations of French elites straddled the issue with regard to their support. 
Couve de Murville had defended the right of capable states to build a nuclear deterrent. 
Others had signaled that even though Paris would not join the treaty nor partake in its 
negotiations it would not discourage others from doing so. De Murville’s deputy and 
Director of Political Affairs, Jacques de Beaumarchais, responded to Canadian request for 
it to consult with the Western Four in Geneva with a simple formulation; “merely take 
heed of our attitude of abstention.”563 Rusk contended to Brandt that a treaty was 
urgently needed because the number would only grow as nuclear energy became more 
widespread; “the possessor of a high school physics text and an ordinary reactor would 
soon be able to make a nuclear explosion.” Those desirous of an independent nuclear 
capability should at least be forced to start from scratch. He hoped with Brandt’s blessing, 
however, that “the primary adherence problems should not lie in an East-West context 
but rather with countries such as India.”564  
 
Conclusion 
Through winter 1967, the course of international nuclear diplomacy ran through 
Bonn and Beijing. By largely resolving the German question, the superpowers had 
designed the basic blueprint of a globe-spanning regime with which to manage the perils 
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of nuclear power. The outstanding matters now related to legitimacy and efficacy rather 
than feasibility and intent. Adrian Fisher of the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency spoke to the Notre Dame American Assembly on March 16, 1967. 
In his remarks, he asked if more countries acquired the knowledge and means to build an 
atomic bomb “can the political inhibitions which now exist continue to prevent the 
Federal Republic of Germany from seeking its own national nuclear defense?” The 
answer could be a global catastrophe: 
If the decision to develop their own nuclear weapons were to be made, we would 
probably have an international crisis which would make the ten days preceding 
October 27, 1962 [the height of the Cuban crisis] look like ten relaxed days 
indeed. This is the thing we are trying to prevent. This is the reason, we — all of 
us, and I say this on both sides, both the Warsaw Pact powers and the NATO 
powers — want earnestly to develop a non-proliferation agreement.565 
The specter of a “German finger on the American trigger” doubtlessly cause many 
sleepless nights in Eastern Europe. Soviet security adviser and one of the diplomats that 
helped to broker the NPT, Oleg Grinevsky, reckoned in 1988 that Moscow “primarily 
designed the whole treaty to close all doors and windows on the possibility of the Federal 
Republic of Germany having nuclear weapons.”566 The gentlemen’s agreement between 
the United States and the Soviet Union on the crucial nonproliferation language marked 
the end of the first stage of nonproliferation diplomacy during which the process unfolded 
along the familiar fault line of the Cold War running along the Elbe River, through the 
Fulda Gap, and up the Berlin Wall.  
Washington and Moscow looked to the “global commons” for shared spaces at 
which to engage in global rule-setting and superpower détente. On January 27, 1967 the 
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Soviet Union and United States continued a streak of planetary custodianship by signing 
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, more commonly referred 
to as the Outer Space Treaty. The Space Race was closely connected to the nuclear arms 
race and, among more far-sighted goals, the Outer Space Treaty sought to curtail the 
extension of military competition into the final frontier.567 Though neither the U.S. nor 
the U.S.S.R. had plans, for instance, to weaponize the Moon, the compact helped to seal 
Soviet-American goodwill on related measures to govern the world through 
condominium or internationalism, or both.   
In the scope of Soviet-American détente and global nuclear diplomacy from 
November 1965 to February 1967, the Vietnam War had a larger impact than 
conventionally presumed. It impelled the White House to turn to arms control exploits 
with the Soviet Union as a peace symbol, drove a wedge deeper into the Sino-Soviet split, 
and limited the ability of the United States to extend security assurances to nuclear have-
nots such as India in exchange for their continued forbearance. It also provoked the 
resignation of George Ball, the foremost champion of the MLF. Though a nuclear-armed 
West Germany was the chief terror for Soviet and East European leaders, Soviet fears of 
proliferation began to turn, like those of the United States, toward the Third World in 
early 1967. The superpowers knowingly colluded to sideline nuclear aspirants (friend and 
foe) and non-aligned states by exploiting loopholes and syncing approaches in the ad-hoc 
arenas where multilateral nuclear diplomacy was waged. Finally, notwithstanding the 
                                                
567 Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg before General Assembly Committee I (Political and 
Security), 17 December 1966, reprinted in 56 Department of State Bulletin (1967), p. 80. Quoted in Paul G. 
Dembling and Daniel M. Arons, “The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty,” Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce, Vol. 33 (1967), 419-456, reprinted in Space Law, edited by Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen 
(Ashgate, 2007), 151-188. 
 253 
common front, non-nuclear powers exploited the middle ground that Soviet-American 
nuclear gamesmanship could only partly overcome.  
Although the issues at stake were momentous, it was diplomatic relationships and 
the community of arms controllers in Geneva and New York that sustained the talks. The 
human dimensions of nuclear diplomacy and the availability of world forums such as the 
ENDC and the UNGA were integral to the conduct of international nuclear diplomacy. 
Alongside efforts to draft a nonproliferation treaty in Geneva and New York City and 
through Soviet-American bilateral conversations, a matching effort to achieve the 
denuclearization of Latin America transpired in Mexico City. The next chapter concerns 
the negotiation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which opened for signature on February 14, 
1967, and which prohibited the introduction of nuclear weapons to Latin America. 
Orchestrated by Mexican Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Alfonso García Robles, the 
Latin American nuclear-free-zone talks demonstrated the power of an individual guided 
by humanitarian and internationalist impulses to effect change on a global scale. The 
attitude of U.S. policymakers toward the Latin American initiative, on the other hand, 
was a testament to the ways in which strategic interests, anticommunism, and the legacy 
of United States imperialism in the region disrupted the pursuit of collective security on 
the Cold War periphery. Latin American nuclear diplomacy had a different purpose that 
that pursued through global forums. It was meant to showcase the region’s fidelity to the 
rule of law and common security and rejected arguments in favor of strategic stability 
through nuclear deterrence. Its successful outcome afforded a contrasting template for 
how to prohibit nuclear weapons, sustained the momentum for international nuclear 
diplomacy while talks dragged elsewhere, and enhanced the stature of García Robles, 
who would go on to play a commanding role in the final stages of nonproliferation 
negotiations. Most fundamental, however, the Treaty of Tlatelolco’s negotiation bore 
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evidence that nuclear prohibitions were not the sole province of the Cold War 
superpowers during the mid-Cold War.  
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Chapter Four | “Tall Oaks from Little Acorns Grow:” Making the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco 
 
“A familiar proverb points out that tall oaks from little acorns grow. The denuclearization of Latin 
America may be one of those acorns; it may serve as an example for the denuclearization of other areas of 
the world … the next step—which has already received encouragement from some nuclear powers—will be 
to gradually reduce, until totally suspended, intra-national or internal proliferation; that is, what is 
produced through the steady manufacture of new nuclear weapons by the powers capable of doing so … 
followed by the gradual reduction of the reserves accumulated by the nuclear powers, which … would 
constitute a transcendental contribution to hastening the day when general and complete disarmament under 
effective control may become the reality aspired to by all the peoples of the world.” 
 
Alfonso García Robles, “Speech Delivered at the Opening Meeting of the Second Session of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America on 23 August 1965,” reproduced in The 
Denuclearization of Latin America (1967) 
Introduction: A Purer Form of Prohibition 
On February 14, 1967, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America opened for signature in Mexico City thanks in large part to Mexican 
Undersecretary of Foreign Relations Alfonso García Robles’s tireless efforts. More 
commonly referred to as the Treaty of Tlatelolco in honor of the Aztec name for the 
capital district wherein the negotiations unfolded, García Roles shepherded the accord 
through a series of commissions, working groups, and diplomatic imbroglios. Nuclear-
weapon-free zone talks in Latin America proceeded sporadically from 1962 to 1967, 
unfolding along many of the same lines as concurrent efforts to hammer out a nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty (NPT) in Geneva and New York City. Its ethical impulse and 
political rhetoric drew on themes and images familiar to antinuclear discourse—
transnational fields of reference, comparisons to the Second World War, linkages to 
modernization, and invocations of generational and planetary justice. The nuclear-free-
zone initiative thus arose for reasons of nuclear fear and antinuclear sentiment, while the 
Cuban Missile Crisis elevated it from a laudable proposal to a pressing imperative. As 
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such, the denuclearization push in Latin America exemplified an emergent strategy of 
legal prohibition reliant on collateral measures to pave the way for nuclear disarmament.  
Even so, the Treaty of Tlatelolco bore evidence of a clash of dissimilar forms of 
nuclear prohibition that pitted champions of liberal internationalism against the security 
internationalism then ascending in Washington and Moscow. Historical readings of the 
treaty have subordinated the Latin American quest to Soviet-American efforts to manage 
the risks of nuclear science and technology. This interpretive hierarchy has led scholars to 
downplay nuclear-free zones in present-day nuclear discourse and statecraft. Historians 
present the Latin American nuclear-free zone as an outlier in the annals of international 
nuclear diplomacy rather than as a foundational accord whose original intents and 
meanings in fact exercised a decisive influence on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and the global nuclear order more broadly.568  
Excavating the guiding principles, lead actors, and power politics in its complex 
negotiating history unearths how decolonization’s aftermath, the twin discourses of 
nuclear catastrophism and modernization, and U.S. machinations in Latin America 
during the Cold War engendered a purer model of nuclear prohibition in the form of 
nuclear-free zones. Latin American talks in Mexico City diverged from those of other 
nuclear assemblies on two counts. First, the regional initiative was self-consciously 
exemplary. It was meant to showcase Latin America’s fidelity since the Bolivarian 
revolutions to the rule of law and the preservation of peace through common security.569 
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Second, its architects discounted the value of strategic stability through deterrence, which 
brought the proceedings into conflict with U.S. military interests and Cold War geo-
strategy. Latin America largely avoided the territorial quarrels that attended 
decolonization elsewhere. But the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy and Johnson’s support 
for military dictatorships enamored of nuclear power, the logic of modernization, 
memories of U.S. imperialism, and Washington’s desire to decouple colonial issues and 
preserve its military leeway hindered efforts to establish the zone. The Treaty of 
Tlatelolco’s tangled making thus attested to the international repercussions of U.S. 
anticommunism on Latin American social democracy; namely, the obstruction of a type 
of nuclear prohibition rejecting the logic of deterrence and encouraging nuclear 
disarmament and common security on a regional basis.570 It also presaged how the stress 
laid on fissile-material accounting and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) in global 
nuclear governance mistook capabilities for intent, misconstruing how raison d’état would 
prompt states such as Brazil and Argentina to seek threshold capabilities rather than 
actual deterrents. The treaty’s achievement in early 1967 was accordingly partial. 
Though neither Brazil nor Argentina chose to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco until the 
1990s, the deliberations legitimated and reshaped the NPT. They also kept nuclear 
weapons out of Latin America and exhibited a purer model of nuclear prohibition.571  
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Brazil, Argentina, and the Idea of a Nuclear-Free Zone 
The idea of a Latin America free of nuclear weapons was first articulated by Melo 
Franco, the Brazilian representative to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 
on September 20, 1962, just weeks before President John F. Kennedy revealed the 
presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.572 In 1961, Brazilian support for a UNGA resolution 
endorsing an African nuclear-free zone raised in protest against French testing in the 
Sahara prefigured Franco’s proposal and signaled greater independence from the United 
States under socialist President João Goulart.573 Franco’s proposal was meant to assert 
Brazil’s regional leadership and prod the superpowers toward a long-awaited nuclear test-
ban treaty. The process of the resolution’s amendment foreshadowed how the United 
States would henceforth try to influence Latin American nuclear diplomacy. The original 
draft called for limits on the transport of “nuclear weapons or carrying devices” in the 
zone; however, even such marginal limits on U.S. military prerogatives were dropped “as 
a result of strong U.S. objections.”574 Argentina’s reaction foretold dissonance as well in 
terms of the inequality inherent to nuclear prohibitions. Although the Argentine 
delegation eventually backed the resolution, its envoy “strongly cautioned that a nuclear 
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weapon-free zone could freeze Latin American states into a permanent state of nuclear 
inferiority.”575  
As South America’s twin giants, Brazilian and Argentinian attitudes would prove 
decisive for the prospects of a Latin American nuclear-free zone. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
the Southern Cone heavyweights emerged as strong competitors and strange bedfellows 
in the nuclear domain. The security threats that might warrant a nuclear option were 
largely bilateral (though Cuba figured as well); even so, the prospect of regional or global 
constraints on nuclear options led them to adopt compatible positions on issues of nuclear 
rights and access, and the corresponding desirability of a Latin America without nuclear 
weapons. The two programs developed in a negative feedback loop driven less by military 
stakes than by status competition; the Brazilian-Argentinian nuclear relationship was thus 
“relatively muted, low key, and non-ideological” in the Cold War context.576  
The Brazilian nuclear program came first, supplying thorium and uranium ores 
extracted from monazite sands to the U.S. Manhattan Project during the Second World 
War. The raw material outflow proceeded through the mid-1950s, when Brazil began to 
insist on “specific compensation” in exchange for its strategic minerals. Admiral Álvaro 
Alberto outlined a national nuclear program in a 1947 letter to Brazil’s National Security 
Council (Conselho de Segurança Nacional; CSN) from New York City, where he 
represented Brazil at the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission amid the Baruch 
Plan debates.577 Presided over by President General Eurico Gaspar Dutra, the CSN was 
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positively inclined toward Alberto’s proposal for developmental and military reasons. 
Alberto found the prospect of ceding ownership of Brazil’s uranium and thorium mines to 
a U.N. authority unequal given the country’s shortcomings in traditional energy sources; 
“fair and equitable compensation” was needed to spur industrial development in light of 
coal scarcity. CSN participants voiced military rationales as well. Colonel Bernardino 
Corrêa de Matos Netto warned that “it [was] not suitable for Brazil to relinquish [nuclear 
energy], because it is necessary to prepare the ground for future wars.”578 For the 
moment, Dutra’s government took no decision on whether to launch a government 
program and lay the human and material foundations of a nuclear program.  
Argentina’s establishment of a National Commission on Nuclear Energy in 1951 
spurred Brazil’s nuclear program. To meet the Argentine challenge, President Dutra 
formed the National Research Council in January 1951. It was President Juan Perón’s 
specious claim in March 1951 that Argentina had achieved thermonuclear fusion in the 
laboratory of Austrian scientist Ronald Richter though that truly catalyzed the Brazilian 
effort. Getulio Vargas, who had returned as Brazil’s leader on January 31, 1951, pushed 
for broader collaboration with industrial powers besides the U.S. to cultivate the country’s 
nuclear brainpower and organization. He approached West Germany about acquiring an 
untested, jet-nozzle centrifuge technology. In 1953, British and American authorities 
halted the delivery, fearing that Brazil would use the centrifuges to enrich supplies of 
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uranium compounds recently provided by France and the U.K.579 With the German 
connection severed, Brazil went in search of new atomic patrons. 
Domestic political currents in which the state’s relationship with the United States 
was a major factor repeatedly wracked the Brazilian nuclear program. Regular elections, 
political instability, and military coups upset nuclear policy between 1954 and 1964. First, 
Vargas’s suicide (under duress) on August 24, 1954, and his replacement by Vice-
President General Café Filho (1954-1955), and then Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), 
brought about greater reliance on the U.S. and its Atoms for Peace program along with 
Admiral Alberto’s resignation. Atoms for Peace furnished the country with two research 
reactors from whose construction Brazilian scientists and engineers learned enough to 
build a nearly indigenous research reactor (Argonauta) in 1962, though Brazil would not 
construct a power reactor (the 626-MW Angra-1 built by Westinghouse) until 1971.580 
Kubitschek’s election in 1956 inaugurated an independent phase of Brazilian nuclear 
policy, entailing a stronger focus on self-reliance and scientific training abroad, together 
with the National Nuclear Energy Commission’s (CNEN) creation under executive 
oversight. Kubitschek, state ministers, and military chiefs of staff reviewed a study on 
Brazil’s nuclear future from the previous year in a CSN meeting on April 30, 1956. The 
group discussed how to “counteract” a congressional and media campaign against its 
nuclear policies by formulating a “suitable and secure” policy conducive to “more 
dynamic action in the field of atomic energy, for the purpose of overcoming [Brazil’s] 
relative backwardness and [to] spur the development of [its] resources according to the 
country’s best interests.” The meeting formed the CNEN, set policy for domestic fuel 
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sources, and reviewed the “advisability of modifying existing international agreements.” 
Motifs of development and dependency were conspicuous with stress laid on the division 
between industrial powers and raw material suppliers in the global market: 
[D]espite the tremendous contribution offered to all peoples in the dissemination 
of techno-scientific information in the atomic field, whose historic initial landmark 
was the 1955 Geneva Conference, no substantial progress will be achieved in any 
national program in this sector unless the question of our own nuclear fuel 
production is solved. … While the sale of certain kinds of reactors is free of 
restrictions, there will be absolute dependence of [sic] nuclear fuel for their 
operation. 
Officials consequently underlined the desirability of ending the country’s reliance on 
foreign states for uranium and thorium enrichment, observing: “it cannot be denied that 
there is a true monopoly of nuclear fuels in the hands of the big powers.”581  
Thereafter, Brazilian nuclear policy focused on building national capacity. The 
state sent students abroad for training as scientists, technicians, engineers, and specialists 
and endeavored to generate nuclear fuel from its uranium and thorium reserves. 
Although the policy’s tenor harmonized with that of Atoms for Peace, omens of future 
clashes mounted. The CNEN would manage uranium and thorium ore whose export was 
contingent on “specific compensation, instrumental and technical, with a view to the 
development of the industrial applications of nuclear energy in the country.” These 
minerals would accordingly only be exported in exchange for industrial reactors and 
technical knowledge by an “exclusive barter system from Government to Government,” 
once quotas set by the National Nuclear Energy Fund were met. The first result was the 
cancellation of a shipment of 300 tons of thorium oxide to the United States. The nuclear 
program would not have a military objective though. The Armed Forces would help to 
                                                
581 "Minutes of the Twentieth Session of the Brazilian National Security Council, Second Brazilian Nuclear 
Plan" August 30, 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archive (Brasilia). 
Obtained and translated by Fundação Getúlio Vargas. The author has retranslated some sections. 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116913. 
 263 
procure raw materials, but for now the nuclear portfolio rested in civilian hands; a 
parallel military program would not arise until the late-1970s. 
The Cuban Missile Crisis was “the catalyst” for Latin American states to make the 
denuclearization of the region a major priority.582 If the superpowers “had peered over 
the edge of the nuclear precipice” during the crisis and then “edged backward toward 
détente,” the white-knuckled days impelled Latin American states to strike a collective 
settlement of their nuclear future.583 The Organization of American States (OAS) proved 
its ability to address nuclear threats when, at U.S. urging, it passed a resolution on 
October 23 sanctioning individual and collective action against Cuba. The resolution 
legitimated a “quarantine” of the island and conferred upon U.S. diplomacy and military 
action the seal of hemispheric security and approval even though blockades entailed acts 
of war according to a strict reading of international law. Latin America’s denuclearization 
held out a possible solution to the standoff and a prophylactic against such future 
confrontations. Brazil pushed their nuclear-free zone concept in Washington and New 
York City as a peacemaking avenue by which to escape the apocalyptic game of chicken 
then unfolding in the Caribbean.  
The United States reaction to the initiative was mixed. The State Department 
deemed it a positive development and concluded that it might afford the Cubans a “face-
saver to free themselves of the missiles since, as a “bona fide Latin American initiative,” it 
might allow Castro to disengage without outwardly kowtowing to U.S. demands.584 The 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) advised Foggy Bottom to support 
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nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa given a consensus among regional states, 
robust verification plans, other nuclear powers’ acquiescence, and no “limitations on 
temporary transport or passage [of U.S. nuclear weapons].” The Disarmament Agency 
paper concluded: 
The establishment of such a zone in Latin America would not only afford an 
acceptable basis, at least to the United States, for settling the present Cuban 
problem but would go a long way toward preventing similar problems from 
arising in that area in the future.585  
Other elements of the national security bureaucracy were less enthusiastic. The 
Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence fretted that U.S. support for multilateral 
solutions might allow the Soviets to temporize. The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected that 
denuclearization talks would not ensure the missiles’ removal, but only limit U.S. nuclear 
options in the neighborhood; in fact, they would most likely benefit the Soviet Union 
because it “ha[d] essentially nothing to lose.”586 The Disarmament Agency attributed the 
Joint Chiefs’ views to anti-Castro and pro-nuclear biases, the “pressing need” to “get rid 
of the missiles,” the “long-term goal” of “get(ting) rid of Castro,” and an unwillingness to 
cede the use of “tactical nuclear weapons in support of ground operations.” Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze backed the Joint Chiefs though, and Foggy Bottom chose 
to take the middle course when Secretary of State Dean Rusk met Brazilian Foreign 
Minister João Augusto de Araujo Castro on September 24, when Rusk stated that Cuban 
“participation was essential,” while reassuring Araujo Castro that U.S. views on the 
scheme were indeed favorable.587  
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Melo Franco tabled the motion at the United Nations General Assembly the day 
after Khrushchev declared the Soviet missiles’ withdrawal from Cuba. He claimed that a 
nuclear-free zone would resolve the crisis and avert its recurrence; for the next five years, 
the matter of Cuban participation would continually bedevil talks. Franco’s speech 
marked the apex of Brazilian commitment to the project though. Its promotional role 
would taper off as the country drifted rightward following a U.S.-backed military coup in 
March 1964. Inter-American cooperation vis-à-vis nuclear weapons risked becoming a 
victim of U.S. anticommunism and hemispheric supremacy. Henceforth, the treaty’s fate 
would depend increasingly on Mexico’s ambassador in Brasília—Alfonso García Robles.  
 
Alfonso García Robles 
García Robles’s fingerprints would fleck both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the 
NPT. The negotiations for the nuclear-free zone and the global nonproliferation regime 
were inextricably linked through concurrence, cross-fertilization, common actors, and 
complementarities. With his European legal education, internationalist outlook, and 
Third World identity (from Mexico’s ambivalent vantage point), García Robles embodied 
the middle ground on which international nuclear diplomacy would increasingly occur 
amid decolonization. In retirement, García Robles would look back on the nuclear-free 
zone treaty as the “most transcendent event … occupy[ing] the place of honor” in his 
time as Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs from 1964 to 1970.588 From his stewardship of 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco and NPT to his leading role in formulating the “Final 
Document” at a special UN session on Nuclear Disarmament in 1978, no statesperson 
from the Global South was as synonymous with nuclear arms control.  
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Born in Zamora, Michoacán in 1911, García Robles earned a law degree at the 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México in 1934, before finishing his studies in 
Europe with postgraduate degrees from the University of Paris and the Academy of 
International Law in The Hague, where he was one of two laureates.589 As president of 
the Alumni Association and the Auditors Institute of International Studies, he presided 
over the First Congress of International Studies at the University of Paris in 1937, which 
took place alongside the final World Exhibition on the Champs de Mars. Soon after, he 
published his first scholarly work, “Pan-Americanism and the Good Neighbor Policy,” 
which displayed trademarks of his life’s work—hemispheric solidarity, resource 
nationalism, the rule of law, and anticolonialism.590 Amid the outbreak of the Second 
World War, he took a job with the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) in its 
Stockholm legation. García Robles developed an expertise there on the expropriation of 
Mexican oil from foreign, mostly U.S.-based firms, and the “smear campaign” that 
ensued. He delivered lectures on the subject to his European alma maters, which were 
then published as La Question du Pétrole au Mexique et la Droit International.591 García Robles’s 
defense of the expropriations would sour opinion towards him in Washington long after 
the Good Neighbor Policy became a dead letter. 
He was promoted when he returned home in 1941 to sub-director of the SRE’s 
General Directorate for Political Affairs, whose functions took him to conferences at Hot 
Springs in 1943, Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, and San Francisco in 1945, where delegates 
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were busy erecting the political framework of the United Nations. These experiences led 
to his appointment as Director of the Division of Political Affairs of the U.N. Secretariat 
from where he oversaw the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) against the 
background of Palestine’s partition and Israel’s rebirth. He also worked to moderate 
territorial disputes in Indonesia and Kashmir, observed the OAS’s formation, and 
directed the first U.N. peacekeeping force in Suez after the 1956 crisis. He stayed in New 
York City for over a decade before returning to Mexico City in March 1957 to serve as 
the SRE’s Director General of Multilateral Policy, guiding Mexico through the Law of 
the Sea conferences, where he collaborated regularly with Indian counterparts.592 In 
October 1961, he received his first assignment overseas since Sweden—the key 
ambassadorship in Brazil.  
It was in Brasília that he encountered the nuclear-free zone idea. The scheme 
accorded with his background and outlook in three ways. First, it fitted his years of 
experience at the nexus of multilateral and U.N. diplomacy. Second, it harmonized with 
his legal training and internationalist worldview. He was a strong admirer of Mexico’s 
nineteenth-century reformer, Supreme Court president, and the inaugural president 
elected under the 1857 Constitution, Benito Juárez, whose axiom—“among individuals, 
as among nations, respect for the rights of others is peace”—García Robles often 
quoted.593 This principle built on the Bolivarian myth that upheld Latin America as a 
laboratory for social democracy, constitutionalism, republicanism, pan-Americanism, and 
anti-imperialism.594 A third constellation of values guided him—future generations’ 
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survival, the planetary environment’s preservation, and his sense of patriarchal 
responsibility for both. In the dedication of his study, El Tratado de Tlatelolco, he wrote: 
To Juanita … With whom I share the conviction that Alfonso and Fernando 
[their sons] are entitled to demand that their parents’ generation does not 
endanger the survival of the human race.595  
He dwelt on the generational and ecological imperatives of nuclear prohibition in the 
preface of another work when describing thermonuclear war’s anticipated aftermath. 
Beyond the “75 per cent of the population of the country under attack” that would die 
instantly from blast and heat, or swiftly from radiation, and the “substantial part of the 
remaining 25 per cent” dispatched by fallout, he depicted the planetary endgame in 
tropes borrowed from the antinuclear movement: 
The other 20 per cent of the fallout would spread more or less evenly over the 
world’s surface. It has been estimated that between 100 million and 300 million 
infants would be born dead or with deformities often bordering on the monstrous 
as the result of a war employing a nuclear explosion of 50,000 megatons … The 
dangers are of such magnitude that distinguished scientists of several nationalities 
have predicted that a large-scale nuclear war might change man’s plasma in such 
a way that the human species … could not survive and that the whole earth might 
eventually become uninhabitable.596 
For García Robles, this latent cataclysm was more than a horror story. It accounted for 
the “duty” of Latin Americans living free of nuclear weapons “to strive to make this 
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situation a permanent and immutable one through a multilateral treaty … universally 
respected.”597  
Like others of his generation, the Second World War’s charnel house haunted his 
efforts to control nuclear weapons. He accordingly located his mission’s “gradual genesis” 
in his 18 months in Sweden: 
… [T]he Second World War was at its apogee, or very close to its lethal apogee. 
And, perhaps constantly seeing, day after day, in the press and hearing over the 
radio, the scathing news of mankind’s works in the world—the aerial bombings, 
the use of canons and machines guns, the waves of soldiers invading one country 
or another and the concentration camps—perhaps all of that, gradually and by 
natural reaction, inspired me to try to contribute in whatever fashion was in my 
power so that events such as these would never happen again.598  
García Robles thus personified a generation of thinkers and leaders whose worldviews 
had been forged by what Albert Camus lamented in 1957 as “more than twenty years of 
insane history:” 
These men who were born at the beginning of the First World War, who were 
twenty when Hitler came to power and the first revolutionary trials were 
beginning, who were then confronted as a completion of their education with the 
Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the world of concentration camps, a 
Europe of torture and prisons—these men must today rear their sons and create 
their works in a world threatened by nuclear destruction.599 
This ethical impulse and García Robles’ wartime and postwar experiences made 
him uniquely suited and inclined to negotiate a Latin America free of nuclear weapons.600  
García Robles was promoted to Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs after Brazil’s 
military coup and Don José Gorostiza’s promotion to Mexican Secretary of Foreign 
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Affairs after Manuel Tello decided to run for congress. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was at first hesitant about the scheme, but eventually heeded García Robles’ admonitions 
to avail itself of a chance to seize the reins of regional leadership in the nuclear arena. 
Tello had agreed in 1963 for García Robles to bring the idea of a joint declaration calling 
for a nuclear-free zone to Goulart’s government.601 García Robles also worked to recruit 
President Adolfo López Mateos to the cause so that he could approach Brazilian 
Chancellor Hermes Lima with a presidential letter highlighting the “dramatic moment” 
at hand whose import merited “a resolute and consistent conduct aimed at the 
preservation of life itself.” The proposal endorsed measures committing willing countries 
not to “manufacture, receive, store, or test nuclear weapons or devices for launching such 
weapons.” Latin America would thereby avoid a nuclear arms race. Five states—Mexico, 
Brazil, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador—signed the declaration, which was issued on April 29. 
Bolivian President Victor Paz Estenssoro invoked the Bolivarian myth on the occasion, 
calling the joint statement evidence of “the peace-loving tradition of the peoples of the 
hemisphere.”602  
Mexico and Brazil circulated the declaration to the Eighteen-Nation Committee 
on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva in May. The Burmese representative there likened 
the scheme to the nonproliferation treaty then garnering attention as a facilitator of 
“general and complete disarmament,” which “must begin by taking all possible steps to 
prevent the problem from growing in magnitude and complexity through the further 
spread of nuclear weapons.”603 The remaining members expressed varying levels of 
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support, interest, and engagement. The five Latin American states then met informally in 
September to discuss next steps and, soon after, six more regional partners joined them to 
petition the U.N. for technical assistance. In response, United Nations Secretary General 
U Thant assigned William Epstein as the project’s scientific adviser.  
In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly on November 11, 1963, García Robles 
drew attention to the arguments for nuclear forbearance, adducing the “astronomical 
sums” that avoiding a regional nuclear arms race would save for development and 
marking out the “incalculable benefit” of peaceful nuclear technology. He also outlined 
the paramount issues in need of resolution: the geographical extent of the “zone;” nuclear 
powers’ compliance; how to distinguished peaceful and military uses; the relationship 
between a nuclear-free zone and decolonization; and proper methods of control. A 
diplomatic triangle between the United States, treaty promoters, and treaty spoilers 
would soon develop to dispute these issues and thereby determine what form of nuclear 
prohibition would take shape in the Western Hemisphere.  
 
U.S. Anticommunism and Latin American Nuclear Diplomacy 
At the time, United States support for nuclear-free zones as stimuli to 
nonproliferation was under review for the Eighteenth Session of the U.N. General 
Assembly. U.S. Ambassador Charles C. Stelle declared on October 29, 1963 that support 
for nuclear-free zones was possible “under appropriate circumstances,” most notably, 
strategic stability, robust verification, and broad participation. However, the U.S. 
national security bureaucracy was “at best lukewarm” due to the Joint Chiefs’ 
reservations concerning limits on U.S. Navy vessels’ nuclear ordnance, the cessation of 
training exercises embarking from Guantánamo with nuclear “packages”, and the risk of 
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Soviet espionage under cover of verification and inspection.604 Foggy Bottom instructed 
embassies in Latin America to point out that a global nonproliferation treaty would attain 
the same ends, while internal State Department views were likewise cautious: 
[The Department of State] predicted that the problems of Cuban participation, 
freedom of nuclear transit, and opposition by Latin American governments were 
such that “its establishment does not seem likely in the near future.605 
U.S. public diplomacy was more permissive. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson praised the 
endeavor at the General Assembly in November as “a most constructive contribution to 
the cause of peace,” while stressing that leadership ought to come from “Latin American 
states themselves.”606  
The U.N. General Assembly blessed the initiative that autumn with Resolution 
1911, which passed sans a solitary nay on November 27.607 The resolution commended 
the five-power statement, encouraged Latin American states to begin exploring mutually 
acceptable measures, and asked for technical assistance from the U.N. Secretary-General. 
The U.S. voted for passage along with 90 other countries. Not all states were favorable 
though. Cuba in league with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw allies abstained. Cuba 
insisted on the Panama Canal Zone and Puerto Rico’s inclusion and the return of 
Guantánamo Bay’s to Cuban sovereignty in exchange for its acquiescence. García Robles 
again took the podium to reaffirm the generational and moral imperatives—“the very life 
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of present and future generations of Latin Americans”—warranting such dramatic 
action.608 Washington still regarded a Latin American nuclear-free zone chiefly as an 
enabler of its own nuclear diplomacy though. In a circular issued two days later, the 
Disarmament Agency noted the impetus for “a universal non-proliferation agreement” 
given by the Latin American denuclearization project. Questions of Cuban participation, 
United States dependencies in the prospective zone, and the exact verification regime 
were still in need of resolution.609 
Mexican hopes of serving as a “moderating influence” on the region were on a 
collision course with the Cold War in Latin America. Cuba remained a hurdle long after 
the October crisis faded. The Disarmament Agency grappled with the Cuban question 
when it undertook a preliminary study on U.S. policy toward a nuclear-free Latin 
America. The report endorsed the joint action of the OAS and U.N. agencies, in 
particular the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommended that “a 
zone with on-site inspection at the cost of Cuban non-participation” was acceptable as 
long as current forms of surveillance persisted. It also advised that Washington could offer 
Guantánamo and the Panama Canal Zone as token non-nuclear territories. Interestingly, 
the five Latin American countries behind the joint statement were also those still 
maintaining contact with the revolutionary island. Despite repeated Mexican calls on 
Havana, the questions of whether Cuba would join and what U.S. concessions might 
secure its adhesion (e.g. the inclusion of Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal, or the return 
of Guantánamo Bay) went unheeded. Cuba’s expulsion from the OAS in July 1964 was a 
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contributing factor.610 And to worsen matters, the OAS, which already had a reputation 
as a U.S.-influenced body, was tapped as the negotiating venue instead of the U.N. 
General Assembly, in whose plenaries Cuba still sat.  
In November, Mexico invited its fellow Latin American states with the pointed 
exceptions of Cuba and Venezuela to send their U.N. Permanent Representatives to 
Mexico City for early talks before the UNGA reconvened in December. García Robles 
proclaimed that a nuclear free-zone in Latin America would not disturb the post-ICBM 
strategic balance; on the contrary, it would foster stability if an event akin to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis recurred while testifying to Latin American independence, neighborliness, 
and peacefulness.611 U.S. policy remained fixated on its strategic competition with the 
Soviet Union though, and Washington would accept Cuban non-participation only on 
the condition “that the Soviet Union is not installing nuclear weapons in Cuba and that 
Cuba is not otherwise obtaining such weapons.”612 
United States support for the plan thus remained tepid. Washington officials were 
suspicious of García Robles’ rise to Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs in light of his early 
defense of oil expropriations and his recent pursuit of a UN resolution in favor of non-
intervention.613 Officials at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City also expressed “concern” 
about Robles’ “long record critical of U.S. motives.”614 On the other hand, Rusk referred 
                                                
610 The Soviet Union tried to exert pressure on Cuba to go along with the treaty proceedings, however, 
Castro refused, perhaps owing to his post-Cuban Missile Crisis grievances regarding Moscow’s lack of spine 
and unwillingness to leave behind tactical nuclear weapons. Gromyko informed Rusk of Cuba’s resistance 
and Rusk in turn informed Mexican Foreign Minister Manuel Tello, see Memorandum of Conversation, 
February 21, 1964, Box 58, Country Files (CF)—Mexico-Honduras, National Security Files (NSF), Lyndon 
Baines Johnson Presidential Library (LBJL). Hereinafter, CF—Mexico, NSF, LBJL. 
611 Serrano, Common Security in Latin America, 26. 
612 Adrian Fisher, Memorandum to Committee of Principals, “Position Paper on Nuclear Free Zones,(U),” 
30 July 1965, quoted in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, 22–23. 
613 Marín Bosch, “Alfonso García Robles: Una Entrevista (An Interview) Por: Miguel Marín Bosch,” 24–
25. 
614 U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Fulton Freeman, Telegram to Foggy Bottom re “Embassy Comments and 
Recommendations,” 21 May 1964, Box 58, Cables, CF—Mexico, NSF, LBJL. 
 275 
to Mexico as the “most sincere” with respect to “doing something about disarmament,” 
because Mexico was the only non-aligned participant at the Eighteen Nation Committee 
on Disarmament in the process of cutting its military budget.615  
The Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, however, enhanced Washington’s 
interest in nonproliferation of which influential officials deemed a denuclearized Latin 
America a key component.616 Although the Pentagon resisted limits on its ability to 
transfer nuclear weapons across the globe, the Disarmament Agency and Foggy Bottom 
hoped that the Latin American initiative might counteract the mounting inertia in 
international nuclear diplomacy. A November 1964 circular from Foggy Bottom passed 
on the assessment that “the U.S. share[d] the Mexican concern over the increased danger 
of proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities in view of the Chinese Communist test,” 
which they feared might prompt other developing states to “follow the ChiCom 
example.”617 The memorandum nevertheless cautioned that a “viable and acceptable” 
nuclear-free zone “would … have to include Cuba … and meet certain other conditions 
(e.g. transit rights).” Legally, nuclear-free zones were equivalent to nonproliferation as a 
“collateral measure” to disarmament. Practically, the initiative was still regarded as a 
secondary priority; a global treaty took precedence. The State Department again 
instructed U.S. envoys in Latin America to relate that “an international non-proliferation 
agreement would attain the essential objective of a nuclear-free zone in L[atin] A[merica] 
and avoid the [evident] difficulties.” U.S. policymakers mostly prayed that the 
declarations would have a beneficial psychological impact on the desultory ENDC talks 
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in Geneva by furnishing a “new impetus” and “enabl[ing] the 19th [UN]GA to issue an 
urgent call for an agreement implementing the Irish Resolution.” The overtures should 
be made “on an informal basis,” however, so as “to avoid the impression of U.S. 
interference or pressure,” which might compromise the treaty because of the depth of 
anti-Americanism in the region.618  
The Gilpatric Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, which Johnson authorized to 
evaluate the global impact of the Chinese test, tried to softne the preconditions in a 
presidential report issued on January 21, 1965. The report called for the country to 
“actively support the establishment of Latin American and African (including, if possible, 
Israel-UAR) nuclear[-]free zones” without qualifications. It went further than Foggy 
Bottom on transit rights, verification, and security assurances as well, advising that the 
U.S. should “be prepared to modify our requirements.”619 The positive development was 
for naught though; Johnson resented Senator Robert Kennedy’s interference and buried 
the report with Rusk’s support. United States policy would thus remain equivocal 
through 1965. 
The Five-Power declaration and subsequent nuclear-free zone talks appealed to 
traditions of cooperation and dispute settlement among the states of Latin America, 
“which had so distinguished itself for its valuable contribution to the development of the 
great principles of law and justice.”620 Generational and environmental imperatives fused 
with the Bolivarian myth to form the rhetorical plank of the efforts. García Robles 
opened the Preliminary Meeting of Latin American states on the denuclearization of 
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Latin America on November 27, exactly one year after the passage of UNGA Resolution 
1911, by invoking the “vital necessity of sparing present and future generations the 
scourge of a nuclear war.” He quoted a speech by President Kennedy to the UNGA in 
1961 to underscore the universal stakes: 
For a nuclear disaster, spread by winds and water and fear, could well engulf the 
great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and the uncommitted 
alike. Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind. … 
And we in this Hall shall be remembered either as part of the generation that 
turned this planet into a flaming funeral pyre or as the generation that met its vow 
to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. … Together we shall 
save our planet—or together we shall perish in its flames.621 
García Robles again deployed the metric of megatons (a “single bomb … equals 25 
millions tons of explosives”) and the total war analogy (“more than twelve times the total 
of all the bombings [of] the Second World War, including … Hiroshima and Nagasaki”) 
to frame the menace. He outlined the need to build the region’s economic strength by 
avoiding a “ruinous” arms race.  
The task at hand was to formulate a preliminary draft of a multilateral treaty 
formalizing the region’s denuclearization. Some of the debates echoed those of the NPT: 
security assurances, decolonization, and peaceful nuclear explosives. Others were unique 
to Latin America: the Cuban question and how to demarcate the zone, especially 
whether to include dependent territories, foreign military bases, and global shipping 
lanes. García Robles dissolved the meeting by donning the ideological garb of 
Bolivarianism by quoting Bolivar’s famous oration at the Congress of Panama in 1826:  
One hundred centuries from now, when posterity traces the origin of our public 
law back to the treaties that shaped its future, it will honor the Isthmus protocols 
… it will find the design of our future relations with the world. What then will the 
Isthmus of Corinth be next to that of Panama?  
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Latin American achievements in the field of common nuclear security, García Robles 
implied, would exceed and supplant those of the European civilization that had 
conquered, colonized, and for so long controlled the Western hemisphere. The Final Act 
established a Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America 
(COPREDAL) that would convene in Mexico City four times from March 1965 to 
February 1967 in order to weigh issues of regional participation, legal definitions, extra-
continental pledges, and verification and inspection means. Latin America would light the 
way, instructing the world how best to prohibit nuclear weapons. 
Regional power dynamics muddled the outlook for a strict regional approach to 
nuclear prohibition. Most Latin American countries valued nonproliferation; however, 
Argentina and Brazil, whose status as regional power brokers underlay their revisionist 
attitudes, bridled at the seeming injustice of a Soviet-American nuclear duopoly. The 
tension between collective stability and secure condominium was as taut in Buenos Aires 
and Brasília as it was in international nuclear forums such as Geneva and New York City. 
Moreover, the specter of a regional arms race paled in comparison to the nuclear idyll of 
a developed Latin America. Recent modifications in U.S. foreign policy toward Latin 
America had further exacerbated troubling trends toward military coups and political 
reaction, pitching the region’s politics decidedly rightward.622 Inter-American relations 
grew more politicized and fraught in proportion to the degree of U.S. meddling. The 
process began with Eisenhower’s embrace of covert operations, stable dictatorships, and 
interventions against Red-tinged governments such as that of Jacobo Árbenz in 
Guatemala.623 The Latin American left responded by forsaking popular fronts and 
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meeting state repression and violence in kind. The Cuban Revolution, the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco, and CIA plots against Castro in Cuba and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican 
Republic sped the political centrifuge, while Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress (largely 
aimed at isolating Cuba) could only moderate the rise of anti-Americanism partly.624 
According to one scholar, “[p]erhaps the main influence of the Alliance was the 
bolstering of the military’s self confidence as an institution capable of managing social and 
economic change.”625 In the Nuclear Age during which socioeconomic progress was 
envisaged through lenses of megawatts and megatons—nuclear technology was perceived 
as a major component of this developmental process. 
U.S. anticommunism was thus both a cause and consequence of the political 
tremors then convulsing Latin American society as revolt and reaction fed a vicious cycle 
of counterinsurgency, covert operations, and Beltway intervention.626 At a minimum, the 
covert backing of rightwing forces gave rise to an enlargement of the U.S. military 
footprint in the region and the buttressing of military regimes besotted with nation-
building and nuclear power. Tacit or tactical support for the military coups against 
President Arturo Frondizi of Argentina in 1962 and President Goulart of Brazil in 1964 
brought military or military-backed governments into power in two of Latin America’s 
largest powers. The Kennedy administration had pondered covert, passive, and overt 
support for a military coup in Brazil. Shortly before General Castelo Branco ousted 
Goulart in fact, Kennedy avowed that he “would not be averse to the overthrow of the 
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elected Brazilian government by forces more friendly to the United States.”627 This 
martial inclination was backed by military action when a U.S. fleet embarked “en route 
[to] Porto Alegre and Rio Grande to blockade exiting ships” and deliver supplies of 
petroleum to Brazilian military forces.628 On the one hand, the advent of military 
dictatorship on March 31 ended the “independent” period of Brazilian foreign policy; the 
country would henceforth hew more closely to Washington. On the other hand, though, 
its position on denuclearization stiffened, and the Johnson administration’s policy of 
benign neglect, adopted in awareness of anti-Americanism’s depth in the region, robbed 
Washington of what leverage it might have wielded. The U.S. occupation of the 
Dominican Republic in April 1965, launched against the backdrop of the second 
COPREDAL meeting, worsened matters. In sum, Cold War thinking inside the Beltway 
hampered efforts by García Robles and other international prohibitionists to keep nuclear 
weapons out of Latin America.  
 
Spoilers and Sponsors 
The Brazilian coup also ended García Robles’s tenure as Mexican ambassador to 
Brazil. He learned of Goulart’s downfall upon his return to Brasília on April 1 after 
vacationing with his wife in Bahia. Days later, he “gleefully” accepted the post of 
undersecretary of foreign affairs because of “the military coup in Brazil.”629 Argentina 
and Brazil shortly emerged as the chief spoilers of the nuclear-free zone scheme. The first 
sign of resistance came at the first COPREDAL session from March 5 to 22, 1965, where 
Brazil blocked García Robles from starting to formulate the treaty language. Instead, the 
meeting adopted an Argentinian initiative to break the process into three working groups 
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under a Coordinating Committee to debate the outstanding issues.630 Brazil’s delegate, 
José Sette Camara, divulged to U.S. listeners that the “Mexican delegation had originally 
hoped to initiate at least some substantive work on [the] draft denuclearization treaty; 
however, García Robles soon recognized this [was] impractical.” He was forced to abide 
by the Argentinian approach, which Sette Camara said conformed better to Brazil’s 
position that “complex problems … could best be approached through medium [to] small 
working groups located at U.N. headquarters.” It was not the last time that Brazil and 
Argentina would coordinate policy to swing proceedings in their favor. Meanwhile, Cuba 
ignored Mexican entreaties to join, and Columbia pushed for Puerto Rico’s inclusion in 
the zone—a U.S. red line.631  
Progress at the COPREDAL thus mainly entailed organizing the working groups. 
Working Group A would draw a clearer map of what geographical or political area the 
zone would encompass by corresponding with absent Latin American republics and 
extraterritorial powers. Working Group B was put in charge of the verification, 
inspection, and control articles. Finally, Working Group C would coax the nuclear 
powers into respecting “in all aspects and consequences [the] denuclearization.”632 The 
delegates took a few concrete steps. Jamaica, Trinidad, and Tobago (former British 
colonies and now members of the British Commonwealth) received invitations to join the 
talks. An “unbiased” external authority (most likely the IAEA) would provide inspection 
and oversight. And talks with foreign states possessing regional dependencies—the U.S., 
France, U.K., and Netherlands—would have no legal bearing on decolonization. 
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Significantly, Mexico was placed in Working Group B, whose scope was limited to 
matters of passing interest to Washington. Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores 
made clear to the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Fulton Freeman, the Argentinian and 
Brazilian tactic of diminishing Mexican and thereby North American influence. Tellingly, 
while Working Group B would meet in Mexico City, the more contentious Working 
Groups A and C would convene in New York.633 García Robles accentuated the positive 
in his final speech, declaring “as in ancient Greece and in the Olympics of today, we pass 
the torch to the three working groups.”634 
The United States and Soviet Union cautiously supported the project in official 
and unofficial spheres. In his inaugural congressional speech on the subject of 
nonproliferation in July 1964, Senator Robert F. Kennedy remarked that “one of our 
greatest assets is that there is not one nuclear weapon in all of Latin America or Africa.” 
Nuclear powers could help to preserve this prelapsarian state, Kennedy counseled, by 
pledging not to emplace nuclear weapons in the regions and through denuclearization 
pacts that the U.S. “should encourage … in every possible way.”635 On the other hand, a 
report issued by the Thompson Committee on Nuclear Proliferation was symptomatic of 
the security internationalism taking hold in Washington. It affirmed that support for 
nonproliferation and denuclearization was advisable in “regions in the world where 
nuclear weapons are not part of the essential security framework.” Though “major steps 
in arms control do not seem to be in the cards,” the support of the U.S. for such zones in 
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Latin America and Africa had the merit of “making clear that the East-West struggle as it 
applies to these regions is not a nuclear struggle and need not become one.”636 The 
Disarmament Agency meanwhile advised the Committee of Principals (a body of deputies 
charged with reviewing U.S. nuclear policy) to inform Latin American governments 
privately of Washington’s “concern for transit rights for nuclear armed ships and 
aircraft.”637 Soviet voices echoed these sentiments albeit with fewer qualifications. After 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ambassador Nikolai Federenko declared at the Political 
Committee of the UNGA that the U.S.S.R. was “prepared to join with the Western 
Powers in giving the necessary guarantees to keep nuclear weapons out of areas 
designated nuclear-free zones,” whether through regional, multilateral, or bilateral 
mechanisms.638 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had restated this position on 
December 7, 1964.  
As expected, the verification, inspection, and control articles were the easiest to 
write. Working Group B submitted a preliminary draft of 14 articles at the second 
COPREDAL from August 23 to September 2. According to García Robles, the main 
principle when devising the control articles was non-intervention, which he characterized 
in his concluding remarks as “rightly considered by all Latin American States as the 
cornerstone of friendly relations among nations.” This sly criticism was probably a dig at 
the recent U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.639 The commission adopted 
some other major decisions beyond the control articles: a declaration of preambular 
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principles, the establishment of a Negotiating Committee consisting of García Robles and 
the chairmen of Workings Groups A and C (to expedite talks ahead of the UNGA’s 
twentieth session), and a final communiqué enjoining the states parties to “redouble their 
efforts” to conclude the treaty at the next COPREDAL.  
The preamble’s working language reaffirmed the treaty’s three purposes: 
development, nonproliferation, and disarmament. Latin America’s historic affiliation with 
internationalism was evoked as well: 
That Latin America, faithful to its deep-seated tradition of universality of outlook, 
must endeavor not only to banish from its homelands the scourge of nuclear war, 
but also, at the same time, to cooperate in the fulfillment of the ideals of mankind, 
that is to say in the consolidation of a lasting peace based on equal rights, 
economic fairness and social justice for all, in accordance with the principles and 
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.640 
More prosaically, the session witnessed the resolution of the knotty question of the zone’s 
scope. Rather than a geographical, linguistic, historical, or political definition, the treaty 
would employ a legal standard; the zone would “equal the sum of the territories in which 
the treaty applies by virtue of the will of the governments ratifying the treaty.”   
The United States began to relax some of its conditions for the treaty by late-
1965. In a meeting on August 27, 1965 with First Secretary of the Italian Ministry 
Antonello Pietromarchi, Disarmament Agency official William Miller observed there 
existed “considerable interest” among Latin American states for denuclearization even 
though the “difficult problem” of Cuba remained. When Pietromarchi raised the matter 
of “whether a [LA]NFZ without Cuban participation would be negotiable or viable,” 
Miller indicated that Cuban participation was not “a sine qua non condition for agreement 
on a LANFZ.” Washington was adamant though that transit rights in the Caribbean and 
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through the Panama Canal be respected; it was U.S. policy not to declare if nuclear 
weapons were present aboard its vessels or aircraft. Miller decline to proffer “a general 
box score of L[atin] A[merican] views” on the treaty, but singled out Mexico as the sole 
“possible exception” to the “considerable understanding of U.S. policy on transit rights in 
recognition of our responsibility for over-all security of the hemisphere.”641 The 
Disarmament Agency was reticent lest the parties assume that Washington would place 
its dependencies in the zone. Given the speed with which the British Empire had 
withdrawn from the Caribbean, U.S. officials were wary of acknowledging that Puerto 
Rico or the Virgin Islands were part of Latin American geography, which might set a 
dangerous precedent. In a letter to García Robles dated December 10, Disarmament 
Agency Director William Foster relayed that his government did “not wish to have 
included in the proposed nuclear free zone the Virgin Islands, since it is United States 
territory, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, because of its integral relationship with 
the United States.”642 This position was acceptable to most Latin American states besides 
Cuba, which wanted more than Guantánamo’s inclusion in exchange for its nuclear 
renunciation. 
From 1965 to 1966, the rift between treaty spoilers, such as Argentina, Brazil, and 
Cuba, and sponsors, such as Mexico, widened. Though Mexican-American relations 
were historically fraught, Mexico relished its strong bilateral relationship with its northern 
neighbor and the prestige gained by serving in a leadership position in regional and 
global arms control efforts. Washington remained encouraging, but Foster started to 
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encounter static from his Brazilian peers at the ENDC in Geneva. Brazilian delegate 
Carlos Bueno criticized U.S. efforts to “exclude certain areas from [the] region to be 
denuclearized” and “reservation[s] such as with regard [to] inspection” because of “its 
[supposed] responsibility for hemispheric security.” Foster responded that Washington’s 
unwillingness to include Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands resulted from constitutional 
desiderata and that U.S. concerns about inspection stemmed from the impossibility of 
“perfect verification” and the resulting need for more expedient measures.643 The U.S. 
position was also guided by the desire to cite the Latin American talks and Mexico’s 
endorsement of IAEA safeguards in support of its own support for their inclusion in a 
draft nonproliferation treaty in Geneva.644  
Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores met with Rusk in New York City on 
October 7, 1965 during the twentieth session of the U.N. General Assembly. Mexico had 
sent a special mission to Cuba to relate the “intent and the outcome” of talks in hopes 
that Castro would opt to participate. Rusk reiterated that Cuba’s involvement was 
“important” and the U.S. would “reserve the right of transit for nuclear-armed and 
powered weapons through the Panama Canal.” The ministers then discussed what effect 
Cuban support for nuclear-free zone would have on U.S.-Cuban relations: 
[Rusk] replied that it would be recognized as a gesture but would not be enough 
at the time to assure our acceptance of the Castro regime. The Minister asked 
what would be enough. [Rusk] replied that Cuba must demonstrate, even though 
it need not make a public announcement to this effect, that it was withholding its 
subversive activities in the area. Cuba must also break its military ties with the 
Soviet Union.”  
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Sensing that Rusk was not about to revise Cuban policy, Flores asked if the U.S. would 
view Mexican overtures to Cuba “as an unfriendly gesture,” to which Rusk responded 
that, on the contrary, he welcomed the efforts. He even drew a parallel to his own 
courtship of “Red Chinese support for our efforts to control nuclear activity.” He pledged 
that Foster would serve as special liaison and intimated that the Panama Canal Zone and 
Guantánamo could be included if transit rights went unaltered. Finally, Rusk asked Flores 
about Brazil and Argentina’s “attitudes” toward the treaty. Flores replied “their attitude 
towards the project was ‘unfriendly’ … [and he] feared that the influence of their military 
is working against the participation of these two countries.”645  
Meanwhile, U.S. support for a nuclear-free Latin America was gradually 
solidifying because of its benefits in the region and with regards to nonproliferation talks 
in Geneva. The Pentagon and Joint Chiefs now agreed that nuclear-free zones were in 
the “overall security interest of the United States.”646 The Disarmament Agency 
summarized the prevailing opinion in a “Position Paper on Nuclear Free Zones” drafted 
ahead of the second COPREDAL. The memorandum outlined the primary limiting 
criterion—transit rights—in regards to nuclear-free zones in regions beyond Europe and 
the Far East, where the National Security Council was contemplating nuclear-sharing 
and feared nuclear-free zones “might tip the balance to Soviet or Chinese Communist 
advantage:”  
An indigenous prohibition on such production would be an important factor in 
halting further nuclear proliferation. … the advantages of these zones in 
restraining proliferation would outweigh any such disadvantage if we can 
maintain transit rights. 
                                                
645 Dean Rusk, Memorandum of Conversation with Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores at 20th-
Session of UNGA, New York, September-October 1965,” 7 October 1965, Box 58, CF—Mexico, NSF, 
LBJ, 1 
646 JCSM-263-65, “Possible U.S. Public Statements on Denuclearization of Certain Areas(U),” 9 April 
1965, quoted in Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, 21. 
 288 
The Disarmament Agency endorsed a simple, ad-hoc safeguards system under IAEA 
administration and warned that including the Panama Canal Zone could prove tricky in 
light of ongoing negotiations with Panama to repatriate the waterway and U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commission plans to blast a new canal using peaceful nuclear explosives.647 Rusk 
approved the Disarmament Agency position paper on November 10 despite military 
unease about limiting nuclear options in the region in case of war with Cuba. Two weeks 
later at the Second Special Inter-American conference in Mexico City, Rusk reaffirmed 
support for a Latin American nuclear-free zone and praised the enterprise as 
“constructive statesmanship in the best tradition of the hemisphere.” On December 10, 
Foster wrote García Robles to inform him that U.S. backing would prove forthcoming if 
the criteria laid out for participation, verification, and security were satisfied. The next 
week, the United States endorsed a UNGA resolution commending Latin American 
efforts to denuclearize the region. 
The talks were still stalled due to Brazilian and Argentinian obstruction. In a 
December 9 telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Freeman remarked that 
Flores had recently told him that “talks with both Argentine and Brazilian [Foreign 
Ministers] in Rio [had] led him to fear both countries would increasingly resist [the] 
establishment [of a] Latin America NFZ:”  
He said he [had] received [the] clear impression [that] Argentina expected [to] 
acquire its own nuclear capability within [a] “few years”, and thus purchase its 
way into [the] nuclear club as [the] only way to exert its influence internationally 
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on major discussion[s] [of] world affairs. Carillo Flores expressed deep concern 
over this apparent reluctance to cooperate in area where Mexico [was] exerting 
initiative. He opined that each day that passes without [an] agreement on [the] 
NFZ makes obtaining such [an] agreement all [the] more difficult, particularly 
since [the] possibilities [of] proliferation to have-not countries [are] increasing 
daily.648 
The Mexican government had taken a more global accounting of nuclear risks. In a 
conversation between President Díaz Ordaz, Ambassador Freeman, and Undersecretary 
of State Thomas C. Mann on New Year’s Eve, Díaz Ordaz opined that Red China 
represented “the greatest threat to world peace,” referencing Mao’s infamous statement 
that “it might welcome war which could reduce its population by two hundred million 
because this would leave more food for the rest to eat.” Díaz Ordaz deplored this notion 
as “aggressive and irresponsible and ha[ving] no concern for the value of human life.”649 
Díaz Ordaz likely crafted the comment for his U.S. audience; even so, Mexican officials 
appeared sincere in their desire to preserve the hemisphere from nuclear hazards. On 
some matters though, the Brazilian and Mexican governments were in harmony, for 
example, the Panama Canal. Foster’s reassurances to the Mexican and Brazilian 
representatives to the ENDC on November 11 that the Canal Zone was on the table 
elicited a caution signal from Rusk, who wanted to avoid prejudicing the U.S.-
Panamanian negotiations to repatriate the waterway.650 
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The United States was unwilling for reasons of pragmatism and anticommunism 
to press Brazilian or Argentinian allies to embrace the prospective zone. Either the State 
Department or the White House could have exerted pressure; however, Washington 
feared that such attempts might prove harmful for reasons of reverse psychology and 
linkages to broader nuclear diplomacy. Disarmament Agency Deputy Director Adrian 
Fisher summed up the danger: 
Attempts on our part to force the hands of governments concerned or to insist 
upon their conforming to our specifications could backfire, by increasing the 
resistance to the creation of such zones or by injecting matters in dispute among 
nuclear powers into regional nuclear-free zone negotiations. The initiative to 
establish such a zone should be that of the states within the region concerned. Our 
general observance of this principle is also helpful in warding off Soviet pressure 
for nuclear-free zones in areas where we and the states concerned oppose them. 
Further, our premature endorsement of such a zone could have unfortunate 
results if the zone as finally set up included elements adverse to our interests.651 
Robert Smith of the Disarmament Agency dismissed such concerns in a State 
Department circular that concluded there was “no information to substantiate [the] 
allegation that either Brazil or Argentina [are] able [to] acquire nuclear capability within 
… [a] few years.”652 He ascribed their prevarications to a desire to survey the “complex 
issues” fully. Henceforth, Washington would confine itself to “private and even discreet 
public support to Latin American efforts” rather than direct pressure or dialogue, leaving 
the ball on the field for Latin America states and in particular Mexico to juggle.653 
Spoilers and sponsors remained at odds over peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), 
transit rights, entry-in-force, and treaty reservations in early 1966. In fact, debates that 
would later affect nonproliferation talks in Geneva and New York City, such as how to 
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distinguish “peaceful” from “non-peaceful” nuclear activities, had their first audience in 
Mexico City. The Coordinating Committee met in February and March 1966 to 
formulate a draft treaty with consensus articles on the source and scope of safeguards, the 
participation of nuclear powers, and the dilemma of peaceful nuclear explosives. The 
committee delivered a report to the third COPREDAL session occurring from April 19 to 
May 4, 1966, when its delegates hammered out a preliminary Multilateral Treaty for the 
Denuclearization of Latin America. The Coordinating Committee report was not the sole 
document guiding deliberations in Mexico City though. The Brazilian and Colombian 
delegations submitted a draft as well that laid out their preferred language. Restricted by 
their observer status, the White House and the State Department found themselves at a 
loss as to how to counteract the Brazilian attempt to torpedo the treaty. White House 
official Barber called Deputy National Security Adviser Spurgeon Keeny, Jr., the 
National Security Council’s factotum on foreign policy issues relating to advance science 
and technology, to complain that it looked to him “as if the Brazilians are pulling the rug 
out of the LA NFZ and it looks to me as if ACDA is just sitting there.” Keeny telephoned 
William Bowdler, the executive liaison officer for Latin American affairs, inquiring 
whether the State Department was confident of its policy of “playing it very hands-off” 
toward the treaty negotiations now that Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela had shown 
their hand and the negotiations appeared “finished unless something happens—like us 
putting some pressure on these countries.” Although Keeny did not believe that regional 
proliferation was an “immediate concern,” he speculated, “within the next decade, one of 
these countries is going to go nuclear.” Furthermore, he had no idea where the Latin 
America bureau in Foggy Bottom stood on the issue. Bowdler responded that his office 
considered it a “good idea,” but had not “independently work[ed] with countries who 
have objected.” Keeny stressed that then was a good time to figure out if it was “do-able;” 
 292 
“do we just wait and say that is where the ball bounces or are we willing to take another 
look at it?”654 
It is unclear if the White House in concert with the State Department and 
Disarmament Agency chose to apply pressure on its truculent allies. Regardless, the Latin 
American delegations in Mexico City managed to approve a consensus draft with 26 
articles and 2 protocols under the chairmanship of García Robles. Protocol I mandated 
that nations with dependencies in the region adhere to the treaty’s strictures, while 
Protocol II called on nuclear powers to respect the denuclearized zone, not abet violations 
by member states, nor “use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting 
parties.” García Robles succeeded in forcing a draft treaty in the face of a dispute in 
regards to the treaty’s entry into force procedures. Spoilers insisted on strict guidelines 
while sponsors focused on expediency. Brazil listed a slew of conditions: ratification by all 
of Latin America including extra-territorial powers, assurances from each nuclear power, 
and the arrangement of IAEA bilaterals for all relevant parties. García Robles, by 
contrast, wanted the zone to come into force piecemeal, when each state signed and 
ratified the treaty. The treaty would remain in draft form until this matter was resolved.  
With the treaty’s outlines drawn, the United States registered points of concern 
through its Latin American embassies and United Nations and Geneva delegations. The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff weighed in on August 4, specifying four criteria for acceptance: full 
participation of Latin American states (meaning Cuba), adequate and effective 
safeguards, continuance of existing transit rights, and the maintenance of the country’s 
ability to protect the Panama Canal and the hemisphere.655 Disarmament Agency and 
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Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) officials still fretted over the permissiveness toward 
PNEs in fears that such a gap might open a backdoor for states desirous of a military 
capability and set a dangerous precedent for the NPT. Of particular concern was the 
implicit sanction of PNEs in Articles 1, 3, 8, and 13 of the draft treaty, which outlawed 
“nuclear weapons” but not “nuclear explosives.”656 For years, the AEC had promoted the 
economic potential of advanced thermonuclear explosives for earthmoving and resource-
extraction through Project Plowshare, which harkened back to Eisenhower’s Atoms for 
Peace speech. As negotiations for a global nonproliferation treaty floundered, however, 
Brazil and Argentina’s protestations that developing nations had a right to all types of 
peaceful nuclear activities threatened the integrity of nuclear prohibitions. The rationale 
was explained in a State Department circular: 
The development of any nuclear explosive device by [a non-nuclear-weapon 
state], even if intended for a non-military purpose, would be essentially 
indistinguishable from a weapons development program and would necessarily 
provide information directly pertinent for such a program. The effect on 
triggering further nuclear proliferation by neighbors and potential adversaries 
would be virtually the same as from building a bomb.657  
The communiqué also spurned the advances of García Robles, who had asked for 
assurances from the United States and its nuclear peers to respect the nuclear-free zone 
by pledging to keep their weapons out of it and refrain from menacing its states parties. 
Although the U.S. position on the project was evolving, its reluctance to permit contraints 
on its own nuclear strategy may have deprived García Robles of valuable diplomatic 
capital as Argentina and Brazil continued to flout the pro-treaty consensus.  
Brazilian and United States officials’ estrangement on the matter of peaceful 
nuclear explosives spread from Mexico City to more general debates in Geneva and New 
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York City. The presidential election of Costa e Silva in October 1966 by a docile congress 
further hardened Brazilian attitudes toward nuclear arms control and made PNEs an 
“article of faith in Brazilian domestic politics.”658 The Argentine coup bringing General 
Juan Carlos Onganía into office in August 1966 meanwhile heightened the level of Brazil-
Argentine collusion. On December 12, 1966, Brazilian Ambassador Sérgio Corrêa da 
Costa expressed his government’s unwillingness to permit limits on PNE development at 
the ENDC. He maintained that Argentina shared these reservations and relayed 
Venezuela and Peru’s opposition to a restrictive U.S. view of how far territorial seas 
extended, challenging transit rights for U.S. nuclear weapons through the region.659 The 
PNE language in the treaty was more and more consequential because delegates in 
Geneva had agreed that the NPT would prohibit “nuclear devices of any kind” (the final 
language would stipulate “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”). With this 
in mind, Foster addressed the delegations at the ENDC to contend that the NPT should 
outlaw PNE acquisition or development because testing such a device was tantamount to 
nuclearization. The implications for a Latin American nuclear-free zone were clear. In 
return for non-nuclear-weapon states renouncing them, Foster pledged that nuclear 
powers would offer a service that would fund, arrange, and conduct PNE-use for 
constructive projects at low cost. A treaty lacking such proscriptions ran the risk of the 
regional and global treaties being born at oods. 
 
Freeman’s Dissent 
The fourth session of the COPREDAL was originally scheduled for August 1966, 
but after various member states requested postponement (most likely Argentina and 
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Brazil owing to the coups) the commission opened its doors on January 31, 1967. The 
first item of business was to discuss the Coordinating Committee’s draft treaty in hopes of 
finalizing a consensus document that would placate spoilers and sponsors alike. On the 
second day of meetings, the U.S. issued an aide-mémoire characterizing a nuclear-free 
zone with a strict definition of nuclear weapons and commensurately loose language on 
PNEs as “illusory.”660 The circular praised the committee’s decision to harmonize the 
limits of territorial seas with those established by “principles of international law,” and 
promoted a treaty that would allow the U.S. to include only those areas (the Canal Zone 
and Guantánamo) that it wished. Finally, the message downplayed the importance of 
nuclear powers signing Protocol II, which would bind nuclear powers to respect the 
treaty’s provision and abstain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against 
member states, pledging them instead to respect the treaty’s provisions and spirit.  
The stakes were larger than the denuclearization quest though. The Disarmament 
Agency was mindful that a U.S. failure to sign Protocol II might compromise Mexican 
and more generally Latin American support for nonproliferation talks in Geneva and 
New York City. U.S. officials were thus keen to associate the Latin America scheme more 
closely with its own arms control agenda. The circular ended with a suggestion that the 
treaty formalize the nuclear-free zone’s relationship to the Organization of American 
States, the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, and the United Nations. 
García Robles was intent, however, on securing the nuclear club’s acquiescence for the 
protocols and an “organic relationship to the OAS” might agitate the Soviets given their 
testy alliance with Cuba.  
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The pace of deliberations in Mexico City was “frenetic.” Some proposals 
conflicted with stated U.S. and Mexican policies in hopes of strengthening the zone, or 
scuttling it altogether. Ambassador Salcedo de Lima of Venezuela pushed for a ban on 
nuclear-weapon transit with the support of the Argentine delegate and against the wishes 
of those of Mexico and Chile. Foggy Bottom objected directly to Caracas, which 
responded that de Lima had operated without instructions from the capital. With the 
misunderstanding resolved, the State Department legal adviser, Leonard Meeker, 
reported that the U.S. position on transit had carried the day, though concerns about the 
treaty’s permissiveness toward PNEs persisted. Washington had held out an international 
PNE service; however, according to Meeker, Latin American states could not “agree to 
be dependent on the grace and favor of nuclear states.”661 Brazil and Argentina were 
especially loath to “forswear nuclear weapons capability on a hemispheric basis alone.” 
United States officials feared that a liberal precedent set in Mexico City would 
impede more robust strictures against peaceful nuclear explosives in a nonproliferation 
treaty. The State Department sent an urgent telegram instructing Ambassador Freeman 
to caution the COPREDAL that permissive language on PNEs would prejudice 
Washington’s support for the treaty. Freeman was better acquainted with the limits of 
possible agreement in Mexico City than Foggy Bottom though. He chose to overstep his 
authority by ignoring the directive in the interest of hemispheric solidarity. He wrote back 
to his superiors in Washington: 
[T]he view of the U.S. regarding every aspect of this treaty has been explained in 
the most careful detail, not only to Gracia [sic] Robles, but to all key members of 
the Preparatory Commission and their respective Governments. … We have been 
listened to sympathetically; a significant number of our points are reflected in the 
Treaty; and what has emerged represents the best possible compromise … to 
make an additional demarche at this point along the lines of the Department’s 
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telegram, now that final approval has been given [the] treaty by [the] Preparatory 
Commission, would not only be totally unproductive but deeply resented.662 
If not for Freeman’s decisive non-action, the U.S. government might have wrecked the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco at the moment of its realization. Instead, the United States endorsed 
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America when 21 Latin 
Americans nations signed it on February 14.663 The treaty’s final text comprised 
numerous preambular declarations, 36 articles, and two protocols. After registering its 
strict reading of the treaty’s articles pertaining to PNEs, Rusk praised the treaty as “a 
milestone on the road to general and complete disarmament and … the conclusion of a 
worldwide treaty prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”664 
 
The Afterlives of Tlatelolco 
The clash of strict versus loose definitions of nuclear explosives persisted during 
nonproliferation talks in Geneva and New York City. Foster recapitulated the 
conservative position when the committee reconvened in March, while the Brazilian 
representative challenged the U.S. opinion and spoke against the inclusion of a ban 
against all nuclear explosives in the NPT.665 Meanwhile, a pas de deux between U.S. and 
Mexican officials began as they competed to exploit the matter of an U.S. signature on 
Protocol II as leverage for stricter language on PNEs in the nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty, and vice versa. García Robles made a Mexican signature on a nonproliferation 
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treaty contingent on members of the nuclear club signing Protocol II. The Mexican 
government made the position official on September 11, 1967, intimating that other 
Latin American state’s signatures might prove similarly conditional: 
In fact, Mexican public opinion – and perhaps the same may be said of the other 
Latin American countries – would find no justification for the Delegation of 
Mexico to recommend the signature of a draft treaty on nonproliferation which 
… will continue to be … very inferior to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as far as the 
rational objectives pursued thereby are concerned, in the event that the present 
situation respecting Additional Protocol II should still exist.666 
 President Díaz Ordaz insisted on the matter when he came to Washington in late 
October. Meanwhile, the Disarmament Agency hoped to use the Latin American desire 
to secure a United States signature on Protocol II to bolster its own position on peaceful 
nuclear explosions and the fostering of international consensus for the NPT.667 
The Disarmament Agency directed an inter-agency review of the implications of 
signing Protocol II from October to early November 1967. The U.S. military was chiefly 
worried about transit rights and the AEC fretted about the precedent set by the treaty’s 
language on nuclear explosives. In league with Foggy Bottom, the Disarmament Agency 
formulated a list of five interpretive statements to accompany a U.S. signature: 1) transit 
rights unchanged; 2) no implications for territorial claims; 3) non-use provision 
inapplicable if a Latin American state initiated hostilities with a nuclear-armed ally; 4) 
territories of Protocol I signatories treated comparably; 5) restatement of U.S. 
interpretation that articles 1 and 5 outlawed PNEs. Before Díaz Ordaz visited, Rusk sent 
Johnson a letter drawn up by Foster and Deputy Under-Secretary of State Foy Kohler 
recommending that the president sign Protocol II, but not Protocol I, and issue a 
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statement laying out the country’s views on transit, nuclear options if hostilities erupted 
with a Latin American state supported by a nuclear power (e.g. Cuba flanked by the 
Soviet Union), and the danger of strict definition of nuclear weapons. The memorandum 
and Johnson’s consent nevertheless marked the first time the United States had accepted 
limitations on its “freedom of response with nuclear weapons.”668 The assurance 
remained unofficial though; in public the Johnson administration took the line of giving 
“very careful and sympathetic consideration to the signing of Protocol II.”669 National 
Security Adviser Walt Rostow began consultations with congress two weeks later, but 
Foster preferred to wait until more Latin American states had signed and ratified. 
Meanwhile, international opinion was mostly behind the treaty. UNGA Resolution 2286 
(XXII) passed by a vote of 82 to 0, commending the treaty and requesting that states 
observe its letter and spirit. Cuba, the lone regional holdout, its Warsaw Pact allies, and 
France abstained.  
The full meanings inscribed in the Treaty of Tlatelolco were clarified by the 
conclusion of nonproliferation talks in Geneva and New York City. The U.S. Joint Chiefs 
wanted their preferred language of transit rights and PNEs upheld, while Foster saw the 
treaty as primarily significant in relation to international nuclear diplomacy, in particular 
the “necessity of gaining support for the NPT.”670 Disarmament Agency support for the 
nuclear-free zone on its own merits and vis-à-vis the nonproliferation treaty allayed the 
Joint Chiefs and Pentagon’s concerns by explaining that congress would review Protocol 
II during the ratification debate and portraying the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
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and Senate Foreign Relations Committee as sensitive to military considerations. The 
Atomic Energy Commission meanwhile adopted the arms control view that the 
development of a PNE by a state party to the treaty would entail a violation of the treaty 
and thereby its annulment.  
On February 10, 1968, García Robles queried Fisher about a United States 
signature on Protocol II. He noted his government’s satisfaction with the U.K.’s recent 
adherence to both protocols and suggesting that such an action would improve a 
nonproliferation treaty’s odds of passage by having “a salutary effect in Latin America.” 
García Robles leaned on the Soviets as well to sign the protocols and intimated that swift 
U.S. action might prompt the Soviet Union, or even Cuba, to sign. He noted that Soviet 
officials had “assured” him that they would follow an American lead.671 In the end, 
Johnson declared that his government would sign Protocol II on the first anniversary of 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco’s opening for signature. During the announcement, Johnson 
related the treaty and the nuclear-free zone it inaugurated to a nonproliferation treaty 
and proclaimed that it was fitting that “this giant step forward should have had its genesis 
in Latin America, an area which has come to be identified with regional cooperation.”672 
In his visit to Mexico City to sign Protocol II on April 1, Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey reaffirmed the role played in the treaty’s making by Latin America’s 
regionalism and internationalism: 
With the successful negotiation of this treaty, the inter-American system, the 
oldest functioning regional system in the world, has once again demonstrated its 
capacity to advance the peace and security of the peoples of this hemisphere.673 
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The vice presidential visit touched on related matters in Mexican-American affairs—the 
Alliance for Progress and “other projects that emphasize efforts to promote social 
advancement.”674  
By October 1967, Brazil and Argentina were among 20 countries (with Jamaica 
pending) to have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, the two regional powers had 
refrained from ratifying, which would have formalized their acceptance of restraints on 
nuclear activities with military implications. Brazil had tried to place numerous stumbling 
blocks in the way of a Latin American nuclear-free zone—prohibitions against the transit 
of nuclear weapons; stringent entry-into-force conditions; the barring of interpretive 
statements; and a strict definition of nuclear weapons encompassing all atomic explosives. 
Its reluctance stemmed from disaffection with the international status quo and hopes that 
PNEs would serve developmental ends. Its policy vis-à-vis the Treaty of Tlatelolco and a 
nonproliferation treaty thus amounted to the avoidance of international commitments 
impinging on the autonomous development of its nuclear capacity to the point of a 
threshold military capability. Accordingly, even though Brasília did not commit itself to a 
military program during this period, the Costa administration worked to maintain 
freedom of action in the nuclear field up to and including a military option.  
The ambivalence of its nuclear policies was on display at the first CSN meeting of 
President Costa e Silva’s military government on October 4, 1967. The ministerial 
assembly discussed a “serious and silent study” of Brazilian nuclear policy against the 
backdrop of the Treaty of Tlatelolco’s opening for signature and the nonproliferation 
talks still in progress. A central matter was how to word the guidelines in order for Brazil 
to reserve “to itself the right of exclusiveness in what regards the guidance and execution 
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of all activities in the field of nuclear energy.”675 Three related matters of wording stood 
out. First, whether the policy should specify what acts the guidelines would sanction, or 
instead use generalities. Second, and relatedly, how the public and private decrees should 
employ the phrase “peaceful purposes” so as to associate Brazil’s nuclear policies with 
those sanctioned by international laws, norms, and institutions. Minister of External 
Affairs José de Magalhães Pinto endorsed this wording in a clause pertaining to the 
Military Ministries that called for the “formation of personnel and in the development of 
special techniques and equipment in the sector.” To avoid a martial reading, Magalhães 
Pinto suggested a change to “equipment related to the peaceful applications of nuclear 
energy.” Minister of Mines and Energy José Costa Cavalcanti concurred, observing that 
“Brazil, through the statement of the President of the Republic, those of the Minister of 
External Relations and even mine, has been stressing the peaceful applications.” 
Magalhães Pinto wanted language that did not raise the nuclear prohibition for which 
“peaceful” served as a watchword:  
I have just returned from several international meetings and at all of them this is 
the prevailing subject, the touchy subject. We know now that the two big nuclear 
powers arrived at an understanding on the question and that the number of 
countries that do not possess nuclear energy and want to use it is very large. They 
need, for this, to organize themselves, decide exactly what they want and advance 
firmly toward the desired objectives. In several statements made through the 
Ministry of External Relations, according to your instructions, Brazil has 
reiterated its wish to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. By the way, the 
Treaty of Mexico prohibits the use of nuclear energy for military objectives, but 
authorizes its use for peaceful purposes. The several conversations I have had 
have been difficult. We are going to have many problems. This is a new field … 
and the big countries, who are the masters of nuclear energy, because of the 
development they achieved through it, will not wish to give ground. There is this 
constant allegation that total knowledge of the matter will result in countries being 
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easily able to produce an atomic bomb. Despite its peaceful tradition, Brazil has 
not been understood, no matter how much it repeats this.  
The comments attested to Brazil’s efforts to retain its nuclear prerogatives while dispelling 
fears of ulterior military motives. In this vein, the meeting vigorously debated whether to 
add a clause upholding PNEs as an object of national policy in order to justify a threshold 
capability.  
Peaceful nuclear explosions had become the conceptual nub of efforts to delineate 
what was legitimate state policy on the spectrum of nuclear science and technology over 
the course of the nuclear-free zone and nonproliferation talks. Magalhães Pinto 
accordingly pushed for modifications to a section of the paper directing the bureaucracy 
“to expand the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in all sectors of 
national activity.” He held that the order should continue with the phrase: “envisaging 
also domestic manufacture, eventual and future, of peaceful nuclear artifacts to be 
employed in geographic engineering works, in mining and other activities genuinely for 
economic development.” Even though the justification was economic, the purpose was 
diplomatic: 
It is imperative that the document includes, among longer-term objectives, one of 
the forms of application of nuclear energy that the Brazilian Government strives 
to preserve in international negotiations and to which it attaches special 
importance. The right to unrestricted research for peaceful purposes is a basic 
point of the nuclear policy defended by the Costa e Silva Administration.676 
Costa e Silva himself objected that such an explicit declaration was “redundant and 
aggressive, [and] without necessity” since the policy definition was a “given” and Brazil 
had neither agreed nor would it agree to such a curtailment of its rights. Magalhães Pinto 
nevertheless desired official confirmation of exactly what rights were being preserved, 
lamenting that Costa e Silva “kn[e]w what [was] happening in Geneva,” where the 
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External Minister was feeling “great pressure from the big powers” to disavow PNEs. His 
request for rhetorical support appears not to have had a military impulse; rather, he cited 
the revolutionary narrative of the Nuclear Age. “[T]he world is on the threshold of a 
great revolution and we should be prepared for it,” he cautioned, “We cannot miss it.”  
Military thinking was not absent though. Minister of Industry and Commerce 
General Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva summed up the inseparability of nuclear 
activities with peaceful purposes from those of military interest by analogizing with post-
First World War prohibitions against poison gases when he argued against including th 
phrase, “peaceful purposes”: 
[I]t would be the same as saying that the Piquete factory is for peaceful purposes, 
because what is produces, nitroglycerin, for instance, is a medicine; picric acid, 
toluol, is a product for the manufacture of solvents; as for ammonium, there are 
also ammonium explosives. “Peaceful purposes” reminds me of an observation I 
heard once from the Ministry of External Relations of Yugoslavia, before the 
bolshevization, in Geneva, where the problem of the use of gases was being 
discussed. A document was then being elaborated to prohibit the use of gases, and 
the Minister of External Relations of Yugoslavia said the following: “If a country 
is attacked, and for its defense it needs to use gases, no document will prevent it 
from doing it”. So, to say that someday Brazil will not make arms with nuclear 
energy is an illusion. It will not be for our days, we may not wish it, but it may 
become an imperative of national security. 
Macdeo Soares’s comments reflected the consensus among members of the Brazilian 
national security council. Minister of the Army General Auerlio Lira Tavares reflected on 
his own experiences after the Second World War, when the Nazi regime was shown to 
have transformed perfume makers into “factories of war instruments.” Given that military 
organizations would stand vigil against “technical surprise[s],” he asserted, “no country 
… can be unmindful of the evolution of technology.” As such, Brazil should be ready to 
“collaborate” and also to follow developments abroad. Magalhães Pinto repeated the 
desirability of a threshold capacity by noting that in spite of international compacts and 
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norms, “in case of any emergency we would be able to use what we already possess.” 
Costa e Silva’s reply was crisp: “Obviously.” 
Magalhães Pinto therefore kept pushing for an explicit reference to Brazil’s 
“sovereign right” to conduct explosions for peaceful purposes. Although the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco had enshrined proscriptions of nuclear explosives for “war purposes,” PNEs 
remained legitimate. “Even so,” he warned, “there is strong international pressure” in 
Geneva to reverse this precedent in a nonproliferation treaty, and “if we do not 
emphasize in the document that the use is for peaceful purposes, I have the impression … 
that we would be under much stronger pressure.” Costa e Silva agreed with Magalhães 
Pinto’s interpretation and acknowledged that Tlatelolco “allowed us to go to Geneva and 
also defend our sovereign right as a country to deal with this subject as an international 
power without any restriction.” Although a final decision was not taken on whether to 
include “peaceful purposes” with pointed reference to explosive devices, Brazil would 
reaffirm its express right to PNEs in Geneva and New York City and then base its 
decision not to sign the nonproliferation treaty on the grounds that its prohibition against 
them was illegitimate and inequitable. 
With the NPT’s contours clarifying in Geneva, the matter of mutual commitments 
to the Latin American nuclear-free zone and the wider nonproliferation regime grew 
more pressing. Given that the Global South now enjoyed a majority in the UNGA as a 
result of decolonization flooding the world parliament with a bevy of postcolonial 
delegations from the Caribbean and Africa, the fate of a nonproliferation treaty was 
increasingly bound up in the nuclear club respecting the Treaty of Tlatelolco. García 
Robles’s influence had waxed together with his well-earned reputation as the treaty’s 
architect. U.S. diplomats knew that Mexico, the rest of Latin America, and other non-
aligned states taking their cues from García Robles, represented a decisive plurality in the 
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Political Committee and the General Assembly and could therefore insist on a U.S. 
signature on the two protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a quid pro quo for their votes. 
Rusk advised Johnson in advance of Mexican President Díaz Ordaz’s visit in October 
1967 that Mexico and its Latin American confederates “will be observing U.S. action on 
these protocols closely as an indication of support for the … LANFZ and arms control 
measures generally.” The Mexican government was vexed that eight months had passed 
since the compact’s opening for signature without a nuclear power signing Protocol II. 
Washington’s acquiescence was key. Though the Mexican government was 
understanding in regards to reservations about Protocol I, which would bring foreign 
territories into the zone, the U.K., U.S.S.R., and France maintained that “they [would] 
adhere [to Protocol II] only if the U.S. [took] such action.” Rusk worried that Mexico 
would “have serious problems in signing an NPT until [such] action is taken by the 
nuclear powers.”  
United States policymakers thus recognized that the fate of the nonproliferation 
treaty was intimately connected to their support of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. All of Latin 
America might withhold their support of the denuclearization treaty “and possibly on 
other arms control measures such as the NPT” if the U.S. did not sign.677 Rusk repeated 
this point as the final phase of nonproliferation negotiations at the UN General Assembly 
drew near in February 1968:  
The Latin American countries are observing U.S. actions on Protocol II closely as 
an indication of our support for the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone and arms 
control measures generally. An early public announcement, prior to signature of 
the Protocol, would be highly desirable in order to encourage ratification of the 
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Treaty by additional Latin American nations and to obtain their support in the 
NPT negotiations.678 
The matter was urgent enough that, when Díaz Ordaz arrived at the White House two 
days later, Rusk counseled Johnson to inform the Mexican president “that the United 
States intends to sign Protocol II.” The decision had been vetted and approved by Foster, 
the Joint Chiefs, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke. An interpretive 
statement that laid out U.S. views on transit rights, PNE proscriptions (shared by all Latin 
American states excepting Brazil and Argentina), the protocol’s territorial scope, and the 
inclusion of sea and air space would accompany the signing. Rusk nevertheless concluded 
“that the circumstances present in Latin America are such as to justify a departure from 
our past policy concerning limitations on our freedom of response with nuclear 
weapons.”679 Although the administration was not prepared to issue a public 
announcement that would necessitate congressional debate and reserved the right to 
contemplate a nuclear response in case of aggression by a Latin American state backed by 
a nuclear-weapon state, the U.S. for the first time showed its willingness to curtail its 
nuclear options by signing in the interest of the rule of law and common security among 
its neighborhoods. When Johnson conveyed his intent to his Mexican counterpart, Díaz 
Ordaz responded “that the Treaty represented five years of hard work, and that it had 
begun, as do all realizations, just as a dream.” The two executives then turned to another 
monumental dream—plans for a nuclear desalination plant to supply water to Baja 
California, Sonora, California, and Arizona.680  
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García Robles continued to press the nuclear powers to adhere to Protocol II of 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco as nonproliferation talks proceeded in Geneva and New York 
City. The French ambassador in Mexico City noted that, immediately upon his arrival at 
the United Nation, the Mexican undersecretary had approached Soviet Deputy Foreign 
Minister Vasilii V. Kuznetsov to remind him that Mexican support for the NPT would 
hinge on Soviet adherence to Protocol II. The Soviet ambassador in Mexico City told his 
French counterpart that his country was dissatisfied with elements of the treaty, most 
notably, U.S. freedom of nuclear transit and the strict definition of nuclear weapons so 
permissive of PNEs. However, García Robles had made a Soviet signature on Protocol II 
a quid pro quo for Mexican support for the nonproliferation treaty, a bargain whose striking 
he portrayed as having been made in bad faith.681 The State Department urged the 
Soviets to sign Protocol II so as to stymie attempts to postpone action on the 
nonproliferation treaty because of allegations of “unwillingness [of the] nuclear powers 
themselves to undertake arms control measures.”682  
Brazil continued to oppose a nonproliferation treaty with a loose definition of 
nuclear weapons that would outlaw PNEs, though it held back from outright opposition 
in Geneva and New York City. As the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament 
finalized the language of a draft treaty to send to the United Nations, Brazil joined 
Sweden and Romania in criticizing the lack of obligations from the nuclear club to 
disarm as well as the absence of security guarantees. In the end, the ENDC was incapable 
of producing a consensus draft due to Brazilian, along with Indian and Italian, objections 
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even after Soviet and American co-chairmen agreed to add measures urged by non-
aligned delegations, such as quinquennial review conferences; stronger preambular 
references to security assurances and a comprehensive test-ban treaty, territorial respect, 
and peaceful nuclear rights; and an Article VI stipulating disarmament negotiations in 
“good faith.” The PNE question came to the fore in New York City when the UNGA 
met to debate the draft treaty. Latin American objections to Washington’s position on 
PNEs were not restricted to Brazil. The Peruvian ambassador remarked to his French 
counterpart that his government held that a strict definition of nuclear weapons should 
suffice. Brazil’s U.N. Ambassador and former Foreign Minister Araújo Castro had 
repeated this view in the interlude between the end of ENDC talks and the 
commencement of U.N. debate, inveighing against the treaty for bestowing on the 
nuclear club the “lion’s share” of benefits and serving as an “instrument of North-
American imperialism in the nuclear domain.”683  
Brazil’s position on the nonproliferation treaty had further “hardened” by mid-
April; nevertheless, the pro-U.S. military government erred on the side of minimizing the 
diplomatic fallout with its chief ally. On April 16, Magalhães Pinto told U.S. Ambassador 
to Brazil John W. Tuthill that he would inform Rusk that Brazil would not sign. As a 
result, he would oppose the nonproliferation treaty at the U.N. because his country could 
not afford “to impede its [nuclear] development for 25 years while nuclear powers … 
proliferate nuclear weapons without limitation.” U.S. policymakers ascribed the tougher 
Brazilian attitude to Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto, surmising that Costa e Silva 
“undoubtedly regrets opposing the US on so significant an issue,” but observing that 
“domestic support on this highly nationalistic issue” in conjunction with the “considerable 
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international support” for anti-treaty forces militated against a strong U.S. push to bring 
Brazil around. The potential to soften Brazilian policy was hampered by the huge 
domestic popularity of nuclear research and a pervasive anti-American mood so that 
“any alteration” would be viewed as a “sell-out” to Washington. Meanwhile, Magalhães 
Pinto hoped that opposition in the international community to the nonproliferation treaty 
was now general enough that Brazilian resistance in league with West Germany could 
block the treaty or at worst delegitimize it because of a slim victory margin.684  
Magalhães Pinto had agreed to parley with Secretary Rusk on May 6. United 
States arms control negotiators were loath to reproduce in the nonproliferation treaty the 
“loophole” that now existed in the Treaty of Tlatelolco with reference to nuclear 
explosives. Foster described the transition from PNEs to nuclear weapons as akin to 
“exchanging one overcoat for another” because “the person wearing it was the same.” 
Ambassador Araujo downplayed the gap between U.S. and Brazilian views and tried to 
convince his interlocutors that although the CSE resented a 25-year freeze, Brazilian 
leaders knew “that an international treaty [was] more important than anything else.” He 
brooded that the nonproliferation treaty and its assurances resolution would “enlarge the 
responsibilities of the U.N. Charter” and of the Security Council in particular. 
Ambassador Sette Camara admitted that “there was no doubt that the Resolution would 
be carried” even with Argentina and Chile in league with Brazil and García Robles 
“blackmail[ing] the U.S.S.R. into signing Protocol II.” Sette Camara asked as well why 
the Security Council resolution proposed by the superpowers lacked a “no-use” clause, to 
which Foster responded that unlike Tlatelolco the nonproliferation treaty would apply to 
zones where nuclear weapons were already stationed. Araujo retorted that “some balance 
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was needed in the NPT about commitments of nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states,” 
but Foster was emphatic that the fusion of arms control and deterrence authorized by the 
NPT—the securitization of internationalism—was the key to renewing the global nuclear 
order.  
[T]he treaty cannot be perfect. … The question now simply is: Is there or not to 
be an NPT? We missed the first chance to regulate nuclear weapons when the 
Baruch Plan was rejected. Now is the second chance. Perhaps this is the last 
chance. 
Foster reassured Camara and Araujo that only PNEs and not “isotope separation[] 
plants, chemical separations plants, or nuclear propulsion” were prohibited. He also 
incorrectly maintained that further amendments to the treaty were unlikely despite 
García Robles ongoing campaign to win more concessions for the nuclear have-nots in 
New York City. Rusk and AEC Director Glenn Seaborg promised an expansion of the 
already sizable U.S. aid program in the nuclear field, including power development, 
desalination, mineral exploration, and oil shale recovery. The U.S. government hoped 
that pledges of nuclear assistance might unlock a Brazilian signature on the NPT, and 
Magalhães Pinto did relay that his government would act “constructive[ly]” in New York 
City, neither “proselytizing against [n]or obstructing the treaty.”685 Brazilian, Indian, and 
French abstentions from the final voting at the United Nations were in fact crucial to the 
treaty’s achievement. 
 
Conclusion 
The decade of the 1960s witnessed the high water mark of nuclear 
internationalism with the opening for signatures of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 
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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Treaty for the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in the Caribbean and Latin America. By banning nuclear weapons 
without qualifications from a bounded region, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was 
simultaneously the most ambitious and most limited of the measures. The scheme was 
introduced before the Cuban Missile Crisis in order to display the region’s leadership and 
fidelity to internationalist measures to assure security on a common basis. It was the 
Soviet-American-Cuban standoff in the Caribbean that broadcast the urgency of an 
agreement. Even so, its consummation required the tireless efforts of Mexican 
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Alfonso García Robles, who translated the mooted 
prohibition into a legal regime. García Robles training as an internationalist jurist, his 
years in the United Nations, and his outlook as an internationalist concerned with 
generational justice underlay his professional activism. His efforts were necessary because 
of the blowback of U.S. anticommunism on the character of Latin American politics in 
the 1960s, when reactionary governments in Argentina and Brazil turned away from 
internationalism and toward a nationalistic stance toward nuclear policies. The U.S. 
foreign policy bureaucracy was slow to acknowledge the truculence of Brasília and 
Buenos Aires, and it remains unclear whether the U.S. State Department leaned on its 
allies there to soften their opposition to a nuclear-free Latin America. Foggy Bottom 
panicked when its promotion of a liberal interpretation of nuclear weapons that included 
“peaceful” nuclear explosives was imperfectly applied with troubling precedents for 
nonproliferation proceedings. Thanks to the intervention of the U.S. Ambassador to 
Mexico, Fulton Freeman, however, the treaty was permitted to go forward with U.S. 
support; nevertheless, the episode illustrated the ambivalent and uneven thrust of U.S. 
policy toward a Latin American nuclear-free zone. 
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Washington ultimately endorsed the collective measure because of its salutary 
impulse on international nuclear diplomacy and the making of a nuclear nonproliferation 
regime. From a greater remove, the tale of the Treaty of Tlatelolco illuminated the 
equivocal legacy of U.S. nuclear diplomacy during the Kennedy and Johnson years. First, 
the alacrity with which successive administrations jettisoned the principles of liberal 
internationalism in favor of a Cold War strategy that embraced right-wing dictatorships 
for the purpose of disempowering social democrats in the region hampered the 
establishment of a nuclear-free zone. Second, Washington’s fixation on military bases, 
colonial holdings, and freedom of transit for U.S. nuclear warheads erected numerous 
roadblocks for the negotiations. Third, the preoccupation with adding a proscription of 
all nuclear explosives in the treaty nearly upended the consensus behind the compact and 
anticipated the supreme dilemma of the nuclear nonproliferation regime—how to 
distinguish between peaceful and military technologies. Finally, the letter and spirit of the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco demonstrated that the quest to control nuclear weapons went beyond 
the nation-states of the Industrial North. Members of the Global South could in fact 
exceed the aspirations of limited or unequal treaties. Excavating the original intents, 
meanings, and understanding from the origins of the Treaty of Tlatelolco thus unearths 
the triumph and the tragedy of a global nuclear order arising in the late-1960s. The 
campaign to bring order to the Nuclear Age was more universal than held by 
conventional wisdom; even so, its signature achievement paled in comparison to actions 
elsewhere.  
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Chapter Five | In Accordance: Safeguards and the International 
Community  
 
[B]y the end of my period there … in ’68, I had learned how to drive a Volga automobile, and drunk a 
good deal of vodka with … fellow Soviet negotiators. There was … just a complete change in the attitudes 
and relationships between the two delegations, starting really with the Cuban missile crisis. 
 
George Bunn, Interview, “Have and Have-Nots,” in War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, Episode 108, 
Betacam, 30 November 1986. 
Introduction: Integration and Inspections 
The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) 
reconvened on February 21, 1967, and met through March 23. A Mexican visitor took 
the floor following remarks by the plenary chairman, U.S. delegation chief William 
Foster, and Soviet spokesman Alexi Roshchin. Foster and Roshchin paid “generous 
tribute” to the “modest contribution” made by Alfonso García Robles to the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, for whose submission to the ENDC the Mexican diplomat was in attendance. 
García Robles touted the features of a nuclear-free zone as “even more ambitious than 
those of a non-proliferation treaty,” lauding it as a model for “guarantee[ing] the 
complete absence of nuclear weapons in a region inhabited by man.” The treaty’s scope 
stemmed in part from the regional absence of nuclear-weapon states and in part from a 
Bolivarian tradition of protecting Latin American independence by means of mutual 
respect for the rule of law, non-aggression, and common security. He expressed his hope 
that the treaty’s opening for signature would afford “the necessary stimulus” to finalize a 
global nonproliferation pact.686 The triumph buoyed Mexico’s reputation as well. With its 
influence soaring, Mexican delegates could do more than shepherd a treaty through by 
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moderating North-South differences. García Robles’s presence bore witness to a shift in 
favor of the non-aligned grouping whose states resided mostly in the Global South. 
International nuclear diplomacy in 1967 brought the international community to 
the threshold of a full draft nonproliferation treaty. With the quandary of NATO nuclear-
sharing largely resolved in the language of Articles I and II, East-West nuclear relations 
centered on the safeguards controversy, while North-South differences emerged most 
clearly around the matters of security guarantees, peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs), and 
disarmament linkages. The overarching concern in nonproliferation proceedings, 
however, was to achieve the consensus needed to make a treaty effective and endow it 
with lasting legitimacy. The superpowers trusted the effectiveness of bilateral safeguards 
with their Cold War allies less and less, but failed to harmonize their views on the formal 
relationship between regional nuclear organizations, most prominently the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the proposed international nuclear 
watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). West Germany and Italy 
resisted Euratom’s full integration into the IAEA inspectorate on commercial and 
political grounds, which led to charges of Soviet-American “complicity” from Bonn. India 
continued to enjoin the nuclear powers to extend nuclear assurances to the non-aligned 
bloc. Although Washington denied New Delhi’s request for reasons of nuclear doctrine 
and nuclear options in Vietnam and Korea, the fostering of an international community 
of arms controllers in Geneva helped to conciliate differences in regards to Article III. 
The Six Days War in the Levant dramatized the perils of nuclear weapons being added to 
regional powder kegs, and the Arab-Israeli conflict impelled a summit in Glassboro, New 
Jersey to improve superpower relations.  
In the end, though, it was low-level, ad referendum talks in Geneva made possible by 
the social milieu there that afforded a partial solution to the safeguards controversy and 
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kept open the window for détente. As a result of these efforts, Soviet and American 
delegations presented common draft treaties with Article III removed on August 24, 
1967. A notable sign of progress, the turn of events launched a new phase of 
nonproliferation diplomacy when the views of non-aligned members increasingly took 
center stage. A Mexican working paper outlining what would eventually constitute 
Articles IV, V, VI, and VII of the nonproliferation treaty garnered widespread support 
among the non-aligned, while Sweden’s insistence on special consideration for a 
comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty (CTBT) embedded a formal linkage between the 
two forms of nuclear prohibition. The Indian attitude remained problematic, however, as 
U.S. and Soviet officials failed to agree on a viable mode of security assurances and 
Canadian efforts to exert pressure on New Delhi backfired. The Eastern and Western 
blocs crept toward an agreement on safeguards in the fall, but divisions in the Federal 
Republic’s governing coalition forestalled the presentation of a full consensus draft treaty 
at year’s end.  
 
Designing Safeguards 
Eastern and Western diplomats still grappled with resolving the salient issues over 
which the blocs were at odds. Clashing Soviet-American views in regards to the legality of 
a collective nuclear force in a European federation and the relationship between the 
safeguards of Euratom and the IAEA succeeded disputes relating to a now defunct 
NATO multilateral nuclear force. The revision of Articles I and II had largely settled the 
German question with respect to nuclear security. According to a French summary: 
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Bonn would renounce by means of an international treaty any form of military 
nuclear capability in peacetime, without however having to sacrifice the measures 
now taken to furnish German units with nuclear weapons in the event of war.687 
Now, the central question was how the treaty would affect European integration. 
Specifically, how would Euratom synchronize its safeguards with those of an international 
regime? And would a treaty recognize a European federation as a de jure nuclear power–
an atomic confederacy–if the U.K. or France bequeathed to it a nuclear arsenal?688 One 
workaround considered by the U.S. Disarmament Agency was to leave the European 
clause ambiguous. This tactic would preclude an original understanding; however, 
deliberate ambiguity would allow Moscow to disavow the contingency while allaying 
West Germany and Italy’s misgivings.689 The objective was therefore “Soviet silence, or 
no-contradiction, when our allies, and later the United States, state that the treaty would 
not bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its 
former components.”690  
On February 25, U.S. Disarmament Agency Deputy Director Adrian Fisher 
apprised Georg von Lilienfeld of the Federal Republic’s Foreign Office that Washington’s 
policy was to obtain Moscow’s tacit approval. West German Chancellor Kurt Georg 
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Kiesinger was handed a copy of the draft summary of interpretations as well that Foggy 
Bottom composed in order to clarify the articles’ original meanings with regard to a 
federal European force in the eyes of Western Europe and the United States.691 U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk had “grave concern[s],” however, regarding the wisdom of 
leaving the interpretations “unresolved.” The U.S. delegation “would look rather silly” if 
they tabled a treaty in concert with Soviet officials when the two sides in fact disagreed. 
Furthermore, such a failure of procedural choreography might hamper efforts of 
Disarmament Agency officials in Geneva, who were struggling to keep U.S. allies in line. 
“This would give all those in Germany and Italy who might be looking for a pretext a 
major point on which to oppose the NPT.”692 The European clause thus loomed over the 
proceedings that summer, a final vestige of the East-West impasse over what form of 
NATO nuclear-sharing and European integration the treaty would sanction. 
The central object of negotiations swung to matters that had heretofore bubbled 
beneath the surface of the transfer-clause bottleneck. First, in what agency would the 
funding, staffing, execution, and oversight of nuclear safeguards reside? Second, how 
could the three nuclear powers represented in Geneva address the insecurity of states 
pledging to renounce the military option? Third, what timeframe and means of redress 
would negotiators embed in the legal text? Fourth, where would the threshold lie between 
the peaceful and military applications of nuclear technology, and especially of “peaceful” 
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nuclear explosives? Finally, what bearing would prohibitions on spreading or developing 
nuclear weapons have on the nuclear arms race? In short, the paramount matters of 
debate now related to technical, institutional, commercial, and procedural determinations 
and hinged on two questions related to perception. Would northern states with promising 
nuclear industries view the proposed global nuclear order and the nuclear emporium it 
would regulate as open and fair? And would countries in the Global South regard the 
treaty as legitimate? The nascent international community needed to answer these 
questions before the treaty opened for signature.  
The United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy remained sensitive to the concerns of 
non-aligned states in Geneva, which hailed mostly from the postcolonial world and 
hungered for developmental aid. Lord Chalfont underlined the “need for means of 
redress” if the nuclear powers were unwilling or unable to make progress on arms 
control.693 Italian representative Francesco Cavalletti di Oliveto Savino maintained on 
February 28 that the treaty’s “effectiveness” and “equity” were “closely interdependent,” 
since its legitimacy depended on signatories deeming it useful and just. “[T]here could be 
no universal approbation for a non-proliferation treaty,” he warned, “that established a 
perpetual discrimination between two classes of countries.” He held that the compact 
must function as a “starting-point” for reversing the arms race and controlling nuclear 
weapons in view of “their gradual elimination.”694 The Canadian representative, E.L.M. 
Burns, seconded Cavalletti, calling for a legal means for member states to withdraw if 
they concluded that authorized nuclear powers were not fulfilling their obligations: 
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It is neither unnatural nor unreasonable that countries forgoing their option to 
produce nuclear weapons should wish to ensure that their act of self-denial should 
in turn lead the nuclear weapon powers to undertake tangible steps to reduce and 
eliminate their vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. We are 
therefore of the opinion that nuclear-weapons States signatories to a treaty should 
be party to a clear and compelling declaration of intent to embark on the process 
of nuclear arms control.695 
The European members of NATO represented in Geneva seemed focused on satisfying 
the demands of non-aligned members, in particular that a treaty codify the equitable 
balance of obligations and rights outlined in UNGA Resolution 2028 (XX).  
The Latin American negotiations alerted United States policymakers to the 
hazards of a nuclear explosives typology specifying the legality of those of ostensibly non-
military design or purpose. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) devised an 
international service that would control and affordably supply nuclear explosives for 
earth-shaping work in the Global South. Other NATO members toed the U.S. and 
Soviet line on the PNE issue, although Italian diplomats admitted to French observers in 
Geneva that they resented the new proscription.696 As for the French, a report by the 
Ministry of External Affairs reviewing developments in nonproliferation talks called 
attention to the potential of an international PNE service to expand and take control of 
other peaceful activities, thereby subverting the principle of national sovereignty.697 It was 
unclear whether these positions resulted from genuine sympathy, a genuine desire to 
strengthen the treaty, disarmament hopes, leverage tactics, or structural incentives for 
middle powers to curb superpower aggrandizement.  
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While the West Europeans reassured the non-aligned states, Soviet-American 
talks aimed at settling outstanding issues related to Europe. Consultations had always 
striven to stave off the arrival of new nuclear powers while fending off geopolitical 
challenges from recent entrants in the nuclear club. In Asia and the Global South more 
broadly, the paramount contender was Mao’s China. In Europe and the Industrial 
North, de Gaulle’s France worked to endow the European political future with a Gallic 
essence. The broader strategy of subduing China and France by enshrining their 
exceptional positions as nuclear powers relied on a willingness of European states besides 
France to accept a nonproliferation regime whose remit was global rather than regional. 
A public communiqué by the West German government called on those states with 
nuclear weapons to “take the next steps” in arms control and disarmament: a CTBT, 
fissile-material cutoff treaty, and a freeze in warhead and delivery vehicle numbers.698 
U.S. and Soviet officials accordingly felt pressure to align their views on the arms race so 
as to increase their leverage in multilateral nuclear diplomacy. U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara met Soviet ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin at 
McNamara’s residence on April 5. There, they endeavored to lay the groundwork for 
strategic weapons talks and discussed the relationship between nonproliferation and 
European affairs. McNamara assured Dobrynin that “western European nations, 
excluding France, would support the Treaty.” All that was needed were some 
“clarifications” on nuclear security, specifically the efficacy of permissive action links on 
U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and the outcome of U.S.-NATO 
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consultations revolving around “possible veto[es]” by governments hosting the 
armaments.”699  
Safeguards were increasingly the focus of Soviet-American bilateral talks. How 
could the two sides reconcile West European nuclear collaboration through Euratom with 
superpower intentions to construct a unified regime along global lines administered by 
the IAEA? France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Italy 
were the six founding members of Euratom, which was established by the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. The architect of European integration, Jean Monnet, had designed the 
treaty in parallel with the consolidation of regional markets for the premier dual-use 
commodities of the Industrial Age–the European Coal and Steel Community. One 
stimulus was integrationists’ conviction that they could avert a third conflict in Europe 
through regional integration and supranational institutions. The 1956 Suez Crisis and 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s resulting embargo of oil exports to Western 
Europe presented a second economic imperative to coordinate more closely on the 
development and regulation of nuclear energy and its neighborhood market. Because of 
the military orientation of its nuclear regime and de Gaulle’s atomic nationalism though, 
France was divesting itself of Euratom. When Euratom Commission President Etienne 
Hirsh tried to circumvent the French veto by enforcing the qualified majority voting 
authorized in the originating treaty, de Gaulle successfully supplanted him and 
reinstituted the customary unanimity principle. As a consequence, Euratom failed to 
expand research into and development of advanced-centrifuge designs for uranium 
enrichment, or breeder reactors capable of yielding prodigious amounts of weapons-grade 
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plutonium because of French unwillingness to abide multilateral work.700 Western 
diplomats therefore fretted that the French veto could prevent Euratom’s subjection to 
IAEA oversight. The five member states’ views were split with West Germany and Italy 
resistant and the Benelux countries amenable to subordinating regional autonomy to 
global nonproliferation efforts.701 
The Soviet Union had become “more Catholic than the pope” in regards to the 
necessity of international safeguards in response to a nuclear boom in West Germany.702 
Moscow still refused to permit IAEA inspections on its own non-military nuclear facilities 
though. In a press conference on February 23, Lord Chalfont chattily expanded on Soviet 
reservations and their implications:  
[The] [p]oint that must be borne in mind is that [the] Soviet Union would regard 
Euratom safeguards as a form of self-policing, and they’d be reluctant to accept 
them. If safeguard arrangements acceptable to the Soviet Union can’t be devised, 
there ain’t going to be any treaty.703 
Moscow’s reversal stemmed from an almost pathological fear of a secret West German 
military program. Soviet displeasure with the state of bilateral arrangements may have 
contributed as well. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were both coming to terms with the 
proliferation risks attending their peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with allied 
governments, leading Washington and Moscow to agree independently with Chalfont’s 
claim that “in general … international and multilateral safeguards [were] more valuable 
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than bilateral.”704 Following a furtive visit by North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung in late-
1966, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev welcomed a 
high-ranking North Korean delegation led by Vice Premier Kim Il to the Soviet Union 
on February 13, 1967. The Hungarian Ambassador in Moscow reported that Kosygin 
and Brezhnev rebuffed a North Korean request for a large nuclear reactor because of the 
opacity with which Pyongyang operated a Soviet research reactor supplied 18 months 
earlier; “since then the Soviet comrades hardly have any data about its operation.”705 The 
Soviet nuclear archipelago had heretofore offered reactors unaccompanied by safeguards 
as long as spent fuel was returned; however, the Kremlin’s faith that recipients would not 
apply atomic largesse to military ends was no breaking.  
The White House likewise questioned bilateral contracts with its Cold War allies. 
The U.S. AEC took a harder look at South Africa’s uranium exports and nuclear 
program in late 1966. The U.S.-South African bilateral agreement was set to expire in 
summer 1967 and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) and AEC wanted 
firmer guarantees that “South African policy [was] to take no action which could in any 
way contribute to the spread of nuclear weapon capability.” U.S. authorities were 
especially concerned that South Africa had supplied uranium ore to France without 
safeguards, which Washington pressed Pretoria to place under IAEA safeguards as a 
precondition of continuing the supply of enriched uranium to the Pelindaba research 
reactor. South Africa resolved in March to await the result of direct talks with 
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Washington and “the outcome of the deliberations … in Geneva.”706 With the talks 
hinging ever more on Soviet-American harmony on the multifaceted safeguards article, 
Moscow and Washington’s distrust of peripheral allies served as a common motivation. 
The U.S. Atomic Energy Agency urged that the treaty authorize an international 
safeguards framework under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Rusk began referring to the agreement as “Dr. Seaborg’s treaty,” after AEC Chairman 
Glenn Seaborg successfully parried an initiative by European federalists in Foggy Bottom 
to modify the language “to provide for IAEA verification of the Euratom safeguard 
system on a basis to be mutually agreed between the two organizations.” He doubted that 
such an arrangement was feasible given that verification would require “unrestricted 
access to … facilities and safeguard activities,” and challenged whether European states 
were in fact so implacably opposed to IAEA supremacy following a transition period.707 
Fisher concurred with Seaborg because the U.S.S.R. and indeed most nations wanted “a 
single uniform and broadly international system.”708 The Disarmament Agency tried to 
inscribe that preference into language on which Atlantic allies and communist 
counterparties could agree and then devise tactics to placate both. Fisher consulted West 
German observers in Geneva, suggesting three revisions that would alleviate their 
misgivings. First, there would be a “substantial transition period for all undertakings in 
the article;” namely, three years would pass before the IAEA and Euratom had to 
determine the exact means of coordination. The “guillotine clause” would oblige 
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Euratom to accept IAEA inspections if a viable alternative eluded the agencies’ 
negotiators. Second, the safeguards would not apply to transfers of “non-nuclear 
materials and equipment” (i.e. products besides fissionable materials), such as reactors, 
centrifuges, and reprocessing plants. Finally, the article would state that preventing the 
“diversion of materials to nuclear weapons manufacture” was its sole aim.709 These last 
two changes were significant because they heralded a movement of lasting consequence 
to orient safeguards toward monitoring flows of uranium, thorium, and plutonium 
through reactors and reprocessing centers rather than conducting forensic operations vis-
à-vis dual-purpose activities and facilities. The revisions were meant to soothe West 
German officials, who complained that the current language might serve as “a basis for 
communist espionage, or for interference in peaceful industrial and scientific 
endeavors.”710 Fisher acknowledged that the Soviets might reject a narrower focus; 
however, he also pointed out that a concert of interest existed. Neither superpower 
wanted to legitimate the creation of a Euratom equivalent in Eastern Europe or the 
Middle East.711 Russian negotiator Roland Timerbaev underscored this point repeatedly 
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when speaking to Western authorities in Geneva. On March 4, Fisher “strongly” advised 
Rusk to consult first with the Soviets before conferring further with allies.712 It would take 
the rest of the summer though for the Soviet and American delegations in Geneva to find 
workable language and pitch it successfully to their respective governments.  
Whether the International Atomic Energy Agency would oversee nuclear-weapon 
states’ peaceful activities was the second question on whose resolution industrial and 
developing states’ consent turned. The U.S. delegation requested a six-week recess when 
the ENDC session concluded on March 23 in order to consult allies in Bonn and Tokyo 
about the safeguards article. The scope of the global nuclear emporium was expanding 
rapidly in the mid-1960s. According to an IAEA report, the total capacity of new reactors 
ordered by all countries in 1966 was 23,000 megawatts—nearly three times the amount 
generated by all nuclear power plants then in operation.713 Moreover, nuclear power 
plants’ operating costs had dropped below those of coal-fired power plants, though the 
calculations omitted expenses related to accident liability, research and development, 
capital subsidies, mining and enrichment, and waste-management, which governments 
usually footed.714 Thanks to Seaborg and Fisher’s interventions, the U.S. draft Article III 
floated to European allies outlined a three-year transition period, but not legal 
equivalence between regional and international agencies. To sweeten the pot against the 
background of European Economic Community talks and burgeoning competition in the 
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energy markets, the U.S. Disarmament Agency with AEC support contemplated the 
merits of offering to place non-military nuclear facilities in the U.S. under IAEA 
supervision. European officials voiced misgivings about industrial espionage and 
commercial equity to Foster when he traveled around Western capitals after the ENDC 
adjourned.715 Foster believed that the “voluntary cooperation of the U.S. nuclear 
industry” was forthcoming and passed along that “[t]he British have indicated privately to 
us … [that] the United Kingdom would do likewise.”716 The Soviet Union was 
intransigent, however, on the subject of allowing IAEA inspectors to enter its inner 
nuclear sanctums. On the eve of North Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings to discuss the 
nonproliferation agenda, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nick Katzenbach begged National 
Security Adviser Walt Rostow to direct Johnson’s attention to the matter. “[O]ur 
willingness to do this,” Katzenbach contended, “may prove the key to solving the 
Euratom safeguards problem in the NPT context.”717 Canadian officials also “put 
forward the idea that the Western nuclear powers make unilateral declarations of intent, 
separate but parallel to the treaty, voluntarily to accept safeguards on their own peaceful 
programs.”718 Such an offer might unlock the support of West Germany, whose officials 
worried about nuclear market-share, and the goodwill of the Global South, whose states 
distrusted all forms of discrimination.  
 A brewing crisis in United States-West German relations risked upending efforts 
to invest the treaty with broad and lasting legitimacy. The offer to submit select U.S. 
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facilities to IAEA inspection tested Bonn’s willingness to aid Washington’s quest to build a 
global nuclear order in league with Moscow. If the Federal Republic’s reservations with 
the treaty were principally commercial under Kiesinger and Brandt, the concession 
would mean that U.S. firms would operate under the same rules as the rest of the 
Industrial North. Moreover, the U.S. government would thenceforth be an equal 
stakeholder in the IAEA. On the other hand, a rejection would reveal if West German 
resistance camouflaged military designs or geopolitical machinations.  
At a press conference on February 27, Kiesinger had lamented Soviet-American 
“complicity” in pushing for a treaty. When presidential adviser John J. McCloy visited 
Bonn to arrange trilateral negotiations among the U.S., the U.K., and the F.R.G. for 
troop offsets in Central Europe, Kiesinger claimed that his remarks were made 
“smilingly.” Even so, the West German chancellor underscored the domestic challenges 
that his coalition government faced as a result of a treaty that would “ask Germany to 
enter into a binding agreement with its major adversary, limiting even further its 
capabilities in the nuclear field.”719 Foster tried to quiet Kiesinger’s concerns that a 
nonproliferation treaty would further disadvantage Bonn at the same moment that the 
U.S. was reducing its troop levels in Europe to compensate for troop deployments in 
Southeast Asia, and the U.S. and U.K. were pushing for an increase in West German 
purchases of military equipment from them in order to set right the lopsided balance-of-
payments engendered by NATO troop deployments.720 With Bonn ever more tempted by 
the political advantages of European integration along Franco-German lines, Washington 
could ill afford circumscribing the evolution of a European federation, or, relatedly, the 
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viability and autonomy of Euratom. Johnson’s promise that an “equitable treaty” would 
bring security to both countries rested on his ability “to work out formulas which the 
Federal Republic and our other Allies [would] find acceptable.”721  
West European concerns with the treaty now related primarily to commercial 
interests, in particular Euratom’s legal relationship to the IAEA. However, security and 
geopolitical considerations continued to reverberate throughout the West German 
domestic sphere. The governing coalition was split on the matter, but pro-treaty voices 
held the upper hand given the ambivalence of Chancellor Kiesinger and the support of 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) chairman Willy Brandt, who controlled the foreign 
ministry. Brandt had thus far staved off treaty opponents such as Finance Minister Franz 
Joseph Strauss of the Christian Socialist Union (CSU). On February 17, Brandt decried 
the “un-objective arguments and exaggerated polemics” of anti-treaty voices in the 
Bundestag. “The treaty,” Brandt proclaimed at a SDP meeting, “should harm no vital 
German interests and if we sign it after conscientious examination, it will not harm any 
vital German interest either.” The Party presidium issued a statement maintaining that 
“the rights of non-nuclear nations” rather than “intentional discrimination against West 
Germany,” was the overriding concern.”722 Whether Bonn’s point man in the 
disarmament arena, Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkoetter shared this view was 
unclear though. At a working lunch in Washington, Chalmers Roberts of the Washington 
Post interrogated National Security Council staffer Spurgeon Keeny about the White 
House’s reading of Schnippenkoetter’s alleged remark that “his mission to the United 
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States was to prevent the NPT?” Keeny could only reply that he was “confident” that 
“U.S.-German relations would survive the NPT.”723 
Capitalist states contemplated the nonproliferation proceedings as members of the 
Industrial North rather than the Atlantic Community. Senator John Pastore (D – RI) 
suggested an innovative approach in a congressional speech whereby Euratom would 
negotiate with the IAEA to “develop equivalent technical safeguards for [its] safeguards 
system” that the Vienna organization would in turn verify.724 In light of Pastore’s 
association with prominent members of the arms control cabal in the Johnson 
administration, members of the Geneva negotiating team likely heard the JCAE 
chairman’s proposed solution. It was certainly remarkable that unofficial conversations 
between the U.S. and Soviet delegations seized on a two-tier arrangement as a possible 
key to breaking the impasse, though the final language would avoid any connotation of 
equivalence.  
The viewpoints of nation-states in the Global South were far cloudier. McNamara 
cautioned Dobrynin that [t]he attitudes of India and certain of the non-European 
powers” were much less clear.725 Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi instructed her 
personal secretary, L. K. Jha, to make inquiries about parallel security assurances for 
India in Moscow, Paris, London, and Washington. Jha persuaded Soviet Foreign 
Minister Andrei Gromyko to hand over a tentative promise to require nuclear powers to 
“act quickly through the Security Council” in case a non-nuclear-weapon state signatory 
to the treaty faced an “unprovoked nuclear threat or attack.” Gromyko had evidently 
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agreed to add the word “threat” at the Indian envoy’s “insistence.”726 When he visited 
Paris that spring, Gromyko described the Indian request as resulting from a desire “to 
benefit indirectly from the deterrent power of existing nuclear forces.”727 On April 19, Jha 
met Johnson to ascertain whether the U.S. would join the U.S.S.R. in issuing “separate 
but similar declarations.” Rostow characterized the language as “not … too onerous, at 
first glance.” Nevertheless, its notification that a nuclear “aggressor” would “not go 
unpunished” would “clearly preclude us from first use of nuclear weapons in either North 
Korea or Vietnam.”728 Johnson chose not to commit the U.S. to a particular action; 
however, his words were studiously encouraging. Yet, even as members of the National 
Security Council applauded the “major change in the Soviet position … clearly set[ting] 
Russia apart from China and closer to us in the midst of the Vietnam war,” military 
planning in East Asia continued to work against a viable security guarantee for non-
aligned states desirous of them.729 They remained a key and irreducible variable in the 
calculus of international nuclear security.  
 
Diplomatic Community in Geneva 
The resumption of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament was pushed 
back to May 18 on account of inconclusive triangular diplomacy with respect to Article 
III among Euratom members, the United States, and Soviet Union. The U.S. and its 
European allies remained at loggerheads, which necessitated the added delay; Bonn 
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“objected” to Foster’s suggestion to table an identical draft treaty with the Soviet 
delegation that left out the safeguards article. West Germany wanted a draft safeguards 
article to feature a transition period and formalize equivalence between the two regimes, 
which Moscow would not condone. The U.S.-Euratom talks collapsed on May 14. 
Brandt bent on procedural issues; however, Bonn placed two conditions on a Soviet-
American joint tabling of draft treaties without Article III.730 First, the consultations 
would transpire “privately” and, secondly, Foster would commend the current draft 
article in the plenary. Although a joint draft treaty was still months away, the concession 
opened the door for back-channel talks in Geneva that would demonstrate the Eighteen 
Nation Committee on Disarmament’s utility as a diplomatic middle ground. 
Soviet and American delegates settled some key points during the intermission. 
New Year’s Day 1967 would mark the date by which a country would need to have 
detonated an atomic explosive to qualify as a legitimate nuclear-weapon state. Nuclear 
have-nots among the Western Four and non-aligned groupings agitated for preambular 
statements enjoining the nuclear haves to “end the nuclear arms race” and spelling out an 
inalienable right to nuclear “peaceful” research and development, as well as questioning 
the treaty’s duration and means of redress for state parties desirous of future amendments 
or withdrawal.731 The non-aligned awaited the submission of a working draft to “put their 
stamp” on the treaty.  
New constellations of affinities among the multiplying states of the world were on 
display in Geneva. The ENDC embodied a new paradigm of internationalism—the rise 
of the “international community.” Its onset occasioned a diluting and consolidation of 
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authority in the two-tiered United Nations system and a widening of its circle of 
jurisdiction to encompass latent threats to international security. These processes would 
play out in microcosm at the 18-nation committee.  
The Geneva negotiations were a foundational moment in the rise of an 
international community and the renovation of the international order against the 
background of Cold War fragmentation. The Second World War brought about a 
twofold postwar settlement. First, Cold War bipolarity hardened by 1947 with the U.S., 
U.S.S.R., and their respective allies, engaged in a tense standoff in Central Europe and 
East Asia. Second, international charters drafted during and after the war constituted a 
galaxy of multilateral organizations and gave rise to a “layer-cake,” multi-organ, world-
spanning body of global governance.732 To articulate the institutional sinews of the 
postwar order, a second-level network of regional and global forums such as the United 
Nations General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament arose to dictate whether 
and how the international system would function and evolve in practice.733 These 
“middle grounds” worked haphazardly in the immediate postwar owing to diverging 
superpower interests. The end-around orchestrated by the U.S. to authorize a U.N. 
police action against North Korean aggression in 1950 when Soviet officials quit the 
Security Council ushered in a decade of political stalemate, especially in regions 
considered vital to Cold War containment. Hence, for more than a decade, the locus of 
U.N. influence resided in the Third World. It was only when the Sino-Soviet split, the 
French revolt, and postcolonial states’ newfound majority in the UNGA threatened their 
alliances and interests that the superpowers returned to the forlorn system of global 
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governance. Nuclear diplomacy was accordingly the cause, the means, and the grounds 
for détente and the global order’s renovation.  
It was consequently at these middle grounds that a new global order coalesced in 
the 1960s. In their political and social function, these nodes comprised the ego and 
superego of a nascent international community. They were sites where plenipotentiaries 
formed relationships, obeyed or circumvented rules, spread intelligence, sought advice, 
aired hypotheticals and alternatives, banded together or split apart, built trust, and 
brokered agreements. Power politics conditioned the architecture of global governance 
and its operation through the establishment of prerogatives, principles, and perceptions 
relating to particular states’ influence, trustworthiness, beneficence, vindictiveness, and 
prestige. The former imperial order bequeathed a suite of ideals and modus operandi 
passing down assumptions about the exemplary history of the Industrial North and 
legacies of prejudice and subjugation that hardened attitudes in the Global South toward 
encroachments on state sovereignty. The flurry of new admissions into the UNGA 
attending decolonization altered the complexion of these deliberative assemblies, making 
them middle grounds between North and South as well as East and West, and bestowing 
a seemingly universal imprimatur on its diplomatic products.  
The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament was in many respects the 
cradle of the emerging international community. Geneva was home of a global network 
of arms controllers. In an interview with Dan McAuliff of the American Broadcasting 
Company, William Foster drew attention to the “considerable” influence exerted by the 
conference “on progress in the arms control and disarmament area.” He underlined the 
committee’s contributions to promoting a nuclear test-ban treaty, facilitating joint Soviet-
American pledges to cut back on fissile-material production, and calling attention to the 
“dangers of space becoming a new battlefield.” The ENDC functioned as a special place 
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where communication lines between East and West as well as North and South remained 
open. It was “the only place where we have a continuing contact with the Soviet Union 
outside of normal diplomat channels,” he opined, as well as “the only place, too, where 
we can take broad soundings on opinions and ideas of the non-aligned nations.” The 
committee was as a marketplace of ideas and information in formal and informal settings:   
In this connection, more discussions take place outside the formal plenary sessions 
of the Conference than in them, in meetings between delegations and the Co-
Chairman. And the Conference serves as a university in a sense. It has been a 
citadel of learning for representatives in the ENDC—indeed for all.734 
Foster again applauded the conference’s “invaluable” worth when he addressed the 
United Nations Society of Berlin in Schlosshotel Gerhus on July 3, 1966. He drew 
attention to the importance of the social milieu in Geneva, commending the practical 
value of “co-chairmen [meetings], social gatherings, working lunches, etc.” He praised 
the forum’s egalitarianism, which “permit[ted] all voices [to] be heard—large [and] 
small.” Foster also welcomed the salutary influence that highlighting arms control and 
disarmament issues had on public opinion to which he attributed the final settlement of 
the Limited Test Ban Treaty.735 The question remained though as to whether the 17 
delegations represented in Geneva could strike a widely acceptable “balance of 
responsibilities and obligations,” when the “lion’s share” relating to nonproliferation fell 
on countries without nuclear weapons and conversely the bulk of sacrifices to “limit and 
reduce nuclear armaments” fell on the nuclear club.736  
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One bright spot was the increasingly warm attitude of Soviet emissaries. Even at 
the height of Soviet-American teamwork as wartime allies, Iola Nikitchenko, the Soviet 
member of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, where Nazi leaders were 
tried on charges of Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity, 
formed no lasting relationships with Western counterparts. Nikitchenko belonged to a 
generation of Soviet apparatchiks who had abetted Joseph Stalin’s tyrannical rule. He 
presided over the Military Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court during the show trials 
of the Great Terror.737 Nikitchenko disappeared behind the Iron Curtain after the 
Nuremberg Trials ended. He either chose never to respond to correspondence from the 
other arbiters on the tribunal, or had the correspondence intercepted by Soviet censors. 
The diplomatic cohort that accompanied Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and 
Alexei Kosygin into power, on the other hand, witnessed the Secret Speech of 1956, 
when Khrushchev renounced Stalinism and hinted at the desirability of “peaceful 
coexistence” with the capitalist world. 
In contrast to the postwar years, Soviet and American delegates to the Eighteen 
Nation Committee on Disarmament came to enjoy close, warm, constructive, and 
abiding relationships. George Bunn was the U.S. Disarmament Agency’s general counsel 
and in summer 1967 the day-to-day negotiator of the nonproliferation treaty. Years later, 
he recalled the antagonism of early social interaction between the delegations: 
[W]hen I first came to Geneva in 1962, the Cold War seemed to be still on. … 
[T]he negotiators were very … challenging, hostile, belligerent … even in a 
cocktail party, … they seemed to be trying to make points against you.738 
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Over time, common attitudes and shared leisure warmed the social climate. The milieus 
in Geneva and other middle grounds were conducive to fostering commonalities by 
means of socialization. The lived experience of the middle ground revolved around 
interminable plenary sessions, hallway chatter, social gatherings at consulates, boozy 
lunches, jaunts about town, outdoor recreation, and the occasional yacht cruise on 
sparkling Lake Geneva nestled amid the white-topped French and Swiss Alps.739 The city 
bred an espirit de corps among diplomats, including the Soviet and American cadres. Bunn 
recollected how leisure activities helped to clear the air: 
[B]y the end of my period there … in ’68, I had learned how to drive a Volga 
automobile, and drunk a good deal of vodka with … fellow Soviet negotiators. 
There was … just a complete change in the attitudes and relationships between 
the two delegations, starting really with the Cuban missile crisis.740 
The mounting frequency and fruitfulness of personal contact in Geneva played a vital 
role in overcoming the Euratom deadlock and progressing with negotiations. Roland 
Timerbaev was Bunn’s Soviet counterpart; he graduated from the Moscow State Institute 
of International Studies in 1949 and then joined the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
On the occasion of Bunn’s passing on April 21, 2013, Timerbaev looked back on the 
roots of the two’s affinity: 
Fortunately, we did not turn into “opposite numbers” representing two rival 
“superpowers” of the Cold War era, which was typical for that time. Very soon, 
we realized we were like-minded people. We deeply believed in the vital need to 
stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and we did our utmost to achieve that 
goal. This was the inherent basis of our close personal friendship that lasted for 
more than 50 years.741  
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The relationship between Bunn and Timerbaev outlasted the Cold War. It was also the 
interpersonal conduit through which the superpowers began to bypass the last roadblock 
to a joint Soviet-American draft treaty.  
The safeguards issue garnered negative scrutiny from all sides at the beginning of 
the summer. The U.S. delegation doubted that elements of the Washington bureaucracy 
would opt to override concerns emanating from major allies such as West Germany, 
Italy, and Japan. Bunn recalled that Foggy Bottom and the White House “had less 
interest … in the nonproliferation treaty” at that juncture, and that Johnson had not 
“really come around firmly in support” because “he was totally preoccupied with the war 
in Vietnam.”742 Furthermore, Euratom was divided over its future. Paris was wary lest the 
nuclear community furnish Bonn with a sanctuary for military research. West Germany 
desired more organizational autonomy in hopes of integrating the European common 
nuclear market and preserving advantages for its nuclear firms (and overall nuclear 
capability) through joint research and development. This prejudiced the views of other 
industrial powers such as Japan, who wanted a fair shake in the global nuclear 
emporium.743 Tellingly, Foster used the nine days accorded by the postponement of the 
ENDC in May to consult with Japanese authorities, who indicated that Tokyo might 
accept a treaty “on the express condition that the civil nuclear installations of the nuclear-
weapon States would also be subject to IAEA safeguards.”744 
Brazil and India issued the strongest demands for equality in peaceful uses of 
atomic energy with a particular focus on nuclear explosives. The real object of their 
protestations was unclear though. Did they want to retain the right to use nuclear 
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explosives to blast harbors and liberate shale oil, or as a backdoor to an atom bomb? 
Brazilian delegate Sérgio Correa da Costa read a spirited defense of PNEs when the 
committee reconvened on May 18, ascribing his government’s signature on the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco to a desire “to speed up the peaceful nuclearization of Brazil.” He 
distinguished sharply between the peaceful and military ends to which states could put 
nuclear technology, lauded its capacity “to eliminate [the] poverty and 
underdevelopment” at the root of interstate conflict, and championed PNEs’ value for 
“great civil engineering projects” and “an ever-increasing variety of applications that may 
prove essential to … progress.” His words reflected Brasília’s stance on the disputed 
meaning of nuclear weapons in the Latin American treaty, whose peculiar tolerance of a 
hypothetical type of nuclear explosives unsuited to military use set worrisome precedents 
for a nonproliferation treaty. He used utopian and postcolonial language to contest the 
prohibition under review, hailing the ceaseless innovation and “boundless prospects” 
promised by nuclear science and technology and attacking a PNE ban as tantamount to a 
“privilege” that would form “an irreparable relationship of dependence.”745 At the next 
session, Indian delegate V.C. Trivedi repeated a statement by Indira Gandhi that a treaty 
should not affect nuclear tools whose use could help developing economies in the Global 
South. Trivedi drew an explicit linkage to neocolonialism: “[t]he civil nuclear Powers can 
tolerate a nuclear weapons apartheid, but not an atomic apartheid in their economic and 
peaceful development.”746  
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The safeguards issue threatened to derail proceedings at a crucial juncture as 
pressure mounted to table a full draft treaty before the U.N. General Assembly session 
that fall. Inertia in Soviet-American détente lessened the prospects of a high-level 
agreement. Arms control and nonproliferation diplomacy had ran on parallel tracks since 
the Cuban Missile Crisis with a slow yet steady improvement in Soviet-American 
relations amid the Vietnam War.747 Alliance tensions, the global compass of U.S.  
commitments, a resurgent West Germany, and domestic revolts were also strong 
inducements.748 U.S.-Soviet détente hinged on the resolution of three outstanding issues: 
strategic arms talks in light of new anti-ballistic-missile capabilities, nuclear 
nonproliferation, and the Vietnam War. The interactive relationship among these three 
matters drove superpower relations in 1967. The Vietnam War constantly threatened to 
spoil efforts to detoxify the superpower relationship. When the new U.S. Ambassador in 
Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, attended the signing ceremony for the Outer Space 
Treaty on January 27, Kosygin fulminated against U.S. bombing raids on North 
Vietnamese airfields and waved off assurances that Johnson was “earnestly trying to end 
[the] conflict,” by riposting that, if so, the U.S. government “should act differently.”749 
Rostow struck a more positive note that day in a meeting with Dobrynin in Washington. 
He thanked the Soviet ambassador for Moscow’s flexibility in regards to nonproliferation, 
which “had made a deep impression” among U.S. policymakers amid concerns regarding 
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the effect of anti-ballistic-missile systems (ABM) on strategic stability and state finances.750 
Dobrynin and Rostow went on to discuss how the nuclear arms race impinged on 
nonproliferation: 
[Rostow] then pointed out to him that it would be harder to get nations to sign a 
non-proliferation agreement if they saw the United States and the Soviet Union 
entering another major round in the arms race. [Dobrynin] questioned [Rostow] 
as to whether I was proposing a specific link between the non-proliferation 
agreement and the ABM agreement. I said that I was not, but merely underlining 
the difficulties we might both face if we were urging others to enter a world of 
non-proliferation while each of us was spending many billions of dollars in 
bilateral strategic arms race. [Dobrynin] said that he understood and agreed with 
this view.751 
Notwithstanding this high-level concurrence, geopolitical interests and strategic nuclear 
buildups lessened the appetite for bilateral arms control on both sides. Soviet arms 
supplies to North Vietnam and U.S. intensification of the conflict raised the stakes and 
the hurdles alike. And incompatible concepts of nuclear strategy worked against common 
understandings on the repercussions of ballistic missile defense, especially while “[t]he 
American public’s commitment to nuclear superiority remained an article of faith.”752 
Troubling developments in the Middle East and East Asia dramatized both the 
difficulty of improving Soviet-American relations and the dangers posed by nuclear 
spread. Israel and her Arab neighbors—Jordan, Syria, the United Arab Republic 
(U.A.R.), and the Palestinian Liberation Organization—undertook an escalating series of 
covert operations, mobilizations, and tit-for-tit incursions in the spring. In May, U.A.R. 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser responded to flawed Soviet intelligence of an imminent 
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Israeli attack by sending more than 100,000 troops into the Sinai Peninsula and expelling 
the United Nations Emergency Force stationed there. A preemptive strike by Israeli jets 
against the Egyptian Air Force triggered the Six Day War, which ended with Israel 
victorious and newly in control of East Jerusalem, the Sinai, West Bank, Golan Heights, 
and Gaza Strip.753 Though short-lived, the conflict illustrated the ability of regional 
conflicts to metastasize into an all-out thermonuclear war in the event that either 
superpower intervened to support or protect an ally. Increasing the risks, Israel possessed 
at least two deliverable atom bombs and Soviet officials were concerned enough about 
the Israeli research facility at Dimona to authorize reconnaissance flights by Soviet MiG-
25 Foxbats before the war.754  
NATO members found the conflict’s nuclear implications unsettling. At a NATO 
ministerial meeting on June 17, Rusk expressed doubts regarding the ability of a 
belligerent to forgo a nuclear strike when faced with imminent defeat. Delegations 
repeated his misgivings widely, including at a press conference by British Foreign 
Minister George Brown. U.S. Ambassador Harlan Cleveland observed that it was “clear 
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that [the] Middle East war has forced everybody to think hard about [the] non-European 
reasons for [the] NPT.”755 Ironically, the People’s Republic of China tested its first 
thermonuclear device on the same day, joining the U.S., U.S.S.R., and U.K. in that 
select group and refuting claims by U.S. authorities that China lacked the technical 
sophistication to build an effective deterrent quickly. If the Levantine conflict showed how 
proliferation might transform regional crises into global powder kegs, the Chinese test 
illustrated how rapidly developing states could breach the thermonuclear barrier. 
The Six Day War afforded an opportunity for high-level Soviet-American talks; 
however, the discussions failed to move the needle on bilateral arms control. The 
hostilities sufficiently alarmed Kosygin that he made the first use of the Kremlin-White 
House “hot line.” The two sides communicated throughout the war. Johnson penned a 
letter to Kosygin in the crisis’s early days suggesting that both sides explore “common 
interests” on three urgent matters—Vietnam, the Middle East, and Cuba—and two 
targets of opportunity—ICBM and ABM limits and a non-proliferation treaty. When 
Kosygin visited New York City to address the U.N. on the subject of post-war Arab 
grievances, Johnson coaxed him into staying for an impromptu sit-down in Glassboro, 
New Jersey. The president was cautiously optimistic in light of Llewellyn Thompson’s 
efforts to court Kosygin. In a conversation with Senate Majority Leader Everett Dirksen 
(R – IL), the president revealed his hopes that the summit meeting might take the edge off 
the Cold War: 
We’re hoping that when he gets through talking to us, that he’ll see that we’re not 
going to gobble him up… now we don’t know that that has any chance, but that’s 
                                                
755 Harlan Cleveland, Telegram from the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 
European Regional Organizations to the Department of State, “NATO Ministerial Meeting: Evaluation,” 
17 June 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XIII, Doc. 258, 588. 
 345 
the best thing that has a chance from what Thompson’s been saying to him 
through the months.756 
Johnson believed that progress on the entangled matters of Vietnam, the Middle East, 
and international nuclear diplomacy presupposed a strong rapport between the leaders. 
“I think I can get on with him all right,” he assured Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Chariman William Fulbright (D- AR), “I got along with Khrushchev all right.”757 
In actuality, the Glassboro Summit, which transpired from June 23 to 27, 
demonstrated how divergent notions of arms control at top levels stymied agreement.758 
When Johnson met Kosygin, he likened their countries to “the oldest brother … and the 
oldest sister,” who on account of their seniority shouldered the burden of “avoid[ing] 
disputes and differences between them so as to set a good example to the other children 
in the family.”759 His espousal of Soviet-American condominium was true to Johnson’s 
patriarchal grasp of domestic and international politics and the strategic need to lessen 
superpower tensions as the international order sustained multiple crises. Kosygin was 
pliable on Southeast Asia, where Soviet influence was negligible; by contrast, Soviet 
geostrategic interests in the Middle East militated against halting arm shipments to Syria 
and Egypt, or repudiating Arab states’ demands for the return of occupied territories.  
The two sides failed to harmonize their views on bilateral arms control as well. 
Kosygin responded to McNamara’s arguments that strategic missile defense was a 
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technical fantasy and an economic black hole with the exclamation, “[d]efense is moral, 
and aggression is immoral!”760 U.S. and Soviet officials later attributed Kosygin’s outburst 
to a mismatch in strategic nuclear cultures. Whereas McNamara and Foster, among 
others, adhered to econometric conceptions of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability, 
these notions had no traction on Soviet politico-military thought in which the Second 
World War and Cuban Missile Crisis signified cautionary tales against unpreparedness or 
strategic overstretch when faced with a superior foe. Furthermore, the vested interest of 
the powerful Soviet military-industrial complex in arms buildups and its corresponding 
faith in a winnable nuclear war stiffened the Soviet spine. Moscow was more intent on 
achieving nuclear parity than on halting the arms race.761 
A nonproliferation agreement was the lone bright spot at Glassboro. When 
Thompson treated with Dobrynin in Washington to explore the possibility of a summit, 
both ambassadors expressed optimism that a treaty was in the cards.762 Conversations 
between Rusk and Gromyko in Glassboro were agreeable though inconclusive. Rusk 
singled out three obstacles beyond Article III: assurances for India, the treaty’s duration, 
and arms control linkages. In regards to the security assurances delivered to New Delhi 
by Moscow, Rusk intimated that it would be easier for the executive branch to endorse a 
U.N. Security Council resolution in order to circumvent the Senate. This would also meet 
an Indian preference for assurances that covered “non-nuclear powers in general.” There 
were more commonalities than dissimilarities in the Soviet and U.S. positions. Both men 
identified October as a “reasonable” date by which to draft “a common text,” testifying 
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to the momentum behind the talks. Since the Soviet Union remained unalterably 
opposed to “family control,” Gromyko advocated jointly tabling draft treaties with the 
safeguards article blank.763 Glassboro thus revealed a continuity in the relationship 
between nonproliferation and détente: while the superpowers struggled to agree on 
regional crises, their concurrence that nuclear weapons should not be introduced into 
them drove efforts to cooperate on multilateral nuclear diplomacy. 
Understandings of East-West détente were as foggy in NATO as between the 
superpowers. U.S. Deputy Undersecretary of State Foy Kohler emphasized the self-
reinforcing “relationship between deterrence and détente” and the “different views” held 
by NATO members regarding the purpose of easing tensions in Europe, particularly by 
means of a non-proliferation treaty. Kohler questioned whether the Atlantic community 
could “have some measure of agreement on what détente means.”764 The French revolt 
worsened matters. Gromyko noted the French ambivalence toward a treaty when visiting 
Paris that spring.765 The European Merger Treaty entered force on July 1, collectively 
subsuming Euratom, the Economic Community, and the Coal and Steel Community into 
the European Communities to which the U.K. reapplied with U.S. support. If Euratom 
facilities, including those in France, went under IAEA safeguards, de Gaulle could disable 
Euratom with unknown consequences for the federal movement.766 West Germany and 
others’ reluctance to divest Euratom of self-inspection authority therefore had weighty 
implications during a period of uncertainty for European integration.  
                                                
763 Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Gromyko, “Non-Proliferation Treaty; Assurances to 
Non-Nuclear Powers; Latin American Nuclear Free Zone,” 23 June 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XI, Doc. 
198, 481-486. 
764 Foy Kohler, Letter to British Undersecretary of State (Watson), “Your letter of June 14, 1967,” 13 July 
1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XIII, Doc. 260, 593. 
765 Op. cit. Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Gromyko, “Non-Proliferation Treaty,” 23 
June 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XI, Doc. 198, 483. 
766 Adrian Fisher, Memorandum to Secretary of State Rusk, “Safeguards Article for Non-Proliferation 
Treaty,” 24 June 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XI, Doc. 199. 
 348 
With high-level consultations stalled, the challenge of finding a solution fell to the 
United States and Soviet delegations in Geneva. Foster decided to explore a compromise 
“at the lower level” and “without instruction” from Washington. Ad referendum talks thus 
ensued between second- and third-ranking members of each delegation: Bunn and Culver 
Gleysteen on the U.S. side, and Timerbaev and Vladimir Shustov on the Soviet. 
Timerbaev would remark that it was “the first time in Soviet-America[n] arms control 
that we were able to discuss ad referendum,” a testament to the newfound rapport at the 
interpersonal level.767 The thinking was that by departing from the official script the two 
sides might alight on mutually acceptable language through “what if … exploratory 
negotiation[s],” even though Foggy Bottom had instructed the U.S. delegation “not to go 
further on safeguards than our existing instructions because of disagreements with the 
Euratom countries.”768 The exploratory negotiations profited from the leisure activities in 
which the delegations shared. Bunn recounted how long hikes afforded familiarity and an 
opportunity for brainstorming: 
We had gotten to know each other through originally just working on the two 
delegations but times had gotten better, relations had gotten better, at least at the 
delegation level, and we often hiked in the mountains – went together on the 
weekends – and talked.769 
The French Alps provided the backdrop when the subordinates took a cable car that 
June, most likely to the top of Aiguille du Midi, and circled the jagged summit that rose 
above the Mont Blanc massif. Timerbaev suggested a clever legal and bureaucratic 
                                                
767 Op. cit. Roland Timerbaev, Interview by Rich Hooper and Jenni Rissanen, Vienna, Austria, 14 June 
2007, 7. 
768 Op. cit. George Bunn, Interview, “Have and Have-Nots,” in War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, 
Episode 108, Betacam, 30 November 1986; George Bunn, “Brief History of NPT Safeguards Article,” NPT 
Negotiating History, February 2006, 6.  
769 Op. cit. George Bunn, Interview by Thomas Shea and Danielle Peterson, Stanford University, Palo 
Alto, CA, 17 February 2006, 7.  
 349 
escape on the walk back down to the world’s highest cable car.770 According to Bunn, he 
proposed: “Let's have an agreement to agree, and to negotiate with … what the 
safeguards will really be, not try and decide all that now.” “The Euratom countries would 
sign not individually, but as a group,” Timerbaev continued, “so that Euratom would do 
the negotiations for all the countries together with the IAEA.” The two sides would not 
“decide everything in this treaty now.771 There were two precedents for the solution. 
First, the Treaty of Tlatelolco allowed either individual states or groups of states to 
negotiate with the IAEA. Second, Bunn referenced the example of “certified public 
accountants and corporation bookkeepers,” when he contributed that Euratom would 
conduct the physical inspections of which IAEA officials would check the results.772 The 
formula would pave the way for a Soviet-American draft treaty with common definitions 
of dissemination and acquisition and which outlined the broad contours of a global 
safeguards system with the IAEA at its core.  
The language formulated in Geneva still needed Moscow and Washington’s 
endorsement though; in fact, the safeguards controversy would last into December. To 
win the support of their respective bureaucracies, Soviet and American delegations 
engaged in an act of collective subterfuge. Each delegation presented the formula to their 
capitals as representing a new offer by the other side; according to Timerbaev, “the 
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agreed formula was presented to Washington as the Soviet formula, and … to Moscow as 
an American formula.”773 Fisher spoke to Rusk via scramble telephone on June 23, filling 
the secretary in on the arrangement before Glassboro. In a follow-up telegram, Fisher 
alluded to an “informal suggestion” put forward by the Soviet delegation and described 
the concept as providing for the establishment of “bilateral or multilateral agreements 
with the IAEA.” He cited the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a precedent. Given the persistence 
of German intransigence and the U.S. agreement not to depart from the NATO 
formulation, Fisher advised that Rusk explore the prospect of a joint Soviet-American 
pledge to subject certain of their non-military nuclear installations to IAEA safeguards in 
order to “eliminate the Euratom arguments.”774 
The concert of high-level and low-level Soviet-American summitry that summer 
illustrated the potential and limits of détente. Though Kosygin and Johnson failed to 
achieve much at Glassboro, the emergence of an international community of arms 
controllers in Geneva found a route by which to circumvent the safeguards controversy. 
The necessity of backchannel talks retarded a final agreement though. According to 
Bunn, when later that summer Llewellyn Thompson remarked to Gromyko about the 
new “Soviet proposal,” the Soviet foreign minister was taken aback: “What do you mean, 
Soviet delegation proposal? I thought that was an American delegation proposal[!]”775 
Despite the miscommunication, the Soviets agreed to table identical draft treaties with the 
safeguards language missing. The phase of negotiations driven by bilateral Soviet-
American diplomacy was coming to an end. Rostow wrote Johnson on August 10 to 
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inform him of the drafting agreement. In the memorandum, he observed that a turning 
point had indeed occurred: “Now the game will move to the non-nuclear powers; and 
some months of negotiations lie ahead. But it is something of an event.”776 
 
The Non-Aligned Weigh In 
The Soviet and U.S. delegations announced the simultaneous tabling of identical 
draft treaties at 3:00 p.m. on August 24, 1967 in the Council Chambers of the Palais des 
Nations, the White House, and the Kremlin. The British Ambassador in Geneva, Edward 
E. Tomkins, had called Fisher the day before. Fisher acknowledged that despite lacking a 
safeguards article, the treaty “might cause the F.R.G. some pain.” However, the United 
States had succeeded in modifying the amendment procedures in Article V to allow 
members states of the IAEA Board of Directors to veto objectionable modifications. 
Kiesinger protested against the draft treaty’s unlimited duration, but when Rusk relayed 
the objection to Gromyko, it elicited “a rather dour ‘no.’” Despite Soviet resistance, 
Fisher remarked that the duration “may be something we will have to compromise on” in 
order for nuclear have-nots to acquiesce, particularly those in the Global South as the 
repercussions on European security mattered less and less in comparison to those for 
global nuclear trade, regional security dynamics, and the treaty’s legitimacy.777  
The features of a nonproliferation treaty bearing on states in the Global South 
were increasingly salient. Tomkins inquired if the Disarmament Agency “expected that 
other nations [would] now come out with all their reservations;” “[a]re we now in for a 
free-for-all[?]” The negotiating process had already weathered the disruptive efforts of the 
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“Germans and the Italians,” Fisher assured him, and with the orchestration of Soviet-
American harmony, “the dangers of objecting to [the NPT] are also greater.”778 
Nonaligned participants repeatedly upheld the virtue of tailoring the treaty to meet 
developmental and disarmament ends that seemed marginal to the treaty’s core function. 
The Brazilian delegation, for example, wanted disarmament savings directed to economic 
development in the Global South.779 Though the proposal went nowhere, such thinking 
registered in non-aligned demands in Geneva and New York City for more nuclear 
assistance and legal entitlements to constructive nuclear technology. The fourth article of 
the new draft treaty accordingly spelled out “the inalienable right” of states parties “to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute, alone or 
in cooperation with other States” and “to develop research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (in conformity with the nonproliferation articles).”780 
According to a U.S. aide-memoire, “the idea for such an article was originally derived 
from the Treaty of Tlatelolco.” Mexico pushed to strengthen the language that fall. When 
coupled with the preambular statements, the “principle” encompassed “not only modern 
reactor technology and the like,” but also “any technological by-products” of nuclear 
explosives necessary for future innovations such as fusion reactors.781 
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The identical Soviet and American draft treaties, an impending United Nations 
General Assembly session, and Conference of Non-Nuclear States authorized by UNGA 
Resolution 2153(XXI) lent impetus for neutral states to “play their role as first 
responders.”782 A nonproliferation treaty was inherently discriminatory; nonetheless, 
neutral states such as Sweden, Mexico, Brazil, and India invoked UNGA Resolution 
2028(XX) when arguing that a treaty ought to strike a balance of rights and obligations in 
order to achieve a more equitable understanding less inimical to their national interests. 
Various non-aligned delegations accordingly took the rostrum that September to call for 
alterations relating to safeguards, technical assistance, peaceful explosives, treaty 
loopholes, security assurances, and nuclear disarmament.  
The most impactful presentation was the Mexican working paper circulated by 
Jorge Castañeda on September 19. The Mexican delegate acknowledged that the treaty’s 
“general features” were reasonable given “present-day political realities,” but singled out 
various preambular statements that merited inscription as “true legal obligations.” He 
advanced two changes to Article IV’s language. First, the article should mandate that 
advanced nuclear powers had a “duty” to supply those states denied nuclear weapons by 
the treaty with technical assistance rather than merely granting a negative guarantee that 
there was an “inalienable right” to productive nuclear artifacts. If some states had to 
renounce certain types of science and technology, it was incumbent upon privileged states 
to set the imbalance right. Second, the admonition extended to PNEs. Though “nothing 
other than nuclear bombs,” these devices held “enormous economic potential … for 
instance in the execution of vast engineering projects.” Since a renunciation of the right 
to possess or conduct nuclear explosions ought not to signify a renunciation of these 
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potential benefits, an international service was warranted.783 In addition, he called for the 
incorporation in the treaty’s body of the preambular note that a nonproliferation treaty 
would not infringe on nuclear-free zones. Finally, Castañeda urged that a treaty contain a 
stronger injunction for disarmament and called for a “solemn recognition” in the treaty 
itself “of the special responsibility of the nuclear Powers:” 
In short, the nuclear Powers cannot actually undertake to conclude future 
disarmament agreements among themselves; but they certainly can undertake to 
endeavor to do so; that is, they can certainly undertake to initiate and pursue 
negotiations in good faith in order to conclude such agreements. … Doubtless it 
would be an imperfect obligation, since it would not be accompanied by 
sanctions, but it would be more than a statement of intention.784  
Alva Myrdal likened the proposed article to a “promissory note,” passing over its 
limitations as a non-binding pledge with the term’s use in contract law to specify under 
what conditions a contract was voided.785 Washington was increasingly disposed to heed 
Latin American suggestions since their assistance had proven so critical in the UNGA 
after the Middle East crisis. U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg had extolled their 
importance to Johnson and his cabinet at an August post-mortem: “Latin American 
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solidarity was important,” he observed: “The more Latin Americans countries can be 
involved in world affairs, the better.”786 
Myrdal vocally championed a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) and 
patiently beseeched her fellow delegates to make its achievement a precondition or 
corollary of a nonproliferation pact. She invoked Jawaharlal Nehru’s 1954 proposal of a 
ban on all nuclear testing to petition the assembly on June 29 to reconsider the merits of a 
total test ban in light of advances in seismology, the advent of large sensor arrays, and 
increasing data exchange among nations. She characterized such an accord together with 
fissile-material cut-off and nonproliferation treaties “as parts of one comprehensive 
pattern.”787 Foster found himself on the defensive. He had called a CTBT the previous 
November “the most significant step we could take to supplement … a non-proliferation 
treaty.”788 The longstanding U.S. stance was that on-site inspections were essential to 
verify a treaty, while the U.S.S.R. held that “national means of detection and 
verification,” namely seismographs and radiological detectors, would suffice. Foster gave 
an affirmative reply on July 11. The Disarmament Agency wanted to avoid the 
impression of having “lost interest in the CTB[T] because failure to do so would have a 
very adverse effect on our position on the NPT negotiations.”789 However, Seaborg 
advised that the AEC and the Pentagon wanted latitude to test a “new generation of 
weapons for the strategic offensive forces” and conduct “development and proof tests” for 
                                                
786 Tom Johnson, Notes, “Cabinet Meeting on August 2, 1967, 12:09 p.m. to 1:50 p.m.,” 2 August 1967, 
Box 1, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, LBJL, 7-8. 
787 Final Verbatim Record of the 309th Meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 
Disarmament, 29 June 1967, Geneva, Switzerland, ENDC/PV.309, 4.  
788 Ibid., 309th Meeting of the Conference of the ENDC, 29 June 1967, 6.  
789 Charles Johnson, Memorandum for National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, “Foster’s proposed draft 
response to Mrs. Myrdal’s statement,” Box 6, Vol. III, Agency File—ACDA, NSF, LBJL. Cited in FRUS, 
1964-1968, Vol. XI, Doc. 200, footnote 2. 
 356 
them as well as the new “Spartan 6 MT, “hot” X-ray ABM warhead.”790 These “defense 
requirements” created a schism between the Disarmament Agency, and the AEC and 
Department of Defense, preventing Foster from endorsing a comprehensive test-ban 
treaty “given adequate inspection.”791 
The United Arab Republic, India, Burma, Sweden, Brazil, and Romania threw 
their rhetorical support behind the Mexican working paper. The Indian and Brazilian 
representatives went further, commending measures to combat “vertical proliferation,” 
such as bans on nuclear testing and fissile-material production for military purposes.792 
The Soviet-American failure to put forward a consensus Article III permitted Myrdal to 
submit a Swedish variant that authorized IAEA oversight on all transfers of nuclear 
materials regardless of the treaty status of either importer or exporter. The Swedish draft 
article also authorized the progressive application of IAEA safeguards on the peaceful 
nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon states. Neutral consensus behind the Mexican 
amendments confronted the superpower blocs with a collective effort to embed technical 
assistance, universal safeguards, and disarmament commitments in the treaty. Even 
Japan, which had so far kept its distance, began to weigh in. Foreign Minister Takeo Miki 
suggested to the UNGA on September 22 that periodic five-year conferences should 
review the treaty’s efficacy and legitimacy.793  
Indian nuclear policy had meanwhile “undergone gradual radicalization,” 
according to Soviet ministers. Foreign Minister M.C. Chagla issued a “categorical” 
statement in the Lok Sahba that New Delhi would not sign the treaty as drafted. A Soviet 
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expert on South Asia chalked the Indian attitude up to its quest to promote itself as leader 
of the non-aligned world by “bring[ing] the so-called common problems of several Third 
World countries to the forefront” of the negotiations. Soviet authorities held out hope that 
joint or separate guarantees from the superpowers could manage the security threat that 
China posed to India.794 Collectively, India and Brazil’s more exacting demands and 
West Germany’s ambivalence augured the rise of a fifth sub-set in the Venn diagram of 
international nuclear diplomacy—the irreconcilables.  
Brazil’s attitude was paradigmatic of the relationship between regional powers in 
the Global South and the embryonic nonproliferation regime. The country had chosen to 
keep open its peaceful and military nuclear options while maintaining a reputation for 
good behavior in the international community and its neighborhood. Brasília and Buenos 
Aires had been the principal spoilers of a Latin American nuclear-free zone before 
acquiescing on the condition that the compact not close all routes to a military option, 
namely PNEs, and limit the zone’s boundaries to those states that signed and ratified.795 
This calculus remained operative when the Brazilian National Security Council debated 
the merits of a nonproliferation treaty and the content of the country’s nuclear policy on 
October 4. A central matter was how to word the guidelines so that Brazil could reserve 
“to itself the right of exclusiveness in what regards the guidance and execution of all 
activities in the field of nuclear energy.”796 The ministers discussed whether the public 
and private decrees should employ the phrase “peaceful purposes” so as to associate 
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Brazil’s nuclear policies with international norms. Minister of External Affairs José de 
Magalhães Pinto endorsed this wording in a clause pertaining to the Military Ministries 
that called for the “formation of personnel and in the development of special techniques 
and equipment in the sector.” To avert a martial tone, however, Magalhães Pinto 
suggested changing the clause to read, “equipment related to the peaceful applications of 
nuclear energy.” Magalhães Pinto believed that “peaceful” was a watchword of legitimate 
nuclear activities at international meetings where there was “a constant allegation” that 
“total knowledge … will result in countries being easily able to produce an atomic bomb:”  
We know now that the two big nuclear powers arrived at an understanding on the 
question and that the number of countries that do not possess nuclear energy and 
want to use it is very large. They need, for this, to organize themselves, decide 
exactly what they want and advance firmly toward the desired objectives. In 
several statements made through the Ministry of External Relations, according to 
your instructions, Brazil has reiterated its wish to utilize nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes. By the way, the Treaty of Mexico prohibits the use of nuclear 
energy for military objectives, but authorizes its use for peaceful purposes. 
The exchange testified to Brazil’s efforts to retain its nuclear prerogatives by allying with 
like-minded states while dispelling fears of ulterior military motives. In this vein, the 
meeting debated whether to add a clause upholding PNEs as an object of national policy.  
Peaceful nuclear explosions were the nub of controversy regarding what 
constituted legitimate nuclear technology. Magalhães Pinto pushed for modifications to a 
section of the paper directing the bureaucracy “to expand the utilization of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, in all sectors of national activity.” He held that the 
command should promote the “domestic manufacture, eventual and future, of peaceful 
nuclear artifacts … [in] activities genuinely for economic development.” Though the 
justification was economic, the objectives were diplomatic: 
It is imperative that the document includes, among longer-term objectives, one of 
the forms of application of nuclear energy that the Brazilian Government strives 
 359 
to preserve in international negotiations and to which it attaches special 
importance.797 
President Costa e Silva objected that such an explicit declaration was “redundant and 
aggressive, [and] without necessity” since the policy definition was a “given” and Brazil 
neither agreed nor would agree to such curtailments on its rights. Magalhães Pinto 
nonetheless desired official confirmation of exactly what rights were preserved, lamenting 
that the president “kn[e]w what [was] happening in Geneva,” where Brazil was feeling 
“great pressure from the big powers.” His request was not made on military grounds; 
rather, he recited the prevailing narrative of the Nuclear Age. “[T]he world is on the 
threshold of a great revolution,” he cautioned,;“[w]e cannot miss it.”  
Military thinking was not absent though. General Edmundo de Macedo Soares e 
Silva summed up the inseparability of nuclear activities with peaceful purposes from those 
of military import by analogizing with prohibitions against poison gases after the First 
World War to argue against including “peaceful purposes:” 
“Peaceful purposes” reminds me of an observation I heard once from the Ministry 
of External Relations of Yugoslavia, before the bolshevization, in Geneva, where 
the problem of the use of gases was being discussed. A document was then being 
elaborated to prohibit the use of gases, and the Minister of External Relations of 
Yugoslavia said the following: “If a country is attacked, and for its defense it needs 
to use gases, no document will prevent it from doing it.”  
He accordingly concluded that forswearing the military option was  “an illusion;” “[i]t 
will not be for our days … but it may become an imperative of national security.” 
Macedo Soares’s opinion was the consensus in the council. Army Minister General 
Auerlio Lira Tavares reflected on his own experiences after the Second World War, when 
the Nazi regime was shown to have transformed perfume makers into “factories of war 
instruments.” Given that military organizations must stand vigilant against “technical 
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surprise[s],” he asserted, “no country … can be unmindful of the evolution of 
technology.” Magalhães Pinto supported a threshold capacity, noting that “in case of any 
emergency we would be able to use what we already possess.” President Costa e Silva’s 
reply was crisp: “Obviously.” 
Magalhães Pinto therefore pushed for an explicit reference to Brazil’s “sovereign 
right” to conduct explosions for peaceful purposes. Although the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
contained a prohibition of nuclear explosives for “war purposes,” PNEs were technically 
legal. “Even so,” he warned, “there is strong international pressure” in Geneva to reverse 
the precedent in the nonproliferation treaty and a failure to imbed a reference in 
Brazilian nuclear policy would subject his diplomats to “much stronger pressure.” Costa e 
Silva agreed, acknowledging that the Treaty of Tlatelolco had “allowed us to go to 
Geneva and also defend our sovereign right as a country to deal with this subject as an 
international power without any restriction.” Although a final decision was not taken at 
the meeting, Brazil continually reaffirmed a right to peaceful explosives in Geneva and 
New York City.  
As governments around the world debated their position on various provisions in 
a nonproliferation treaty, the safeguards controversy wended its way through the United 
States, Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, NATO, and Euratom. A co-
chairmen’s’ meeting in Geneva on September 1 between Foster and Roshchin 
demonstrated that the Gordian knot of Article III still required untangling. Roshchin 
praised the “informal meetings” of Bunn and Timerbaev that had enabled the Soviet 
delegation to put forward a new Article III more palatable to the U.S. and its Euratom 
allies because it permitted states to negotiate with the IAEA “individually or together with 
others states.” Nevertheless, a litany of concerns remained: the stated purpose, a reference 
to Euratom, whether safeguards would apply to facilities or “source or special fissionable 
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materials,” protections for technological development and nuclear trade, and whether the 
guillotine clause would fall after 18 or 36 months.”798 The Soviet version was more 
ambitious regarding the scope of safeguards, authorizing the IAEA to oversee “all source 
or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such 
state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out by it anywhere.”799 An explicit legal reference 
to Euratom was still anathema to the Eastern bloc. In private conversations with Bernard 
de Chalvron, the French observer in Geneva, an East German minister fulminated 
against Euratom since it “contained only members of NATO and constituted an 
association under Bonn’s firm control.”800 Members of the Disarmament Agency, 
Seaborg, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed Bunn to finalize the safeguards language 
before the Political Committee of the UNGA met in November.801  
The European Community’s Council of Ministers met in Brussels on October 2 
and 3. Foster was anxious for a consensus on safeguards and security assurances lest non-
aligned states exploit a blank slate in New York City. He worried that awaiting a final 
decision would impede the co-chairmen’s ability to broker a compromise.802 With France 
neutral, the remaining five Euratom members failed to formulate their own safeguards 
article. West German officials found the European Communities less supportive than 
hoped. Italian representatives were like-minded and Belgian officials cooperative, but 
neither was willing to derail negotiations. The remaining members wanted a treaty more 
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than an unfettered Euratom.803 The inauguration of the Nuclear Planning Group may 
have been responsible; McNamara inferred that whereas European allies once pled for 
more nuclear emplacements, they had now arrived at “the opposite extreme;” “[t]hey are 
scared to death of the use of nuclear weapons.”804 Instead, the European Communities 
issued an aide-mémoire listing five principles. First, NPT safeguards would apply to 
“source and special fissionable material and not to facilities.” Second, Euratom and the 
IAEA would conclude an agreement on safeguard implementation directly. Third, 
existing supply agreements between Euratom, or its member states, and second parties 
(most importantly the U.S.) would not be affected in the interim. Fourth, the international 
agency would verify the safeguards administered by Euratom rather than apply its own. 
Finally, the conclusion of negotiations should not conform to a deadline.805 
White House officials feared unleashing a nationalistic backlash if the article 
deviated excessively from the principles fought for by West Germany. While the Social 
Democrats (SDP) downplayed the impact of a nonproliferation accord on West German 
interests, leaders of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union 
(CSU) parties were staunchly opposed. Finance Minister Strauss denounced a treaty as “a 
U.S.-Soviet “deal” made behind Germany’s back and at her expense.”806 Rostow warned 
Johnson that they needed to persuade the Soviets to acquiesce to a role for Euratom in a 
future safeguard regime so as not to “give the Germans an excuse for rejecting the 
Treaty,” which would “seriously damage our relations with them.” Failure to achieve 
                                                
803 Dean Rusk, Memorandum to President Lyndon Johnson, “Status of NPT Negotiations,” undated, 
FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XI, Doc. 218, 534. 
804 Tom Johnson, Notes, “President’s Meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Helms, and Christian,” 3 
October 1967, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, LBJL, 3.  
805 Dean Rusk, Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Posts, “Status US-Soviet NPT 
Safeguards Negotiations,” 11 November 1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XI, Doc. 216, 524-529. 
806 Walt Rostow, Memorandum to President Lyndon Johnson, “Germany and the N.P.T.,” 7 November 
1967, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XI, Doc. 215, 523. 
 363 
consensus with Soviet officials, on the other hand, risked the General Assembly session 
intervening, which could delay a treaty by as much as a year, if not kill it outright.”807 
The United States thus walked a tightrope between West German fears of its 
marginalization and Soviet resolve to close backdoors to nuclearization in Europe.  
The co-chairmen’s ability to control the nuclear agenda hinged on the resolution 
of the safeguard controversy. Foster and Dobrynin exchanged views on the acceptability 
of neutral amendments in early October. Though they deemed the majority impractical 
and Dobrynin waved aside any changes to treaty’s duration or its amendment 
procedures, some of the Mexican proposals were “possibly acceptable.”808 On November 
2, Foster explained to Dobrynin that Soviet willingness to accept safeguards on their own 
peaceful activities might secure the goodwill of European parties. He then presented a 
version of the ad referendum formula for Soviet review that West German officials had 
accepted that day. The refined language dismantled the guillotine clause and kept 
Euratom safeguards, but made the IAEA the final arbiter of compliance through an 
adversarial system of inspections of the flow of fissile materials. Time was running out 
before the Political Committee met to review issues relating to disarmament. Pushing the 
agenda back would give neutral states an opening to push for more amendments in 
Geneva and at the upcoming Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapons States sponsored by 
Pakistan. Foster nevertheless would not compromise on “IAEA safeguards,” nor would 
Dobrynin budge on duration or amendment.809 However, Soviet interest was genuine 
because of a nonproliferation treaty’s stabilizing effects in the developing world. Dobrynin 
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wondered if “Indian and Brazil would go along with the NPT.” Foster was uncertain, but 
suggested that security assurances were probably the best hope.810  
Alas, the Indian position had hardened alongside that of Brazil. Canadian High 
Commissioner James George called on Indian authorities in early December, leaning on 
them to accept a treaty lest they jeopardize Canadian aid and nuclear assistance. The 
coercion and Indian elites’ reactions were symptomatic of growing North-South tensions 
in the nuclear realm. When George delivered an ultimatum to R. Jaipal, the Indian joint 
secretary wryly asked, “[a]m I to assume the Americans will be in to see me on Monday 
and the Russians immediately after them?” Foreign Secretary Dayal’s response was 
meanwhile so cantankerous that George called it “shocking.” Brushing aside the threat of 
aid suspension, Dayal reportedly avowed that “India would never give up an iota of its 
hard-fought independence by signing the NPT.” Prime Minister Gandhi was less prickly 
but equally frank. She maintained that the Chinese and Pakistani threats were reason 
enough to keep her options open and questioned the real worth of security assurances:  
If the Americans want to come to our aid against an attack by the Chinese they 
will, even if they don’t sign the NPT. And if they don’t want to come to our aid, 
they won’t even if we do sign the treaty.  
George surmised that Indian Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Dr. Vikram 
Sarabhai, whom he characterized as a “nationalist first and scientist second,” was “the 
primary architect of [the Indian government’s] position on [the] NPT.” Sarabhai 
evidently visited Gandhi weekly and spoke to her via telephone many times a day.811  
George’s judgment of the chairman’s “emotional and somewhat irrational position on 
[the] NPT” teemed with the feminized adjectives typical of Western prejudices against 
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Asian men. In truth, Sarabhai would more likely have agreed with Dayal’s rationale: 
“India’s political leaders held in sacred patrimony the freedom of future generations.”812 
As India rebuffed George’s threats, Soviet and U.S. officials tried to bypass the 
safeguards obstruction, but continued to founder on the shoals of West Germany. Foster 
cautioned Washington from his vantage “as a Co-Chairman,” that “we are now being 
asked to fight mainly for the interests of only one of our allies, as against our own national 
interests and those of the most of the rest of our allies and most of the rest of the 
world.”813 Neither West Germany nor Italy would acquiesce to a formulation that made 
the IAEA the regime’s sole watchdog and regular meetings of the NAC failed to break the 
impasse.814 Rusk believed that preserving Euratom’s prerogatives was not in the country’s 
“long range interest … as far as the countries outside of Euratom are concerned.”815 
However, the European variable complicated the global calculus: to contain nuclear 
weapons, the country jeopardized its strategy of Soviet containment centering on Berlin.  
On December 2, Johnson offered to place the nation’s non-military nuclear 
facilities under international safeguards, which Brandt lauded as a “significant step.” On 
the same day, the president sent a letter to Kiesinger urging the chancellor to display 
flexibility and accept the November 2 formulation whose substance the Soviets had 
accepted with the lone exception of a desired reference to “IAEA safeguards.” In a White 
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House meeting on December 5, Rusk expressed “doubts” that progress was possible since 
the safeguards article caused Bonn such “political problems.”816 George McGhee, the 
U.S. Ambassador in Bonn, echoed these misgivings. He feared that political dissension 
within the governing coalition could have disastrous results and warned that Johnson 
might have to choose “between the NPT and keeping Germany as an ally.”817 Though 
Kiesinger refrained from sending “a stiff letter on the NPT,” the letter that arrived on 
December 8 made clear that the Soviet wording was unacceptable. The president did not 
press the matter. The ball was now firmly in the Soviet court.  
The superpowers temporized in Geneva and New York City in hopes that a 
solution would materialize. In early November, Foster noted that disarmament hearings 
would occupy the Political Committee for some time, but contended that a Soviet draft 
convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons would only exacerbate Soviet-
American differences.818 In the end, the convention hearing occupied the Political 
Committee through mid-December, when the ENDC dissolved without a consensus 
treaty and the UNGA commenced debates on how to break the deadlock. Soviet 
Ambassador Vasilii Kuznetsov leaned on Indian and U.A.R. representatives at the U.N. 
to co-sponsor a resolution with the U.S. and U.S.S.R. requesting that the ENDC present 
a full draft treaty to the General Assembly in the spring. The French ambassador noted 
that neither Arab nor socialist states “could fully explain the Soviet delegation’s insistence 
on concluding this project in accordance with the U.S. delegation.”819 Soviet officials 
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seemed chastened by a “gang-up” of non-nuclear states against the superpowers in the 
UNGA.820 The General Assembly nonetheless passed Resolution 2346 A (XXII) 
requesting submission of a full report by March 15, 1968. With the Conference of Non-
Nuclear Weapons States postponed until August, the superpowers had barely managed to 
retain control over the proceedings. Soviet officials warned though that “endless 
negotiations” had formed “more opponents than supporters of the treaty.” The Soviet 
counselor in the Washington embassy estimated that only a couple of months remained 
during which a successful outcome for the treaty remained viable; “after that it might be 
too late.”  
 
Conclusion 
Even though the course of negotiations in 1967 failed to resolve the safeguards 
controversy, the contours of a widely acceptable nonproliferation treaty had emerged. 
The safeguards controversy was a barometer of improving Soviet-American relations 
amid the Vietnam War thanks to greater trust through dialogue and fraternization at the 
diplomatic middle ground in Geneva. The Six Day War exemplified fears that the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into postcolonial battlegrounds where containment was 
increasingly under threat would draw the superpowers into a general war whose 
escalation might occasion the strategic-level use of weapons of mass destruction. Eastern 
and Western policymakers were less successful in allaying India’s security anxieties in the 
context of China’s growing capabilities. In the absence of a Soviet-American accord on a 
mutually acceptable Article III, the non-aligned members of the ENDC, and in particular 
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the Mexican delegation, succeeded in proffering new amendments to nudge the compact 
under consideration in the direction of a more equitable undertaking reflecting traditional 
conceptions of liberal international based on sovereign equality. The nonproliferation 
draft treaty would ultimately reflect these efforts, which proved critical to winning the 
support of the greater international community at the United Nations in 1968.  
The next chapter concludes the history of the making of the nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty. The Soviet and American delegations tabled a comprehensive 
draft together on January 18, 1968, ushering in a frantic and fateful stage of negotiations 
at the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament and, subsequently, the United 
Nations Political Committee and General Assembly. The views of potential 
irreconcilables among the nuclear have-nots such as Brazil and India were in tension with 
the superpowers’ self-imposed constraints in regards to security assurances and their 
unwillingness to permit the indigenous development of peaceful nuclear explosives. The 
battle to guide resolutions through the General Assembly and the Security Council to 
endorse the draft treaty and obligate the nuclear-armed members of the council to tackle 
nuclear threats in an expedient manner, respectively, met significant resistance from 
Latin American and African states. The French attitude toward the legal precedents set 
by the treaty and the related assurances resolution was potentially decisive in view of its 
veto on the Security Council. The fate of the treaty and the global nuclear order it 
authorized thus hinged on French and non-aligned misgivings about a legal regime 
empowered to discriminate among nation-states according to their status as legitimate or 
illegitimate nuclear powers. 
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Chapter Six | “Upon All Mankind:” Final Negotiations for the 
NPT 
 
“The Secretary added that there are few people who truly understand the real meaning of nuclear war – 
perhaps not more than 25 or 30 in the U.S.. Kuznetsov said that the Soviet Union understood it very well. 
The NPT had been under the highest consideration in the USSR which had concluded that the NPT 
negotiations were of the highest importance and the only way to stop proliferation. He returned to the 
importance of solidarity between the US and Soviet Union…” 
 
U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Ambassador Vasilii Kuznetsov, 17 May 1968, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 239, 
602.  
Introduction: Power and Prohibition   
International negotiations for a nonproliferation treaty had accelerated once the 
MLF roadblock was removed. The diplomatic lines of action now ran increasingly along 
North-South lines as the two superpowers strove to ward off the arrival of nuclear 
weapons in Cold War hot spots while appeasing allies whose interests were diverging 
from postwar patrons as the specter of superpower conflict faded and their nuclear sectors 
expanded. The implicit compromise in the draft treaty’s non-dissemination and non-
acquisition articles allowed consultative arrangements in NATO nuclear-sharing 
arrangements, but scrapped a multilateral nuclear force and equivocated about a united 
European deterrent. These articles thus largely settled questions relating to Cold War 
nuclear security and the German question. A fusion of nuclear deterrence, international 
organizations, and arms control would preserve the peace by replacing common security 
with a delicate alloy of nuclear terror and prohibition. The negotiation of issues relating 
to a nonproliferation treaty now centered less on the East-West standoff and more on 
security assurances for states that forwent the military option, a level playing field for 
nuclear exporters and importers, and the fairness of what would inevitably be a 
discriminatory order of nuclear privileges. These matters necessitated a more attentive 
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hearing of the views of non-aligned states from the Global South and, in the end, the 
resolution of how an elegantly imperfect treaty could be made universal, durable, and 
just.   
The Soviet and U.S. delegations tabled a full draft treaty on January 18, 1968, 
inaugurating a final eventful phase of international efforts to shape a global nuclear order. 
The feat elicited widespread astonishment at the depth of Soviet-American cooperation 
and ran into trouble as soon as it was formalized. With a Conference of Non-Nuclear 
State set to begin in late summer, the superpower needed to stay on the same page as 
allied and non-aligned states sought to modify or thwart a treaty’s composition. Among 
Western powers, Japan, Italy, and West Germany voiced concerns, making requests for 
greater “flexibility” in the treaty’s procedures and regular conferences to review its 
performance. In the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, non-aligned 
delegations won changes to Articles IV, V, and VI, together with review conferences to 
occur every five years. These revisions failed to dispel criticisms of irreconcilables such as 
India and Brazil, whose demands for a formal right to develop peaceful nuclear explosives 
and for binding security assurances went unmet. Soviet and United States leaders 
anticipated Indian and Brazilian opposition at a special session of the United Nations 
General Assembly in April and planned to “isolate” near-nuclears in New York City. 
Brazil, India, and West Germany failed to assure the critical mass needed to delay or foil 
the proceedings. Nevertheless, the skepticism of large Latin American and African blocs 
in the UNGA called into doubt whether a resolution endorsing the draft treaty could 
receive enough favorable votes to signify international consensus. 
The United States and the Soviet Union offered guarantees and revisions while 
exerting considerable pressure on recalcitrant states to ensure a successful vote in the 
Political Committee and General Assembly. Mexican acquiescence was the key to Latin 
 371 
American votes. Its procurement required the adoption of a new set of textual changes 
advocated by Mexican Deputy Secretary Alfonso García Robles that reaffirmed the U.N. 
Charter’s principles of peaceful conflict resolution and the rule of law while also 
expediting and expanding rights to peaceful nuclear technology. The African bloc 
conditioned their backing on a renewed U.N. debate on the issue of South African 
interference in South West Africa, but settled for assurances that Pretoria would vote in 
favor of the resolution. The Soviet ambassador brought the U.A.R. and the rest of the 
Arab world on board by making similar pledges in regards to Israel. The Soviet-
American strategy was to hold the line against further amendments. However, it nearly 
fell apart when U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk acceded to West German requests to 
delay the vote until after the Conference of Non-Nuclear States. U.S. Disarmament 
Agency Director William Foster’s threat to resign in protest compelled Rusk to walk back 
the concession. The Soviets and Americans were still obliged to weaken the resolution, 
altering it to commend rather than endorse the treaty, in order to persuade three-fourths 
of the assembly to vote in favor. The UNGA resolution paved the way for the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to open for signature on July 1, 1968, though 
not before irreconcilables had one last chance to voice their displeasure. A debate over 
placing nuclear security assurances under the aegis of the Security Council called 
attention to the Pandora’s box that might open by empowering permanent members with 
nuclear arsenals to preside over a global order founded on nuclear prohibitions. 
 
Resolution and Resistance 
With the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament set to reconvene in 
Geneva on January 18, 1968, the superpowers worked full-heartedly for an agreement. 
The Kremlin had concluded that nuclear risks in Asia and the opportunity to bind West 
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Germany more tightly to its non-nuclear status made an imperfect deal better than none 
at all, or one further weakened by neutralist influence. The key non-nuclear players—
Brazil, India, and West Germany—seemed increasing aligned against a treaty and Soviet-
American clout risked evaporating on account of a growing affinity among nuclear have-
nots, exemplified by the Conference of Non-Nuclear States scheduled for August. As a 
consequence, the two Cold War rivals worked to coordinate their negotiating strategies. 
Washington started to believe that Moscow was more intent on global nonproliferation 
that on weakening NATO. Though the East-West conflict remained operative, China’s 
nuclearization and the Six Day War had reoriented Soviet focus from a “parochial 
concern” with West Germany to “a broader view” to “minimize on [a] global basis 
prospects for hostilities involving nuclear weapons … by halting [the] further spread of 
nuclear weapons into possible contentious areas.” Moscow was accordingly ready to 
accept a treaty “largely on [U.S.] terms.”821  
The final resolution of the safeguards controversy occurred after the New Year. 
The Soviet Foreign Ministry felt that U.S. insistence on the November 2 version entailed 
an “ultimatum,” though U.S. Disarmament Agency officials evidently convinced their 
Soviet interlocutors that they “did not envisage merely paper verifications.”822 Soviet 
diplomats in Washington and Geneva thus worked to soothe Moscow’s fears that 
Washington’s line was in truth a “pressure play.” Vuli Vorontsov of the Soviet embassy in 
Washington served as a go-between in early 1968. He advised Disarmament Agency 
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Assistant Director Samuel De Palma that Moscow was amenable to capping the treaty’s 
duration at 25 years and clarifying that amendments would bind only those states parties 
accepting them. By contrast, Soviet policy vis-à-vis the Japanese suggestion of periodic 
review conferences remained unsettled. The Politburo would decide the Soviet position 
on Article III, though, according to Vorontsov, its political preoccupations would make it 
“exceedingly difficult to deal with an essentially technical question.”823  
Japanese attitudes toward the safeguards article were as crucial as they were 
complex. Tokyo played a double game so that any exemptions won by Euratom would 
redound to its benefit, while striving to ward off an eventuality in which Western Europe 
gained the upper hand over the Japanese nuclear industry.824 Presidential adviser John J. 
McCloy worried in a letter to Foster, who was convalescing in a Maryland hospital after a 
cardiac episode, that a settlement of the pivotal article would prove impossible. Working 
out its “complexities” and assigning “the proper relationship between the IAEA, 
Euratom, the Japanese, and other non-European non-nuclears,” McCloy confessed, was 
going to be a “close-run thing.”825 
In fact, a final agreement remained in doubt on the morning that the Eighteen 
Nation Committee on Disarmament was set to resume. However the Politburo made its 
decision, the Soviet delegation in Geneva received instructions early on January 18 to 
inform their U.S. counterparts that Moscow had accepted the November 2 version of the 
safeguards article. The delay was deliberate so that Johnson could not report the coup 
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during his State of the Union address to Congress.826 Nevertheless, after months of 
squabbling, the superpowers had agreed on a four-paragraph construction that made the 
IAEA the superintendent of global nuclear activities. A Soviet colleague wrote Foster in 
the hospital to proclaim his sentiment that “this was the greatest achievement between the 
Soviet Union and the United States which had taken place since World War II.” Foster 
was “inclined to agree.”827 The article did not specify “IAEA safeguards;” rather, the 
fourth paragraph specified the conclusion of agreements with the IAEA by states parties, 
“individually or together with other states,” in accordance with the agency’s statute. The 
formulation allowed Euratom to devise in consultation with the Vienna watchdog an 
adversarial program of audits of fissile-material accounting and external inspection in 
case of discrepancy.   
There were also changes to articles and clauses that pertained to the amendment 
procedure, duration, review conferences, and withdrawal terms of the treaty. At the 
behest of NATO allies, the U.S. had curtailed the power of treaty amendments by 
making adherence voluntary, setting the duration at 25 years, and mandating a review 
conference five years after the treaty went into force. The Soviets had not budged on 
periodic review conferences though and in recompense for their concessions had stripped 
out the withdrawal clause.828 Robert Kranich of the U.S. Disarmament Agency believed 
that the compromise had worked out in the West’s favor. In a Washington sit-down, he 
informed West German embassy official Adolph von Wagner that the U.S.S.R. had been 
persuaded by U.S. resolve, the broad and vocal “dissatisfaction of the non-nuclear 
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countries as expressed during the last [UN]GA” and appreciation for the need to 
conclude a treaty speedily “because of the possibility of proliferation elsewhere in the 
world.” According to von Wagner, the F.R.G. was reluctant to pledge their signature on 
and ratification of the treaty before the Euratom-IAEA relationship clarified further 
following bilateral talks. Kranich reminded von Wagner that deliberations were not 
finished yet and Washington would continue to press for security assurances, protections 
for peaceful applications of nuclear energy, as well as regular conferences to review the 
treaty’s efficacy and legitimacy.829 
In Brussels, U.S. Ambassador Harlan Cleveland briefed the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) on the turn of events. Reviewing the document “article by article,” 
Cleveland underscored that “easy access to peaceful nuclear technology … [and] steps to 
halt [the] nuclear arms race … were of special interest to non-nuclear-weapons states,” 
neglecting the signficance of security assurances. Mexico’s interventions had been pivotal 
in adding “Articles IV, … V, VI, and VII” to the joint draft treaty. The fourth article 
elevated the statement in the preamble “concerning freedom of access to peaceful nuclear 
technology” to a binding commitment, which he claimed had received “broad NAC 
support;” the next three articles, including “Article VI,” which similarly “reiterated [the] 
preambular idea of ending [the] nuclear arms race and working towards disarmament,” 
had also “not been controversial in [the] NAC.” The “major change,” though, was 
limiting the treaty’s lifespan to 25 years. Though a comparatively faraway terminus for an 
international treaty, the U.S. had wanted an unlimited duration before it “had been 
induced … [by] wide-spread support among [their] allies” to accept the quarter-century 
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mark.830 The joint Soviet-American draft thus entailed a largely complete document. 
Canadian ambassador Ross Campbell rose to comment that even though new 
modifications should receive “full consideration,” those “favored by few should be treated 
accordingly.”831  
The West German and Italian ambassadors, Wilhelm Grewe and Baron Carol de 
Ferrariis Salzano, were handed the document before the meeting in order to allow them 
to solicit their capitals’ views. In contrast to Campbell, Grewe implored that the views of 
the non-aligned “be weighted and not counted,” a testament to the growing alignment of 
F.R.G. interests with those of non-aligned skeptics. Cleveland nonetheless adjudged the 
German reaction “comparatively forthcoming;” the “comparatively upbeat” response by 
de Ferrariis, on the other hand, was a “solo flight.” Just the day before, the Italians had 
submitted a raft of new measures. Although they portrayed them as designed to address 
the conjoined quandaries of “credibility” and alleged nuclear “imperialism,” they were 
tailor-made to delay the NPT: a requirement that 80 rather than 40 states ratify before 
entry into force, lower barriers to entry for new amendments, and the exclusion of IAEA 
officials from the review conference.832 De Ferrariis let slip that the Italian Foreign 
Ministry had received news of the “sudden tabling … “in [a] state of shock,” auguring a 
continuing struggle among U.S. allies and non-aligned states that could endanger the 
international consensus behind a treaty.833  
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The time had now come for non-aligned states to weigh in at Geneva and New 
York City. The tabling of the joint Soviet-American draft nonproliferation treaty on 
January 18, 1968, inaugurated an eventful phase of multilateral nuclear diplomacy. The 
divergent views of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” (allied and nonaligned) were now the 
most important divide in the plenary debates with the March 15 deadline looming. From 
his hospital room, Foster sent a letter congratulating the Geneva negotiating team and the 
Disarmament Agency more generally for the achievement. He deemed them “more 
directly responsible for getting the draft actually approved than any other element.”834 
After five years of orchestrating a viable treaty with U.S. bureaucrats, NATO allies, 
communist rivals, and non-aligned states, such plaudits were well-earned. Now, the U.S. 
delegation in Geneva faced the challenge of endowing the nonproliferation pact with the 
global legitimacy that only the participation of a broad and representative segment of 
international society could confer. Unfortunately, “the many influences which appeared 
to be directed toward holding [a treaty] back” were now fully roused. The Italians were 
not the only ones stunned by the breakthrough. French observer Bernard de Chalvron 
noted a fraught tone when neutral and non-nuclear delegates spoke in the corridors of the 
Palais des Nations, writing to Paris that “the news caused some astonishment among 
[those] who do not share the two co-presidents’ optimism.”835 Foster also noted a climate 
of disquiet in a letter to Samuel De Palma in which he expressed the hope that treaty 
skeptics, including “our ‘principal’ partners here (Italy and West Germany),” were 
“feeling an increasing sense of isolation.” He divulged that the “approach of our ‘friends’ 
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to the south (Mexico and Brazil)” was “one of the great puzzles and disappointments to 
me;” nevertheless, he expected they would “eventually come around.”836  
The committee had less than two months to discuss and revise the draft before the 
United Nations General Assembly subjected it to collective scrutiny. U.N. Secretary 
General U Thant addressed a message to the opening plenary urging the deliberative 
body swiftly to conclude a treaty, which signified “an indispensable first step towards 
further progress on disarmament.”837 Notwithstanding the U.N.’s imprimatur, the first 
proposal of a complete draft treaty marked neither the end of inter-alliance strife, nor the 
capitulation of non-aligned states and nuclear have-nots. De Chalvron spoke with the 
West German spokesman that day. Though West Germany was satisfied “with progress 
to date,” the Frenchman likened the suggestion that the treaty still needed improvements 
to “delaying tactics.” Moreover, de Chalvron noted that Euratom’s “hopes” of assuring 
some measure of nuclear autonomy meant that Bonn and Rome would continue to 
prevail upon Paris to eschew its veto in the European Communities.838  
The Kiesinger government was in fact riven by discord among its top ministers. 
Foreign Minister Brandt and the Social Democrats regarded a treaty as a disarmament 
instrument consonant with an incipient policy of Ostpolitik to widen contacts with Eastern 
Europe in order to improve relations with the communist world. Conversely, Finance 
Minister Strauss, whose Christian Democrats were equally crucial to the governing 
coalition, continued his vociferous attacks against the treaty. According to de Chalvron, 
the Soviet-American settlement had astounded West German officials. Apparently, Bonn 
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had originally agreed to the November 2 formulation in fear of losing its credibility on 
Ostpolitik and in expectation of a refusal by Moscow.839 The mood was accordingly “heavy 
and despondent” when the Federal Republic’s National Defense Council met on January 
22. Kiesinger and Brandt resolved that the government would support the treaty 
publically so as to “prove not only its support for non-proliferation but [also] that it is a 
good ally.” Strauss, on the other hand, “forcefully” called for the government to reject the 
NPT, but he was in the minority; Kiesinger preferred to focus on maximizing a treaty’s 
“flexibility” with reference to periodic review conferences, limited duration, and tough 
standards for renewal.840 Bonn still suspected Moscow’s motives though, even in regards 
to its alteration the revision procedures, whose implications should have pleased the West 
Germans. In a conversation with French Ambassador François Seydoux, West German 
Disarmament Minister Schnippenkoetter wondered aloud at the Soviets’ intentions, 
surmising that their acquiescence to a 25-year horizon was merely a ploy to blunt the 
criticism of troublesome allies such as Romania.841  
The specter of a French veto in Euratom or the United Nations Security Council 
loomed. In regards to the merits of a nonproliferation treaty, French rhetoric and raison 
d’état pointed in opposite directions. De Gaulle did not want a German state (against 
which France had fought twice that century) to acquire the ultimate weapon. Far better 
that Paris possess the sole force de frappe on the continent, leaving Bonn the junior partner 
in European politics and security. De Gaulle’s governing principles were at odds with his 
regional interests though. The Gaullist “grand design” valorized the myth of French 
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grandeur while expounding a universal theory of world politics based on a “European 
Europe” and sovereign autonomy in matters of state and especially nuclear and defense 
policy.842 The Delphic auguries emanating from Paris puzzled Europe watchers in 
Washington. They worried that de Gaulle wanted to “wreck the NPT,” “or at least try to 
prevent German adherence to it.” Defense Minister Pierre Messmer and de Gaulle had 
recently issued proclamations casting the treaty as irrelevant to disarmament and inimical 
to nuclear have-nots’ interests because it would only force them “to tie themselves closer 
to the nuclear powers.” French Gaullists evidently feared that a “new Yalta” would arise 
from Soviet-American détente after the Six Days’ War.  
De Gaulle delivered a speech to the French War College on January 27 that 
encapsulated his pessimistic views on the likelihood of stemming nuclear spread. He 
predicted that Japan would soon shift from an economic focus to enhancing its political 
capital by pursuing “commensurate military power,” including the construction of a 
nuclear deterrent.843 De Gaulle’s ambivalence toward a new global nuclear order was 
apparent when the Quai d’Orsay circulated a telegram to its embassies in ENDC 
member states on February 3. In it, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs outlined 
current French thinking. Counter to U.S. assumptions, it portrayed the German question 
in NATO as largely settled, but nonetheless criticized the prospect of a Soviet-American 
condominium in the nuclear domain. The circular reiterated the Gaullist maxim that 
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each country was free to determine its own defensive arrangements and international 
commitments. Having transgressed international norms to build their own nuclear 
arsenal, the French were loath to infringe on state sovereignty lest they seem hypocritical: 
It is in this spirit that we scrupulously abstain from participation in the ongoing 
discussions, irrespective of the body in which they unfold, being understood that 
the treaty could have no relevance to our policy.844 
The political implications, however, belied the anti-treaty rhetoric. Abstention was in fact 
tantamount to acquiescence since the policy barred the use of the French veto. And, in 
truth, French authorities reassured Soviet diplomats visiting Paris that they were working 
“behind the scenes to get Germany to sign,” and had no intention of otherwise 
obstructing the proceedings.845 In bilateral talks, Paris had made it “abundantly clear” to 
Bonn that it was expected to sign the treaty.846 The Quai d’Orsay would nevertheless 
review its position as talks edged toward a denouement. 
Momentum had started to build at the Eighteen Nation Committee on 
Disarmament for some amendments as non-aligned and non-nuclear members sought a 
fairer bargain. On February 8, Alva Myrdal of Sweden took the rostrum to discuss the 
question of how a nonproliferation treaty ought to relate to broader concerns about the 
nuclear arms race: 
How can we—the non-nuclear-weapon States—be expected to enter into an 
interminable obligation to remain non-nuclear if the nuclear-weapon States are 
engaged in an interminable nuclear escalation? This question is really not one, as 
has sometimes been said rather reproachfully, of seeking any quid pro quo. It is a 
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question of the whole atmosphere, of perspective; and it cannot be concealed that 
the atmosphere of confidence was greater two years ago than it is today.847 
Though most non-nuclear delegates expressed their pleasure upon seeing the inclusion of 
Article VI, whose language Mexico had proposed the previous fall, Myrdal pointed out 
that the Soviet and American authors had redacted key clauses, for example, “with all 
speed and perseverance,” “to arrive at further agreements,” and to seek “the prohibition 
of all nuclear-weapon tests.” She proposed more modest replacements. The words “at an 
early date,” should “introduc[e] once more the sense of urgency which we all feel presses 
for further measures to halt the nuclear arms race.” In addition, to include the word 
“nuclear” before “disarmament” would underline the paramount hazard posed by such 
cataclysmic weapons. Finally, she urged that the committee add a new paragraph 
referencing a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) to the preamble. The majority of 
nuclear have-nots endorsed the Swedish amendments. Bunn accordingly believed that 
Myrdal’s amendments ought to be integrated in the final text in order to ease the 
accession of Sweden whose lead other non-aligned states might follow.848  
The attitudes of many nuclear have-nots were still murky. There was of course 
considerable variation among the seventeen delegations in Geneva. In the Ethiopian 
delegate’s phrasing, there seemed “as many ways of looking at this treaty as there are 
member nations.” Nevertheless, the nuclear have-nots increasingly besieged the haves.849 
Bunn and Vorontsov spoke on February 15 in an effort to resolve the variance between 
the Kosygin proposal and the U.S. preference for a broader non-use pledge in a treaty, 
which would provide for nuclear guarantees to those states lacking nuclear weapons as 
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well as the military assistance of a nuclear-weapon state. The prominent stage afforded 
“disgruntled ENDC members,” and most frustratingly Romania, from which to express 
their grievances irked Vorontsov, who went so far as to suggest that the major players’ 
foreign ministers fly in to finish the work. The Romanians had recently broken Warsaw 
Pact ranks to lament the absence of security assurances and “legal obligations” for 
disarmament. U.S. negotiators had their own problem allies. The NAC meeting on 
February 14 to discuss the Italian proposals of the previous month was the most intense to 
date.850 Afterward, Rome seemed chastened and, a week later, its representative outlined 
four relatively modest and constructive amendments: a right to fissile materials, 
quinquennial review conferences, clearer language with reference to the treaty’s 25-year 
duration, and a six-month waiting period upon notification of withdrawal.  
After the Italian address, the non-aligned grouping met to discuss how “to hasten 
the work” and “clear out the underbrush” for a final draft.851 Indian diplomats were hard 
at work in and out of Geneva trying to marshal a “non-signing bloc” of West Germany, 
Japan, Sweden, and Italy “that swapped arguments against the treaty and regularly 
consulted at a high level on what stands to take.”852 Close coordination was of course still 
occurring between the Soviet and American delegations, who consulted on how to 
achieve a consensus draft treaty with minimal revisions. Vorontsov preferred “to finish 
the text in Geneva and oppose any changes at the UNGA,” but Bunn was more cautious. 
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Though he concurred that such a tactic fitted Soviet and U.S. interests, it was improbable 
that a draft treaty would come through New York City without alterations.853  
Security guarantees were the crux of negotiations and ultimately the grounds for 
Indian disavowal. British Disarmament Minister Fred Mulley confessed in an early 
plenary that the conspicuous lacuna of security assurances epitomized the many 
unresolved issues of particular importance to the Global South.854 The granting of 
security guarantees, whether positive in terms of pledging support in case of nuclear 
threat, or negative in terms of eschewing the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
signatories, were critical to Indian acceptance. They also split Western opinion with 
respect to the basis on which the treaty could win the most support. The U.S. could ill 
afford more military commitments with its forces increasingly mired in Vietnam. Nor 
would the Pentagon accept the Kosygin proposal, which would leave those European 
territories, most alarmingly West Germany, that hosted U.S. nuclear weapons uncovered. 
De Palma informed Roshchin on February 19 that his government would not acquiesce 
to a non-use pledge that left its NATO allies so exposed.  
Time and indoctrination had caused Indian strategic nuclear culture to mature 
and harden, which made weak assurances decreasingly viable. In 1968, the “great-power 
military strategic jargon” of “assured second-strike capability[s]” and “credible first-strike 
scenario[s]” were on the lips of educated elites in Bombay and New Delhi, who 
increasingly doubted that the U.S., or the U.S.S.R., would come to India’s aid in the 
event of a nuclear-tipped clash with Mao’s China. According to an American visitor, 
Indian elites then regularly invoked the cautionary lessons of West European insecurity 
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during the Berlin and Cuban crises as well as French nuclear strategist Pierre Gallois’s 
strategic axioms:  
Conjoined with this [nuclear faddishness] is the great popularity of the power-
political abstractions of Pierre Gallois. … for example, the assurance of many 
American writers in the late 1950s that the United States could never rationally go 
to World War III in defense of Europe. Late in 1968 one Indian government 
official after another could be found commenting in almost identical terms that 
“no nation ever helps another except out of its own selfish interest;” that is, the 
United States would never retaliate against anyone that dropped a nuclear 
explosive on New Delhi.855 
The impossibility of a non-use pledge because of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 
reluctance to sacrifice nuclear options in Vietnam and Korea, and negative assurances 
because of nuclear emplacements in Central Europe, winnowed the inducements of 
which U.S. diplomats could avail themselves to secure India’s signature, especially since 
Indira Gandhi and Vikram Sarabhai had already repulsed Canadian threats to cut off 
economic and military assistance. The Indian delegate to the ENDC declared on 
February 27 that the “urge to seek greater security … by acquiring nuclear weapons 
cannot be curbed by a prohibition applied only to those that do not already possess 
them.” His ensuing criticisms of nearly every article and clause of the draft treaty made 
“clear where exactly India st[ood].”856 The Indian representative was “instructed not to 
take a stand on the draft treaty for the time being;” nonetheless, his call to “impose equal 
obligations on all” was hard to reconcile with an immanently discriminatory compact.857  
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The Indian broadside echoed the mounting discontent of various non-aligned 
states as well as Eastern and Western bloc members. De Chalvron reported that 
encounters with various emissaries in the hallway, including officials from Sweden, Brazil, 
and West Germany, disclosed “irritation at Soviet-American collusion.” The Romanian 
emissary, for instance, complained that recent developments belied the committee’s 
mandate to “deal with disarmament.”858 The frequent Romanian diatribes against the 
treaty led Foster to characterize the negotiations as “an innocent bystander in the 
fraternal battle” between the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. Brazil’s attitude was also 
enigmatic, although Foster, now returned to Geneva, “felt somewhat better about the 
reaction of our Southern hemispheric colleague.”859 Meanwhile, West German diplomats 
applied constant pressure on U.S. officials to shorten the treaty’s duration, institutionalize 
review conferences, harmonize regional and international safeguards, add security 
guarantees, and mandate disarmament steps. Foster claimed that he did not intend to 
renegotiate these matters with Roshchin; however, Bonn held out hope that Washington 
might wring some “improvements” out of Moscow. Indeed, Foster was curious on March 
1 about the “response from our friends from the East as to [their] acceptance of certain 
suggested changes.”860 The political rifts in the communist bloc were undeniable once 
Bucharest refused to join six fellow communist governments in signing the Sofia 
declaration in support of the treaty’s prompt conclusion. Romania’s rebelliousness 
seemed an offshoot of positioning itself betwixt Moscow and Beijing in the Sino-Soviet 
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split. On March 11, just days before the United Nations deadline, the Romanian envoy 
advanced a proposal for eleven burdensome amendments in an attempt to throw a 
wrench in the whole negotiating works. 
The draft treaty came through two months of frenetic debate in Geneva (the 
plenary met everyday toward the end) with a few revisions and a new initiative to develop 
security guarantees under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council. In response 
to nuclear have-nots, Foster and Roshchin presented a revised text on March 11 that 
incorporated most of Myrdal’s amendments. It mandated quinquennial conferences to 
review compliance with the body and preamble of the treaty, added a statement in the 
preamble favoring a CTBT, and reworded Article VI to read: 
Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effectives measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early 
date, and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.861 
The new language formalized the significance of expeditious action in the disarmament 
field to the treaty’s future legitimacy as well as the particular gravity of further nuclear 
prohibitions. These changes met the concerns of Sweden and other pro-treaty, non-
aligned states as well as the wishes of Italy and West Germany for more “flexibility.”  
The revised language nevertheless failed to address the demands of potential 
irreconcilables, such as India and Brazil, whose grievances bore on PNEs and security 
assurances. The co-chairmen refused to inscribe a stricter definition of nuclear weapons 
akin to that outlined by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. On March 7, however, the three nuclear 
powers represented in Geneva advanced a new way of resolving the security dilemma 
inherent to the treaty. The proposal called for a United Nations Security Council 
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resolution that would vest in that body the duty and authority to take “immediate action” 
on behalf of a signatory facing a nuclear threat or attack.862 This would of course 
necessitate France assuming the same obligation as a permanent member of the council. 
At an afternoon press conference, Foster suggested that even though a “procedural 
debate” might occur before the council authorized the use of force, Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter sanctioned individual or collective action to defend a member state from 
aggression or a “threat of aggression,” a term that originated in nuclear strategy rather 
than the charter’s actual text. The primary object was to convince New Delhi that a 
nonproliferation regime was in its best interests. U.S. authorities also hoped that “if China 
altered its point of view in regards to the U.N. … it could easily accept the resolution’s 
tenor.”863 Alas, these two objectives were badly mismatched since the People’s Republic 
would not abjure its right to a seat on the Security Council and remained the sole nuclear 
threat to the Republic of India. Foster nevertheless declared that he had “not conceded 
that India [would] not sign the nonproliferation treaty.”864 
 The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament agreed to report the new draft 
to the General Assembly on March 14. However, the draft treaty failed to garner a 
majority of votes in the plenary to endorse it, let alone the unanimity needed to bestow 
the committee’s imprimatur on the document. Brazil, India, and Romania even abstained 
on the seemingly innocuous question of whether to report the draft treaty to the United 
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Nations General Assembly. In all, eleven delegations voted against affixing the seal of 
committee approval. Only Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, and Poland (the 
superpowers’ closest allies) joined the superpowers in voting in favor. The Romanian 
refusal to sign the Sofia declaration was especially “unprecedented,” compelling Moscow 
to vent its spleen at Bucharest in Ivestiya and Pravda.865 Following the votes, de Chalvron 
found the Brazilian delegate ambivalent and the Indian envoy malcontent. He concluded 
that the have-nots would press to rework the treaty in New York City since the co-
chairmen had failed to alleviate fully their concerns in Geneva.866  
The committee report included two annexes: a draft nonproliferation treaty and a 
draft assurances resolution. In his departure statement, Foster characterized the latter as 
“a step of major historical significance.”867 The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
concurred albeit on different grounds. The Bureau of Political Affairs in the Quai 
d’Orsay scrutinized the proposed resolution’s implications for international jurisprudence, 
singling out the reference to “threats of aggression” as signifying a foreboding new 
element for the U.N. Charter: 
It could be dangerous to incorporate the “threat of aggression” with “aggression” 
as grounds for recourse to action by the nuclear powers. One thus risks in fact 
justifying the initiation of a preventive war. One could believe that it was for this 
reason that the Charter’s authors eliminated this concept.868  
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The evaluation suggested moving the reference to Article 51 from the legal apparatus to 
the preamble to avoid a reading subject to future abuse. It also challenged the value of 
establishing a new category of state—“permanent members of the Security Council 
possessing nuclear armaments”—that left out Communist China. In sum, the report 
concluded, the resolution would afford nuclear have-nots with little extra security because 
the “Anglo-Saxons and Soviets” would retain “freedom of action as far as what measures 
they choose to adopt.” Notwithstanding these reservations with the resolution, the author 
counseled that France abstain when it came to a vote, even though inaction would not 
prevent its passage.869 With states lacking nuclear weapons “unable to hide their 
disillusionment with a treaty whose discriminatory character was ever more apparent,” 
the French were stuck between a rock and a hard place. Romania and Japan had already 
asked French diplomats if their government would address the UNGA on the matter.870 
A memorandum to French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville equivocated: 
The juridical reasons are there to fight against a project that, in its letter if not its 
spirit, constitutes a revision of the Charter: it discriminates among non-nuclears to 
the advantage of treaty signatories; it hierarchizes forms of aggression and 
introduces the ambiguous concept of “threat of aggression;” it distinguishes 
among the permanent members those which possess nuclear arms and invests 
thereby the present situation with an anti-Chinese character that Beijing does not 
fail to note. Finally, it departs from the established jurisdiction of the Security 
Council, whose decisions have always applied to specific problems.871   
To veto a resolution whose “practical consequences for us” were nil was nonetheless 
“inconvenient” since Paris had nothing to offer in recompense. With talks entering their 
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final chapter in New York City, however, the “great Power unanimity” principle 
enshrined in the United Nations Charter empowered de Gaulle to determine the fate of 
the fledgling new global order. 
 
End Game 
The nonproliferation treaty’s submission before a special session of the United 
Nations General Assembly represented an opportunity and a danger. The world 
parliament’s approval was indispensable for the treaty to have lasting legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, the cosmopolitan and often cacophonous atmosphere of the 124-nation 
gathering, where matters relating to South African sovereignty over South West Africa 
festered, posed a challenge to international nuclear diplomacy that Washington in 
particular had thus far striven to avoid—opening the deliberations to the entire 
“international community.” Whereas in Geneva the diplomatic community and the 
ENDC’s intimacy helped to soften disagreements and thereby foster consensus, the failure 
of the U.N. Disarmament Committee in 1966 testified to a general debate’s drawbacks. 
The concept of nuclear nonproliferation had elicited wide approval from the Irish 
Resolution of 1958, the Indian proposal of 1964, and the joint draft treaty unveiled that 
January. Though the mostly “non-nuclear” states of the world would find it hard “to 
repudiate the approval they had always given in principal to the quest” to end nuclear 
spread, the possibility of a negative or inconclusive outcome was quite real.872  
The prospect of a French veto was not lost on Foster, who expressed to French 
Ambassador Charles Lucet in Washington on March 27 that he hoped “France would 
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not veto the proposal when the Security Council deliberated.”873 Lucet assured him that 
France’s policy of abstention and neutrality still obtained; however, in fact, the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in the midst of a review. The Bureau of Political Affairs 
again challenged whether a “menace of aggression by means of nuclear weapons” 
signified “a qualitatively new situation,” and lambasted the measure’s toothlessness, its 
anti-Chinese tenor, and its discriminatory nature. In a refinement of earlier fears of 
legitimating “preventive war,” the analysis warned against classifying states as licensed or 
unlicensed nuclear powers and then conferring upon the Security Council and its 
nuclear-armed members the power to enforce their “respective positions in the nuclear 
pecking order.”874 In short, the resolution might make nuclear-armed permanent 
members of the Security Council the world’s policemen. The report nonetheless 
counseled that France should not use its veto. The reasoning was doctrinal. Mexico had 
asked France and the remaining nuclear powers to sign Protocol II of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco barring use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against signatories. To employ 
the veto would oblige France “to explain its policy” of uninhibited nuclear-weapon use to 
counterbalance its weakness in conventional forces “unless we are ready on this point as it 
concerns us to fulfill the wishes of the (“vast majority”) of nuclear have-nots … in the 
direction of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.”875 Other considerations abounded 
as well, most disturbingly the triumph of “a common Soviet-American quest in spite of 
the world’s vicissitudes to place global stability under their dual mandate:” 
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It is the aspect conferred on the whole affair by the two greatest nuclear powers 
that constitutes the principal reason for French reserve. We refused in effect to 
participate in a venture that, while not representing a real disarmament measure, 
seeks to establish for the benefit of the two biggest powers a regime consolidating 
their nuclear monopolies and legalizing discrimination among states.876  
Unwilling to abet a Soviet-American entente yet unable to make a viable counteroffer, or 
draw the ire of nuclear have-nots, for now Paris maintained that policy of reserve.  
 The climate of opinion among the near-nuclear states felt inhospitable. Between 
March 15, when the ENDC adjourned, and April 24, when the UNGA was set to 
convene, U.S. and Soviet representatives struggled to address their concerns and, failing 
that, to convince them not to interfere. On the day the ENDC commended the draft 
treaty, Indira Gandhi proclaimed her government’s dissatisfaction and unwillingness to 
sign.877 The attitude of Indian AEC Chairman Sarabhai appeared somewhat warmer in 
early April. He informed a U.S. AEC official that Indian assent might be forthcoming if 
the superpowers froze their nuclear assets, orchestrated a comprehensive test ban, 
permitted either “all nations … to design and manufacture PNEs, or none,” and made 
security assurances into a veritable extended deterrent because in the event of hostilities 
between nuclear haves and have-nots the “threat of use of nuclear weapons [was] 
implicit.”878 Elsewhere on the subcontinent a Japanese ambassador confirmed that 
Pakistan “would definitely not sign the Treaty unless India did.”879  
Brazil focused its diplomatic energies on preserving rights to peaceful nuclear 
explosions. Members of the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations continued to request 
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a strict definition of nuclear weapons akin to that in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and 
consonant with the Costa e Silva administration’s desire to pursue PNEs for massive 
earthworks and for hedging its nuclear bets by acquiring a world-class program. 
Postcolonial resentments colored Brazilian official’s language in diplomatic conversations 
and ministerial deliberations. Ambassador João Augusto de Araújo Castro, Brazil’s 
representative in the ENDC, the U.N., and the U.S., condemned the treaty’s embargo of 
PNEs as symptomatic of a “leonine” treaty (a French juridical term for “unconscionable 
contract”) in which the U.S. had taken the “lion’s share.” He denounced the treaty “as an 
instrument of North American imperialism in the atomic domain.”880 U.S. diplomats 
were leaning on Latin American governments on account of their collective sway in the 
UNGA, of whose 121 states, 25 hailed from the region. Alas, Brasília’s attitude had only 
hardened. Magalhães Pinto informed the U.S. Ambassador in Brasília on April 16 that 
his government would not sign the current draft treaty. The U.S. ally was even prepared 
to inveigh against it in New York City. Foggy Bottom inferred from the nationalistic 
sentiment on the Brazilian street that the NPT signified “an affront to Brazilian 
sovereignty” militating against compromise. More distressing, Magalhães Pinto was 
convinced that Brazil had enough support among have-nots to thwart the treaty or, at 
worst, shrink the majority to the point of illegitimacy.881  
Even the Federal Republic balked at the idea of joining the treaty. Foster reported 
that Bonn was “exploring every option to defer the debate till better days” (most likely 
after the Conference of Non-Nuclear States) and to that end West German observers 
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sounded out African delegates in New York City.882 Kiesinger’s coalition was still riven by 
internal discord and its emissaries conveyed a banquet of discontents about the course of 
negotiations. The treaty might pave the way for the denuclearized Central Europe 
envisaged by the Rapacki Plan.883 It could weaken West Germany’s position in the 
Nuclear Planning Group. It could impair Euratom’s operations. Bonn continued to 
petition Paris to involve itself on that last score. Schnippenkoetter explained to McGhee 
in Bonn that “a well-prepared signature debate in the Bundestag” was vital to averting a 
“disastrous” internecine battle between Strauss’s Christian Social Union and Brandt’s 
Social Democratic Party.884 Kiesinger in all likelihood simply wished that the treaty 
would go away.  
The views of other U.S. allies were equally foggy. Since Tel Aviv had shown a 
“favorable but passive attitude toward the NPT,” Rusk appealed to Johnson to send a 
presidential letter to Levi Eshkol urging the Israeli prime minister to endorse the treaty in 
the General Assembly and then sign the accord. But the president opted not to send a 
personal missive; instead, the overture was made at the ministerial level.885 There were 
also rumors that Israel wanted a quid pro quo from the U.S.S.R. In exchange for its 
signature, Tel Aviv had reported asked that the Soviet Embassy, closed since the Six Day 
War, reopen as a symbol of Moscow’s recognition of Israel’s right to exist.886 Even 
Australian leaders articulated “a battery of reservations about the non-proliferation 
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treaty.” In Canberra, Prime Minister John Gorton’s skepticism, which “almost sounded 
like de Gaulle,” took Rusk aback.887 The temptation of advanced nuclear states to 
develop threshold capabilities was evident in Australia, where members of the Atomic 
Energy Commission feared that constraints on advanced work such as uranium 
enrichment would impair “their ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon … on very 
short notice.”888 With a staunch U.S. ally taking such a “cautious and reserved view” of 
the forthcoming deliberations, the treaty’s fate seemed to hinge on dispelling the 
misgivings of various skeptical governments.889  
The tide of negative opinion impelled Washington and Moscow to maintain a 
common front. Johnson’s announcement on March 30 that he would not stand for 
reelection amid plummeting domestic support after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam had an 
equivocal effect on U.S. nuclear diplomacy. On the one hand, it jeopardized the 
coherence and continuity of U.S. policy after Johnson’s term in office ended. On the 
other hand, Johnson’s legacy was now fully bound up in the fate of his signature peace 
initiative. With the special UNGA session looming, U.S. Disarmament Agency and State 
Department functionaries set guidelines for tactics and strategy. Prior experience 
indicated that smaller states afforded their permanent UN representatives substantial 
leeway, which resulted in regional voting patterns. A policy workshop singled out the 
assistance of key states such as Canada, Japan, Mexico, Ethiopia, and the U.A.R (whose 
Ismail Fahmy would serve as the Political Committee’s president) as critical to isolating 
the “few near-nuclears from [the] overwhelming majority [of] countries having no 
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prospect of developing nuclear weapons,” whose security the nonproliferation treaty 
would enhance. Soviet emissaries were expected to make inroads with their friends in the 
non-aligned bloc and Soviet adherence to Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco might 
win Mexico’s support, always a bellwether of the critical Latin American vote. An 
affirmative Security Council vote on assurances could for its part facilitate a positive 
referendum on the NPT. Washington could stomach minor amendments of a hortatory 
nature, but it was hoped that the importance ascribed to Soviet-American détente by the 
international community would allow the superpowers to keep their roles as maestros.890  
The Soviets were pressing their Warsaw Pact allies to back their pro-treaty stance. 
The Romanian, Yugoslavian, and Soviet mission secretaries sat down in New York City 
to discuss the treaty before the UNGA session. The Romanian attendee relayed 
Bucharest’s continued belief that the treaty was improvable and cast doubts on whether 
key states, such as India, Pakistan, Japan, Israel, or Egypt would adhere. Yugoslavia’s 
attitude was vital to Soviet outreach to neutral states in light of Belgrade’s leadership 
position in the non-aligned movement. Its secretary commiserated with Soviet “haste” to 
open the treaty for signature before U.S. elections given that “the majority of the so-
called near-nuclear states [were] Western countries.” According to the Soviet 
interlocutor, Gennady Stashevsky, Washington’s fear of “being drawn into a nuclear 
conflict” and Johnson’s desire “to occupy a place in history by signing the treaty” ensured 
U.S. fidelity to the NPT and the concept of nonproliferation more broadly. Concurrent 
discussions about the status of South African claims in South West Africa would 
complicate debate in the Political Committee. Already, various African countries worked 
to forge a link between that issue and their positions on the treaty. Facing such obstacles, 
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Stashevsky enjoined his Yugoslavian counterpart for Bucharest not to remain indifferent 
but “rather assist them in persuading the non-aligned countries.”891 García Robles had 
intimated to Soviet ambassador Vladimir Kuznetsov at the United Nations that Mexican 
support might only prove forthcoming if the U.S.S.R. signed Protocol II.892 Given that 
Moscow was reticent to commit itself to a non-use pledge, the Soviet delegation could use 
all the assistance that it could muster.  
The Political Committee began discussing the draft nonproliferation treaty on 
April 26, when U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg and Soviet Ambassador Vladimir 
Kuznetsov gave speeches explaining and espousing the draft treaty. Though assembly 
members were struck by the newfound harmony in the Soviet and American 
performances (one joked that “the only thing they didn’t do was hold hands”), a 
meaningful and lasting note of discord rang out in the speeches.893 Goldberg highlighted 
the treaty’s “three major purposes.” First, it would reduce the likelihood of nuclear 
weapons spreading to new states and thereby increasing the risks of atomic conflict. 
Second, a regime centered on the IAEA would promote fair and equitable access “to the 
peaceful blessings of nuclear energy.” Third, the compact’s letter and spirit enjoined all 
countries to advance toward nuclear and general and complete disarmament. On the last 
point, Goldberg singled out the periodic review conferences as the primary means of 
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enforcement.894 He depicted the compact’s legitimacy as connected inextricably to 
further arms control and disarmament:  
My country believes that the permanent viability of this treaty will depend in large 
measure on our success in the further negotiations contemplated by Article VI. … 
Following the conclusion of this treaty, my government will, in the spirit of Article 
VI … pursue further disarmament negotiations with redoubled zeal and hope and 
with promptness.895  
Though his speech was regrettably tarnished by an ill-timed and large U.S. underground 
nuclear test in Nevada that same day, the U.S. ambassador presented the treaty as resting 
on a foundation of three coequal pillars. Kuznetsov, by contrast, underscored “[t]he 
uppermost and in our opinion the predominant feature of the draft,” which he described 
as “closing all channels, both direct and indirect, leading to the possession of mass 
destruction weapons.” Kuznetsov’s emphasis on nonproliferation reflected the Soviet’s 
chief intent in keeping such weapons out of German hands. Goldberg’s tripartite 
rendering, on the other hand, was sketched for the multinational audience of the United 
Nations General Assembly hall. It framed the treaty as the result of multilateral talks—
“the creation of all nations, large and small.”896 These two interpretations—the 
nonproliferation treaty as a grand bargain or as chiefly an instrument to stem the nuclear 
tide—would henceforth dominate thinking and discussion about the treaty’s founding 
principles. 
 Concordant Soviet and American views were a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a treaty’s success though. The irreconcilables were casting about for a viable 
plurality with which to disrupt the proceedings in hopes of delaying matters until the 
Conference of Non-Nuclear States met. The Indian deputy representative informed a 
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member of the French delegations that his country would not sign the treaty as drafted 
nor support the Security Council resolution. “All their sympathy rested with the French 
position,” but they would not intervene so as “not to upset openly the United States and 
the Soviet Union.” They were nonetheless taking the temperature of nuclear have-nots to 
ascertain whether a postponement of the vote was possible. A Brazilian official had 
apprised the deputy that “besides his country, Chile and Argentina would also support 
this solution.” The Indian delegation now waited to see if a general movement would take 
shape with “the attitude of African countries still undecided.”897  
Rusk, Seaborg, and Foster met with Brazilian ambassadors Araújo Castro and 
Sette Camara and Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto on May 6 to try and quiet criticisms 
relating to PNEs in particular. Araújo Castro divulged that the Brazilian National 
Security Council’s unwillingness “to be put under a technological freeze for 25 years” 
ruled out its support. He was equally frank in regards to the climate of opinion in the 
UNGA, where, according to him, Brazil, India, and others had failed to marshal the 
numbers needed to thwart the treaty: 
He had no doubt that the present draft would be carried by a wide majority of the 
[UN]GA. At the same time there was no enthusiasm for the project at the 
[UN]GA. But there was no organized resistance to it. It was generally recognized 
that we have no room for significant concessions.898 
García Robles apparently thought otherwise and kept trying to “blackmail” Moscow into 
signing Protocol II, while also formulating new amendments together with the 
Scandinavian delegations.899 And indeed there was some flexibility in the U.S. position. 
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The Brazilians criticized the decision to have the draft resolution “endorse” rather than 
“commend” the treaty as well as the absence of non-use guarantees in the assurance 
resolution. Though Rusk and Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford believed that such an 
inclusion would not lessen the credibility of the extended U.S. deterrent, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff cautioned against setting a “precedent that could lead to further restrictions on 
U.S. nuclear options.” For now, however, the chief policymakers deferred a final decision 
to include a non-use pledge in the assurance formula.900  
France’s tacit acquiescence buoyed the resolution’s chances while non-aligned 
indifference buffeted them. On Thursday, May 2, French Ambassador Berard 
proclaimed that even though France “would not sign the nonproliferation treaty, in the 
future it would comport itself in that domain exactly as those states that chose to adhere 
to it.”901 At that time, Soviet and U.S. delegates continued to maintain that amendments 
were unnecessary and unworkable. By the next week, however, they had begun to float 
the possibility of amendments to bolster support among the non-aligned states in fear of a 
vote for adjournment after they encountered stiffer than anticipated resistance from 
African, Latin American, and Asian delegations.902 Egyptian committee president Fahmy 
announced on May 6 that his government would co-sponsor a revised draft resolution to 
endorse the treaty, which incorporated a seemingly minor, but nonetheless consequential, 
deletion for which the Italian representative had asked. Egyptian Ambassador Mohamed 
Awad el Kony confided to Berard that Cairo had taken the decision “under strong 
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pressure from Moscow.”903 And according to the Romanian deputy representative, the 
co-sponsorship was bought with Soviet assurances regarding Israeli’s attitude toward the 
treaty.904 By deleting a reference to the treaty text drafted and submitted by the ENDC, 
and winning over the support of the Egyptian delegation, the revised resolution could 
“open [the] floodgates” to treaty amendments, either helping or wrecking the resolution’s 
passage.905  
The Latin American and African groupings with 24 and 32 countries, 
respectively, constituted the most important voting blocs in the United Nations General 
Assembly. Alone, they counted almost half the delegations among their members, and 
together with the Western and Eastern bloc more than two-thirds of the available plenary 
vote. Courting these two groups was thus part and parcel of the superpowers’ strategy of 
isolating near-nuclear powers, including India, whose plenipotentiary had repudiated the 
draft treaty on May 14 because it “fossilize[d] and legitimate[d] the status quo.”906 There 
were two obstacles to their support. Brazil had made clear that neither it, nor Argentina, 
nor Chile, would vote in favor. This made Mexico the key to the other 20 states of Latin 
America. García Robles continued to press his Soviet counterparts to sign Protocol II and 
worked with Scandinavian delegations to push for new amendments that would yield a 
more equitable balance of obligations and rights. In an address to the Political Committee 
on May 16, he tabled a preambular reference to the U.N. Charter’s principle of peaceful 
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conflict resolution, an expansion of Article IV to guarantee rights to equipment and 
material, a provision in Article V that negotiations to form an international PNE service 
occur “as soon as possible,” and a strengthening of Article VI to specify the cessation of 
nuclear weapons’ “manufacture and perfection.” He held the line on a liberal definition 
of nuclear weapons prohibiting indigenous development of PNEs; nonetheless, the U.S. 
clung to control over the course of proceedings. To counter his efforts, Washington 
ordered the U.S. mission in New York City to “hold [the] common front” with their 
Soviet counterparts lest García Robles “open the floodgates” to a new torrent of 
amendments.907  
Ironically, the African bloc was simultaneously the least threatened by nuclear 
proliferation and the largest key to the treaty’s fate. An address by the Ghanaian 
ambassador in which he decried the draft treaty for not combatting vertical proliferation 
and for contradicting the Treaty of Tlatelolco in regards to PNEs spooked Western 
observers.908 However, the majority of African states and particularly those of central and 
southern Africa were more intent on wringing concessions out of the U.S. and its allies to 
censure and punish South Africa for its interference in South West African affairs. 
Disarmament Agency and State Department authorities were not deluded; amendments 
might prove necessary. For now, nonetheless, they would await the Political Committee 
vote before countenancing revisions in the General Assembly. 
Perversely, it was the U.S. Secretary of State who came nearest to opening the 
treaty up for debate and in the process nearly triggered a major crisis of U.S. nuclear 
diplomacy. In response to Bonn’s vocal opposition, Rusk reportedly told Bundestag 
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deputy and nonproliferation specialist Kurt Birrenbach that, facing an unmanageable 
number of abstentions, Washington would submit the draft treaty to the ENDC for 
further study. Birrenbach was a moderate among West German policymakers and the 
prospect of the NPT’s 25-year time span outlasting the end of the NATO alliance 
concerned him. The following day, Foster received a record of the conversation. He 
rushed to demand that Rusk immediately and categorically retract his statement and 
threatened to resign in the middle of the debate in New York City if Rusk failed to do so. 
French Ambassador Charles Lucet recounted the ensuing sequence of events: 
In an unprecedented gesture, Rusk wrote the West German charge d’affaires, in 
Knappstein’s absence (the West German ambassador to the U.S.) who was in 
Bonn amid consultations, to tell him that having misunderstood the dossier, he 
had led Birrenbach in error and that in fact the U.S. position had not changed.909  
Bonn found the episode disagreeable; Lucet surmised that Vietnam had overwhelmed 
Rusk and he had badly misjudged the state of negotiations in New York City, where 
Foster and Roshchin were still confident of success. To allay Birrenbach’s anxiety, 
Washington pledged to reaffirm its NATO allegiance when it signed the treaty.910 
Rusk and Foster’s row was an exception to a pattern of “close collaboration” 
between Soviet and American leaders.911 Rusk met with Soviet Ambassador Kuznetsov 
on May 17 to discuss the state of play. Their attitudes toward amendments were evolving 
in tandem, though Rusk was comparatively more amenable. The two sides would brook 
cosmetic changes that could secure “significantly wider adherence.” The Africans and 
Latin Americans, along with France, evoked the most apprehension and Kuznetsov urged 
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Rusk to “make good use of [U.S.] bargaining power.” Ghana, Tanzania, and Kenya led 
the African resistance and Kuznetsov saw two ways to win them over. First, Pretoria’s 
vote was crucial “in swinging the entire African vote.” Second, African ministers had 
resolved at a recent Afro-Asian meeting to link their support to demands relating to South 
West Africa. Francophone Africans’ support was especially suspect, though Kuznetsov 
believed that the French favored the treaty and would sway their former colonies. As for 
Latin America, he asked for “U.S. help,” especially with García Robles, whom Rusk 
characterized as “more Mexican than the Mexicans” in his quest to nudge the treaty 
toward the traditional tenets of internationalism. The Soviets had qualms with García 
Robles’s proposed changes, especially references to the Treaty of Tlatelolco in the 
resolution and treaty. Moscow was still loath to endorse its non-use protocol and its strict 
definition of nuclear weapons.912   
The friendlier tenor of Soviet-American relations was evident when conversation 
turned to West Germany. Schnippenkoetter had circulated a memorandum the week 
before lobbying for concrete disarmament steps and had reportedly encouraged other 
delegations to offer amendments.913 Kuznetsov gainsaid his action as engendering 
“uncertainty and doubt about the NPT.” Rusk “offer[ed] the Soviet some advice” and 
warned against applying undue pressure on West Germany in view of the political fissures 
in Bonn. With powerbrokers such as Birrenbach “troubled,” Kiesinger and Brandt 
wanted domestic cover to dispel the appearance of bending to Soviet pressure. The final 
matter for which there was “considerable dissatisfaction at the U.N.” was security 
assurances, which nettled Japan and India in particular, since China’s feat had most 
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directly threatened their security. Rusk identified two interrelated considerations as 
militating against bolstering the assurances resolution: his government’s reluctance to 
assume new military commitments, and, relatedly, an overriding desire to avoid any new 
points of friction or uncertainty relative to Soviet nuclear forces. The United States had 
“enough allies as it [was].”914 Rusk’s comment may have had more than one meaning 
given that Japan and Italy had called for nuclear non-use pledges and access to nuclear 
fuel, respectively, that very day.915  
Soviet-American agreement still fell apart on questions of nuclear doctrine. Foster 
and Goldberg wanted discretion at the U.N. to outline a U.S. non-use formula if the 
Soviets once again invoked the Kosygin proposal, or if the drift of debate turned non-use 
into an unavoidable topic. Before the Political Committee reconvened, Foster, Goldberg, 
and Clifford requested presidential authorization to note the country’s intent “to refrain 
from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons State, Party 
to the NPT treaty, that is not engaged in an armed attack assisted by a nuclear-weapon 
State.”916 However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took issue because they feared such an 
assurance would dilute U.S. nuclear credibility, limit military options in case of conflict, 
and set a precedent for more prohibitions.917 Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs John Leddy advised Rusk to rebuff the proposal for now, but reserve the right to 
choose the circumstances under which the U.S. would enunciate its non-use formula 
publically. Perhaps more momentous, however, was the readiness of the United States to 
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declare at the height of the Vietnam War a tacit policy of eschewing the use of nuclear 
weapons against nuclear have-nots. 
With new assurances off the table, Soviet and American delegations in the United 
Nations relied on shrewd bargaining and their political influence to ensure that 
affirmative resolutions passed the Political Committee and the General Assembly with 
ample majorities. The acceptance of non-aligned, non-nuclear-weapon states hinged on 
the credibility with which the superpowers could cast the treaty as a multinational 
artifact, the expected adherence of key regional powers, such as Japan, Israel and South 
Africa (Indian and Brazilian intransigence was widely known), and the apparent integrity 
of Article VI. On the final count, Foster and Rusk urged Johnson to jumpstart Soviet-
American strategic arms limitation talks.918 On May 2, the president sent a letter to 
Kosygin proposing to announce bilateral talks “to limit strategic offensive and defense 
missiles” at the General Assembly so as “to ensure the successful completion of work on 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”919 Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin relayed that his 
government would vote for the resolution, which secured the positive attitudes of the 
Arab countries; however, Tel Aviv did not want to fully “remove the question mark from 
this issue.” Rabin confessed that the possibility of an Israeli bomb furnished leverage in 
the peace negotiations.920 In truth, Israel’s promise not to be the first to introduce nuclear 
weapons in the region obfuscated their intention to build an atomic arsenal in secret.921 
Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki meanwhile declined co-sponsoring the resolution 
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for fear of furnishing the treaty’s domestic opponents with extra ammunition.922 Pretoria’s 
outlook was of particular consequence since the State Department was unwilling to satisfy 
postcolonial African states’ demands for a political quid pro quo. In exchange for their 
support, they wanted the next session of the General Assembly to discuss South Africa’s 
continued control over South West Africa in defiance of its mandate’s termination in 
1966.923  
On May 28, Goldberg and Kuznetsov permitted two significant revisions of the 
draft resolution. First, rather than endorse the treaty, the resolution would merely 
commend it, thereby avoiding the impression that affirmative votes signaled the intents of 
those states voting yes to sign the treaty. Second, the resolution noted the assembly’s 
appreciation of the ENDC’s efforts rather than promoting its work unconditionally, 
which opened a procedural pathway for new amendments.924 Three days later, the Soviet 
and U.S. ambassadors tabled a new draft treaty that incorporated most of García Robles’ 
proposed alterations. The preamble reaffirmed the UN Charter’s injunction against “the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
nation.” Article IV now outlined rights to equipment and materials as well as information 
pertaining to nuclear energy’s peaceful applications. Article V specified that signatories 
would speedily negotiate an agreement to supply PNEs under the auspices of “an 
appropriate international body,” most likely the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
And Foster and Roshchin agreed to change the preambular reference to arms control and 
disarmament to endorse that nuclear powers would negotiate effectives measures “as soon 
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as possible.” French Ambassador Berard observed that the revisions would “dispel the 
reservations of the majority and, at least, those of the Latin American countries.925 
The Soviet and American negotiating teams had come to terms as to which 
amendments they could acquiesce in a contingency plan beforehand, permitting the 
redrafted treaty’s speedy presentation.926 Though García Robles’s intervention was 
crucial in light of the Latin American vote’s importance, Goldberg portrayed the new 
treaty as an embodiment of the efforts and viewpoints of a group of international actors—
Nigeria, Italy, Mexico, Chile, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and Japan—to highlight the “good 
faith and willingness to compromise” that the nuclear powers had displayed. Widespread 
opinion in Turtle Bay nevertheless held that the new draft treaty was primarily devised to 
win over Latin American delegations, twelve of which afterward elected to serve as co-
sponsors. As for African intransigence, U.S. intermediaries had reassured South Africa 
that IAEA oversight would not impair its uranium-mining industry. Pretoria’s 
announcement that it supported the resolution, while reserving a final decision with 
respect to its signature on the treaty, placated most of its neighbors despite their grudges 
against apartheid and South African revanchism.927  
Diplomatic outreach, conciliation, reassurance, and outright badgering by Soviet 
and U.S. representatives were crucial nonetheless. In regards to the turns of events, 
Berard concluded:  
While these concessions are more apparent than real, they have served as a 
pretext for a number of delegations, under intense Soviet and U.S. pressure to join 
the draft resolution, as revised.928 
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The Soviet-American campaign to endow the nonproliferation treaty with lasting 
legitimacy by orchestrating a near consensus at the United Nations culminated with the 
resolution’s approval in the Political Committee on June 10 by a score of 92 votes in favor 
and only 4 against. The pro-treaty forces were relieved. By contrast, in Rio de Janeiro, 
the Brazilian chancellor portrayed the outcome as a victory for anti-treaty forces in view 
of the number of abstentions, questioning whether many countries did not in fact vote in 
favor reflexively.929  
A full plenary of the UNGA nevertheless confirmed the majority two days later 
when 95 countries voted in favor against 4 nays and 21 abstentions. Berard announced 
that although France did not intend to sign the treaty, it would nevertheless comport itself 
like a signatory. President Johnson surprised the United Nations General Assembly with 
his appearance after the vote. He called on the Eighteen Nation Committee on 
Disarmament to forge ahead with “the limitation of strategic offensive and defensive 
nuclear weapons” and then praised an international accord to halt the spread of nuclear 
weapons that “keeps alive and keeps active the impulse toward a safer world.”930  
The Security Council vote was the final puzzle piece, though the success of the 
General Assembly resolution had lowered the stakes. The French attitude was pivotal as 
well as cryptic. Pressure from U.S. and Soviet officials on Francophone African states had 
mounted between the two votes. When the Nigerien representative solicited his opinion, 
Berard counseled that modifying his prior abstention might prove awkward, indicating 
that he was reluctant to actively assist the project.931 Cameroon and Chad would switch 
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their votes along with Costa Rica from abstention to favorable. Foster, Roshchin, 
Goldberg, and Kuznetsov hoped that Berard would likewise abstain in the Security 
Council. Kuznetsov called on the French ambassador after the committee vote to inquire 
after France’s attitude in light of its abstention there. Berard assured him that his 
government indeed maintained its policy of reserve scrupulously, adducing in support of 
French disinterest the favorable votes of Francophone African states in comparison to 
Anglophones, two of which, Tanzania and Zambia, had joined Albania and Cuba in 
disapproval.932  
Afterward, Berard transmitted to Paris a message that he had composed for the 
occasion of the Security Council vote. In it, he reiterated French claims that the 
nonproliferation treaty was not equivalent to disarmament. The return statement written 
by the Quai d’Orsay softened the language by bolting on a more constructive final 
paragraph, which pledged that France was “ready for all initiatives that the other Powers 
would be disposed to accept with her in this domain.933 Kuznetsov called on Berard again 
on June 17 to express his appreciation for France “having done nothing to thwart 
Moscow and Washington’s policies.”934 The two ambassadors then conversed about a 
recent dispute over Berlin transit, the Paris peace talks to negotiate a settlement in 
Vietnam, and the Middle East. Their discussion’s thrust attested to the limitations of the 
détente embodied by the treaty as well as the limits of French independence from Cold 
War politics in Europe: 
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 I told Monseiur Kuznetsov that, as he knew, our positions on the question of 
Vietnam and on that of the Near East were close cousins of those of his 
government. It was not the same for Berlin. We could not accept the measures 
taken by East Germany. We consider them as contrary to agreements and as 
assigning prejudice to rights which we have recognized in Berlin. Those initiatives 
could only accentuate on this matter our solidarity with London and Washington 
and darken our cordial relations that we have been developing with Moscow.935 
Kuznetsov took the reproach in stride, observing that even though there existed technical 
matters on which the superpowers shared interests, “it was with France that the U.S.S.R. 
could hope to realize a constructive politics in the interest of peace.”936 Berard would 
later underscore Kuznetsov’s opinion for the Quai d’Orsay that “fundamental differences 
would persist between the Soviet Union and the United States.”937 
The French decision not to oppose the security assurance resolution assured its 
passage through the Security Council. However, the triumph would prove contested 
given that Algeria, Brazil, Pakistan, and India were present as non-permanent members. 
The resolution’s success in the Security Council would thus set the stage for the debates 
that would habitually attend the post-NPT arc of international nuclear diplomacy. 
Representatives from the pro-treaty observer states (Canada, Denmark, Paraguay, 
Hungary, and Senegal) all endorsed the measure on June 17 with the Paraguayan 
plenipotentiary underscoring the importance that Latin American states attached to 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their satisfaction at the treaty’s revision in that 
direction. Berard reiterated his statement during the General Assembly debate that the 
French nuclear arsenal was intended purely for defensive purposes.938 The following day’s 
debate was livelier. The Indian representative, G. Parthasarathi, had revealed to Berard 
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the previous night that New Delhi had directed him to insist on a vote by paragraph. He 
was instructed to reject the first two sub-paragraphs and the final body paragraph 
referencing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and then to abstain 
relative to the ensemble. When Berard informed Parthasarathi that he could not follow 
his lead on account of the French veto, the Indian emissary then managed to obtain 
authorization from New Delhi overnight to desist from this course so as not “to risk 
dividing the abstentionists.”939 The debate was heated nonetheless. Algeria denounced 
the treaty for isolating the People’s Republic of China. Brazil complained that certain of 
the nuclear powers had yet to adhere to Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Pakistan, 
which was the subject of intense pressure from the U.S. on account of its relative 
amenability, stated its preference for a vote to occur after the Conference of Non-Nuclear 
States and challenged why the term “aggression” was used rather than “use or threat of 
use of nuclear weapons.” He summed up the reservations of numerous states when he 
observed that “declarations of intention” amounted to less than a sure guarantee.  
Finally, Ambassador Parthasarathi admonished the direct linkage between the 
assurances resolution and the nonproliferation treaty, which left those states declining to 
sign and ratify the discriminatory compact seemingly unprotected:940 
The basis for any action by the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security is the Charter of the United Nations. Any linking 
of the security assurances to the signature of a non-proliferation treaty would be 
contrary to its provisions because the Charter does not discriminate between those 
who might adhere to a particular treaty and those who might not do so.941 
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India’s reservations echoed those expressed by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
regards to the potentially dangerous precedents that a nonproliferation treaty and the 
corresponding assurances resolution would set by creating new classes of states, “which 
were not found in the U.N. Charter, and whose application could lead to abuses.” In fact, 
the nonproliferation treaty in conjunction with the security assurance resolution arguably 
established in the law and norms governing the international nuclear arena the notion of 
a rogue state. The United Nations Security Council nonetheless passed resolution 255 
(1968) on June 18 with ten members voting in favor and five abstaining among whose 
numbers France, India, Brazil, Algeria, and Pakistan were counted. Though Goldberg 
and Kuznetsov celebrated the accomplishment as a hopeful sign that U.S.-Soviet détente 
would develop in concert, many key non-aligned states felt alienated by the new global 
nuclear order, which they regarded as insufficiently responsive “to the concerns of 
nuclear have-nots and certainly to those without the benefit of the protection of an 
alliance featuring a nuclear power.942 Chinese Premier Chou En-lai encapsulated the 
sentiment of many in the Global South when he denounced the nonproliferation treaty as 
an attempt to “turn non-nuclear countries into their protectorates and press forward with 
a new type of colonialism – nuclear colonialism.”943 
 
Conclusion 
 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was deposited in 
government archives in Moscow, Washington, and London on July 1, 1968. At the 
ceremony in London at which he signed the compact on behalf of his country, British 
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Prime Minister Harold Wilson acclaimed both the Soviet-American fulcrum and the 
global compass of the accord:  
The Treaty is also proof that in a matter of the highest importance East and West 
can work together towards the common goal of world security. We all know how 
much the Treaty owes to the United States and the Soviet Union, whose 
distinguished representatives have just signed this Treaty. And I pay tribute in 
particular to the tireless work and skilled diplomacy of Mr. Foster and Mr. 
Ros[h]chin, the co-Chairmen of the E.N.D.C., who can be rightly proud of the 
success with which their labours have at last been crowned. … 
Your Excellencies, this is not a Treaty for which just two or three countries are 
responsible. It exists because it reflects and enshrines mankind’s universal and 
fundamental desire for peace and security. Every Government whose 
representative supported the Treaty in the United Nations General Assembly and 
voted for the resolution can feel that it has contributed to the Treaty we are 
signing today; and the many representatives present at this ceremony have the 
special distinction of demonstrating their support for the Treaty by signing it on 
the day that it is opened for signature.”944 
All told, representatives of 57 countries inked their signatures on copies of the treaty in 
the capitals of the three repository governments on that inaugural day. Conspicuously 
absent, though, were the scripts of the key threshold states—Argentina, Brazil, Israel, 
Japan, India, and Australia—whose governments pondered whether denying themselves 
the right to develop the ultimate weapon and its attendant technologies represented a 
prudent or foolhardy choice. As for the United States, its readiness to ratify the treaty 
evaporated when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia less than two months later. 
Though Richard Nixon would not valorize the NPT, his intention to pursue détente with 
the Soviet Union helped to steer the treaty eventually through the U.S. Senate, where it 
was signed in 1969. The nonproliferation treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970, 
when 47 states had deposited their instrument of ratification. 
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The long-awaited joint tabling of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty by Foster and 
Roshchin on January 18 inaugurated a fateful stage of international nuclear diplomacy. 
The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, formulated its non-
acquisition and non-dissemination articles with East-West exigencies in mind. The 
safeguards articles sought to balance the efficacy of execution with the equality of market 
share, while preserving the nuclear dimension of European integration through which 
West Germany hoped to escape its confinement in the stockade of the Cold War. The 
Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament had already left its mark on the treaty text 
in the form of guarantees for provisions of peaceful nuclear science, technology, and 
explosives, as well as “good faith” negotiations to abate and end the superpower arms 
race. The final stage of deliberations in Geneva from January 18 to March 14 
strengthened many of these provisions in small yet meaningful ways. More 
consequentially, the phase of negotiations at last dominated by non-nuclear members had 
embedded procedural mechanisms, most notably periodic review conferences, to review 
the treaty’s legitimacy every five years with regard to whether an equitable balance of 
rights and responsibilities was still being struck.  
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty contained in its articles a set of paradoxes 
that complicated its making and would bedevil its future. Deliberations in the United 
Nations General Assembly and Security Council in late-spring and early-summer 1968 
bore witness to these inner contradictions. Paris kept itself scrupulously detached from the 
proceedings; however, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs contemplated impeding the 
negotiations and vetoing a critical assurances resolution to ward off abuses stemming 
from the establishment of new classes of nation-states based on nuclear status and the 
empowerment of nuclear-armed members of the Security Council to enforce the status 
quo. Soviet and U.S. diplomats encountered greater than anticipted resistance in New 
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York City. Threshold states were loath to abjure the option to write their own nuclear 
policies in response to security conditions and national pride, but the vast majority of 
nuclear have-nots at the United Nations were small powers whose immediate welfare 
relied more on Soviet-American goodwill than unrestricted nuclear choices. The 
superpowers thus succeeded in leveraging the provisional acquiescence of key threshold 
states such as Israel and South Africa to win over Arab and African states. By 
strengthening and clarifying a few key clauses and articles, Foster and Roshchin obtained 
the endorsement of Mexico’s Alfonso García Robles, whose belief in internationalism 
prompted him to regard the treaty as an imperfect yet improvable vessel. García Robles’s 
support in turn unlocked the affirmation of a majority of Latin American states, whose 
interests were primarily tied to peaceful nuclear energy and whose support ensured a 
successful vote in the United Nations Political Committee and General Assembly.  
France chose not to veto the assurances resolution despite its many flaws for 
reasons of prestige and doctrine. The Quay d’Orsay feared upsetting non-aligned opinion 
when it had nothing to offer in return and would find itself forced to justify its action by 
admitting that its nuclear doctrine dictated the unreserved right to employ nuclear 
weapons indiscriminately to offset its conventional weakness in the European theater. 
Better Soviet-American relations proceeded alongside and largely thanks to the 
nonproliferation talks, but the limits of détente were readily apparent in New York City. 
Issues relating to Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Berlin continued to divide them.  
The negotiation and opening for signature of the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons thus signalled the start of a new process rather than the end of the 
Cold War, or of the spread of nuclear weapons. In fact, the making of the NPT 
reinforced the centrality of nuclear weapons to the imagined prestige and status of great 
powers. In a report written in the immediate aftermath of the triumph in Turtle Bay, 
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Richard Rosencrance of the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Council predicted 
that the nascent regime would prove less efficacious than members the U.S. Disarmament 
Agency, among others, had envisaged. States inclined to pursue a military capability 
would still do so, and even states party to the NPT could “develop their peaceful nuclear 
progress to the point where a bomb option [could] be exercised in short order.” The 
challenge of such a “nuclear pregnancy” would demand new instruments of surveillance, 
control, and enforcement not yet integrated into the nonproliferation regime whose 
construction might unsettle the elegant equilibrium cultivated through years of 
observation, dialogue, trust-building, and negotiation.  
An opinion piece in The Times of India by H. R. Vohra exemplified the dilemma 
facing near-nuclears as well as the perplexity of the regime’s architects residing in 
Moscow, London, and Washington, DC: 
India’s position is probably best described as a double denial. India risks denial of 
the protection offered by the three nuclear powers. India also denies itself self-
protection through self-help by creation of its own nuclear deterrent. … Its main 
gain is that it retains a choice, which, it says, it has no intention of using. What 
good an unused choice could do intrigues Western minds.945 
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s order to test a peaceful nuclear explosive would 
not occur for six more years. Even so, the crux of the matter was clear at the dawn of the 
new global nuclear order. What good was an unused choice in a world where nuclear 
power and prohibition were so delicately balanced? 
  
                                                
945 H. R. Vohra, op. cit., “India and Nuclear Security: The West Perplexed,” 12 July 1968. 
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Conclusion | A Cold War Treaty in a Post-Cold War World 
In a interview in 1980, William C. Foster was asked if the word “disarmament” 
should be dropped from the title of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
The interviewer, Ralph Stuart Smith, was himself a veteran of the agency established by 
President John F. Kennedy in 1961 whose list of accomplishments included the 1963 
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), the 1972 SALT I accord with the U.S.S.R., and the ill-starred 1979 
SALT II agreement that foundered after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that 
year. Smith questioned if the term gave the wrong impression because it sounded 
“utopian to a lot of people and causes needless distrust among the military?” Foster 
replied that it was an idea worth considering, “not because I don’t believe in that as an 
ultimate goal that we should work toward, but because the word has come to be 
misunderstood:” Foster confessed that although disarmament was almost unimaginable, 
the United States’ commitment to it was vital in order to reach the less distant ends at 
which the country aimed: 
[W]e have to be concerned about the way people in various parts of the world 
think about the United States. As a purely practical matter, I believe that besides 
projecting a picture of strength, we have to project ourselves to the rest of the 
world as a civilized country, which understands its responsibilities as the world’s 
leading nuclear power. This means that when we have an international obligation, 
we should try to carry it out.” 
His admonition was particularly relevant in regards to the legitimacy of the NPT, “the 
centerpiece of international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons” for whose 
making no individual was more responsible than him.  
During the interview, Foster underscored the importance of achieving a long-
delayed comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) whose negotiation the United States had 
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solemnly vowed to undertake “as expeditiously as possible.” The CTBT opened for 
signature on September 24, 1996, though the United States has still yet to ratify the treaty 
in November 2013. Nevertheless, Foster’s warning retains its gravity. The NPT embodied 
a moment of global ordering orchestrated by the United States and the Soviet Union that 
was underwritten by a fusion of their power and their principles. Tectonic shifts in world 
affairs following the end of the Cold War threaten to crack the foundation of that global 
order and the nonproliferation regime that is its central bulwark against nuclear anarchy.  
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 epitomized the triumph and tragedy of Cold 
War nuclear internationalism. Despite long odds and false starts, the nonproliferation 
regime centering on the International Atomic Energy Agency and its inspectors 
accurately gauged the likelihood of an illegal, clandestine military nuclear program under 
the regime of Saddam Hussein. The original intent of the regime’s safeguards were 
fulfilled as its capabilities and meanings developed over time and in response to new 
challenges. The regime also worked, however, in the sense of its basic premise that United 
Nations Security Council permanent members possessing nuclear weapons had a special 
dispensation to enforce the legitimate nuclear order. Thus far, the blunder of the Iraq 
War has yet to corrode visibly the treaty and regime’s legitimacy. As Foster warned, now 
over thirty years ago, however, its survival may well hinge on whether the United States 
can repair and then sustain its reputation for good faith in the international community.  
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